I replied:

I have no specific information on that point.

That was true as of 1941. It was not true as of today, or as of last week.

I had seen last week, and before I gave this testimony, [2282] a copy of an affidavit from Col. George W. Bicknell, assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in Hawaii, before Colonel Clausen. [2283] In this affidavit Colonel Bicknell says:

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consul, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere.

[2284] The other point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that I fear on rereading my testimony that I have given the impression of complacency on my part and on the part of my Division with regard to these delays in the magic messages. I very deliberately avoided testifying to the technical side of the decoding of these

messages.

(1) Because I am not competent to really go into the technical side of it; and

(2) Because you will have before you a competent officer of the Signal Corps who handled this matter directly.

It was not, of course, my province, but I would like to say we were by no means complacent about it. We knew simply the difficulty of doing this work. Three processes had to be performed. A message had to be deciphered, then it had to be decoded, and then the Japanese had to be translated into English.

I have testified as to what my Division was able to do to aid the Signal Corps in translations. The other two very important and highly technical processes of deciphering and decoding we were not competent to aid in, and I felt sure that those devoted men who spent so much time on it were doing everything they possibly could in the

matter.

Japa

[2285]
It was a marvel-

The astonishing thing, Mr. Chairman, was not that these messages were delayed in the process of translation from nese to English, but that we were able to do it at all. ous piece of work on the part of the highly technical men who handled that extraordinary job of breaking codes and ciphers. [2286] The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, toward the end of your testimony at your last appearance I asked you a question that I would like to

79716-46-pt. 2-31

repeat at this time to connect up with the previous testimony that you have given.

On page 2275 of the record I asked you the question:

General, I understood you to say that for years it had been understood by the Army-I assume that means, of course, the high ranking officers of the Armythat hostilities with Japan would involve an attack on Hawaii, and that a knowledge of the Japanese people caused the anticipation of a surprise attack.

And then I asked you if that is substantially and in essence your statement on that point.

Then you answered:

That the possibility if not the probability of an attack on Hawaii was inherent in a Japanese war. You gentlemen of the Congress appropriated millions of dollars for that fortress. Against whom were you building it?

Then I asked you:

[2287]

at is your

I understand that, but what I am trying to get statement that it had been understood by the Army for years that that was the situation.

And you answered then:

That is correct, sir.

Then I asked you:

Then would it naturally follow that the military commander at Hawaii might reasonably be expected to understand that also?

And your reply then was:

I could certainly say that the four Generals under whom I have had the honor to serve at Hawaii gave me every indication that they understood that situation all right.

Now, that answer, of course, still stands as you gave it there?
General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it does come within your knowledge, then, that the four generals who were in command of the Hawaiian Department during your period of service there understood the situation as you have indicated by the statement you have made here? Senator LUCAS. Did he answer?

the

General MILES. Yes, sir; I can make that absolutely flat statement. I worked under those commanding generals in [2288] preparation of war plans, the revision of war plans and of the defense projects, and I am convinced that all of those four gentlemen, as well as General Drum, who later took command, and when I was here in the War Plans Division, thoroughly understood that that outpost had one sole mission, the defense of the naval base in a Japanese war. The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, as far as you know, that was the understanding by all of those who were in command of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I assume that the whole purpose of all of these war games and similar activities in which the Army engaged from time to time was more or less as a practice to be trained and prepared for the time when the real thing might come, is that true? General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And throughout the years there had been various war games and maneuvers and practices of that kind? General MILES. That is true, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, the results of those war games and practices were reported to the War College and other divisions and branches of the Army for study and preparation, were they not?

[2289] General MILES. Reports were made on the large maneuvers by the Hawaiian Department to the General Staff in Washington. They were usually reviewed by the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Many local maneuvers, war games and exercises were not, as I remember it, reported to Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it was the practice to make use of the experience gained during those war games and practices of that type, wasn't it, for the benefit of our officers of the Army who were not engaged in the particular game at the time.

General MILES. Yes, sir. Our war plans for the defense of Hawaii, the defense project and the war plan itself had been built up during years of study and experience of various maneuvers and exercises. It was a splendid command in which to serve as a G-3, both from the point of training and of operations, because there was but one situation you had to consider and one enemy and all of your experience and the experience of men who had gone before you was all down one path.

General Wells particularly saw that every officer landing in Hawaii, saw to it that every officer landing in Hawaii for duty with the Hawaiian Department, read certain documents on the defense of Hawaii, documents which used for the enemy and everybody knew who "Orange" was. [2290] the term "Orange" as the term The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a part of his duty to do that, wasn't it?

General MILES. That was an order of General Wells, certainly, regarding all officers of all ranks who joined the Hawaiian Department. The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, wasn't it a part of the duty of any officer in command of Hawaii to do that, to be familiar with the experiences gained through these previous war games and maneuvers and experiences of that kind?

General MILES. I would say so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So, then it would be reasonable to assume that it was a part of the duty of any commander in command of the Army forces in Hawaii to familiarize himself with the experience gained through previous war games and maneuvers of that type?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I think that is a correct statement. When I was in the War Plans Division in the middle thirties we went even beyond that and attempted to have ordered to Washington for a short period of duty not only commanding generals going out to Hawaii but their chief staff officers, so that we could have consultations with them on that very point, the existing war plans and the experiences [2291] that were behind those war plans. I remember distinctly General Patton coming to Washington at our request before he went to Hawaii as G-2.

Mr. GESELL. Congressman Cooper, I do not like to interpose but I think the committee should be informed

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I yield with pleasure, of course.

Mr. GESELL (continuing). that General Miles has made available to us this morning the excerpts from the memoranda of General Drum which he referred to in his testimony as relating specifically to the matter that the Congressman is covering in his testimony.

I have one copy of these excerpts here and have just glanced at them. I think they are quite pertinent and I would like to hand them to you or have them put in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, read it at this point.

Mr. GESELL. The reference occurred at pages 2168 and 2169 of the transcript and I think one of the members of the committee or counsel, I forget which, asked General Miles to make available the material that he was referring to in the correspondence of General Drum and that is the reason that it is material to have this come to us at this time.1 The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, read it in at this point. Allow me to inquire, though, before you do that, when was General Drum in command at Hawaii?

[2292]

General MILES. General Drum, as I remember, sir, took command in 1935, I should say about the middle of the year 1935 and I think he was out there 3 years.

The VIRE CHAIRMAN. Three years, is that right?

General MILES. But I am not sure of that. I think 3 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 1935, and that would take him to about 1938? General MILES. And General Herron was in command before General Short.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

General MILES. Perhaps General Drum was there only 2 years. The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed then, Mr. Gesell and read them.

Mr. GESELL. The first is entitled: "Excerpt from memorandum from Major General H. A. Drum, Commander, Hawaiian Department, to the Adjutant General, War Department, dated September 21, 1935: Subject: Defense mission Hawaiian Dept." [Reading:]

Many assumptions are plausible as to an enemy's action against Hawaii. The variable factor relates to the location of our fleet at the time of an emergency or [2293] its success in an encounter with the enemy's main fleet. We can enumerate enemy's possible modes of action as including blockades, air raids, naval raids, landing raids, air attacks, naval attacks, landings in force, local uprisings and sabotage or any combination of these. We can assume with some certainty that local uprisings will occur on all the islands of the territory and that the first enemy hostile action will be attempted as a surprise. With our fleet present in the Pacific and undefeated, hostile external action will probably be limited to air, naval, and land raids combined with local uprisings. Hostile naval success would, no doubt, be followed by a combination of blockade and landing and air operations in force.

Pearl Harbor, with its drydock, its shops, gas and oil tanks, and ammunition storage, and our air installations on Oahu are extremely vulnerable to air attacks. One oriental power is strong enough in surface vessels and aircraft to execute successful air attacks against these objectives unless intercepted in sufficient time and with sufficient strength to defeat the attacks.

The doctrine that the only certain way to defeat an aggressive air force deci sively is to destroy it on its base is sound and is applicable to the defense of [2294] Oahu. To prevent the destruction of or serious damage to our air fields on Oahu and Pearl Harbor by hostile aircraft, carriers must be sunk or driven off before they can launch their aircraft and the enemy must be prevented from establishing air bases on other islands within range.

From either an offensive or defensive viewpoint of our problem, timely information of a hostile approach is essential. The essential factor in this connection is to receive warnings of the approach of hostile air forces in sufficient time to permit our air forces to leave the ground and attack the enemy's carriers before they are within airplane operating radius of our vital installations on Oahu.

Assuming that carrier-based bombardment airplanes have an operating radius of 200 miles and that our bombardment is "in readiness" and loaded with the proper types of bombs—the highest practicable degree of readiness-first infor1 P. 822, supra.

mation of the carriers must be received when they are at least 300 miles from Oahu in order for our bombardment aviation to attack the carriers before they launch their aircraft. Advance notice of greater length of time is desirable. The maintenance of an aerial screen nearly 2,000 miles long requires a large number of airplanes. Economy demands the operation of some of our airplanes from the most distant islands in the Archipelago such as Kauai and Hawaii in order to reduce the time of flight to and from the 300 miles circle.

Now, the other memorandum, if the Congressman wishes me to proceed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, I would like for you to proceed but let us have the date of the one you just read.

Mr. GESELL. That was dated September 21, 1935.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a memorandum of General Drum? Mr. GESELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To the War Department?

Mr. GESELL. To the Adjutant General, War Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. War Department. All right, go ahead.

Mr. GESELL. Now, the next one is an excerpt from the memorandum of Maj. Gen. E. T. Conley, the Adjutant General, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated April 2, 1936.

I take it this is a memorandum going the other way, from the War Department to the Commanding General, dated April 2, 1936.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would be correct, wouldn't it, General? [2296] General MILES. Yes, sir. That was the final answer of the War Department to General Drum's letter of September 1935, which the counsel has just read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was the statement from the War Department to the Army commander at Hawaii?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. This reads:

4. "The need for suitable air fields (on the cutlying islands) as an essential and vital element of the defense plans of the Hawaiian Department."

a. This point concerns our use of outlying air fields in defense, primarily against hostile sea-borne aviation. The enemy's use of such outlying fields would be dependent, as already indicated, upon our ability or inability to deny them to him, and upon his ability to repair the damage done to them by our initial demolition or subsequent air bombardments.

b. In the basic letter (Paragraph 3 b) the point is stressed that the only certain way to defeat an aggressive air force decisively is to destroy it on its bases. From this it is argued that our air forces based on Hawaii and Kauai would be of appreciable advantage in attacking hostile air forces while still on their carriers.

[2297] c. The War Department recognized that the installations at Pearl Harbor are vulnerable to air attack; that the enemy may have sufficient seapower to make such an attack from carriers; that the only certain way to defeat such a hostile air force is to sink or drive off the carriers before they can launch their planes; and, finally, that timely information of a hostile approach would be the essential factor in this problem.

d. The question therefore arises whether our air forces based on Hawaii and Kauai could solve this problem. This appears very doubtful when viewed in the light of the latest information on possible enemy sea-borne air power.

e. Information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence is to the effect that each of the four Orange carriers is capable of a sustained maximum speed for 8 or 10-hour runs of between 25 and 28.5 knots an hour. This would mean that these carriers, during an 8-hour night, could make an approach of between 215 and 245 miles, or in a 10-hour night an approach of between 270 and 305 miles.

f. Furthermore, according to information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, the radius of action of existing Orange carrier-based bombers is 330 miles. [2298] This radius will undoubtedly be materially increased as