The President decides how far a has been superseded by the law of the State, and therefore he not carry its provisions into effect. Now we know, Sir, that Constitution of the United States declares, that that Constitut and all acts of Congress passed in pursuance of it, shall be the preme law of the land, anything in any State law to the contr notwithstanding. This would seem to be a plain case, then, which the law should be executed. It has been solemnly deci to be in actual force, by the highest judicial authority; its executi is demanded for the relief of free citizens, now suffering the pa of unjust and unlawful imprisonment; yet the President refus to execute it. In the case of the Chicago Road, some sessions ago, the Preside approved the bill, but accompanied his approval by a messag law is to be saying how far he deemed it a proper law, and how far, therefor it ought to be carried into execution. enforced. Jackson's theory of his oath to The logical effect of this theory. In the case of the harbor bill of the late session, being applie to by a member of Congress for directions for carrying parts of th law into effect, he declined giving them, and made a distinction between such parts of the law as he should cause to be executed and such as he should not; and his right to make this distinction has been openly maintained by those who habitually defend his measures. Indeed, Sir, these, and other instances of liberties taken with plain statute laws, flow naturally from the principles expressly avowed by the President, under his own hand. In that important document, Sir, upon which it seems to be his fate to stand or fall before the American people, the veto message, he holds the following language: "Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others." Mr. President, the general adoption of the sentiments expressed in this sentence would dissolve our government. It would raise every man's private opinions into a standard for his own conduct; and there certainly is, there can be, no government, where every man is to judge for himself of his own rights and his own obligations. Where every one is his own arbiter, force, and not law, is the governing power. He who may judge for himself, and decide for himself, must execute his own decisions; and this is the law of force. I confess, Sir, it strikes me with astonishment, that so wild, so disorganizing a sentiment should be uttered by a President of the United States. I should think that it must have escaped from its author through want of reflection, or from the habit of little reflection on such subjects, if I could suppose it possible, that on a question exciting so much public attention, and of so much national importance, any such extraordinary doctrine could find its way, through inadvertence, into a formal and solemn public act. Standing as it does, it affirms a proposition which would effectually repeal all constitutional and all legal obligations. The Constitution declares, that every public officer, in the State governments as well as in the general government, shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. This is all. Would it not have cast an air of ridicule on the whole provision, if the Constitution had gone on to add the words, "as he understands it"? What would come nearer to a solemn farce, than to bind a man by oath, and still leave him to be his own interpreter of his own obligations? Sir, those who are to execute the laws have no more a license to construe them for themselves, than those whose only duty is to obey them. Public officers are bound to support the Constitution; private citizens are bound to obey it; and there is no more indulgence granted to the public officer to support the tively interConstitution only as he understands it, than to a private citizen to obey it only as he understands it; and what is true of the Constitution, in this respect, is equally true of any law. Laws are to be executed, and to be obeyed, not as individuals may interpret them but according to public authoritative interpretation and adjudication. The sentiment of the message would abrogate the obligation of the whole criminal code. If every man is to judge of the Constitution and the laws for himself, if he is to obey and support them only as he may say he understands them, a revolution, I think, would take place in the administration of justice; and discussions about the law of treason, murder, and arson should be addressed, The President bound by the Con stitution as authorita The early practice of delivery in person. The origin of the written message. not to the judicial bench, but to those who might stand charged with such offences. The object of discussion should be, if we run out this notion to its natural extent, to enlighten the culprit himself how he ought to understand the law. 76. The Presidential Message The Constitution imposes on the President the duty of giving to Congress from time to time information on the state of the Union, and also of recommending to its consideration such measures as he may think necessary and expedient. It does not prescribe whether this shall be done in person or by written communications. The early practice and the origin of the present custom are thus described by Senator Benton. Under the first two of our Presidents, Washington, and the first Mr. Adams, the course of the British Parliament was followed in answering the address of the President, as the course of the sovereign was followed in delivering it. The Sovereign delivered his address in person to the two assembled Houses, and each answered it: our two first Presidents did the same, and the Houses answered. The purport of the answer was always to express a concurrence, or non-concurrence with the general policy of the government as thus authentically exposed; and the privilege of answering the address laid open the policy of the government to the fullest discussion. The effect of the practice was to lay open the state of the country, and the public policy, to the fullest discussion; and in the character of the answer to decide the question of accord or disaccord of support or opposition-between the representative and the executive branches of the government. The change from the address delivered in person, with its answer, to the message sent by the private secretary, and no answer, was introduced by Mr. Jefferson, and considered a reform; but it was questioned at the time, whether any good would come of it, and whether that would not be done irregularly, in the course of the debates, which otherwise would have been done regularly in the discussion of the address. The administration policy would be sure to be attacked, and irregularly, in the course of business, if the spirit of opposition should not be allowed full indulgence in a general and regular discussion. The attacks would come, and many of Mr. Jefferson's friends thought it better they should come at once, and occupy the first week or two of the session, than to be scattered through the whole session and mixed up with all its business. But the change was made, and has stood, and now any bill or motion is laid hold of, to hang a speech upon, against the measures or policy of an administration. In the following letter, President Jefferson laid before Congress the reasons which led him to abandon the custom of delivering the in person: message The Honorable the President of the Senate: December 8, 1801. SIR: The circumstances under which we find ourselves at this place rendering inconvenient the mode heretofore practised of making by personal address the first communications between the legislative and executive branches, I have adopted that by message, as used on all subsequent occasions through the session. In doing this I have had principal regard to the convenience of the Legislature, to the economy of their time, to their relief from the embarrassment of immediate answers on subjects not yet fully before them, and to the benefits thence resulting to the public affairs. Trusting that a procedure founded on these motives will meet their approbation, I beg leave through you, sir, to communicate the inclosed message, with the documents accompanying it, to the honorable the Senate, and pray you to accept for yourself and them the homage of my high respect and consideration. TH: JEFFERSON. 77. Executive Influence on Congressional Legislation Through his power to send messages and veto laws, the President has the constitutional right to influence the course of legislation in Congress. But he may bring pressure to bear in many other He may use the message as an instrument to rouse public ways. The in terest of the President in legislation. Congress often counsels with executive depart ments. The advice of the attorneygeneral is asked. opinion; he may hold conferences with the directing party leaders in Congress; he may take private members into consultation. To some this extra-constitutional influence of the President seems entirely warranted by sound political practice, for it brings those who have to execute the laws in touch with those who make them, and, furthermore, it enables the President as representative of the whole nation to exercise his proper influence in the management of the nation's business. To others, however, this appears to be a wholly objectionable practice. Both sides of the case are thus stated in a recent debate in Congress: MR. DOLLIVER. - I am not one of those who have been irritated by the interest which the President of the United States has taken in this controversy.1 His interest has been upon the broadest and highest national ground. He has stated his views and convictions to the American people in every section of the country, and not one line can be attributed to him having in it the trace of a partisan outlook upon this great national question. Therefore whatever interest he has taken in it can certainly not be attributed to a partisan design of any kind or character. I have been familiar for a good many years with the attitude of the executive department of the Government toward the work of Congress. There is a member of the Senate now who, if he were disposed to give his experience, would be able to verify what I say, that it has been for many years the no uncommon practice for the Congress of the United States to take counsel with the executive departments in perfecting great acts of national legislation. There are at least five acts of legislation, all of them referring to this and similar questions, that were put through both Houses of Congress in the last five years practically without change, as they came from the office of the Attorney-General of the United States. In the present controversy the Attorney-General has certainly had the invitation of the legislative branch of the Government to take an interest in the matter. Among the very first things the Committee on Interstate Commerce did was to invite him to 1 Over the regulation of railway rates. |