The character of the

union makes

dissolution possible.

Superfluous legislation by the

states.

pliance of any, although it should be the latent disposition of all. Here are causes and pretexts which will never fail to render federal measures abortive. If the laws of the States were merely recommendatory to their citizens, or if they were to be rejudged by county authorities, what security, what probability would exist that they would be carried into execution? Is the security or probability greater in favor of the acts of Congress, which, depending for their execution on the will of the State legislatures, are, tho' nominally authoritative, in fact recommendatory only?

8. Want of Ratification by the People of the Articles of Confederation. In some of the States the Confederation is recognized by and forms a part of the Constitution. In others, however, it has received no other sanction than that of the legislative authority. From this defect two evils result: (a) Whenever a law of a State happens to be repugnant to an act of Congress, particularly when the latter is of posterior date to the former, it will be at least questionable whether the latter must not prevail; and as the question must be decided by the Tribunals of the State, they will be most likely to lean on the side of the State. (b) As far as the union of the States is to be regarded as a league of sovereign powers, and not as a political Constitution, by virtue of which they are become one sovereign power, so far it seems to follow, from the doctrine of compacts, that a breach of any of the Articles of Confederation by any of the parties to it, absolves the other parties from their respective obligations, and gives them a right, if they choose to exert it, of dissolving the Union altogether.

9. Multiplicity of Laws in the Several States. Among the evils of our situation, may well be ranked the multiplicity of laws, from which no State is exempt. As far as laws are necessary to mark with precision the duties of those who are to obey them, and to take from those who are to administer them a discretion which might be abused, their number is the price of liberty. As far as laws exceed this limit they are a nuisance; a nuisance of the most pestilent kind. Try the Codes of the several States by this test, and what a luxuriancy of legislation do they present. The short

period of independency has filled as many pages as the century which preceded it. Every year, almost every session adds a new volume. A review of the several Codes will shew that every necessary and useful part of the least voluminous of them might be compressed into one-tenth of the compass, and at the same time be rendered ten-fold as perspicuous.

of state legislation.

10. Mutability of the Laws of the States. This evil is inti- Instability mately connected with the former, yet deserves a distinct notice, as it emphatically denotes a vicious legislation. We daily see laws repealed or superseded before any trial can have been made of their merits, and even before a knowledge of them can have reached the remoter districts within which they were to operate. In the regulations of trade, this instability becomes a snare not only to our citizens, but to foreigners also.

15. The Call for the Constitutional Convention, 1787

The

demand for a revision of the Articles

The recognition of the abuses arising from a weak form of confederate government naturally led earnest men to plan for its reconstruction. In 1780, even before the Articles of Confederation went into force, Hamilton had drafted a plan of a con- of Constitution; and in 1785 the legislature of Massachusetts, on the federation. recommendation of Governor Bowdoin, passed a resolution in favor of calling a constitutional convention. The following year, on the initiative of Virginia, a convention met at Annapolis to consider the question of uniform commercial regulations, among other problems of interest to the states. Only five states were represented, so that no important business was transacted relating to the subject before the assembly, but a report, drawn up by Hamilton, recommending a general convention to revise the federal system was adopted. Hamilton's report was sent to the Confederate Congress as well as to the states, and on February 21, 1787, that body passed this resolution:

Resolved, That, in the opinion of Congress, it is expedient that, on the second Monday in May next, a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the

The response to the

Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.

16. New York Resolves to Appoint Delegates to the Convention

All of the states except Rhode Island responded to the resolution of Congress by appointing delegates to the convention. The resolution of the New York legislature given below is in general of Congress. harmony with the form and tenor of the resolutions of the other

resolution

states.

February, 1787.

Resolved, (if the Honourable the Assembly concur herein), That three Delegates be appointed on the part of this State to meet such Delegates as may be appointed on the part of the other States respectively, on the Second Monday of May next, at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and to the several Legislatures such alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the several States, render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union; and that, in case of such concurrence, the two Houses of the Legislature will on Tuesday next proceed to nominate and appoint the said delegates in like manner as is directed by the Constitution of this state for nominating and appointing delegates to Congress.

17. The Difficulties Confronting the Convention *

Owing to the diversity of interests among the states, the difficulties of bringing about an adjustment acceptable to all were numerous and weighty, and they appeared at one time so insuperable that Franklin recommended to the convention that special prayer be offered for Divine assistance. A clear statement of the fundamental obstacles in the way of a satisfactory constitutional

settlement is given in The Federalist, from which this extract is taken:

problem o.

and strong

government.

Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very The important one must have lain, in combining the requisite stability combining and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty liberty, and to the republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the public: yet that it could not easily be accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal dangers, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in government is essential to national character, and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself, than it is odious to the people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the people of this country, enlightened as they are, with regard to the nature, and interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good government, will never be satisfied, till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the state administrations.

and

On comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the Stability vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty frequent of mingling them together in their due proportions. The genius elections. of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people; but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period, the trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires, that the hands, in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the

The pretensions

same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures, from a frequent change of men: whilst energy of government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand. Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of partition, between the authority of the general and that of the state governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects, extensive and complicated in their nature. Experience has instructed us, also, that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges or powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science. To the difficulties already mentioned, may be added the interof the large fering pretensions of the larger and smaller states. We cannot err, in supposing that the former would contend for a participation in the government, fully proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose, that neither side would entirely yield to the other, and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It is extremely probable also, that after the ratio of representation had been adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh struggle between the same parties, to give such a turn to the organization of government, and to the distribution of its powers, as would increase the importance of the branches, in forming which they had respectively obtained the greatest share of influence. There are features in the constitution which warrant each of these suppositions; and as far as either of them is well founded, it shows that the convention must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety, to the force of extraneous considerations.

and small

states.

Nor could it have been the large and small states only, which