nature, that appeared in themselves exceedingly insignificant. Such, it is possible, may be the case here. We often speak of imitativeness, as a principle which governs children; but are less willing to acknowledge, which is hardly less the fact, that it is a principle which governs men. We cannot doubt, from the reflection we have been able to bestow upon it, that the principle before us, whatever aspect it may present at first sight, was designed to be, and is in fact, one of the important supports of society; a source of knowledge, happiness, and power. If this principle were obliterated, the bond of union, which now holds so closely together the two great divisions of society, the old and the young, would be greatly weakened; an event in all points of view much to be deplored. Not only in childhood but in mature age, as we have already had occasion to intimate, we walk in the steps of our fathers, following in arts and in manners the same practices, and sustaining the same institutions; and it is desirable, as a general thing, that we should do so. do it, not merely because we suppose them to be clothed with the attribute of superior wisdom; but also because we are prompted, often unconsciously to ourselves, by the influence of this powerful principle. And it is in this way, partly at least, that generation is connected with generation, that the torch of experience, lighted in the preceding age, is made to shed its beams over that which follows; and that society, kept in the vicinity of the beaten track, is not subject to sudden and disastrous convulsions.

And we

We would merely add, if this principle has such vast influence, as we have no doubt that it has, it is incumbent on every one carefully to consider the nature and tendency of the example which he sets. He, who sets a bad example either in domestic or in public life, is not only blasted and withered in himself; but almost necessarily leads on in his train a multitude of others to the same results of degradation and ruin. On the contrary, he, who does good in his day and generation, infuses, whether he designs it or not, the effulgence of his example into a multitude of hearts, which nature has opened for its reception; and thus, with better and higher results, lights them upward to happiness and glory.

§. 119. Remarks on the subject of emulation.

In giving an account of those mental principles, which we profess to introduce and examine under the general head of Propensities, we should probably be thought to have left the subject but partially explored, if we were to say nothing on the topic of Emulation. By the term Emulation, for there does not appear to be a perfect agreement as to what is expressed by it, is sometimes understood the desire of equality; but more frequently the desire of SUPERIORITY. In regard to Emulation the general view of Mr. Stewart, in which he would probably be followed by many persons, is this. He regards it, like those propensive principles which have come under our notice, as implanted or original; like them too, although not very high in the comparative honor which we attach to it, he considers it as innocent and useful, when restricted within the limits of its appropriate sphere of action. When it passes those limits, he describes it as being evil, and as being properly designated by the term Envy.

Whether to yield our assent to this opinion, supported by an authority from which in most cases it might not be safe to differ, we hardly know. There is one difficulty, however, in receiving it, which we propose for the reader's consideration. In all the active principles, which constitute the department of our mental nature, which is now the subject of consideration, from instinct upward to conscience, there is obviously a gradation not only of honor, but of AUTHORITY. And as conscience is the highest on the list, they are all subordinate, in the determination of their respective claims, to the intimations and decisions of that paramount faculty. This we hold to be a great and irrefragable truth in mental philosophy, which no where finds an abler and more decided advocate, than in Mr. Stewart himself.

But if Emulation be the desire of superiority, as it is generally understood to be, we do not readily perceive how it can by any possibility subject itself to that rule of subordination, which is a first principle in the structure of the sensitive or active mind. The desire of superiority, if it actually exists implanted in the human constitution, must from its very nature throw defiance at the doctrine of subordination.

Whatever, in virtue of any rule of comparison that can possibly be applied, sustains a higher rank, at once brings this principle into conflict; and the contest, which is thus generated, can never be quieted, until the relative position of objects is changed, and that, which previously stood foremost, subsides to the inferior station of a dependant or a follower. As man, therefore, by the very conditions under which he is created, is in fact, and ever will be, in a state of inferiority, as compared either with the members of his own race or those of a higher race of beings, he is permanently located in the midst of a perpetual conflict. It is the very nature of a desire to prompt to action; to counteract every disposition to inertness; to urge forward in the race of acquisition or advancement. And as he is surrounded by beings, that are in some respects superior, either physically or mentally, either in the gradations of existence, or in some of the situations and circumstances of existence, he finds no rest to the sole of his foot; it is his misery that he cannot, even if he had a disposition to, close his eyes to his situation; the sight of every object above him, even of angelic natures, kindles a consuming fire in his bosom. It would seem, that the contemplation of the Supreme Being himself, if SUPERIORITY is truly the original and appropriate object of emulation, would excite the rivalries of this unhallowed ambition.It is not easy to suppose, that such a principle, leading to such fearful results, and placed so far beyond the regulation of any controlling influence, is implanted, as an original and essential element, in the mental constitution.

§. 120. Emulation resolvable into the principle of imitativeness.

We are inclined to the opinion, on such a consideration of the subject as seemed to be required by the difficulties attending it, that Emulation is not, as is commonly supposed, a separate and original principle. We suppose it to be nothing more, than the action of those other principles, which are known and admitted to be implanted, stimulated into increased activity by the principle of Imitativeness. That IMITATIVENESS is an original tendency of the human mind will probably not be regarded as a matter of doubt; and it is scarcely less evident, that it possesses, especially in early

life, great activity and strength. Now, in regard to this principle, it will be recollected, that it naturally and appropri ately exists only in reference to those things, which are in fact, or which are supposed to be, above us. It is undoubtedly the case, that men sometimes very much mistake in this matter; but in point of fact, the object, which calls the principle of imitation into action, sustains, in the view of the imitator, at least for the time being, a share, greater or less, of comparative pre-eminency.

Imitativeness, therefore, keeping this consideration in view, is obviously capable of effectuating what is commonly ascribed to the more mitigated forms of emulation. We see a person, for instance, exerting his ingenuity in the formation of some curious and interesting object; and the principle of imitation prompts us to attempt doing the same thing. We see a person, in some superior walk of life, adopting a novel dress and equipage; and under the operations of this principle, we experience a degree of uneasiness, until we have done the same. It is the nature of the principle to set us upon being equal to, or being like others. And when it operates in reference to persons, who were before nearly on an equality, we do not, in common parlance, feel any impropriety in speaking of it as a case of rivalry or emulation; especially as the circumstance of the nearness of equality is likely to give to the principle a degree of liveliness and energy, which it might not otherwise possess. And still more, perhaps, is this the case, whenever imitativeness operates in connection with some other original principle. When, for instance, a youth sees another nearly of the same age more advanced in knowledge, the natural desire of knowledge appears to be stimulated to greater activity by the principle of imitation. When a person sees another extending his stores of wealth, the natural desire of possession is aroused to greater energy by the principle under consideration; and girding himself anew to the pursuit of riches, he goes and does likewise. And we do not hesitate to speak of these, (and similar remarks will apply to others like them,) as cases of rivalry in the pursuit of knowledge or wealth. Whether this view of the subject is a correct one, we will not pretend to say with entire confidence; but we believe that it is not more

encumbered with difficulties, or less susceptible of proof than any other view, which is likely to be presented. At any rate it relieves us from the task of endeavoring to settle the moral character of emulation; a subject which has exercised the ingenuity, and divided the sentiments of philosophers.

§. 121. Of the natural desire of esteem.

Another important propensity, not resolvable into any thing else, but original and standing on its own basis, is the desire of esteem.In proof of the natural and original existence of this principle in the human mind, we are at liberty to appeal, as in the case of all the other propensities, to what we notice in the beginnings of life and the first developements of the mental nature. Before children are capable of knowing the advantages, which result from the good opinion of others, they are evidently mortified at expressions of neglect or contempt, and as evidently pleased with expressions of regard and approbation. As it is impossible satisfactorily to account for this state of things, on the ground of its being the result of reasoning, experience, or interest, the only explanation left, is, that this desire is a part of the connatural and essential furniture of the mind.

II, We may remark further, that the desire of esteem is found to exist very extensively and strongly, in the more advanced periods of life. If we look at the history of nations and of individuals, how many men do we find, who have been willing to sacrifice their life, rather than forfeit the favorable opinion of others! When they have lost all besides, their health, their fortune, and friends, they cling with fondness to their good name; they point triumphantly to their unsullied reputation, as a consolation in their present adversities, and the pledge of better things in time to come. This is es

pecially true of those periods in the history of nations, when the original sentiments and traits of the people have not been corrupted by the introduction of the arts of luxury and refinement.

III, There is this consideration also, which has a bearing upon this topic. We are sometimes in such a situation, that the favorable or unfavorable opinion of others can have no possible bearing, so far as we can judge, on our own per