ence. The desire of existence, by common acknowledgement,is natural to us; the desire of happiness is natural also; and since there can be neither the one nor the other without power, it seems reasonable to think, that the desire of power is essential to, and is implanted in our nature. There are various circumstances, obvious to every one's notice, which go to confirm this view of the subject; as will be seen in the following extract from the writings of Mr. Stewart. §. 127. Facts in proof of the natural desire of power. "The infant, while still on the breast, delights in exerting its little strength on every object it meets with, and is mortified when any accident convinces it of its own imbecility. The pastimes of the boy are, almost without exception, such as suggest to him the idea of his power. When he throws a stone or shoots an arrow, he is pleased with being able to produce an effect at a distance from himself; and, while he measures with his eye the amplitude or range of his missile weapon, contemplates with satisfaction the extent to which his power has reached. It is on a similar principle that he loves to bring his strength into comparison with that of his fellows, and to enjoy the consciousness of superior prowess. Nor need we search in the malevolent dispositions of our nature for any other motive to the apparent acts of cruelty which he sometimes exercises over the inferior animals,-the sufferings of the animal in such cases, either entirely escaping his notice, or being overlooked in that state of pleasurable triumph, which the wanton abuse of power communicates to a weak and unreflecting judgment. The active sports of the youth captivate his fancy by suggesting similar ideas,-. of strength of body, of force of mind, of contempt of hardship and of danger. And accordingly such are the occupations in which Virgil, with a characteristical propriety, employs his young Ascanius. "At puer Ascanius mediis in vallibus acri "Gaudet equo; jamque hos cursu, jam præterit illos ; "Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem. "As we advance in years, and as our animal powers lose their activity and vigor,we gradually aim at extending our in fluence over others by the superiority of fortune and station, or by the still more flattering superiority of intellectual endowments,by the force of our understanding, by the extent of our information,by the arts of persuasion,or the accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power pleases the orator in managing the reins of an assembled multitude, when he silences the reasons of others by superior ingenuity, bends to his purposes their desires and passions, and, without the aid of force, or the splendor of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations!"* UNTARY. §. 128. Of the moral character of the desire of power. If it be true that the desire of power is connatural to the human mind, it will probably be found, like other analogous principles, to possess a two-fold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLSo far as its action is instinctive, we may suppose it to be innocent at least, and probably useful. So far as it is voluntary, the virtue or vice, which attaches to it, will depend upon its regulation. If it be kept in subordination to the dictates of an enlightened consicence and to the feelings and duties we owe to the Supreme Being, its exercise is virtuous. If, on the contrary, it acquires inordinate strength, as it is very likely to do, and is excessive in its operation, pushing us forward to the pursuit of forbbiden objects and the invasion of other's rights, it then becomes vicious. When the desire of power becomes excessive, and exists and operates as a leading and predominant principle, we commonly denominate it Ambition. He, who is under the influence of AMBITION, desires power; not because it assimilates him to his Maker, not because it affords him the increased means of usefulness, nor for any other reason which commends itself to a strictly virtuous mind; but simply because it administers to the gratification of an unrestrained and insatiable selfishness. §. 129. Veracity or the propensity to utter the truth. It is in the propensive part of our nature that we are to locate the important principle of Veracity; in other words, that disposition and tendency to utter the truth, which characterizes men generally, and which there seems abundant Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Chap. II, §. 4. reason to regard as original or connatural to the mind. When we utter the truth, we fulfil the functions of our nature; the action of the mind flows easily in an undisturbed and even channel; there are none of those mental jars and revulsions, which generally attend an effort of falsification. To utter a falsehood is against nature; and is as much at variance with the structure of the Pathematic, as of the Moral Sensibilities. That is to say, when we deliberately utter a falsehood, we are not only condemned by Conscience; but are obliged to stem the natural current of the Desires. There are undoubtedly occasional exceptions to this statement. But they may probably be reduced to two classes of persons; first, those, in whom the original principle has been perverted by the influence of evil example or some other unfavorable cause; second, those, still fewer in number, who are the subjects of an original mental malformation. In the first class the tendency to falsehood is the work of the man rather than of his nature; the second indicates a state of mind, more or less approaching the regions of insanity.In addition to these cases, it may be said further, that sometimes, under the influence perhaps of a sudden and powerful temptation, men of acknowledged veracity are betrayed into the utterance of an untruth. But still the general fact, to which these cases must be regarded merely in the light of exceptions, remains good. The utterance of the truth is in conformity with nature; falsehood is against it. so much the fact, that in ordinary cases, the utterance of thousands of truths secures to a man no especial credit, for this is what we naturally expect; while the utterance of a very falsehoods will be likely to destroy his reputation forever. And this is §. 130. Of the two-fold action of the propensity to truth. few The principle of Veracity, as might be supposed from the circumstance of its being admitted into the class of the propensions, has the two-fold action, already often mentioned. -In all ordinary cases, the probability is, that its action is INSTINCTIVE. A thousand times a day, in answer to the questions of others or in giving directions or on some other occasions, we utter what is true in fact, or what we suppose to be true. And we do this, without stopping to reflect whether it is a matter of duty, but apparently and in reality by a natural or instinctive movement, just as the hungry man instinctively seeks to gratify his appetite for food. In other cases, the action is obviously VOLUNTARY. If, for instance, a man is strongly tempted, by the presentation of some pecuniary inducement, to utter a falsehood, the instinctive action of the principle is interrupted. By an effort of the Will we check it; we stop; we examine the nature and weight of the inducement, which is presented; conscience is called in to give its decision in the case; and the action of the principle under such circumstances evidently becomes a voluntary one. It is, indeed, difficult in some cases to draw the line distinctly between the instinctive and voluntary action; but it is the latter alone, which can properly be said to have a moral character. When, under the influence of a strong temptation, the instinctive tendency is overruled, and we utter the truth in compliance with the mere dictates of conscience, we are the subjects of moral merit. When, on the other hand, we deliberately and voluntarily utter falsehood, we are the subjects of crime. And it may also be added, that the circumstance of the utterance of the truth being, in all ordinary cases, instinctive, increases the crime of its violation; because falsehood under such circumstances generally implies a high degree of deliberate and voluntary effort. §. 131. Propensity of self-love, or the desire of happiness. We proceed to explore this part of our sensitive nature still further by adding, that the desire of enjoyment or happiness appears to be an original or connatural element of the mental constitution. No one will presume to assert, that the desire of suffering is natural; that we ordinarily rejoice in the prospect of coming woes, and endure them with gladness of heart. Nor are there satisfactory grounds for the opinion, that enjoyment and suffering are indifferent to the human mind; and that there is no choice to be had between them. Such a supposition would be contrary to the common experience, and the most obvious facts. On the contrary, our own consciousness and what we witness in others effectually teach us, that the desire of happiness is as natural as that of knowledge or esteem, and even hardly less so, than it is to desire food and drink, when we experience the uneasy sensations of hunger and thirst.. Under the instigation and guidance of this strong propensity, men not only flee from present evil and cling to present happiness; but, foreseeing the events of the future, they prepare raiment and houses, fill their granaries, in anticipation of a day of want, and take other measures for the prolonging of life, health, and comfort. It is kindly provided, that they are not left, in taking precautions subservient to their preservation and well-being, to the suggestions and the law of reason alone, but are guided and kept in action by this decisive and permanent principle. And it is proper to add, that this desire operates not only in reference to outward and bodily comforts, but also in relation to inward consolations, the inspirations and solaces of religion in the present life, and the anticipated possession of that more glorious happiness, which religious faith attaches to a future state of existence. But it should ever be remembered, that the desire of our own happiness, like the other desires which have been mentioned, ought to be subjected to a suitable regulation. An enlightened conscience will explain, under what conditions our personal welfare may be pursued, and in what cases, whether it relate to the present or the future, it should be subordinated to considerations of public benefit, and of universal benevolence. §. 132. Of selfishness as distinguished from self-love. We cannot but suppose, for the reasons that have just been suggested, that the desire of happiness or propensity of personal good, is an attribute of man's nature. This opinion is not only accordant with the suggestions of the light of nature; but is sanctioned by other and higher authority. The pursuit of our own happiness is obviously recognized in the Scriptures; and is urged upon us as a duty. While we are required to love our neighbor, it is no where said, that we must perform this duty to the exclusion of a suitable re- ' gard for our own felicity. The desire of happiness, thus implanted in our own constitution, we denominate by a simple and expressive term, SELF-LOVE. But it cannot be denied, that the import of the term is frequently misunderstood, |