cision on the son's conduct. Otherwise he would not. And on the supposition, that he possessed such knowledge, it is difficult to suppose, that he would be indifferent to the son's conduct, much less approve it, or that he could look upon it otherwise than with feelings of decided disapprobation.(See, in connection with this subject §. 226 in the preceding chapter.)

§. 235. Of the training or education of the conscience.

We infer from what has been said in this chapter, that there is such a thing, philosophically considered, as a training or education of the conscience. We propose to remark more fully on the subject of moral education in another place; but we may properly refer to it a moment here, in connection with the views, which have now been taken. No man is at liberty to say in regard to any given case, that I am willing to refer this case to conscience, and to abide by the decisions of conscience, without first taking the pains to lay the case fully and fairly before the power, that is to sit in judgment upon it. We might as well expect the judge in a court of civil justice to give an upright decision without facts, without evidence, and without law; as to expect a correct decision from the spiritual judge, that exercises authority in the judgment-seat of the Sensibilities, without a full and fair presentment of the facts by the Intellect. And when we say it is necessary to make a full statement of the facts, we may add further, that they are to be stated not only in themselves, but also in their relations and bearings upon each other.This is one form of moral training or moral education. other words, in order to have a right conscience in respect to the vast multitude of things, which are the proper subjects of moral adjudication, it is necessary to extend the field of our knowledge; to know much, to think much, to compare much.

§. 236. Of guilt when a person acts conscientiously.

In

The question has sometimes been started, Whether a person is in any case to be considered as guilty and to be punished for actions done conscientiously; for instance, when certain ignorant Savages are supposed to act conscientiously in leaving their aged and infirm parents to perish. In view of what

has been said in this Chapter, we seem to be prepared to answer this question in the affirmative.

We have seen that the moral nature, in consequence of its intimate connection with the powers of perception and reasoning, is in some measure under our own control. On the one hand, it may be enlightened and guided; on the other, darkened, and led astray, and in some cases be made to approve of actions of the most unworthy and sinful kind. Men, therefore, are to have a right conscience; this great and exalting principle is to receive and ought to receive the very first attention; and they are accountable whenever it is neglected. Otherwise we furnish a very easy and convenient excuse for all the cruelties of the Inquisition, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by the Catholics, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by each other, for all the acts of unkindness and tyranny, which have ever been exercised upon individuals and communities.

And the position, that men are accountable and guilty for having a wrong conscience, in proportion to their means of knowledge and their ability of rectifying the conscience, holds good in respect to the most ignorant and degraded Savage tribes, as well as in respect to civilized nations. It is true, no individual ought to assume the province of judging in all cases, what that degree of guilt is; for no one is competent to it. All, that is meant to be asserted, is, that when persons feel an emotion of approval in doing wrong, (that is, in doing what is condemned by the general moral sentiments of mankind, and by the will and law of God;) and yet have within their reach neglected sources of knowledge, which, on being laid open to the mind, would have caused different feelings, they are criminal for such neglect of the information before them, and consequently, cannot under such circumstances be rendered otherwise than criminal by any internal approbation.

§. 237. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section from the case of the Apostle Paul.

66

The Apostle Paul was at one time a great persecutor. He shut up the early Christians in prison; and when they were put to death, he gave his voice against them." Nevertheless he expressly says, in reference to these very tran

sactions; "I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." He evidently, from his own statement, supposed he was doing right; in other words, he was conscientious in his conduct. Here is a case in point, to which the principles of the preceding section may be made to apply.

That Paul, as he by implication asserts himself to have been, was conscientious in his persecutions of the early Christians there can be no doubt. That he was, at the same time, exceedingly guilty seems to be equally certain. He had not made himself acquainted with all the facts in the case; he was too bigoted to his own sect, too passionate, and too cruel to make a full and impartial investigation of the merits and demerits of those, whom he had determined to destroy. He acknowledges, that, at the very time when he supposed he was acting conscientiously, he was "exceedingly mad against them." But every one knows, that an exceedingly excited state of the passions is very unfavorable to a minute and impartial inquiry. The presumption is, whatever the reason of it may have been, that he had no correct knowledge of the life, miracles, and doctrines of Jesus Christ; or the belief, practices, and character of Christians. His consciencé accordingly, as is its nature, acted in view of what he actually knew, and not in view of what he might have known. His conscience in the circumstances of the case could not do otherwise than it did, viz, approve its conduct. Nor in strictness of speech are we to say, that he was to blame for acting according to his conscience; but to blame, exceedingly to blame for not having, as on proper inquiry he might have had, and would have had, a right conscience.

362

CHAPTER FOURTH.

NATURE OF MORAL BEAUTY.

§. 238. Of the origin of emotions of moral beauty.

Ir seems to be a proper place here, as incidental to the main subject, to remark upon the nature of Moral Beauty. We have already had occasion to refer to this subject, in connection with some remarks on natural beauty, (§. 38;) but it seems to be deserving of a more particular notice. Our first remark in the explanation of this topic, is, that there is a close analogy between natural and moral beauty; and that consequently the nature of the latter may be easily understood by a reference to the former. The beauty of outward objects, whatever may be its inherent or intrinsic nature, (a subject which, like that of the inherent or intrinsic nature of rectitude, is probably beyond the limits of the powers of the human mind,) is revealed to, and is cognizable by us, in consequence of the structure of the natural sensibilities. In other words, we are so constituted, that the perception of certain objects is naturally and necessarily followed, in our Sensitive nature, by the existence of emotions of beauty. It is the existence of these emotions, which, it is proper to remark, do not depend upon our volition, but are the work of nature alone, that reveals to us the beautiful object, as having the character of beauty. Without this we should know, it is true, the mere existence of the object; but the additional and distinctive fact of its beauty would not be known. These are not only the facts in the case, but they are ultimate facts, and contain, in the outlines at least, a statement of nearly all, that is to be said.

This statement will apply, with but slight alteration, to moral as well as natural beauty. A moral object, (we speak now of one which is morally good,) in distinction from a mere natural object, becomes such to us, (that is to say, we know it to be such,) in consequence of its being stamped with moral approbation. When clothed as it were with this new garment, it assumes, even in the view of the intellectual apprehension, a character unknown before. Intellectually considered, it stands forth distinctly as a new object. And as it thus embodies itself in the intellectual apprehension, or, as we more commonly express it, as it thus appears in the view of the intellect, it is followed in the sensibilities, the same as any physically beautiful object is, by emotions of beauty. The soul is delighted with the contemplation. And the same as in any instance of natural beauty, it diffuses here also, by means of the principle of association, the splendor of the inward emotion over the outward cause. And thus moral objects, as well as physical, and even in a still higher degree, are made to shine forth with an attractive lustre.

The phrase Moral Beauty appears to be based upon the experience which has just been described. It merely designates the abstract conception, which, in connection with that experience, we are enabled to form of beauty of a moral kind.

§. 239. Of the origin and import of the phrase, moral deformity.

We sometimes speak of MORAL DEFORMITY, as well as of moral beauty; nor are we to suppose, that the phrase, which is a very common one, is without meaning. It originates in precisely the same way, as far as the mental action is concerned, as its opposite. When an object, which is morally wrong, is before the mind, it excites an emotion directly the reverse of an emotion of beauty. In other words, it is impossible for us to contemplate a case of moral wrong, without having, in addition to those feelings of disapproval by means of which its immorality is revealed in the mind, other emotions more or less painful. We not only condemn it as a violation of rectitude; but it is at once clothed, in our view of it, in features that are unlovely and hateful.

The phrase Moral Deformity, like the opposite one of Moral Beauty under the reverse of circumstances, has its