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for its collection, and must be complied with, Mr. Justice Field saying (p. 206):

"The obligation of a contract, in the constitutional sense, is the means provided by law by which it can be enforced,by which the parties can be obliged to perform it. Whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of these means impairs the obligation. If it tend to postpone or retard the enforcement of the contract, the obligation of the latter is to that extent weakened. The Latin proverb, Qui cito dat bis dat―,he who gives quickly gives twice, has its counterpart in a maxim equally sound-,Qui serius solvit, minus solvit, he who pays too late pays less. Any authorization of the postponement of payment, or of means by which such postponement may be effected, is in conflict with the constitutional inhibition. If, therefore, we could see that such would be the effect of the provision of the act of the State, No. 5 of 1870, requiring judgments to be registered with the controller before they are paid, we should not hesitate to declare the provision to be invalid. But we are not able to see anything in the requirement which impedes the collection of the relator's judgments, or prevents his resort to other remedies, if their payment be not obtained. The registry is a convenient means of informing the city authorities of the extent of the judgments, and that they have become executory, to the end that proper steps may be taken for their payment. It does not impair existing remedies."

The act was again before this court in the case of Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358. In that case the act was fully analyzed, and it was pointed out that the payment of judgments thereunder was extremely uncertain and depended entirely upon the discretion of the council, after providing for other municipal purposes and expenses, and was in direct violation of powers of taxation which existed at the time the debt sued for in that case was created, and could not be constitutionally enforced as against such claim.

Applying the principles thus announced to the case at bar,

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we think Act No. 5 of 1870, postponing indefinitely the payment of relator's judgment, if given effect, would deprive the receiver, as the representative of the interested creditors, of the benefit of the right of taxation for the payment of their claims which existed before the passage of the act of 1870. By 29 of the act of September 14, 1868, above quoted, the common council of the city of New Orleans and others were empowered and directed annually to order and caused to be raised and collected by a tax upon the estates, real and personal, subject to taxation within said city, the sums of money annually estimated and apportioned as the share of such city for the total expense of the Metropolitan Police District. This act was followed by other supplementary and amendatory acts to make the purpose more effectual, and was not repealed until the act of March 31, 1877, which abolished the Metropolitan Police Board. This repeal could not take away the right of the creditors of the Metropolitan Police Board to have taxation for their benefit. Nor could the act of 1870 constitutionally take away the rights created by former legislation for the security of their debts and postpone indefinitely the payment of their claims until such time as the city was ready and willing to pay them.

We are of opinion that the writ of mandamus should have been awarded in favor of the relator, requiring the city to pay over the taxes for which the judgment was rendered, or to levy and collect a tax therefor for the benefit of the relator as receiver. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

215 U.S.

CALIGA v. INTER OCEAN NEWSPAPER COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 22. Argued November 5, 1909.-Decided November 29, 1909.

Statutory copyright is not to be confounded with the exclusive property of the author in his manuscript at common law.

In enacting the copyright statute Congress did not sanction an existing right but created a new one dependent on compliance with the statute.

Under existing copyright law of the United States there is no provision for filing amendments to the first application; and, the matter being wholly subject to statutory regulation, copyright on a second application cannot be sustained.

The statutory limit of copyright cannot be extended by new applications.

157 Fed. Rep. 186, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Otto Raymond Barnett, with whom Mr. Clarence T. Morse was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Copyright exists at common law as an incident to ownership. It may be lost by publication. The copyright statutes specify what steps must be taken to avoid such loss upon publication. Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Fed. Rep. 726; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Peters, 591; Board of Trade v. Commission Co., 103 Fed. Rep. 902; Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303; Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408.

Copyright law is to be construed liberally and beneficially. Nothing but a general publication or an express surrender of his rights will affect a proprietor's common-law copyright property. Allan v. Black, 56 Fed. Rep. 754; Myers v. Callaghan, 128 U. S. 617.

A general publication is one which gives an express or implied right to copy the thing published.

An exhibition of a painting under conditions which do not

215 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

give to the public a right to copy does not amount to a general publication. Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. Rep. 730; Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. Rep. 321.

A deposit of a photograph in the Library of Congress in compliance with the copyright statutes merely serves to identify the thing to be copyrighted and, not giving any express or implied right to copy, does not amount to a publication.

Under the statute the only condition which will prevent obtaining a copyright is prior publication. Rev. Stat., §§ 4952, 4956. A copyright registration may be abandoned by failure to publish within a reasonable time after such registration. In such event the common-law right never ceases. Boucicault v. Hart, Fed. Cas. No. 1,692; Carillo v. Shook, Fed. Cas. No. 2,407.

If, therefore, a registration may be abandoned by failure to publish within a reasonable time, it may also be abandoned by a subsequent re-registration in the absence of any intermediate publication. Osgood v. Aloe Inst. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 291.

Common law copyright and statutory copyright cannot coexist, the first only terminates upon a general publication, the second only begins upon a general publication. Prior to such publication, common-law copyright remains unimpaired notwithstanding any registration which may have been made with the Librarian of Congress for the purpose of obtaining the protection of statutory copyright. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 347; Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 164 U. S. 105; Boucicault v. Hart, Fed. Cas. No. 1,692; Carillo v. Shook, Fed. Cas. No. 2,407.

The title of a copyrighted publication must correspond with the title filed for purpose of copyright with the Librarian of Congress. Mifflin v. White, 190 U. S. 260.

The copyright statute providing a penalty for infringement is in form penal, but is remedial in intent. Dwight v. Appleton, Fed. Cas. No. 4215.

Plaintiff's only legal remedy for copyright infringement is

Argument for Defendant in Error.

215 U. S.

under Rev. Stat., § 4965, for the penalty there provided. Walker v. Globe Newspaper Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 594.

Publication by a licensee of a copyrighted work without marking such reproduction "copyrighted," etc., does not invalidate the copyright. Press Assn. v. Daily Story Co., 120 Fed. Rep. 766.

Any unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted painting, or of the substance thereof, whether by a newspaper cut or otherwise, is an infringement of the copyright. Werckmeister v. P. & B. Mfg. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 445, 449; Schumacher v. Schroenke, 30 Fed. Rep. 690; Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. Rep. 32; Springer Co. v. Falk, 59 Fed. Rep. 707; Sanborn Co. v. Dakin Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 266.

The variance between the date of copyright registration pleaded under a videlicet, and the dates proven was not fatal, even if the registration of November, 1901, were a nullity. Greenleaf on Evidence, § 61; Stephen on Pleading, 292; Rawle's Bouvier, 1195; 1 Chitty Pl. 257; Allen v. Black, 56 Fed. Rep. 754; Myers v. Callaghan, 128 U. S. 617; Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. Rep. 467; Wheeler v. Read, 36 Illinois, 85; Beaver v. Slanker, 94 Illinois, 175, 185; Reinback v. Crabtree, 77 Illinois, 188; Long v. Conklin, 75 Illinois, 33; United States v. Le Baron, 4 Wall. 648; Taylor v. Bank of Alexandria, 5 Leigh (Va.), 512; Martin v. Miller, 3 Missouri, 99; Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vermont, 479.

Mr. James J. Barbour, with whom Mr. Clarence A. Knight was on the brief for defendant in error:

Where two copyrights of the same painting are procured by the painter thereof, the second copyright is void. Mifflin v. Dutton, 112 Fed. Rep. 1004; Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,136; Black v. Murray, 9 Sc. Sess. Cas., 3d Ser., 341; Thomas v. Turner, 33 Ch. Div. 292; Scrutton, Law of Copyright, 119; Drone on Copyright, 146; Macgillivray on Copyrights, 27.

A patentee cannot have two patents for the same inven

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