which had received a portion of its territory, in proportion to the amount of taxable property received, and this is the method provided by law." This view of the statute is not directly attacked by appellants, and, if it may be said that the general argument is a criticism of it, the answer is what was said in English v. Arizona, 214 U. S. 359, 363, that "unless in a case of manifest error, this court will not disturb a decision of the Supreme Court of a Territory construing a local statute." Chapter 20 of the Session Laws of 1903 is an answer also to other contentions of appellants. If the county of Santa Fé is primarily liable for the bonds she is the proper party to an action upon them, and through her officers the payment of the judgments recovered can be enforced. The contention of appellants, therefore, that the counties of Rio Arriba and Torrance are "necessary parties to a complete determination of the case," is untenable, as indeed all other contentions that are based upon the addition to those counties of portions of Santa Fé County. The most serious contentions of appellants are that the levy of eighty-two mills was sufficient to pay the judgments, interest and costs, and that the levy of twenty mills in addition was excessive. We think, however, that the reply made by the Supreme Court of the Territory adequately disposed of them. The learned court pointed out that the resolution of the board of county commissioners, a copy of which appears in the record, showed that the levy of eighty-two mills had the purpose only, and was sufficient only, to pay the then amount of the judgments, together with interest. It was further pointed out that the interest to accrue was not provided for, and that it amounted on the day when the peremptory writs of mandamus were issued to $32,874.05. It follows necessarily, as the court said, that the contention that the eighty-two mills levied was sufficient, "is unfounded and untrue in fact.” To the contention that the twenty mills levied are excessive, in that they are more than sufficient to pay $32,874.05, the court replied that, if this were so, the VOL. CCXV-20 peremptory writs should not have been issued. But, the court added, it is not shown that the assessable value of property in Santa Fé County has increased, while it does appear on the other hand that portions of the county had been cut off; therefore, it was said, it is fair to presume "that the assessed valuation of the county is not in excess of what it was in 1901, when the eighty-two mills levy was made." From this presumption it was concluded that twenty mills would produce, if collected in full, $32,996.00, an excess only of $112.05. And it was observed that since the peremptory writs were issued interest had accrued to the amount of $10,000.00. The writs required not only the levy of twenty mills for the year 1905, but for each and every year thereafter and until the judgments with interest and costs be paid. This the Supreme Court pronounced error, and modified the judgments by striking out the requirements for a continuous levy. This appellants assign as error, contending that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to modify the judgments of the lower court, and that by doing so it changed the "theory and cause of action." The argument to sustain the contention is somewhat roundabout. Exclusive original jurisdiction in mandamus, it is said, is conferred on the District Court by § 2771 of the laws of the Territory, and, while an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as in other civil actions (§ 2772), that the power of the court to modify the judgment of a district court, given by § 897,1 does not extend to a judgment in "In all cases now pending in the Supreme Court or which may be hereafter pending in the Supreme Court, and which may have been tried by the equity side of the court, or which may have been tried by a jury on the common law side of the court, or in which a jury may have been waived and the case tried by the court or the judge thereof, it shall be the duty of the Supreme Court to look into all the rulings and decisions of the court which may be apparent upon the records, or which may be incorporated in the bill of exceptions, and pass upon all of them and upon the errors if any shall be found therein, in the rulings and decisions of the court below, grant a new mandamus. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is urged, "was simply to affirm or reverse and remand." This, it will be observed, is very general. It would seem even to imply that the Supreme Court has not even the power of direction, but must leave the District Court to get right ultimately through successive judgments, appeals and reversals. And the anomaly is attempted to be sustained by saying that mandamus is not included in the useful power given to the Supreme Court by 897 in cases taken to it to "render such other judgment as may be right and just and in accordance with law," because, it is said, that mandamus "is not a case on the equity side of the court, nor is it one tried on the law side with a jury, nor is it one in which a jury has been waived and trial had by the court or judge, especially as concerns the present proceeding." This is a misunderstanding of the statute. Its purpose is to not only give the power to review, but to prevent its defeat through the distinction between causes of action and modes of trial. Further argument is unnecessary. Even if the contention had grounds of support it would be answered by the case of English v. Arizona, 214 U. S. 359, and the case of Armijo v. Armijo, 181 U. S. 558, 561. In the latter case we said that practice "in the courts of the Territory is based upon local statutes and procedure, and we are not disposed to review the decision of the Supreme Court in such cases. Sweeney v. Lomme, 22 Wall. 208." Of the other contentions of appellants, it is enough to say that they are without merit. Judgments affirmed. trial or render such other judgment as may be right and just, and in accordance with law; and said Supreme Court shall not decline to pass upon any question of law or fact which may appear in any record either upon the face of the record or in the bill of exceptions, because the cause was tried by the court or judge thereof without a jury, but shall review said cause in the same manner and to the same extent as if it had been tried by a jury." Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 215 U.S. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. SHEEGOG. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF No. 41. Argued December 12, 1909.-Decided December 20, 1909. Where the joinder of the resident and the non-resident defendants prevents removal to the Federal court, the fact that on the trial the jury finds against the non-resident defendant only has no bearing on the question of removal if the joinder was not fraudulent. Allegations of fact, so far as material in a petition to remove, if controverted, must be tried in the Federal court, and therefore must be taken to be true when the state court fails to consider them. A plaintiff may sue the tort-feasors jointly if he sees fit, regardless of motive, and an allegation that resident and non-resident tortfeasors are sued for the purpose of preventing removal to the Federal court is not a sufficient allegation that the joinder was fraudulent. A lessor railroad company remains responsible, so far as its duty to the public is concerned, notwithstanding it may lease its road, unless relieved by a statute of the State. Whether defendants can be sued jointly as tort-feasors is for the state court to decide; and so held that, where the state court decides that a lessor road in that State is responsible for keeping its roadbed in order, the joinder of both lessor and lessee roads in a suit for damages caused by imperfect roadbed and management is not fraudulent and the lessee road, although non-resident, cannot remove if the lessor road is resident. 126 Kentucky, 252, affirmed. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Edmund F. Trabue, with whom Mr. John C. Doolan, Mr. Attilla Cox, Jr., and Mr. Blewett Lee were on the brief, for plaintiff in error: The lessor and conductor were joined as petitioner's co 215 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. defendants solely to prevent a removal to the Federal court, and the trial court sustained their motions for peremptory instructions in their favor, and plaintiff below prosecuted no appeal from these judgments, but abandoned his case as to them both. The allegations of fact in a petition for removal must be accepted by the state court as true, because an issue on such allegations can be tried only in the Federal court. Railway v. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513, 517; Plymouth v. Amador Co., 118 U. S. 264, 270; Louisville R. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 599; Alabama Gt. Southern Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 218; Wecker v. National Co., 204 U. S. 176; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207; Dow v. Bradstreet, 46 Fed. Rep. 824; Arrowsmith v. Railroad Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 165; Diday v. Railway Co., 107 Fed. Rep. 565; Union Co. v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 209; Kelly v. C. & A. R. Co., 122 Fed. Rep. 286; Gustafson v. Railway Co., 128 Fed. Rep. 85; Dishon v. C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 471; Boatmen's Bank v. Fritzlen, 135 Fed. Rep. 650, 668 (certiorari denied, 198 U. S. 586); South Dakota Co. v. Cin. & St. P. Ry. Co., 141 Fed. Rep. 578, 581; Thomas v. Great North. Ry. Co., 147 Fed. Rep, 83, 86; Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Sou. Ry. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 122, 126; M'Guire v. Great North. Ry. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 434, 439; Politz v. Wabash Ry. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 941; M'Alister v. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co., 157 Fed. Rep. 740, 743; Harrington v. Gt. Nor. Ry. Co., 169 Fed. Rep. 714; Donovan v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 169 Fed. Rep. 363. The state court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to try or determine the question of fact tendered by the petition for removal, much less to try it on evidence heard only on the merits. Rutherford v. I. C. R. R. Co., 120 Kentucky, 15; Coley v. I. C. R. R. Co., 121 Kentucky, 385; Dudley v. I. C. R. R. Co., 127 Kentucky, 221; Underwood v. I. C. R. R. Co., 31 Ky. L. R. 595, holding that the state court may try issues of fact upon a petition for removal, is a doctrine unsound in |