greater or less extent of the trespasses committed. See Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15. Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 449. It has been intimated by the Georgia court that relief would be granted, irrespective of possession. Pierce v. Middle Georgia Land & Lumber Co., 131 Georgia, 99. Griffin v. Sketoe, 30 Georgia, 300. See also Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 536, 543. The other ground mentioned is that if Ashburn should sue, his deed would not enable him to recover. But in any case proper for relief the deed does not convey a good title. It is enough that the invalidity does not appear upon its face, but rests partly on matter in pais, and that possession under it for seven years might give a title by the Georgia Code,. § 3589, embodying earlier statutes.

The fact that Crawford during the pendency of the suit had cut the trees on a portion of the land did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court. If that or the other grounds that we have mentioned were the reasons for dismissing the bill as to him, it should be retained and damages assessed. Milkman v. Ordway, 106 Massachusetts, 232, 253. If different facts from those that we have discussed were found to exist it does not appear.

It is urged that the bill is multifarious. But it charges a conspiracy between the several trespassers, and trespasses extending over the greater part of the four contiguous lots treated as one. The objection of multifariousness is an objection of inconvenience. The defendants did not stand upon their demurrers setting it up. There has been a trial after long delay. In view of the evidence and the fact that the objection did not prevail with the lower courts, we are of opinion that it should not prevail now. While the decree must be reversed, our decision is without prejudice to any finding upon the facts consistent with the rules that we have laid down.

Decree reversed and case remitted to the Circuit Court for further proceedings.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

215 U.S.

SCOTT COUNTY MACADAMIZED ROAD COMPANY v. STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. HINES, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OF CAPE GIRARDEAU COUNTY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 52. Argued December 7, 8, 1909.-Decided December 20, 1909.

Following the construction given by the state court, held that where a charter for a toll-road provided that the privileges granted should continue fifty years subject to the right of the county to acquire it after twenty years, all privileges ceased on the expiration of the fifty years; and the owner of the franchise was not deprived of his property without due process of law, nor was the obligation of the contract in its charter impaired, by an injunction, from further maintaining toll-gates on such road.

207 Missouri, 54, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Edward S. Robert, with whom Mr. Douglas W. Robert and Mr. William L. Becktold were on the brief, for plaintiff in

error:

A franchise or charter granted by a State to a quasi-public corporation is a contract the obligation of which cannot be impaired. St. Clair Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 161 U. S. 663.

The decision of a state court, holding as a matter of construction, that a particular charter or charter provision does not constitute a contract, is not binding on this court. Mobile & O. R. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486.

Due process of law requires compensation to be made, or secured, to the owner of private property when it is taken by

215 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

a State or under its authority for public use. C., N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321; C., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269.

A judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use without compensation made or secured to the owner, is wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 222; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 526.

Corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional provision forbidding the deprivation of property without due process, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Covington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; People v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658, 683; Railway Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; United States v. Express Co., 164 U. S. 686; Railway v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 268; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Cooper &c. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727.

If an instrument is subject to two constructions, the rule that the construction most favorable to the public should be adopted does not apply, if its application would obviously defeat the legislative intent. A fortiori the rule has no application where the meaning of the grant is clear and free from ambiguity. Moran v. Miami Co., 2 Black, 722; St. Clair Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, supra.

Mr. M. A. Dempsey and Mr. T. D. Hines for defendant in

error:

The charter expressly provides that the privileges granted by the charter shall continue for fifty years. The company and its franchise to take tolls therefore expired February 24, 1903. Session Laws, 1853, 337, 338.

The roadbed in question was a public highway established by public authority for public use, and is to be regarded as a public easement and not as private property. The right to

VOL. CCXV-22

Argument for Defendant in Error.

215 U.S.

travel over the road was an easement vested in the public, and when the charter expired this easement continued, disburdened of tolls, but otherwise unaffected. State v. Hannibal County Road Co., 138 Missouri, 332; Campbell on Highways, No. 8, p. 8; No. 14, p. 11; Benedict v. Gait, 3 Barb. 469; Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y. 516; St. Clair Co. Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63; 27 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 320; Pittsburg &c. v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. 583; State v. Lake, 8 Nevada, 276; State v. Curry, 6 Nevada, 75; State v. Dayton, 10 Nevada, 115; Wood v. Turnpike Co., 24 California, 474; Craig v. People, 47 Illinois, 487; Police v. Jury, 44 La. Ann. 137; Hayward v. Mayor, 8 Barb. 492; Hooker v. Utica, 12 Wend. 371; State v. Passaic, 42 N. J. L. 524; State v. Mayor, 29 N. J. L. 441; Kansas v. Lawrence, 22 Kansas, 438; Blood v. Woods, 95 California, 78; People v. Davidson, 21 Pac. Rep. 538; State v. Maine, 27 Connecticut, 641; Central Bridge v. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; People v. Newburg, 86 N. Y. 302; Heath v. Barrymore, 50 N. Y. 302.

The words "perpetual succession" mean continuous succession during the life of the charter only. Of themselves they do not confer perpetuity upon a corporation. The word "perpetual" qualifies the succession and not the duration of the corporation. State ex rel. v. Payne, 129 Missouri, 477; Ralls Co. Case, 138 Missouri, 332.

The claim of fee simple to the roadbed as a defense is untenable.

No constitutional question is involved. The county does not seek to take any property without compensation or without process of law, but merely seeks by process of law an adjudication as to whether or not the right or franchise to take tolls has expired.

Injunction is a proper remedy. This court is without jurisdiction to determine the appeal. There is no Federal question in the case. Mills v. County of St. Clair, 8 How. 567; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; New Orleans v. N. O. Waterworks Co., 185 U. S. 336; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2

Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 583; Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How. 317; Miss. & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit brought in pursuance of a statute to enjoin the plaintiff in error from maintaining toll-gates upon a road alleged to be a public highway. The defendant justifies under a charter granted by a special act of February 24, 1853, which contained the following section: "8. The privileges granted in this charter shall continue for fifty years; provided, that the county courts of the counties of Cape Girardeau and Scott may, at the expiration of twenty years, or any time thereafter purchase said road at the actual cost of construction, and make it a free road." Mo. Laws, 1853, pp. 337, 338. The defendant says that it has not received the cost of construction, and sets up the Constitution of the United States, Art. I, § 10, the Fourteenth Amendment, and other less material clauses. The reply is that the right to take tolls expired on February 24, 1903, when the fifty years contemplated by the charter had elapsed. There was a trial and a judgment for the relator, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, and the case was brought here. State ex rel. v. Road Co., 207 Missouri, 54.

The plaintiff in error contends that the privileges referred to in 8 are but three: the life of the corporation brought into being by the charter, the exclusive right to maintain a toll-road granted by § 2, and the right to take higher tolls than those allowed to toll companies organized under a general act then in force; but that it cannot be deprived of its right to take tolls except by a purchase of the road at the actual cost of construction. It says that the provision for the right to purchase at the expiration of twenty years 'or at any time thereafter' imports that the right to make the road free, even after fifty years, can be gained only by pur