verb in the very next article. ("The Choctaw Nation of Indians consent and hereby cede.") Therefore the second article says 'to them' rather than 'to it,' just as it says "while they (i. e., the Nation) shall exist as a Nation," and it adds to the untechnical 'in fee simple' untechnical words of limitation of a kind that would indicate the intent to confine the grant to the Nation, which 'successors' would not, and at the same time to imply nothing as to the rules for inheritance of tribal rights, as "heirs" might have seemed to do. We may compare "for the Government of the Choctaw Nation of Red People and their descendants," in Article 4. The word was addressed to the Indian mind.

There is not a suggestion of any trust in the language to either the technical or the unlearned reader, and it is most unlikely that the United States would have attempted to impose one upon the Choctaws in favor of the existing members of the tribe in the very "Treaty' that dealt with them as a quasi independent nation recognized by Article 5 as having the right to make war, and that by the fourth article bound the United States to secure to that nation "the jurisdiction and government of all the persons and property that may be within their limits west," etc. It is true that in further promising to secure the nation from all laws except those enacted by their own National Councils, the fourth article adds "not inconsistent with the Constitution, Treaties and Laws of the United States;" but this addition is far from suggesting that a constitutional right of property has been conferred upon a designated class, that might be enforced in a Circuit Court of the United States by a bill in equity against what was called a Nation. How far any one was from that understanding or from doubting that all the rights granted by the United States were in the Choctaw Nation is shown by the treaty with the Chickasaws upon which the plaintiffs rely. The nation had no right to make that treaty as it did, if it was subject to the trust supposed. Again, the limitation of time, 'while they shall exist as a nation and live on it,' shows that

the grant has reference to the corporate existence of the nation as such, and very plainly qualifies the absoluteness of the earlier words, "in fee simple." The suggestion that it limits the duration of the legal title only but leaves a trust outstanding is simply arbitrary. If the plural signifies the members of a class constituted cestuis que trust the limitation would attach to the trust. But the only answer necessary is that no such separation or intent can be discovered in the words.

What we have said shows another sufficient answer to the plaintiffs' claim. They say and argue, as they must in order to make out their right to a distribution to themselves, that the Choctaws and Chickasaws no longer exist as nations. But if so, the grant also was at an end when the nations ceased to be, and it rested with the bounty of the United States to decide what should be done with the land, except so far as it already had been decided by treaties or statutes upon which the plaintiffs do not and cannot rely. It is said that by Article 18, in case of any well-founded doubt as to the construction of the treaty, it is to be construed most favorably toward the Choctaws. But there is no well-founded doubt, except whether the construction contended for would have been regarded as favorable to the Choctaws, since it would have cut down the autonomy that the treaty so carefully expressed. See further Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 488. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 307. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 568.

The residue of the bill becomes immaterial upon the failure of the plaintiffs to make out a title under the treaty and patent. It refers to the act of June 28, 1898, c. 517, 30 Stat. 495, and the earlier statutes leading up to it, which established a commission, ordered it to prepare correct rolls of citizenship, and provided by § 21 of the act of 1898 that the rolls so made, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, should be final, (See also Acts of March 3, 1901, c. 832, 31 Stat. 1058, 1077; April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.) By § 11 a divi

sion was to be made among the "citizens" of the tribes according to the rolls, and by § 12 the allottees were to have undisturbed possession when the report of the allotments had been made to the Secretary of the Interior and confirmed by him. By 29 an agreement with the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the matter was ratified, and by act of July 1, 1902, c. 1362, 32 Stat. 641, a further agreement was ratified, which again excluded all except those whose names were on the roll. Art. 35. The bill charges that these agreements, as well as a part of the act of 1898, were void as excluding some of the plaintiffs who were not residents of the nation on June 28, 1898, and as not having been approved by the class, or a majority of the class, alleged to have been designated by the treaty and patent that we have discussed. The bill goes on to allege that rolls were prepared by the Commission, and approved by the Secretary, within the time allowed by the statutes, (Act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, § 2, 34 Stat. 137), and that the time has expired, but the rolls were not made in conformity to the act of 1898, and are not correct but fraudulent, in various particulars set forth.

But these allegations make out no case for the plaintiffs. It is said that the statutes recognize individual rights as already existing. It is true that by a treaty of June 22, 1855, 11 Stat. 611, the United States guaranteed the lands "to the members of the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes, their heirs and successors, to be held in common; so that each and every member of either tribe shall have an equal, undivided interest in the whole" with provisos. But the plaintiffs do not claim under this treaty or mention it in their bill, or a treaty of April 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 769, by Articles 11-36 of which the change from common to individual ownership was agreed, and it was provided that unselected land should "be the common property of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in their corporate capacities," etc. Art. 33. They might be descendants or the members of the tribe as it was in 1839 or 1842, and yet not members or heirs of members of the tribe

of 1854, therefore it is unnecessary to construe this treaty. Neither do the plaintiffs claim under any title to be derived from the statute providing for distribution according to the rolls of citizenship. They do not allege that they are citizens or attempt to bring themselves within any grant later than the treaty and patent that we have discussed. They disclose that their names are not upon the rolls and that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior has been against them and they show no reason for our not accepting the rolls and decision as final according to the terms of the distributing acts. See West v. Hitchcock, 205 U. S. 80; Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249, 259.

Decree affirmed.

MARBLES v. CREECY, CHIEF OF POLICE.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 23. Submitted November 5, 1909.—Decided November 15, 1909.

The executive of a State upon whom a demand is made for the surrender of a fugitive from justice may act on the papers in the absence of, and without notice to, the accused, and it is for that executive to determine whether he will regard the requisition papers as sufficient proof that the accused has been charged with crime in, and is a fugitive from justice from, the demanding State, or whether he will demand, as he may if he sees fit so to do, further proof in regard to such facts.

A notice in the requisition papers that the demanding State will not be responsible for any expenses attending the arrest and delivery of the fugitive does not affect the legality of the surrender so far as the rights of the accused under the Constitution and laws of the United States are concerned.

The executive of the surrendering State need not be controlled in the discharge of his duty by considerations of race or color, or, in the

Argument for Appellant.

215 U. S.

absence of proof, by suggestions that the alleged fugitive will not be fairly dealt with by the demanding State.

On habeas corpus the court can assume that a requisition made by an executive of a State is solely for the purpose of enforcing its laws and that the person surrendered will be legally tried and adequately protected from illegal violence.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. George D. Reynolds for appellant:

The provisions of § 5278, Rev. Stat., will be strictly construed and all the requirements of the statute must be respected. Ex parte Hart, 63 Fed. Rep. 259; Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. Rep. 298; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

The following facts should have been clearly stated in the warrant issued by the Governor of surrendering State to show that it is issued in a case authorized by law and the power to issue the warrant depends upon the following facts:

1. That the person is charged in some State or Territory of the United States with treason, felony or other crime.

2. That he had fled from justice and was found to be a fugitive from justice.

3. That he was found in the State.

4. That the executive authority of the State from which he fled had demanded his delivery to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

If the warrant omits to state that the person has fled from justice or that he is found in the asylum it is defective. Matter of Romaine, 23 California, 585, 592.

The executive of the asylum State is not required by the act of Congress to cause the arrest of appellant and his delivery to the agent appointed to receive him without proof of the fact that he was a fugitive from justice. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642.

A warrant for arrest and return must recite and set forth the evidence necessary to authorize the state executive to issue it and unless it does it is illegal and void and the warrant is