rules and regulations are proven unreasonable.28 But whether a regulation of a state railroad commission, otherwise legal, is arbitrary and unreasonable because beyond the scope of the powers delegated to the commission, is not a Federal question.20 The commission may, subject to review thereof, maintain actions for penalties in case its orders are violated, and may upon proper notice make its orders executory.30 The act of the legislature of Minnesota, creating a railroad commission, is not unconstitutional in assuming to establish joint through rates or tariffs, over the lines of independent connecting railroads, and apportioning and dividing the joint earnings. Such a commission has a clear right to pass upon the reasonableness of contracts in which the public is interested, whether such contracts be made directly with the patrons of the road or for a joint action between railroads in the transportation of persons and property in which the public is indirectly concerned. And whether or not connecting roads may be compelled to enter into contracts as between themselves, and establish joint rates, it is none the less true that where a joint tariff between two or more roads has been agreed upon, such tariff is as much within the control of the legislature as if it related to transportation over a single line.31 Again, as the creation of a board of railroad commissioners and the extent of its powers; what the route of railroad companies created by the State may be; and whether parallel on competing lines may consolidate, are all matters which a State may regulate by its statutes, and the state courts are the absolute interpretators of such statutes; a decree of a state court requiring a railroad company, which does an interstate business, to con 28 State v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (Fla., 1906), 41 So. 705. 20 Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. 585. 30 Railroad Commission v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 111 La. 133, 35 So. 487. As to appeal from "decision, denial, direction or order" of municipal authorities to railroad commissioners, see Joyce on Elec. Law (2d ed.), § 360a. 31 Minneapolis & St. Louis Rd. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct. 900, 46 L. ed. 1151. struct its lines within the State in accordance with provisions of its charter and the directions of the state railroad commission, is not an interference with interstate commerce because compliance therewith entails expense or requires the exercise of eminent domain.32 § 168. Delegation to Railroad Commission-Public Utility Law of Wisconsin.-The Public Utility Law of Wisconsin of 1907, gives to the railroad commission of that State jurisdiction over public utilities and provides for the regulation thereof. Its specific provisions are given elsewhere herein,33 and its general features are those set forth in the appended note.34 32 Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Rd. Co. v. Mississippi, 210 U. S. 187. 33 See Appendix, herein. way companies, and all public util- vision and control extends to the 34 In an article, by Eugene A. Gilmore, upon "The Wisconsin Public Utilities Act," published in vol. 19, Green Bag (1907), p. 517, it is said: "By the legislation of 1905 and amendments thereto, and by the enactment of the 'Public Utilities Bill' at the recent session of the legislature, all forms of public business in Wisconsin are subject to the control and supervision of a commission of three men known as the 'Railroad Commission' appointed by the governor for six years, and confirmed by the Senate. The governor may at any time remove any commissioner for cause. By the 'Railroad Act' of 1905 this commission was first created, and all common carriers, including steam railroads, interurban electric railroads, bridge and terminal companies, express companies, car companies, sleeping-car companies and freight and freight-line companies were placed under its control. The recent legislation places under this same commission, tele- municipal operation of public utiligraph companies, urban street rail- ties. * * * The object of the § 169. Delegation to Railroad and Warehouse Commission-Railroads-Carriers-Increase of Capital Stock.The authority vested in a railroad and warehouse commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgment, what are equal and reasonable rates and fares for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company, is not a delegation of legislative power.35 And as the regulation of the business conducted by common carriers is one over which the legislature has full power to act, ample authority can by law be conferred upon a railroad and warehouse commission to call for information on any carrier, whether a natural or artificial person, resident or non-resident, carrying on business within the State, where such information is absolutely essential for the proper conduct of the carrier and the protection of the public. And a statutory provision empowering the courts to direct the manner of service of notice upon such common carrier, when proceeded against, does not constitute a delegation of legislative power to the judiciary.36 A state legislature may also pass a statute providing generally law is to secure adequate service perience of the Public Franchise from all public utilities under con- League of Massachusetts and from ditions which are fair and reasonable, the legislation in Massachusetts and not only to the public, but also to New York dealing with the same the corporations concerned, and at problem." Mr. Gilmore also conthe same time leave sufficient in- siders the following important and ducement for the improvement and characteristic features of the act, unextension of such utilities and the der the headlines of “Valuation"; further installation and develop- "Capitalization"; "Competition"; ment of similar utilities throughout "Municipal Ownership"; "Common the State. * * * The law is not Use of Facilities"; "Accounting and wholly an experiment, but is based Publicity"; "Depreciation"; "Conupon and follows a long line of Eng- trol of Rates and Service"; "Sliding lish legislation, dating as far back as Scale and Division of Surplus Pro1855, which has dealt, apparently ceeds"; and "Municipal Control." with great success, with the business of supplying gas for lighting and heating. Many of the provisions of the law have been suggested by the Sheffield Gas Acts of 1855 and 1866. The framers of the bill have also drawn from the information and ex 35 State v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782. 36 State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Adams Exp. Co., 66 Minn. 271, 273, 38 L. R. A. 225, 68 N. W. 1085, per Collins, J. for what purposes and upon what terms, conditions and limitations an increase of capital stock may be made, and it may confer upon a commission (a railroad and warehouse commission) the administrative duty of supervising any proposed increase of stock. It may also delegate to the commission the duty of finding the facts in each particular case, and empower and require it to allow the proposed increase where the facts exist which bring the case within the statute. But the legislature cannot, by any statute, authorize such commission in its judgment to allow an increase of a corporation's capital stock for such purposes and on such conditions or terms as it shall or may deem advisable, or in its discretion to refuse it, as such an attempt to confer authority would be a delegation of legislative power. And where the statute does delegate to a commission such legislative power, it is unconstitutional and void; a distinction exists between the delegation of legislative powers and administrative duties; that between the delegation of power to make a law, which involves a discretion as to which it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law." 37 § 170. Delegation to State Corporation Commission.—As State has inherent power to regulate and control public service corporations, operating within its limits, and to prescribe within reasonable bounds the facilities and conveniences which shall be furnished by them, it may delegate to or confer this power upon a body, such as a state corporation commission, although it possesses, to some extent, legislative, executive and judicial powers. And where such commission is, by the constitution and laws of a State, given control over common carriers of persons and goods as to matters relating to their public duties and charges, and the latter are given full opportunity, upon notice, to be heard as to their defense and also a right of appeal to the state court, they are not, by such legislation, deprived of their property without due process 37 State v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 445, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 250, 111 N. W. 289. of law. But although this applies to the exercise of its judicial powers, still, in exercising its legislative powers the commission is not obligated to give notice to the parties to be affected thereby. Again, the subjection of common carriers to the control of such corporation commission by the state constitution and laws does not deny to them the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of that provision of the Federal Constitution. The state constitution and laws apply alike in such case to all persons and companies similarly situated, and the classification is a reasonable one. Nor is the commission an illegal and invalid tribunal, even though invested to a certain extent with legislative, executive and judicial powers; nor does such grant of powers conflict with the Bill of Rights, which expressly provides that, "except as hereinafter provided, the legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be kept separate and distinct." But where a choice of either of two methods of performing a charter duty is given a corporation, it should not be limited to one of them by the commission, nor should the latter make any order affecting the right of a connecting carrier who has had no notice and was not a party to the proceeding.38 Again, while a State in the exercise of its police powers may confer authority on an administrative agency to make reasonable regulations as to the place, time and manner of delivery of merchandise, moving in channels of interstate commerce, such commerce cannot be directly burdened thereby, and any regulation which does so is repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and this applies to an order of a state corporation commission which requires a railway company to deliver cars from another State to a consignee on a private siding beyond its own right of way as it constitutes a burden on interstate commerce; but quære whether such an order applicable solely to state business would be repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.30 The state corporation commission, in determining the 38 Winchester & Strasburg Rd. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 264, 55 S. E. 692. 39 McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. 722, 50 L. ed. 1142, aff'g but modifying Southern |