of incorporation.33 So a statute giving a lien and providing for its enforcement against railroad companies which is unconstitutional in part may be valid as to the rest.34 Nor will a statute imposing conditions upon foreign corporations doing business in a State be void as a whole even though it includes invalid provisions, where such invalid parts are separable.35 So where statutes empower villages to supply water for use of the inhabitants and regulate water rates for fire protection in certain cases and provide for taxation to meet deficiencies from water receipts, such provisions as are not essential may be eliminated.36 And although an attempt of a city to make exclusive a franchise for waterworks may be invalid, still the valid part of the grant may be enforced.37 So where the manifestly clear intention of the legislature is to effect a change in a system of waterworks and the maintenance thereof, and by eliminating the unconstitutional provisions of a statute the old system must still be relied on, the whole enactment will be void.38 Where a code provided that a city could not grant

a material relation to valid part which depends thereon, whole act invalid).

plies only where it is plain that the lawmaking body would have enacted the legislation with the provision eliminated. It was so said in the recent case of Howard v. Illinois

"An act will not necessarily be condemned as a whole because some separable part is vulnerable to con- Central Rd. Co (Employers' Liastitutional objections. * * But, there is authority for the proposition, that even though the provisions of an act are separable, and not dependent one upon the other, the rule that the unconstitutional provision may be discarded and the valid provision allowed to stand ap

33 Kirksey v. Florida & G. Plank Road Co., 7 Fla. 23, 68 Am. Dec. 426.

34 New England Engineering Co. v. Oakwood St. Rd. Co. (C. C.), 75 Fed. 162.

35 Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611, 47 L. ed. 328, 23 Sup. Ct. 206.

*bility Cases), 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. ed. Without stopping for a discussion of the proposition as announcing a rule of construction we may accept it as correct in principles." Eckerson v. City of Des Moines (Iowa, 1908), 115 N. W. 177, 188, per Bishop, J.

36 Skaneateles Water Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 54 N. Y. Supp. 1115, 33 App. Div. 642, aff'd 161 N. Y. 154, 55 N. E. 562.

37 City of Gadsden v. Mitchell, 145 Ala. 137, 40 So. 557.

38 Blades v. Board of Water Commissioners of the City of Detroit, 122 Mich. 366, 81 N. W. 271.

a right to operate a system of waterworks for a period longer than a certain number of years, and an ordinance in question granted such right for a longer term and an equal right thereafter with all others supplying such city with water, it was held that the grant, in so far as it was within the term allowed under the statute, was valid, but that it was void for the period in excess thereof, and also that an act of the General Assembly legalizing the void portion of such ordinance was invalid.30 Again, where a statute, which directs a board of railroad commissioners not to include the embankments, tunnels, cuts, ties, trestles or bridges of railroads in the schedule of property of railroad companies, prepared by them for the purpose of assessment of taxes, is in conflict with the constitution relating to the assessment and taxation of property within a State, it does not render the remainder of the statute invalid where it is separable therefrom.40 But while the act of Congress of 1906, known as the Employers' Liability Act, embraces subjects within the authority of Congress to regulate commerce, it also includes subjects not within its constitutional power, and the two are so interblended in the statute that they are incapable of separation, and the statute is therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and non-enforcible.41 So unreasonable features of an ordinance and the other portions thereof may be so interdependent that the whole will be void. This rule has been applied to an ordinance granting a franchise and making a contract with a heat, light and power company."

42

§ 236. Intent-Effect to Be Given to Every Part. The purpose of construction or interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent.43 The whole and every part of the

39 Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa, 234, 91 N. W. 1031.

40 Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U. S. 97, 7 Sup. Ct. 469, 30 L. ed. 588. "Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois Central Rd. Co.), 207 U. S. 463, 464, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L.

ed.

42 Le Feber v. West Allis, 119 Wis. 608, 97 N. W. 203, 100 Am. St. Rep. 917. See §§ 231, 232, herein, as to presumption and exception.

43 Colorado: Murray v. Hobson, 10 Colo. 66, 13 Pac. 921.

Illinois: Andel v. People, 106 Ill. App. 558.

Indiana: Hunt v. Lake Shore & M.

statute, each section, provision, clause and word should be examined, if necessary, to determine what was intended, and all should be made to harmonize and be given effect, if possible; the intention is to be ascertained from the language used, and the words should be applied to effectuate such intent.44 So

Alaska: Chambers v. Solner, 1 York, New Haven & Hartford Rd. Alaska, 271. Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 704; People,

Arkansas: Wheat v. Smith, 50 Terry, v. Keller, 54 N. Y. Supp. 1011, Ark. 266, 7 S. W. 161. 35 App. Div. 493, case aff'd 158 N.

Colorado: Denver v. Campbell, 33 Y. 187, 52 N. E. 1107. Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142.

District of Columbia: Duehay v. District of Columbia, 25 App. D. C. 434.

words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their proper connections, giving each in its place its proper force.45 In seeking the intent of the legislature, in case of ambiguity in the language used, regard must be had to the subject-matter of the statute, to what the legislature may be presumed to have known and anticipated; the difficulties, mischief or evil to be remedied, or the cause inducing the enactment and the general purpose and design indicated by the act.46

§ 237. Plain and Manifest Intention.-What is clearly and plainly expressed evidences the legislative intent,47 and language which is clear and unambiguous must be construed as written; 48 nor is the manifest and plain intention to be defeated

Virginia: Smith v. Bryan, 100 Va. 199, 4 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 121, 40 S. E. 652.

West Virginia: Building & Loan Assoc. v. Sohn, 54 W. Va. 101, 46 S. E. 222; Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. E. 484.

stances and understanding, at the time the law was framed." Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo (Toledo Bank v. Bond), 1 Ohio St. 622, 637, per Bartley, C. J.

When there is an ambiguity in the language of a statute it may be

45 Building & Loan Assoc. v. Sohn, necessary to inquire into the objects 54 W. Va. 101, 46 S. E. 222.

of the legislature in its enactment; or if it be a private act, the purpose of the beneficiaries in asking for it; but when the language is clear, and

46 United States: McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287, 41 L. ed. 437, 17 Sup. Ct. 92. Louisiana: Richard v. Lazard, 108 needs no interpretation, and leads to La. 540, 32 So. 559.

Maine: Gray V. Cumberland County Commrs., 83 Me. 429, 22 Atl. 376.

Maryland: Maryland Agricultural College v. Atkinson, 102 Md. 557, 62 Atl. 1035.

West Virginia: Webb v. Ritter, 60 W. Va. 193, 206, 54 S. E. 484.

"It is a rule of interpretation, of universal application, that a law is to be so construed as to carry out the intention of the maker, and that to ascertain that intention, not merely is the language of the law to be looked to, but also the subject-matter to which it relates, the evil provided against, and the attending circum

no absurd conclusion, this will not be done. Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. 832, 27 L. ed. 812.

Where the words of a statute are obscure or doubtful, the intention of the legislature is to be resorted to in order to discover their meaning. People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 357, 8 Am. Dec. 243.

47 Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 32 L. ed. 106, 9 Sup. Ct. 651, 2 Denver Leg. N. 193, case reverses 34 Fed. 845; Barnard v. Gall, 43 La. Ann. 959, 10 So. 5; Maryland Agricultural College v. Atkinson, 102 Md. 557, 62 Atl. 1035.

48 Walker v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 110 La. 718, 34 So. 749.

49

by construction; and, generally, there is no room for construction or interpretation where the language is clear and unambiguous, its application plain, and its meaning certain.50

§ 238. Natural and Reasonable Effect and ConstructionOrdinary or Popular Meaning-Absurdity or Injustice.—In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose and its constitutional validity must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect; 51 and a fair, reasonable and natural construction is to be given if possible, unless it is evident that the language was used in a peculiar or restricted sense.52 So the general terms of a statute are to be reasonably construed, leaving the provisions of the enactment practically operative.53 And an ordinance which requires that the line of a railroad company shall be lighted, if sufficiently definite to inform the company of such requirement and the manner and time of carrying out its provisions, even though it does not specify a particular time, must be reasonably construed.54 Words and phrases are presumed to be used in their natural and ordinary sense; the common, popular or received import of words furnishes the general rule of interpretation,55 unless it is ap

State, Barton County, v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. (C. C.), 32 Fed. 722.

50 United States v. Colo. & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 321, 324; Johnson v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 117 Fed. 462, 54 C. C. A. 508; Swarts v. Siegel, 117 Fed. 13, 54 C. C. A. 399; Chudnovski v. Eckels, 232 Ill. 312, 83 N. E. 846; McGowan v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 60 N. J. L. 198, 38 Atl. 671; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Alexander, 7 Okla. 591, 54 Pac. 42, aff'g 7 Okla. 579, 52 Pac. 944.

51 Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30, 43 L. ed. 60, 18 Sup. Ct. 768; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. ed. 543.

52 Opinion of Justices, In re (N. H., 1907), 68 Atl. 873; Wehrenberg v.

New York, New Haven & Hartford
R. Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 704.

Reasonable and not technical meaning should be given. Jasper v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 202.

Reasonable construction to be given statutes prescribing tax sales. Kane v. Garfield, 60 Vt. 79, 13 Atl. 800.

53 Electro Magnetic M. & D. Co. v. Van Auken, 9 Colo. 204.

54 St. Mary, Village of, v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 60 Ohio St. 136, 53 N. E. 795.

55 United States: Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. (57 U. S.) 251, 14 L. ed. 925; United States v. Colo. & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 321.

Alabama: Western Union Teleg. Co. v. State Board of Assessment,