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Later Act.-Words in a subsequent act are presumed to be used in the same sense as in a prior act under which they have acquired, through judicial interpretation, a definite meaning, unless a contrary intent appears.62 So the construction of a subsequent statute will follow that of a previous one from which it is derived where the same words are employed in the same connection.63 And where the Federal Supreme Court has given a construction to relative provisions in different parts of a statute, and Congress then makes a new enactment respecting the same subject-matter, with provisions in different sections bearing like relations to each other, and without indicating a purpose to vary from that construction, the court is bound to construe the two provisions in the different sections of the new statute in the same sense which, in previous statutes, had uniformly been given to them, and not invent a new application and relation of the two classes.64

§ 269. Derivative Statutes-Construction of Statutes Adopted from Foreign State or Country.-The known adjudged construction of a statute by the highest court of a foreign State or country where it was enacted is generally to be given to it when such enactment is thereafter adopted by another State or country, unless such interpretation is contrary to the spirit and policy of the adopting State, or country, or unless circumstances are so different as to necessitate a different rule.65 So if Congress adopts a state statute it adopts

02 The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440, 25 v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414, 20 Sup. L. ed. 168. Ct. 155, 44 L. ed. 219, case reverses 9 App. D. C. 48.

63 Guggenheim Smelting Co., In re, 121 Fed. 153; Cooper v. Yoakum, 91 Tex. 391, 43 S. W. 871 (words of later statute adopted from earlier one, adopts construction); Sanders v. Bridges, 67 Tex. 93, 2 S. W. 663 (statute adopting language of prior enactment adopts its construction by highest tribunal.

Prior acts may be cited to solve but not to create an ambiguity. Hamilton

04 Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 81, 28 L. ed. 76, 3 Sup. Ct. 507.

65 United States: James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129, 24 Sup. Ct. 224, 48 L. ed. 328 (a statute copied from a similar statute of a foreign State or country is generally presumed to be adopted with the construction which it already has received); Henrietta

its construction.66 But the rule that the known and settled construction of the statute of one State will be regarded as

Mining & Milling Co. v. Gardner, 173 U. S. 123, 43 L. ed. 637, 19 Sup. Ct. 327; Boise City Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 123 Fed. 232; Coulter v. Stafford (C. C.), 48 Fed. 266.

with the company by a city; limitation of indebtedness of municipality).

Kansas: Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35, 53 (Comp. Laws, 1879, chap. 84, § 29, adopted from another State, making railroad Muheim companies liable for damages to employee by negligence of its agents, etc.). Compare State v. Campbell (Kansas, 1906), 85 Pac. 784. Massachusetts: Ryalls v. Me

Arizona: Costello V. (Ariz., 1906), 84 Pac. 906. Compare Copper Queen Consol. Mining Co. v. Territorial Board of Equalization (Ariz., 1906), 84 Pac. 511.

Arkansas: McNutt v. McNutt chanics Mills, 150 Mass. 190, 191(Ark., 1906), 95 S. W. 778.

Florida: Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Beazley (Fla., 1908), 45 So. 761 (unless contrary to the spirit and policy of the laws of the adopting State; a case of liability of railroad company; fellow servant).

Colorado: Chilcott v. Hartm, 23 Colo. 40, 45 Pac. 391, 35 L. R. A. 41; Omaha & G. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 5 L. R. A. 226, 21 Pac. 925, 2 Denver Leg. N. 281.

Connecticut: See West Hartford v. Hartford Water Commrs., 68 Conn. 323, 36 Atl. 786.

Dakota: White v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul R. Co., 5 Dak. 508, 41 N. W. 730.

193, 5 L. R. A. 667, 22 N. E. 766 (Employers' Liability Act, Stat. 1887, c. 270, copied verbatim with same variations of detail from the English Stat., 43 & 44 Vict., c. 42); Pratt v. American Bell Teleph. Co., 141 Mass. 225, 227, 5 N. E. 307, 55 Am. St. Rep. 465 (Stock Jobbing Act, Pub. Stat., c. 78, § 6).

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Minnesota: Nicolet National Bank' v. City Bank, 38 Minn. 85, 8 Am. St. Rep. 643, 35 N. W. 577.

Missouri: Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 45, 20 S. W. 101, 16 L. R. A. 754, 35 Cent. L. J. 305, 46 Alb. L. Jour. 204, aff'g 17 S. W. 76 (statutes from other States construed in subordination to their constitution and laws).

Montana: Oleson v. Wilson, 20 Mont. 544, 52 Pac. 372, 63 Am. St. Rep. 639; First National Bank v. Bell Silver & Copper Mining Co., 8

District of Columbia: Strasburger v. Dodge, 12 App. D. C. 37, 26 Wash. L. Rep. 8 (adopted without material change, carries construction). Idaho: Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho, Mont. 32, 19 Pac. 403. Compare 426, 75 Pac. 246.

Indiana: Laporte, City of, v. Gamewell Fire Alarm Teleg. Co., 146 Ind. 466, 469, 45 N. E. 588, 35 L. R. A. 686, 58 Am. St. Rep. 359 (contract for fire alarm system made

Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Sparrow, 29 Mont. 132, 74 Pac. 197, 64 L. R. A. 128.

Nebraska: Forester v. Kearney National Bank, 49 Neb. 655, 68 N. W. 1059.

ce Willis V. Eastern Trust & Ct. 347, 42 L. ed. 752, 26 Wash. L. Banking Co., 169 U. S. 295, 18 Sup. Rep. 166.

accompanying its adoption by another is not applicable where that construction had not been announced when the statute was adopted; nor when the statute is changed in the adoption.67 Nor is such construction absolutely binding where it is subsequently overruled in the State of original enactment." And where a statute of one State has been substantially adopted in another and as enacted in the latter is adopted in still another State and the second adopting State had declined to follow the construction of the State of its original enactment, and a case arose in the third adopting State, the court was held at liberty to follow its own judgment in the interpretation of the statute and was not obliged to follow the construction given such enactment by the second adopting State. Again, subsequent additions and modifications of adopted statutes are not adopted where there is not an expressed or strongly implied intent so to do.70 Where English statutes have been

New Jersey: State, Anderson, v. Camden, 58 N. J. L. 515, 33 Atl. 846. North Carolina: Bridgers v. Taylor, 102 N. C. 86, 8 S. E. 893, 3 L. R. A. 376.

Oklahoma: National Live Stock Commission Co. v. Taliaferro (Okla., 1908), 93 Pac. 983.

South Dakota: Yankton Sav. Bank v. Gutterson, 15 S. Dak. 486, 90 N. W. 144; Adams v. Grand Island & W. C. R. Co., 10 S. Dak. 239, 72 N. W. 577.

Tennessee: Compare Smith v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 115 Tenn. 543.

67 Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 293, 35 L. ed. 1018, 12 Sup. Ct. 227 (taxation; sales for taxes; railroads; lands).

Statute adopted from another State; rule as to adoption of construction and presumption that legislature had such construction in mind does not apply to decisions rendered after such adoption. Olin v. Denver

Utah: State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah, 312, 73 Pac. 562, 633; Dixon v. Ricketts, 26 Utah, 215, 72 Pac. 947; People v. Ritchie, 12 Utah, 180, 42 Pac. 209.

Wisconsin: State, Rogers, v. Wheeler, 97 Wis. 96, 72 N. W. 225; Milwaukee County v. Sheboygan, 94 Wis. 58, 68 N. W. 387; Pomeroy v. Pomeroy, 93 Wis. 262, 67 N. W. 430.

Such construction must have been by highest court and so long established as to raise presumption that legislature adopting it knew of such construction. Smith v. Baker, 5 Okla. 326, 49 Pac. 61.

& Rio Grande R. Co., 25 Colo. 177, 53 Pac. 454, 30 Chic. Leg. N. 427, 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 708.

68 Oleson v. Wilson, 20 Mont. 544, 52 Pac. 372, 63 Am. St. Rep. 639.

69 Coulam v. Doull, 133 U. S. 216, 33 L. ed. 596, 10 Sup. Ct. 253.

70 Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Southern R. Co. (C. C.), 89 Fed. 190; Andrews v. People, 173 Ill. 123, 50

adopted into our own legislation, the known and settled construction of those statutes by courts of law, has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts, or has been received with all the weight of authority." When a British statute is adopted by Congress by reference, such adoption always refers to the law existing at the time of adoption only and no subsequent British legislation affects it.72

$270. Re-enactment - Consolidation - Revised Statutes -Codes.—Where the language of a statute which has received a construction by the highest court is adopted by reenactment, or by a revision or consolidation of statutes or codes, it carries with it the construction given it before such adoption, unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature intended that it should, as adopted, receive a different interpretation. The presumption is, in such case, that the legisla

N. E. 335; Court of Insolvency v.
Meldon, 69 Vt. 110, 38 Atl. 167.

" McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 28 L. ed. 269, 4 Sup. Ct. 142.

The rule uniformly observed by the Federal Supreme Court, in construing statutes is to adopt the construction made by the courts of the country, by whose legislature the statute was enacted. This rule may be susceptible of some modification when applied to British statutes which are adopted in any of the States; by adopting them they become our own, as entirely as if they had been enacted by the legislature of the State. Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. (30 U. S.) 264, 8 L. ed. 120. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600, 40 L. ed. 819, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, rer Brown, J.

Statutes adopted from England; construction there will be of force. Jarvis v. Hitch, 161 Ind. 217, 67 N. E. 1057, citing numerous cases. 72 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 524, 9 L. ed. 1181.

The construction which British statutes had received in England, at the time of their adoption in this country, indeed, to the time of the separation of this country from the British empire, may very properly be considered as accompanying the statutes themselves, and forming an integral part of them; but however subsequent decisions may be respected, and they are entitled to great respect, their absolute authority is not admitted; if the English courts vary their construction of a statute which is common to both countries, the Federal Supreme Court asserts that it does not hold itself bound to fluctuate with them. Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. (30 U. S.) 264, 8 L. ed. 120.

73 United States: Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29, 36 L. ed. 609, 12 Sup. Ct. 799 (where the Revised Statutes adopt language of a previous statute, Congress must be considered as adopting that construction). Alabama: Potter v. State, 92

ture had in mind a known judicial construction.74 And where the language of the revision is fairly consistent with that of a prior statute it will be presumed that the revisers have not changed the law.75 If the United States Supreme Court has construed relative provisions in different parts of a statute and Congress then makes a new enactment on the same subjectmatter, with provisions bearing like relations, they must be construed in the same way.76 But an act included in a code by the codifier is not a part of such code when the latter was adopted before the passage of the act, and the enactment should be construed in the form in which it was enacted, independently of the code; 77 and a statute is not given greater efficacy by embodying it in a statutory revision.78 If the meaning is plain the courts cannot look to the statutes codified in the Revised Statutes, and repealed with their enactment, to see if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to interpret obscure and ambiguous phrases in the revision or to construe doubtful language used in expressing the meaning of Congress.79 Again, upon a revision of statutes

Ala. 37, 9 So. 402; Snider v. Barks, 84 Ala. 53, 4 So. 225; Woolsey v. Cade, 54 Ala. 378, 25 Am. Rep. 711.

Indiana: Hilliker v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., 152 Ind. 86, 52 N. E. 607.

Nebraska: State, Pearson, v. Cornell, 54 Neb. 647, 75 N. W. 25. Texas: Hussey v. Moser, 70 Tex. 42, 7 S. W. 606.

Wisconsin: State, Rochester, v. Racine County, 70 Wis. 543, 36 N. W. 399.

74 Woolsey v. Cade, 54 Ala. 378, 25 Am. Rep. 711. See White v. State, 134 Ala. 197, 32 So. 320; Camp v. Wabash R. Co., 94 Mo. App. 272, 68 S. W. 96.

Co., 110 U. S. 81, 28 L. ed. 76, 3 Sup.
Ct. 507.

"Rayford v. Faulk (Ala., 1908), 45 So. 714 (an act to regulate insurance business).

78 Knight v. Ocean County, 49 N. J. L. 485, 12 Atl. 625.

79 Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 508, 39 L. ed. 601; Dwight v. Merritt, 140 U. S. 213, 11 Sup. Ct. 568, 35 L. ed. 450.

The Revised Statutes of the United States must be accepted as law on the subjects they embrace, as it existed December 1, 1873. When their meaning is plain the court cannot recur to the original statutes to see if errors were committed in revising them, but may do so when necessary to interpret or construe doubtful v. Commonwealth Ins. language. United States v. Bowen,

75 Duffield v. Pike, 71 Conn. 521, 42 Atl. 641; Bartram v. Hopkins, 71 Conn. 505, 42 Atl. 645.

76 Claflin

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