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Syllabus.

THE KENSINGTON.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 15. Argued January 17, 1901.-Decided January 6, 1902.

"The Kensington," a steamer transporting passengers from Antwerp to New York, took on board at Antwerp, as such passengers, the petitioners in this case, and, in receiving them and their luggage, gave them a ticket containing, among other things, the following: (c) The shipowner or agent are not under any circumstances liable for loss, death, injury or delay to the passenger or his baggage arising from the act of God, the public enemies, fire, robbers, thieves of whatever kind, whether on board the steamer or not, perils of the seas, rivers or navigation, accidents to or of machinery, boilers or steam, collisions, strikes, arrest or restraint of princes, courts of law, rulers or people, or from any act, neglect or default of the shipowner's servants, whether on board the steamer or not or on board any other vessel belonging to the shipowner, either in matters aforesaid or otherwise howsoever. Neither the shipowner nor the agent is under any circumstances or for any cause whatever or however arising liable to an amount exceeding 250 francs for death, injury or delay of or to any passenger carried under this ticket. The shipowner will use all reasonable means to send the steamer to sea in a seaworthy state and well-found but does not warrant her seaworthiness. (d) The shipowner or agent shall not under any circumstances be liable for any loss or delay of or injury to passengers' baggage carried under this ticket beyond the sum of 250 francs at which such baggage is hereby valued, unless a bill of lading or receipt be given therefor and freight paid in advance on the excess value at the rate of one per cent or its equivalent in which case the shipowner shall only be responsible according to the terms of the shipowner's form of cargo bill of lading, in use from the port of departure. There was no proof specially tending to show that at the time the ticket was issued the attention of the travellers was called to the fact that it embodied exceptional stipulations relieving the company from liability, or that such conditions were agreed to. Held: (1) Following the courts below, that the loss must be presumed to have arisen from imperfect stowage:

(2) That testing the exemptions in the ticket by the rule of public policy, they were void:

(3) That the arbitrary limitation of 250 francs to each passenger, unaccompanied by any right to increase the amount by an adequate and reason-able proportional payment, was void.

Statement of the Case.

THE libel by which this action was commenced sought to recover the value of passengers' baggage which it was alleged the ship had wrongfully failed to deliver. The facts essential to be borne in mind in order to approach the questions arising for decision are as follows:

The International Navigation Company, a New Jersey corporation, on December 6, 1897, at the office of its Paris agency, issued to Mrs. and Miss Bleecker, the wife and daughter of an officer of the United States Navy, a steamer ticket for a voyage from Antwerp to New York on the Kensington, a steamer in the control of the company, advertised to sail from Antwerp on December the 11th. The ticket was delivered to Mrs. Bleecker, who at the time made part payment of the passage money. The baggage of the two passengers was shipped by rail to Antwerp, to the care of the agent of the company there. Mrs. Bleecker, at Antwerp, on the 10th of December, paid the remainder of the passage money, and it was entered on the ticket. The baggage having in the meanwhile been received, the charges which the agent at Antwerp had advanced were refunded and a receipt was issued. It was stated therein that the value of the baggage was unknown, and that it was shipped subject to the conditions contained in the company's steamer ticket and bill of lading. Mrs. Bleecker and her daughter embarked, and the steamer sailed on the 11th of December. The ticket was subsequently taken up by the purser.

The baggage was stowed in what was known as number 2, upper steerage deck. The voyage was an exceptionally rough one, the ship encountering heavy seas and winds, rolled from thirty-eight to forty-five degrees on either side during the height of the gale, and was obliged to heave to for about fifteen hours. On arrival at New York the baggage was found to be totally destroyed. By constant shifting it had been reduced to an almost unrecognizable mass, was commingled with débris of broken china and straw, and covered with water. The first was occasioned by stowing crates of china in the same compartment. The presence of the water was explained by the fact that an exhaust pipe which passed through the compartment

Statement of the Case.

had been broken by the shifting of the contents of the compartment, and hence the exhaust escaped into the compartment.

There is no possible view which can be taken of the facts by which the loss of the baggage was brought about by which the ship could be held responsible if the steamer ticket was in and of itself a complete contract, and all the conditions or exceptions legibly printed on the face thereof were lawful. The ticket was signed by the agent of the company as Paris, was countersigned by the agent at Antwerp, but was not signed by either Mrs. Bleecker or her daughter. One of the conditions printed on the ticket provided that there should be no liability to each passenger, "under any circumstances," beyond the sum of 250 francs, "at which such baggage is hereby valued," unless an increased value be declared and an additional sum paid as provided by the condition.

There was no proof tending to show that at the time the ticket was issued the attention of Mrs. Bleecker or her daughter was called to the fact that it embodied exceptional stipulations, relieving the company from liability, or that such conditions were agreed to, except in so far as a meeting of minds on the subject may be inferred from the fact of the delivery of the ticket by the company, and its acceptance, and that it contained on its face, in small but legible type, among others, the stipulations which are relied upon. The testimony of Mrs. Bleecker and her daughter was that when the ticket was received it was put aside without reading it, and that it was not subsequently examined before it was delivered to the ship's officer. The District Court held that the loss of the baggage was attributable to bad stowage; that the ticket and the conditions printed on it were a contract binding upon the parties, so far as the conditions were lawful. The conditions generally relieving from liability for negligence were held to be void, but the stipulation as to the value of the baggage was held valid; recovery was allowed only for the equivalent of 250 francs to each. 88 Fed. Rep. 331.

On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. 94 Fed. Rep. 885.

The case by the allowance of a writ of certiorari is here for. review.

Opinion of the Court.

Mr. Roger Foster for petitioners.

Mr. Henry Galbraith Ward for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The District Court held, although the condition of the weather might account for the shifting of the baggage, that result could also have arisen from its bad stowage, and in the absence of all proof by the ship that the baggage had been properly stowed, when such proof was peculiarly within its reach, the loss must be presumed to have arisen from the imperfect stowage. The Circuit Court of Appeals, whilst in effect agreeing to this conclusion, in addition found that there was proof in the record tending to sustain the conclusion that the baggage had been improperly stowed, and that no proof even tending to rebut this testimony had been offered by the company. As in the argument at bar the conclusion of the court below on this subject was not seriously questioned, we content ourselves with saying that as a matter of fact we find them to be sustained, and therefore pass from their further consideration.

The loss of the baggage being then attributable to improper stowage, the question is, Was the vessel relieved from the consequence of its fault by the exceptions contained in the passenger ticket? The District Court decided "that a ticket of the character described for a transatlantic passage is a unilateral contract, and, like a bill of lading, is binding upon the person who receives it, so far as its provisions are reasonable and valid." In other words, the court held, although there was no proof of the meeting of the minds of the parties upon the subject of exceptional limitations to be imposed upon the contract of carriage, the receipt and retention of the ticket implied a unilateral contract embracing the exceptions found in legible characters on the face of the ticket. And being thus a part of the express and written contract, the exceptions would be enforced provided they were just and reasonable. The Circuit Court of Appeals in effect approved these views of the District Court.

Opinion of the Court.

Whilst apparently the question whether there was a unilateral contract necessarily arises first for consideration, such is not the case when the situation of the record is taken into view. For should we, in disposing of this question, determine that the rul ings of the court below as to the unilateral contract were correct, we would not thereby be relieved from deciding whether the conditions embodied in the contract were valid. On the other hand, should we conclude that the conditions relied on were void, there will be no occasion to determine the question of contract. We hence invert the logical order of consideration, and first come to determine whether the conditions enumerated in the ticket relieved from the responsibility otherwise resulting from the bad stowage of the baggage. In doing so we shall, of course, assume, for the purpose of this branch of the case only, that the conditions relied upon were a part of a unilateral contract, and were binding as far as they were just and reasonable. It is apparent if the carrier, in transporting the baggage, was governed by the act of February 13, 1893, c. 105, designated as the Harter Act, any provision in the ticket exempting from liability for fault in loading or stowage was void because inhibited by the express provisions of the statute. 27 Stat. 445. As,

however, the view which we take of the conditions expressed in the ticket will be equally decisive, whether or not the Harter Act concerns the carriage of passengers and their baggage, it becomes unnecessary to intimate any opinion as to whether the provisions of the act in question apply to such contracts. The exceptions found on the face of the ticket upon which the carrier depends are as follows:

"(c.) The shipowner or agent are not under any circumstances liable for loss, death, injury or delay to the passenger or his baggage arising from the act of God, the public enemies, fire, robbers, thieves of whatever kind, whether on board the steamer or not, perils of the seas, rivers or navigation, accidents to or of machinery, boilers or steam, collisions, strikes, arrest or restraint of princes, courts of law, rulers or people, or from any act, neglect or default of the shipowner's servants, whether on board the steamer or not, or on board any other vessel belonging to the shipowner, either in matters aforesaid

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