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ADMIRALTY. 1. “The Kensington," a steamer transporting passengers from Antwerp to

New York, took on board at Antwerp, as such passengers, the petitioners in this case, and, in receiving them and their luggage, gave them a ticket containing, among other things, the following: “(c) The shipowner or agent are not under any circumstances liable for loss, death, injury or delay to the passenger or lis luggage arising from the act of God, the public enemies, fire, robbers, thieves of whatever kind, whether on board the steamer or not, perils of the seas, rivers or navigation, accidents to or of maohinery, boilers or steam, collisions, strikes, arrest or restraint of princes, courts of law, rulers or people, or from any act, neglect or default of the shipowner's servants, whether on board the steamer or not or on board any other vessel belonging to the shipowner, either in matters aforesaid or otherwise howsoever. Neither the shipowner nor the agent is under any circumstances or for any cause whatever or however arising liable to an amount exceeding 250 francs for death, injury or delay of or to any passenger carried under this ticket. The shipowner will use all reasonable means to send the steamer to sea in a seaworthy state and well-found, but does not warrant her seaworthiness. (d) The shipowner or agent shall not under any circumstances be liable for any loss or delay of or injury to passengers' baggage caried under this ticket beyond the sum of 250 francs at which such baggage is hereby valued, .unless a bill of lading or receipt be given therefor and freight paid in advance on the excess value at the rate of one per cent or its equivalent, in which case the shipowner shall only be responsible according to the terms of the shipowner's form of cargo bill of lading, in vise from the port of departure. There was no proof specially tending to show that at the time the ticket was issued the attention of the travellers was called to the fact that it embodied exceptional stipulations relieving the company from liability, or that such conditions were agreed to. Held: 1. Following the courts below, that the loss must be presumed to have arisen from imperfect stowage: 2. That testing the exemptions in the ticket by the rule of public policy, they were void: 3. That the arbitrary limitation of 250 francs to each passenger, unaccompanied by any right to increase the amount by an adequate and reasonable proportional payment, was void.

The Kensington, 263. 2. Alexandroff, a conscript in the Russian naval service, was sent as one of

a detail of fifty-three men to Philadelphia, to become a part of the crew of a Russian cruiser then under construction at that port. On bis ar


rival at Philadelphia, the vessel was still upon the stocks, but was
shortly thereafter launched, and continued for some months in the
water still under construction. Alexandroff, who had reinained dur-
ing the winter at Philadelphia in the service and under the pay of the
Russian government, deserted the following spring, went to New York,
renounced liis allegiance to the emperor, declared his intention of be-
coming a citizen of the United States, and obtained employment.
Shortly thereafter, he was arrested as a deserter from a Russian ship of
war, and committed to prison, subject to the orders of the Russian
Vice Consul or commander of the cruiser. On writ of habeas corpus,
it was held : (1) that although the cruiser was not a ship when Alexau-
droff arrived at Philadelphia, slie became such upon being launched;
(2) that, under the treaty with Russia of 1832, in virtue of which these
proceedings were taken, she was a ship of war as distinguished from a
merchant vessel, notwithsta ing she had not received her equipment
or armament, and was still unfinished; (3) that, under her contract of
construction, she was from the beginning, and continued to be, the
property of the Russian Government, and was, therefore, a Russian
ship of war, potwithstanding she had not received her crew on board,
nor been commissioned for active service, and was still in process of
completion; (4) that Alexandroff, having been detailed to her service,
was, from the time she became a ship, a part of her crew within the
meaning of the treaty; (5) that the exhibition of official documents,
showing that he was a member of her crew, had been waived by his

admissions. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 424.
3. A ship becomes such when she is launched, and continues to be such so

long as hier identity is preserved: from the moment she takes the

water, she becomes the subject of admiralty jurisdiction, Ib.
4. A seaman becomes one of the crew of a mercbant vessel from the time

he signs the shipping articles, and of a man of war from the time he is

detailed to her service. Ib.
6. A decree in admiralty in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii,

in a case pending in the courts of the Republic of Hawaii at the time
of its annexation to the United States, is not subject to an appeal to
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Ex

parte Wilder's Steamship Co., 545.
6. The trustees of The Sun Association are to be charged with knowledge

of the extent of the power usually exerted by its managing editor, and
must be held to have acquiesced in the possession by him of such au-
thority, even though they had not expressly delegated it to him, and
he is held to have been vested with such power. An authority to
charter a yacht for the purpose of collecting news was clearly within
the corporate powers of the association. Sun Printing & Publishing

Association v. Moore, 642.
7. It is impossible to assume in this case that the relation of The Sun As-

sociation to the hiring of the yacht was simply that of a security for
Lord as a hirer of the yacht on his personal account, and the two pa-
pers in evidence are in legal effect but one contract, and must be in-
terpreted together. Ib.

8. As the trustees of The Sun Association must be presumed to have ex-

ercised a supervision over the business of the corporation, they are to
be charged with knowledge of the extent of the power usually exer-

cised by its managing editor. Ib.
9. The fixing of the value of the vessel in the contract can have but one

meaning that the value agreed on was to be paid in case of default in

returning. Ib.
10. The decision of the court below that the sum due in consequence of a

default in the return of the ship was not to be diminished by the
amount of the bire which had been paid at the inception of the cou-

tract, was correct. Ib.
11. The naming of a stipulated sum to be paid for the non-performance of

a covenant, is conclusive upon the parties in the absence of fraud or

mutual mistake. Ib.
12. Parties may, in a case where the damages are of an uncertain nature,

estinate and agree upon the measure of damages which may be sus-

tained from the breach of an agreement. Ib.
13. The law does not limit an owner of property from affixing his own es-

timate of its value upon a sale thereof. Ib.
14. As the stipulation for value in this case was binding upon the parties,

the court rightly refused to consider evidence tending to show that the
admitted value was excessive. Ib.


When a debtor, years before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, gives to

a creditor an irrevocable power of attorney to confess judgment after
maturity upon a promissory note of the debtor; and the creditor,
within four months before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
the debtor, obtains such a judgment and execution thereon; and the
debtor fails, at least five days before a sale on the execution, to vacate
or discharge the judgment, or to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy;
the judgment and execution are a preference “suffered or permitted"
by the debtor, within the meaning of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898,
c. 541 $ 3, cl. 3, and the debtor's failure to vacate or discharge the
preference so obtained is an act of bankruptcy under that act. Wilson
v. Nelson, 191.

1. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, followed. Dayton Coal of

Iron Co. v. Barton, 23.
2. The ruling in De Limą v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, reaffirmed and applied.

Dooley v. United States, 151.
3. Yo distinction, so far as the question determined in that case is con-

cerned, can be made between the Philippines and the Island of Porto
Rico, after the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, April 11, 1899, and certainly not (a) because of the
passage by the Senate alone, by a majority, but not two thirds of a
quorum, of a joint resolution in respect to the intention of the Senate


in the ratification; (6) or, because of the armed resistence of the na-
tive inbabitants, or of uncivilized tribes, in the Philippines, to the do
minion of the United States; (c) or, because one of the justices who
concurred in the judgment of De Lima v. Bidwell, also concurred in the
judgment in Downes V. Bidwell, 182 U. 8. 244. Fourteen Diamond

Rings, 176.
4. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Zernecke, ante, 582, af-

firmod and followed. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Ea-

ton, 589.
5. This case is affirmed on the authority of Midway Company v. Eaton,

ante, 602. Midway Company v. Eaton, 619.
6. The case of Hewitt v. Schultz, 180 U. S. 139, followed and applied to the

facts of this case. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Bell, 675.
7. This case was argued and submitted with Southern Pacific Railroad

Company v. Bell, ante, 675, and by the same counsel, resembles that
in all essential particulars, and is controlled by it. Groeck v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co., 690.

" 4. .

1. This action was brought by defendants in error to recover the value of 187

bales of cotton destroyed in the fire mentioned in Texas & Pacific Rail-
way Company v. Reiss, unte, 621. The facts as to the manner of doing
business at Westwego are the same as those stated in that case, and
also in the case of the saine company v. Clayton, 173 U. S. 348. The
bill of lading contained the following clauses: “1. No carrier or party
in possession of all or any of the property herein described shall be lia-
ble for any loss thereof or damage thereto by causes beyond its control;

or for loss or damage to property of any kind at any place oc-
curring by fire, or from any cause except the negligence of the carrier."
“3. No carrier shall be liable for loss or damage not occurring on its
own road or its portion of the through route, por after said property
is ready for delivery to the next carrier or to consignee.

Cotton is excepted from any clause herein on the subject
of fire, and the carrier shall be liable as at common law for loss or
damage of cotton by fire.

“11. No carrier shall be liable for
delay, por in any other respect than as warehousemen, while the said
property awaits further conveyance, and in case the whole or any part
of the property specified herein be prevented by any cause from going
from said port in the first steamer, of the ocean line above stated,
leaving after the arrival of such property at said port, the carrier here-
under then in possession is at liberty to forward said property by suc-
ceeding steamer of said line, or, if deemed necessary, by any other
steamer. 12. This contract is executed and accomplished, and all lia-
bility hereunder terminatos, on the delivery of the said property to the
steamship, her master, agent or servants, or to the steamship com-
pany, or on the steamship pier at the said port, and the inland freight
charges shall be a first lien, due and payable by the steamship com-
pany.” Held: (1) That the measure of the common law liability between
connecting carriers is properly stated in the opinion in the next preced-

ing case, and the cases therein referred to; (2) That under the wording
of the fourth clause in the bill of lading the defendant was properly
held liable; (3) That there was nothing to go to the jury upon the question
of a delivery of the cotton to the steamship company under the twelfth
clause of the bill of lading; (4) That upon the facts stated it was clear
that at the time when the cotton was lost there had been no delivery,
actual or constructive, to the steamship company, so as to divest tho
defendant of its common law liability for the loss of this cotton.

Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Callender, 632.
2. Whatever may generally be the effect of a notice tu a connecting carrier,

upon the question of terminatiug or alteriug the linbility of a preced-
ing carrier for the goods, it is quite clear that it has no effect in dimin-
ishing the liability until actual delivery in a case where the preceding
carrier still continues to have full control over the goods and has a
choice as between connecting carriers, and inay, notwithstanding such
general notice, deliver the goods under certain circunstances to an-
other carrier for further transportation. 16.

1. The act of the legislature of the State of Teunessee, passed March 17,

1899, Statutes of 1899, c. 11, p. 17, requiring the redemption in cash of
storé orders or other evidences of indebtedness issued by einployers
in payment of wages due to employés, does not conflict with any pro-
visions of the Constitution of the United States relating to contracts.

Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 13.
2. The Statute of Kansas of March 3, 1897, entitled “ An act defining what

shall constitute public stock yards, defining the duties of the person or
persons operating the same, and regulating all charges thereof, and re-
moving restrictions in the trade of dead animals, and providing penalties
for violations of this act," is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States, in that it applies only to the
Kansas City Stock Yards Company, and not to other companios or cor-
porations engaged in like business in Kansas, and thereby denies to
that company the equal protection of the laws. Cotling v. Kansas

City Stock Yards Co. and the State of Kansas, 79.
3. The Federal Constitution neither grants nor forbids to the governor of a

State the right to stay the execution of a sentence of death. Storti v.

Massachusetts, 138.
4. The act of Congress taking effect May 1, 1900, and known as the Foraker

act, which requires all merchandise going into Porto Rico from the Uni-
ted States to pay a duty of fifteen per cent of the amount of duties paid
upon merchandise imported from foreign countries, is constitutional.

Dooley v. United States, 151.
5. The Constitution, in declaring that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles

exported from any State, is limited to articles exported to a foreign
country, and has no application to Porto Rico, which, in the case of
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, was held not to be a foreign country

within the meaning of the general tariff law then in force. 16.
6. The fact that the duties so collected were not covered into the general

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