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Stat. § 1014, is justified in treating the instrument as an indictment found by a competent grand jury, and is not authorized to go into evidence which may show or tend to show violations of the United States statutes in the drawing of the jurors composing the grand jury which

found the indictment. Ib. 12. By a removal such as was made in this case the constitutional rights of

the defendants were in no way taken from them. Ib.


See USURY, 1.







PUBLIC LAND, 5, 14, 17;

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TAX AND TAXATION. 1. A privilege tax upon a railroad corporation is a tax upon property.

Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Co. v. Hewes, 62. 2. Edward P. Gallup, a resident in the State of New Hampsbire, acted as

the executor of the will of William P. Gallup, deceased, of the county of Marion in the State of Indiana. He was served with notice, under sections 8560 and 8587 of the Revised Statutes of Indiana, of an intention of the county auditor in that county to add to the list of the taxable personal property in his possession as executor, and was required to appear and show cause why that should not be done. The Supreme Court of Indiana held, against his objection, that he was at the time that the proceeding by the auditor began, an official resident of Marion County, and was therefore within the express terms of the statute. Held that this was a construction or application of the statute to the

case in hand which was binding on this court. Gallup v. Schmidt, 300. 3. The method followed by the auditor in assessing the additional taxes

was, perhaps, open to criticism, but was approved by the Circuit and Supreme Courts of the State, and presents no question over which this court has jurisdiction. Ib.

4. There was no invalidity in the fact of additional assessments. U. S.

Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 535. 5. The filing of the intervening petition and the final adjudication thereon

were in time. Ib. 6. That the receiver had been discharged before final proceedings were

had, is immaterial. Ib. 7. The Santa Fé Company cannot claim that it was misled, in any way, as

to its liability for these taxes. Ib. 8. No order was necessary for retaking possession. Ib. 9. The property was sufficiently described in the decree, and it must be

assumed that the testimony warranted the description. Ib. 10. Until there was an identification of the property subject to taxation,

and a determination of the amount of taxes due, it would be inequita

ble to charge penalties for non-payment. Ib. 11. There was no error in refusing interest prior to the decree. Ib.


TRADE-MARK. This was a controversy relating to a trade-mark for protective paint for

ship's bottoms. The court held: (1) That no valid trade-mark was proved on the part of the Rahtjen's Company in connection with paint sent from Germany to their agents in the United States, prior to 1873, when they procured a patent in England for their composition; (2) That no right to a trade-mark which includes the word “patent," and which describes the article as “ patented," can arise when there has been no patent; (3) That a symbol or label claimed as a trade-mark, so constituted or worded as to make or contain a distinct assertion which is false, will not be recognized, and no right to its exclusive use can be maintained; (4) That of necessity when the right to manufacture became public, the right to use the only word descriptive of the article manufactured became public also; (5) That no right to the exclusive use in the United States of the words “ Rahtjen's Compositions " has been shown. Holzapfel's Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen's American Composition Co., 1.

TREATIES. The treaty of February 26, 1871, between the United States and Italy only

requires equality of treatment, and that the same rights and privileges be accorded to a citizen of Italy that are given to a citizen of the United States under like circumstances, and there is nothing in the petition tending to show such lack of equality. Storti v. Massachusetts, 138.


USURY 1. In an action upon a note given to a national bank, the maker cannot set

off, or obtain credit for, usurious interest paid in cash upon the renewals of such note, and others of which it was a consolidation. Haseltine v. Central Bank (No. 2), 132.

2. In cases arising under the second clause of Rev. Stat. sec. 5198, the per

son by whom the usurious interest has been paid can only recover the same back in an action in the nature of an action of debt. The remedy given by the statute is exclusive. Ib.

See ConstituTIONAL LAW, 1.

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