The records of the Department, February 25, 1898, show this confidential cablegram from Roosevelt to Commodore Dewey: "Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hong-Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. orders."

Keep Olympia until further

I saw Mr. Roosevelt many times during this trying period and like all others with whom he came into contact, I was deeply impressed by his earnest, convincing arguments.

When war was actually declared, he said:

"My work here is done. I must get into the fight myself."

It would extend the scope of this article too far for me to more than allude to the correspondence between our distinguished Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, in which he was urged to withhold his resignation and remain in the Department where he was doing such valuable service; but he had determined his course of duty, and in May we find him with a commission for himself as lieutenant-colonel, and with a

colonel's commission for the then almost unknown Dr. Leonard Wood, en route to Texas to raise what was popularly known as Roosevelt's Regiment of Rough Riders, and officially as the First Regiment of United States Volunteer Cavalry. He only demanded good arms for his men and the chance to get them against the enemy. The rest to be left in his hands.

When it became apparent that the troops at Tampa would compose the first expedition of active operations, Roosevelt, then far off in Texas, burdened the telegraph lines with dispatches until orders reached him to go with his fine regiment and become a part of the cavalry division which I commanded at that place. Learning the hour of his arrival, I met him with staff-officers at the train, expecting that the regiment would need much after their long journey. Roosevelt, Colonel Wood and other officers were all in fine spirits, and assured me they had everything and that they would be comfortable in the cars that night. The next day I put them into camp, and in an hour the entire regiment was out upon drill.

It was here that it was my privilege to enjoy my greatest intimacy with this young officer.

This was very close, as their brigade commander, General Young, was at Lakeland, thirty miles distant, with his other two regiments, and, therefore, the Rough Riders reported direct to me, their division commander.

Both Roosevelt and Wood urged me to frequent inspections, to be present at their drills, to examine into their equipment and administration, and they frequently came to me, generally together, laying before me their methods of drill, discipline, etc. They were anxious to be assured if their methods were the best, and that they be corrected if any change or improvement could be suggested. They had tactics and army regulations constantly in hand, and I was surprised to see how thoroughly they had become informed upon all that pertained to their duties as regimental commanders.

June 7 came, and with it Admiral Sampson's telegram: "If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet."

It was in the quiet darkness of night that an officer of General Shafter's staff came to my tent

with orders from Washington for us to embark at daylight the next morning at Port Tampa, distant nine miles from our camp. Immediately all was activity. Roosevelt and Wood were before me in a few moments, received their orders, and in an incredibly short time their regiment, with all its equipments, was by the side of the railroad, ready and waiting for the cars. Soon after daylight Port Tampa was reached, and we were soon on shipboard, the promptness with which the Rough Riders were embarked being largely due to the indomitable push of the young lieutenant-colonel. The delay at Port Tampa until June 17 was caused by the false report that Spanish war-vessels threatened the course we were to sail.

On June 20 we reached Daiquiri, Cuba.

On the morning of the 22d the navy, with steam and naphtha launches towing large strings of boats, commenced landing our troops.

General Shafter put Lawton's division and Bates' brigade before us.

We felt this keenly, and knowing that the purpose was to get ashore promptly, we commenced landing with our own ship's boats, rowed by our

men.

Roosevelt's energy and push helped very much in this effort, and before night we had landed 964 officers and men of the cavalry division.

Siboney is on the ocean and is nine miles nearer Santiago than Daiquiri.

On the 22d General Lawton was ordered with his division, about five thousand strong, to march upon and capture the enemy at Siboney, so that the remainder of the troops and supplies could be landed at that place.

Lawton reached Siboney on the 23d, but found that the enemy had already evacuated that place and had taken the road toward Santiago.

At noon on the 23d General Shafter had not heard from Lawton and he ordered the commander of the cavalry division, with the 964 men of his command, to proceed to Siboney and put his advance close to the enemy.

The division commander ordered Young, Wood and Roosevelt forward and hastened on in person, and finally found the enemy stationed on the Santiago road between two and three miles from Siboney. He reconnoitered the Spanish position and after dark returned to Siboney. Before daylight these 964 dismounted cavalry