d. One who has received the proceeds of a settlement cannot be heard to deny the agency through which it was obtained. Adams v. Irving Nat. Bank, 6 L.R.A. 491, 116 N. Y. 606, 23 N. E. 7.

III. Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais; waiver. J. By receiving benefits. b. The rule that acts done subsequently Commercial Bank, 62 L.R.A. 783, 174 N. to the other person's change of position, Y. 181, 66 N. E. 726. which they do not invite or influence, will not operate as an estoppel, has no application to prevent a receipt of payment, made long after the acts which induced the original change of position from being relied on as such where the payment was made as part of the original transaction and before the true facts were discovered. Rogers v. Portland & B. Street R. Co. 70 L.R.A. 574, 100 Me. 86, 60 Atl. 713.

c. A convenantee who, with the means at hand of knowing all the facts, accepts his share of money paid by the convenantor for a release from his obligation, will be precluded from afterwards proceeding to enforce the covenant. Wood v. Bullard, 7 L.R.A. 304, 151 Mass. 324, 25 N. E. 67.

e. A principal does not, by accepting,
without knowledge of the source, money on
account from an agent who secures it by
executing a note in the name of the prin-
cipal without authority, render himself
liable on the note, on the theory that, hav-
ing accepted the benefit of the loan, he can-
not repudiate liability for it. Calhoun v.
McCrory Piano & Realty Co. 52 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 571, 129 Tenn. 651, 168 S. W. 149.
(Annotated)

§ 161. Municipality.
See ante, § 13.

§ 162. Officer.

d. The lessor of the right to remove gravel does not, by taking pay for that taken nearer to neighboring property than the agreed line so as to interfere with its a. One who has accepted the appointment lateral support, estop himself from enforc- to an office having at least a potential ing the contract obligation of the lessee existence, and has received the emoluments not to interfere with such support. Orr v. Dayton & M. Traction Co. 48 L.R.A. (N.S.)

474, 178 Ind. 40, 96 N. E. 462.

§ 159. Acceptance of compensation

of it, is estopped from endeavoring to show
to his own advantage that the office has
never been lawfully created because it was
not done in the proper mode,-as, by ordi-
Cal. 504, 42 Pac. 243.
Buck v. Eureka, 30 L.R.A. 409, 109

nance.
for lands taken for public use.

As waiver of claim to interest, see INTER-
EST, § 37 b.

b. A public officer who accepts and retains the salary provided by the law in a. Private roads previously established force when he takes office cannot question under a statute declared unconstitutional the validity of the statute. Gross v. Whitare not thereby affected, since acceptance ley County, 58 L.R.A. 394, 158 Ind. 531, 64 of damages awarded upon their establish- N. E. 25. ment by eminent domain estops the party so accepting, from complaining. Arnsperger v. Crawford, 70 L.R.A. 497, 101 Md. 247,

61 Atl. 413.

b. One who has accepted the compensation awarded for a right of way over his property is estopped to question the validity of the proceedings by which it was ascertained. Sterritt v. Young, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 169, 14 Wyo. 146, 82 Pac. 946.

§ 163. Street railway company.

which takes and retains all the advantages a. An electric street railway company and benefits of an ordinance under which it is permitted to operate its road in the duties to the public imposed upon it by the streets cannot escape the performance of ordinance, on the ground that the ordinance and the duties imposed by it are ultra vires both the municipality and the railway company. People ex rel. Jackson Corporation securing subscriptions to stock, v. Suburban R. Co. 49 L.R.A. 650, 178 III. 594, 53 N. E. 349.

§ 160. Of acts of agent.

see CORPORATIONS, § 78 b.

See also ante, §§ 123 e, 154 s, t.

a. A principal cannot receive and retain

Okla.

See also ante, § 82 b.
§ 164. Divorced woman.

the benefits of a transaction and at the
same time deny the authority of the agent a. A woman is estopped to claim a share
by whom it was consummated. Antrim in an estate as widow, although a divorce
Lumber Co. V. Oklahoma State Bank, obtained from her in a suit brought by the
L.R.A.1918A, 528,
162 Pac. guardian for her insane husband was ab-
solutely void, where she has accepted ali-
mony under the decree and contracted a
subsequent marriage. Mohler v. Shank, 34
L.R.A. 161, 93 Iowa, 273, 61' N. W. 981.

723.

-

b. One who claims the beneficial results of a general agency cannot disavow the untoward results of the negligent acts of his own agent in an identical transaction. Bodine v. Berg, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 65, 82 N. J. L. 662, 82 Atl. 901.

c. Where a person acts for another who accepts the fruits of his efforts, the latter must be deemed to have adopted the methods employed, as he may not, even though innocent, receive the benefits and at the same time disclaim responsibility for the fraud by means of which they arose. Taylor v.

b. Acceptance by a woman of the benefits of a decree granting a divorce and awarding alimony out of the property of her husband within the jurisdiction of the court does not estop her from maintaining in another state an independent suit to recover alimony out of the real estate of her former husband situated in the latter state which the court granting the divorce did not take into account in fixing the

III. Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais; waiver. j. By receiving benefits.

amount of alimony. Bodie v. Bates, L.R.A., complying with his contract by the wrongful act of the vendee in obtaining an outstanding title to a portion of the land, so

k. By character or relation of parties. far as that portion of the land is concerned,

Grantor and persons in privity with him,
§ 170. Generally.
Cestui que trust by act of trustee, see ante,
see ante, §§ 22, 23.
Estoppel in one capacity by contract made
§ 57 1.
in another, see ante, § 61.
Estoppel in

one capacity, by admissions made in another, see ante, § 71 i. Subscriber to cost of factory, by act of committee of subscribers, see ante, § 75 h.

Partnership, see ante, § 93 a, b.
Stockholders, see ante, § 98 a..
Board of railroad commissioners by act of
their secretary, see ante, § 99 c.
Officer of corporation, see ante, § 103 c.
Infant, see ante, §§ 108, 117 i.
Assignee, see ante, §§ 119 nl, 126 g.
Client, by acts of attorney, see ante, § 119

Receiver, see ante, § 119 x.
Devisees, see ante, § 133 f.
Acts or claims in one capacity, as estop-

ping inconsistent acts or claims in an-
other capacity, see ante, § 147.
Effect of estoppel in favor of or against ad-
ministrators appointed in one state on
administrator in other state, see EXECU-
TORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, § 129 h.
Ward by act of guardian, see ante, § 79 a;

DOWER, § 39 j; GUARDIAN AND WARD,
§ 29 a.

Co-obligors on bond, see JOINT CREDITORS
AND DEBTORS, § 4 d.
Who affected or concluded by judgment, see
JUDGMENT, IV. g.
See also ante, §§ 39 w, 72 n.

of, nor be bound by, an estoppel. Luke v.
a. Strangers can neither take advantage
Hill, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 559, 137 Ga. 159,
73 S. E. 345.

111. Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais; waiver. 1. Who affected. parties and their privies to the act or representation relied on. Equitable Loan & Secur. Co. v. Lewman, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 879, 124 Ga. 190, 52 S. E. 599.

c. In the law of estoppel, one person becomes privy of another by succeeding to the position of that other as regards the subject of the estoppel, or by holding in subordination to that other. Womach v. St. Joseph, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 140, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S. W. 443.

d. An agreement by a tenant to pay rent for the use of a right of way over adjoining property which is appurtenant to the estate is not binding on his lessor if made without his knowledge. Schwer V. Martin, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 614, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1221, 97 S. W. 12.

e. An act of stockholders of a corporation which attempts to ratify a fraud or misapplication of the funds of the corporation by the directors is binding by way of estoppel only on such stockholders as vote in favor of the approval. Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 112,

206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 138.

f. The minority of bondholders secured by trust deed on corporate property cannot estop the majority or the trustee from contesting a claim for prior lien for money advanced for additions to the plant, by merely suffering the additions to be made, with knowledge of the advances and without objection. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Doud, 52 L.R.A. 481, 105 Fed. 123, 44 C.

C. A. 389.

g. Only those who are actors in procur ing the allowance of an injunction against the commencement of an action can, upon

that account, be equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations. Ilunt

er v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. 3 L.R.A. (N.S.)

1187, 73 Ohio St. 110, 76 N. E. 563.

h. The estoppel of a partner in a bank to assert that an overdraft in the name of a corporation entirely owned by him was his individual debt, when persons have given credit on his assurances that the only debts were for books and materials,

which

on whose land the water is thrown has no
right to embank against it. Wills v. Babb,
6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 136, 222 Ill. 95, 78 N. E.
42.
(Annotated)

k. Although the owner of a vessel is
estopped to assert that supplies secured
by his representation that they were
necessary and were to be used for the
vessel, were not so used, it may be that
the estoppel would not bind a third person
who had furnished supplies that were in
fact used on the vessel. Chamberlain
Transp. Co. v. Ashland Nat. Bank, 70
L.R.A. 353, 133 Fed. 725, 66 C. C. A. 555.
§ 171. Public.

Estoppel of municipality, county, town or state, see ante, I.

a. Equitable estoppel will sometimes be asserted even against the public. Oliver v. Synhorst, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 243, 48 Or. 292, 86 Pac. 376.

b. Laches of public officers are not generally accounted against the public. Owensboro v. Hope, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 996, 128 Ky.

524, 108 S. W. 873.

§ 172. Grantee or mortgagee.
Estoppel by deed, see ante, § 24.
To deny street easement, see HIGHWAYS, §
See also ante, §§ 28 g, 73 a, 103 c; VENDOR
AND PURCHASER, § 77 d.

24.

a. The estoppel upon a grantor, after the execution and delivery of a deed, from setting up a conditional delivery, or qualifyclude the grantee. Pioneer Sav. & L. Co. ing it in any way, does not always conV. Providence-Washington Ins. L.R.A. 397, 17 Wash. 175, 49 Pac. 231.

Co. 38

b. The purchaser of land from several rights therein by the estoppel only of a owners is not estopped from asserting his part of his grantors. Welsh v. Taylor, 18 L.R.A. 535, 134 N. Y. 450, 31 N. E. 896.

c. A defendant in ejectment is not estopped to set up adverse possession by the fact that his grantor, after setting up the same defense in a prior action, had settled amounted to a small sum, will operate also it by buying the plaintiff's title and giving in favor of such creditors against a trustee his notes for the purchase price, and that in insolvency of the bank. the same plaintiff has brought a second acSchmucker, 35 L.R.A. 392, 84 Md. 535, 36 tion after a default in payment of the notes. Greene v. Couse, 13 L.R.A. 206, 127 N. Y. 386, 28 N. E. 151. (Annotated)

Atl. 592.

Potts V.

i. One claiming under the lessor of oil and gas privileges is estopped from setting up that the lease constituted a mere license revocable at pleasure, where the lessor is, and for more than three years has been, using gas for domestic purposes furnished under the terms of the lease, and has never served any notice on the gas company that she desired a forfeiture of the lease. Comp ton v. People's Gas Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.)

787, 75 Kan. 572, 89 Pac. 1039.

j. By claiming a prescriptive right to flood another's land by virtue of acts of strangers in turning the water from a stream, a person makes those acts his own, and is bound thereby as against the claim that he is not responsible for the change, and that therefore, as against him, the one

d. A man whose participation in an act of mortgage by his wife of her separate property is shown only by a recital that came the said woman, wife of the said husband, "herein joined, aided, and authorized by her husband," will not be held to have consented to the inclusion in the mortgage bound thereby as against the claim of his of his separate property so that it will be subsequent mortgagee, although he may be personally estopped to deny that it is inL.R.A. (N.S.) 289, 122 La. 1016, 48 So. 439. cluded. W. F. Taylor Co. v. Sample, 28 (Annotated)

$173. - purchaser at judicial sale. See also ante, §§ 22 b, 133 g; post, § 181 b.

a. Purchasers at a judicial sale, although

III. Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais; waiver. 1. Who affected.

for value and in good faith, are affected to | the same extent as the person whose title they buy, by an cstoppel in pais which prevented him from asserting the title. Lindsay v. Cooper, 16 L.R.A. 813, 94 Ala. 170, 11 So. 325.

b. A son asserting title to his father's leasehold estate through an execution sale under a judgment recovered by the son against him, with knowledge of the facts, is affected by the father's estoppel to dispute the fact that his title was a fee in favor of one to whom the father purported to mortgage such title. Townsend v. Boyd, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1148, 217 Pa. 386, 66 Atl.

1099.

a. A principal is as effectually estopped by the act of his agent within the apparent scope of his agency as if he had performed it himself. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 22 L.R.A. 325, 58 Fed. 723, 7 C. C. A. 444.

b. A principal may not deny the truth of the representations of his agent with respect to the matter which is the subject of such agency, though the agency is of a limited or special character. Kimbro v. New York L. Ins. Co. 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 421, 134 Iowa 84, 108 N. W. 1025.

c. If one party refers another, on a disputed fact, to a third person as authorized to answer for him, he is bound by what his referee answers upon the occasion, as much as if the answer had been given by himself. Aldridge v. Etna L. Ins. Co. 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 343, 204 N. Y. 83, 97 N. E. 399.

d. A person is estopped from denying liability for the fault of one whom he has held out as his agent, where the duty, the vio lation of which constitutes the tort, springs

from a contract made on the faith of the

apparent agency. Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co. 52 L.R.A. 429, 167 N. Y. 244, 60 N. E.

597.

b. The true owner of land, by attesting a deed the contents of which he knows, made by a person who has no title, will be estopped from asserting his title as against e. A carrier is not estopped to deny dethe grantee and his privies; but this es-livery of goods transported by the act of toppel will not bind an existing creditor of the person estopped. Equitable Loan & Secur. Co. v. Lewman, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 879, 124 Ga. 190, 52 S. E. 599. (Annotated)

§ 175. Surety.

a. The bondsmen of a township school treasurer are estopped from showing that reports made by their principal are untrue. Cowden v. Trustees of Schools, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 131, 235 Ill. 604, 85 N. E. 924. 8 176. Wife.

Estoppel of married women generally see ante, III. b.

Estoppel of married woman by deed, see

ante, § 23.

Estoppel of wife by act of husband, with respect to homestead, or joint, or community property, see ante, § 52. Representations of husband as estopping widow's claim of dower, see DOWER, § 30 b.

See also ante, § 119 kl.

its agent in mailing to the shipper a post
card on a printed form supplied by the
shipper stating that the goods had been de-
livered, where subsequent communications
between the shipper and the consignee clear-
Levers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. L.R.A.
ly show that there had been no delivery.
1918A, 294, 22 N. M. 599, 166 Pac. 1178.
§ 178. Corporation.

Municipal corporations, see ante, I. a.
Estoppel of corporation to deny its own cor-
porate existence or powers, see ante, §

54.

See also ante, §§ 110 e, 157 g.

a. A wife is not estopped to claim her validity of a declaration of a dividend by a. A corporation is estopped to deny the rights in the homestead by the fact that at stockholders who by common consent conthe time it was sold by her husband she curred with the directors in the managewas living apart from him in another statement and control of the corporation, where and he represented that he was unmarried. the rights of creditors are not in any way Mason v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. 26 involved. Thiry v. Banner Window Glass L.R.A. (N.S.) 574, 94 Ark. 107, 125 S. W. Co. L.R.A.1918B, 1048, 81 W. Va. 39, 93 S. 656. (Annotated) E. 958. $177. Principal by acts of agent. (Annotated) Estoppel of principal to deny agency or authority of agent, see ante, § 123. Estoppel of principal by receiving benefit of acts of agent, see ante, § 160. Of carrier to deny validity of bill of lading, see CARRIERS, § 5 h. Insurance company, see INSURANCE, XIX. See also ante, § 154 t.

within a Carey act project, which has reb. A corporation consisting of settlers ceived and taken over a system of irrigation for such project from the corporation sumed the duty and obligation of operating constructing the same, and which has asthe same and selling water rights to other settlers therein, cannot, in a proceeding to compel it to sell and issue shares of stock

III. Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais; waiver. 1. Who affected.

b. Heirs are not estopped by a void judgment during their ancestor's life for the sale of his land as that of a decedent, although they were parties to the proceeding and did not appeal from or directly attack jurisdiction, and also because estoppels must be mutual, and the purchaser of the land at the sale would not be estopped thereby. Springer v. Shavender, 33 L.Ř.A. 772, 116 N. C. 12, 21 S. E. 397.

to a purchaser of land within the project, | son, who stands in his shoes, is bound by an raise any question as to the failure of the estoppel raised by the fraud of the decedent. construction company to comply with its Union Mortg. Bkg. & T. Co. v. Peters & contract with the state in the manner of Trezevant, 30 L.R.A. 829, 72 Miss. 1058, 18 constructing the system or furnishing suf- So. 497. ficient water to comply with its contract. State v. Twin Falls Land & W. Co. L.R.A. 1916F, 236, 21 Idaho, 410, 121 Pac. 1039. c. An incorporated college is estopped from saying that persons acting as trustees before its organization in obtaining ait, since there can be no estoppel without subscription to buy property for it had no power to bind it by an agreement that it would repay or save harmless those who, to obtain a certain large subscription, agreed to indemnify the subscriber against liability for interest called for by the terms of the subscription, where they have been compelled to pay such interest and it has gone into the fund invested in the college property. Morton v. Hamilton College, 35 L.R.A. 275, 100 Ky. 281, 38 S. W. 1.

§ 179.bank.

See also ante, §§ 113 b, 145 c, 152 i.

a. The acts of the cashier and president of a bank in turning over to the bank to repay their shortage therewith, funds collected by it for another person, estop the bank from claiming that it has no funds of such person. Minnesota Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Tagus State Bank, L.R.A.1917A, 519, 34 N. D. 566, 158 N. W. 1063.

b. The act of the cashier and president of a bank in turning over to the bank funds of a customer deposited therein, to repay their shortage with the bank, estops the bank to deny that it has the funds of such customer. Minnesota Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Tagus State Bank, L.R.A.1917A, 519, 34 N. D. 566, 158 N. W. 1063.

c. A bank is so far concluded by the acts of its cashier authorized to draw a check upon the bank's funds, in drawing checks payable to fictitious payees or to customers whose names are used for fictitious purposes and indorsed by him upon the checks, as to be estopped from denying the validity of such acts as against the bank upon which the checks are drawn and which has paid them in good faith. Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 23 L.R.A. 584, 140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 98.

§ 180. Former partner.

a. One cannot be made liable as a partner for tortious acts of his former copart ner, on the ground of estoppel, because of failure to give notice of the dissolution of the partnership. Shapard v. Hynes, 52 L.R.A. 675, 104 Fed. 449, 45 C. C. A. 271. § 181. Heirs and representatives. By deed, see ante, § 25.

Acts in representative capacity, as estopping
claims in individual capacity, see ante,
§ 147 a.

On subscription, see SUBSCRIPTION, § 2 d.
See also ante, §§ 67 a, 69 c, 84 c, 96 d, 134

8.

c. Fraudulent representations by the owner of a homestead to the effect that he is unmarried, by which he effects a sale of the property, estop his heirs from setting up the invalidity of the conveyance on the ground that his wife did not join in it. Mason v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574, 94 Ark. 107, 125 S. W. 656.

d. Infant children of a woman who has mortgaged her property as security for her husband's debt are not estopped from asserting their title in case the property is sold after her obligation is discharged and she is dead, as against a purchaser in good faith of the title secured at the mortgagee's sale, where they had no knowledge of the facts so as to make them guilty of fraud in permitting the mortgage to remain uncanceled. Fleming v. Borden, 53 L.R.A. 316, 126 N. C. 450, 36 S. E. 17, 127 N. C. 214, 37 S. E. 219.

e. Where all of the interested parties to an adoption proceeding appeared before the county court of a county other than that of the person desiring to adopt a child, and agreed on the one side to relinquish the child and consented to its adoption on the condition that it should have full rights of heirship as if born in wedlock, and on the other to adopt and make it an heir, and the child is surrendered to the custody of and remains in the family of the adopting parent until the death of that parent, which occurs while the child is of tender years, the collateral heirs of the deceased adopting parent are estopped to deny the validit- of the adoption proceedings and that the child is entitled to inherit, notwithstanding the statute requires a person desiring to adopt a child to file the petition of adoption in the county of his residence. Milligan v. McLaughlin, 46 L.R.A: (N.S.) 1134, 94 Neb. 171, 142 N. W. 675.

f. That a remainderman makes no objection to the levy of an execution against his alleged share in the estate, or to a sale thereunder, and makes no attempt to have the sale set aside, does not estop his heirs from claiming that the levy was in lid because under the instrument creating the estate no interest had come into his posses sion which was subject to execution. Cropper v. Gaar, L.R.A.1916B, 1139, 151 Ky.

a. The representative of a deceased per-376, 151 S. W. 913.