III. Who may claim exemption. Woolfson v. Mead, L.R.A.1915A, 396, 96 | definite intention of returning, loses his Neb. 528, 148 N. W. 153. (Annotated) right to exemptions, and subjects the propc. The protection of exemption statutes erty to attachment, although he leaves his extends to all litigants in the courts of family in the state, and expects to rethe state of its enactment, whether residents turn there when he secures employment or not, unless it is expressly or impliedly which will justify him in so doing. Keelin restricted to some designated class of per- v. Graves, L.R.A.1915A, 421, 129 Tenn. 103, sons. Bond v. Martin, 44 L.R.A. 430, 33 165 S. W. 232. (Annotated) Or. 551, 54 Pac. 158. c. The instant a person begins his removal from the state, with a set purpose to abandon his residence, he becomes a non ment and exemption laws, without acquir. ing a residence in another state, or even crossing the state line. State use of Burt v. Allen, 50 L.R.A. 284, 48 W. Va. 154, 35 S. E. 990. d. Whoever submits himself or his property to the courts of a state, being required to yield to all requirements made of citi-resident within the meaning of the attachzens in relation to collection or debts or maintaining suits, is entitled to all benefits, exemptions, and privileges of citizen debtors or suitors therein. Bond v. Martin, 44 L.R.A. 430, 33 Or. 551, 54 Pac. 158. e. An exemption of "current wages for personal service" from garnishment applies to nonresidents of the state as well as to residents. Bell v. Indian Live Stock Co. 3 L.R.A. 642, Tex. - 11 S. W. 344. f. A statute exempting wages from the reach of creditors in supplementary proceed ings will operate in favor of nonresidents and will be construed to include property sought to be reached by mesne process, such as writs of attachment and garnishment is sued to place the property in the custody of the court to preserve it for application to plaintiff's claim. Goodwin v. Clayton 67 L.R.A. 209, 137 N. C. 224, 49 S. E. 173. g. Nonresidence, within the meaning of W. Va. Code, chap. 41, § 23, granting to a husband or father an exemption of personal property to the extent of $200, has the same meaning as nonresidence under the attach ment law. State use of Burt v. Allen, 50 L.R.A. 284, 48 W. Va. 154, 35 S. E. 990. h. A nonresident may claim an exemn tion of household furniture from attachment under Hill's (Or.) Ann. Laws, § 282. subd. 4, providing that household furniture to a specified value shall be exempt from execution if owned by householder and in actual use or kept for use by and for his family, or when being removed from one habitation to another on a change of resi dence. Bond v. Martin, 44 L.R.A. 430, 33 Or. 551, 54 Pac. 158. § 38. Effect of removal, or preparations to remove from state. a. A mere temporary removal, without a set purpose to abandon his former residence, is not sufficient to make a person a nonresident of a state, within the meaning of statutes relating to attachments or exemptions. State use of Burt v. Allen, 50 L.R.A. 284, 48 W. Va. 154, 35 S. E. 990. d. One who has acquired, under the provisions of W. Va. Code 1899, chap. 41, the right to have personal property exempted from forced sale, does not forfeit it on the ground of nonresidence until he begins to remove his person from his place of abode within the state to another state or country with intent to fix his residence in such other state or country, although he may intend to leave the state permanently, and has made complete preparation to do so, and has delivered his personal property and effects for shipment to a point outside the state. Brown v. Beckwith, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 778, 58 W. Va. 140, 51 S. E. 977. (Annotated) e. A debtor who has sold all his nonexempt property, and started to remove to another state, with the intention of establishing a residence there, is a "resident of the state" within the meaning of the exemption law, and entitled to claim his exemptions, where, while yet within the state, an attachment is levied on his horse. Grimstad v. Lofgren, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 990, 105 Minn. 286, 117 N. W, 515. f. A laborer who removes from a state in whose courts he has instituted proceeding to enjoin his local creditor from proceedings in the courts of another state to subject his wages to the payment of a debt, at any time before they are applicable thereto, loses the benefit of the general exemption laws of the state where the suit was brought. Wierse v. Thomas, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1008, 145 N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58. g. A person who is a resident of the state on the day of the sale of exempt property, having in good faith resumed his residence after a temporary abandonment thereof, may claim his exemption at any time before the sale, although he was a nonresident on the date of the levy. State use of Burt v. Allen, 50 L.R.A. 284, 48 W. Va. b. A man of family who departs from the state to secure employment, with no i 154, 35 S. E. 990. EXEMPT LIST. Power of civil service commission to extend, see .... CIVIL SERVICE, § 6. EXHAUSTED. See WORDS AND PHRASES, 1277. EXHAUSTION. Recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act for exhaustion followed by disease, see ........ WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § ...APPEAL AND ERROR, 8 140. Effect of omission of, from record on appeal, see ... APPEAL AND ERROR, § 169 d. Permitting taking of, to jury room, see Performance of, as consideration for contract, see .. CONTRACTS, §§ 38, 39. EX MALIFICIO. Trust ex maleficio, see .... ...LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, § 191 a; TRUSTS, §§ 27-42. EXONERATION. Applicability of doctrine, in assessing, for pur- ..... § 1. Generally. a. An "expectancy" has no attribute of property. Johnson v. Breeding, L.R.A. 1917C, 266, 136 Tenn. 528, 190 S. W. 545. b. A vested right is property which the law protects, while a mere expectancy is not property, and therefore is not protected. Hoeft v. Knights of Honor, 33 L.R.A. 174, 113 Cal. 91, 45 Pac. 185. c. No heir, as such, has a vested interest in an estate during the life of the owner. Stone v. Bayley, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 429, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 820. d. A bare expectancy is not protected as a vested right, but may be modified or destroyed at the will of the lawmakers by statute. Bass v. Roanoke Nav. & Water Power Co. 19 L.R.A. 247, 111 N. C. 439, 16 S. E. 402. e. An anticipated interest in property cannot be said to be vested in any person, so long as the owner of the interest in possession has full power, by virtue of his ownership, to cut off the expectant right by grant or devise. Dibrell v. Lanier, 12 L.R.A. 70, 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87. § 2. Transferability of. CONTRACTS, § 329. CONTRACTS, § 436 a. .DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. ESTOPPEL, $25 f. HUSBAND AND WIFE, § 102 f. ... .MINES, § 26 a. that a mere possibility not coupled with an interest cannot be transferred. Bridge v. Kedon, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 404, 163 Cal. 493, 126 Pac. 149. d. A covenant by an heir apparent to relinquish his expectancy in certain property of a relative is not invalid under Cal. Civ. Code, § 700, providing that "a mere possibility such as the expectancy of an heir apparent, is not to be deemed an interest of any kind," and § 1045, declaring that "a mere possibility not coupled with an interest cannot be transferred," which provisions are merely declartory of the common law. Re Garcelon, 32 L.R.A. 595, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414. (Annotated) e. The expectancy of an heir to inherit his father's estate is not an interest capable of assignment in equity, any more than at law. McCall v. Hampton, 33 L.R.A. 266, 98 Ky. 166, 32 S. W. 406. (Annotated) f. Contingent estates in expectancy are proper subjects of contract so that their assignment, fairly made on valuable consideration, will be enforced in equity as executory agreements to convey,, although they are inoperative at law. Hudnall v. Ham, 48 Of future and contingent interests generally, L.R.A. 557, 183 Ill. 486, 56 N. E. 172. see ASSIGNMENT, II. b. a. The expectancy of an heir in an ancestor's estate may become the subject of contract, and may be assigned in equity, if the agreement is fairly made and for an adequate consideration. Clendening v. Wyatt, 33 L.R.A. 278, 54 Kan. 523, 38 Pac. 792. b. At common law, a mere possibility, such as the expectancy of an heir, is not such an existing interest as to be the subject of a sale or capable of passing by assignment, but in equity the rule is different, and agreements for the sale or release of expectancies, if fairly made, and for an adequate consideration, are enforceable upon the death of the ancestor. Re Garcelon, 32 L.R.A. 595, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414. c. An expectant interest in an estate may be assigned in equity notwithstanding the statutes provide such expectancy is not to be deemed an interest of any kind, and L.R.A. Comb. Dig.-284. g. The holder of a merely expected or contingent interest, growing or expected to grow out of actually existing, though defeasible contractual rights, has power to deal with it, and his engagements made with reference to such an interest, while it is merely expectant and contingent, may be enforced in equity after the interest shall have become vested and absolute. Kerr v. Crane, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 692, 212 Mass. 224, 98 N. E. 783. 3. Validity of conveyance of. Warranty of title by heirs conveying their interest, see COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS, § 21 k. a. The right acquired by the assignee of the expectancy of an heir apparent in his ancestor's estate is only cognizable and enforceable in equity, which will not protect and enforce such right unless it appeals to the equitable consideration of the court. . Read v. Mosby, 5 L.R.A. 122, 87 Tenn. 759, | is void. Spears v. b. The transfer of a mere expectancy conveys nothing at law, and to be enforceable in equity, must be founded upon a valuable, not merely a good, consideration. Re Lennig, 38 L.R.A. 378, 182 Pa. 485, 38 Atl. 466. c. A written agreement to transfer a share of a mere expectancy cannot be sustained as a gift and is not valid when it is entirely one-sided, without any consideration, and is not made in settlement of any controversy or dispute. Re Lennig, 38 L.R.A. 378, 182 Pa. 485, 38 Atl. 466. d. Courts of equity uphold specific as signments of mere possibilities, based on a valuable consideration, where enforcement of the agreement will not contravene their own rules of public policy. McAdams v. Bailey, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1003, 169 Ind. 518, 82 N. E. 1057. e. A contract with reference to the mere expectancy of an inheritance may be equivalent to an assignment of property if and when it shall fall into possession. Hale v. Hollon, 36 L.R.A. 75, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S. W. 287. f. An assignment of an expectancy need not to be to one interested in the estate, but is vaild if made to an entire stranger. Bridge v. Kedon, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 404, 163 Cal, 493, 126 Pac. 149. Spaw, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 118 S. W. 275. (Annotated) k. A quitclaim deed to real estate owned by the maternal grandmother of the grantor (the mother of the latter being deceased), who expects to inherit from her a share thereof, conveys nothing, and does not preclude the grantor from subsequently claiming the share devised by the grandmother to the deceased mother of the grantor. Mosier v. Carter, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1182, 84 Kan. 361, 114 Pac. 226. (Annotated) 1. A conveyance of the grantor's expectant interest as heir in his ancestor's real estate, by a deed containing no covenants of warranty, is not binding upon the grantor, even although as heir he subsequently comes into possession of the interest so conveyed. McClure v. Raben, 9 L.R.A. 477, 125 Ind. 139, 25 N. E. 182. (Annotated) m. An attempted sale of the interest which the grantor expects to receive as heir in his ancestor's real estate will not be enforced against him in equity, when as heir he comes into possession thereof, although the purchase was made in good faith, unless the price paid was the full and fair market value of the property at the time of the purchase, and the ancestor was made acquainted with all the facts and acquiesced McClure v. Raben, 9 L.R.A. 477, 125 Ind. 139, 25 N. E. 182. (Annotated) 8 4. -as against heirs. in the sale. g. Approval of the ancestor is not necessary to uphold an assignment by an heir of his expectancy. Bridge v. Kedon, 43 a. A warranty deed of his expectancy by L.R.A. (N.Š.) 404, 163 Cal. 493, 126 Pacing on his heirs who take not through him one who predeceases his ancestor is not bind 149. but as heirs of the ancestor. Johnson v. h. The mere want of the assent of an insane person to a conveyance by her brother of his expectancy of inheritance from her does not render it void. Hale v. Hollon, 368 L.R.A. 75, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S. W. 287. i. A deed, the subject of which is not an existing estate but only an expectancy, is treated in equity as a covenant to convey, which will be enforced against the grantor or his privies, whenever the property covered by it comes into possession. Taylor v. Swafford, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 442, 122 Tenn. 303, 123 S. W. 350. j. An attempted conveyance by heirs apparent, of their interest in the property of the ancestor, even with the latter's consent, 5. — as against creditors. a A conveyance of a mere expectancy is as binding upon judgment creditors of the without intent to defraud creditors. Hale grantor as it is upon himself, if it is made S. W. 287. v. Hollon, 36 L.R.A. 75, 90 Tex. 427, 39 b. A conveyance by an insolvent of his expectancy in the estate of his father, who is alive, to his wife, for a mere consideration of love and affection, is void as against creditors at the time of conveyance or at the death of his father. Read v. Mosby, 5 L.R.A. 122, 87 Tenn. 759, 11 S. W. 940. EXPECTANT ESTATE. See WORDS AND PHRASES, 1283. EXPECTANT HEIR. See WORDS AND PHRASES, 1284. |