g. A forfeiture of property under the anti-trust act of 1890, § 6, cannot be declared in an equity suit. Únited States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 46 L.R.A. 122, 85 Fed. 271, 29 C. C. A. 141, modified in 175 U. S. 211, 44 L. ed. 136, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96. h. Courts of equity do not as a rule enforce a forfeiture where there has been a vested right, but this rule does not apply to a case where the contract itself, under which the parties claim contains an express provision forfeiting a right upon the happening of a certain contingency. Tennant v. Fretts, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 625, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387. i. A court of equity will not, as a rule, lend its aid to devest an estate for a breach of a condition subsequent. Miller v. Western College, 42 L.R.A. 797, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432. j. Equity will never declare or enforce a forfeiture, or devest an estate or title for violation of a condition subsequent, if there is a legal remedy. Wheeling & E. G. R. Co. v. Triadelphia, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 321, 58 W. Va. 487, 52 S. E. 499. k. Equity does not assist the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture, or anything in the nature of a forfeiture. MacKenzie v. Pres bytery of Jersey City, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 227, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 61 Atl. 1027. $ 3. Relief from, in equity. Asking relief in equity as estopping claim that there was no forfeiture at law, see ESTOPPEL, § 140 f, g. a. Equity will not relieve against a statutory forfeiture. Wheeling & E. G. R. Co. V. Triadelphia, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 321, 58 W. Va. 487, 52 S. E. 499. b. Equity will relieve from forfeitures for nonperformance of covenants other than those for the payment of money, arising out of accident, mistake, or surprise, and in the absence of wilful and deliberate refusal to perform, when no pecuniary injury has resulted to the covenantee and the wrong done is easily remediable; but such power of relief is discretionary, and will not be exercised unless the delinquent covenantor is able and willing immediately to perform the covenant. Wheeling & E. G. R. Co. v. Triadelphia, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 321, 58 W. Va. 487, 52 S. E. 499. relieve c. Equity has jurisdiction to against a forfeiture of a tenant's estate for breach of collateral covenant if the breach came through accident or mistake. Gordon V. Richardson, 69 L.R.A. 867, 185 Mass. 492, 70 N. E. 1027. See also ESTOPPEL, § 119 h. § 4. Release or waiver. a. Forfeitures resulting from a breach of condition may be expressly released or may be the subject of a waiver resulting either from circumstances or from express language. Moss v. Chappell, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 398, 126 Ga. 196, 54 S. E. 968. b. A party to be charged waives a forfeiture if, with knowledge of all the facts, he requires the claimant to do some act inconsistent with the position that the contract has become inoperative by reason of the breach of conditions. Gilliland V. Southern R. Co. 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1106, 85 S. C. 27, 67 S. E. 20. By altering instrument; effect on civil liability, see ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Of way bill, see ..... FACTORS, 15 b. Of name of payee on check, as a false pretense, see FALSE PRETENSES, § 9. bility for false pretenses, see Fraud in failing to give notice of, see As evidence of insanity, see Indictment or information for, see Delivery of forged policy, see Competency of juror on prosecution for, see Of note and mortgage, see Of satisfaction of mortgage, see Notice to married woman of purchaser's reliance Notice of agent as to, as notice to principal, see Of indorsement on paving tax certificates pledged By agent, effect on principal's rights, see Right to show that signature to recorded deed was Effect of record of forged deed, see Search warrant for forged trademarks, etc., see Election between counts on prosecution for, see . .... ..... Action for conversion against one to whom checks are transferred by forged indorsement, see Competency of wife as witness against her husband, see See also WORDS AND PHRASES, 1441. § 1. Generally. a. Forgery is not a felony at common law. State v. Murphy, 16 L.R.A. 550, 17 R. I. 698, 24 Atl. 473. b. Though a statute denounces as forgery the making of a false instrument with intent to defraud, or the utterance of a forged instrument with such intent, if the instrument is both forged and uttered by the same person, there is a single crime! of forgery committed. Frisby v. United States, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 96, 88 App. D. C. 22. § 2. What constitutes generally. a. Forgery is the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another's rights. State v. Wheeler, 10 L.R.A. 779, 20 Or. 192, 25 Pac. 394; People v. Pfeiffer, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 138, 243 Ill. 200, 90 N. E. 680. b. At common law in order to constitute forgery there must be a false writing or alteration of an instrument; the instrument as made must be apparently capable of de FALSE PRETENSES, § 19 a. JURY, § 86 b. LIBEL AND SLANDER, $$ 9 q, 118. MORTGAGE, § 52 j. MORTGAGE, § 60 b, c. NOTICE, § 18 c. NOTICE, § 24. NOTICE, $ 36 c. PLEADING, § 533 b. PLEDGE AND COLLATERAL SE- PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, § 75. RECORDS AND RECORDING LAWS, RECORDS AND RECORDING LAWS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 6 c. TRIAL, § 7 j. TRIAL, § 211. TROVER, § 27 c. WITNESSES, § 27 d. frauding and there must be an intent to d. A writing which is what its purports e. It is requisite, in order to constitute forgery by uttering or publishing a forged instrument in writing, that it be uttered or published as true or genuine, that it he known by the party uttering or publishing it as false, forged or counterfeited, and that it be uttered or published with intent to prejudice, damage or defraud another person. State v. Webster, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) | the alteration is of a memorandum of the 337, 88 S. C. 56, 70 S. E. 422. weigher's judgment as to the grade of the f. The making of an instrument which grain, indorsed on the back of the receipt possessed, not only apparent, but real, legal to enable a purchaser to fix the price to be efficiency, and which in addition to being paid for the grain, since the memorandum apparently capable of effecting a fraud, is not part of the receipt, so that its alterawould, if it were genuine, have created a tion will not change the legal effect of the legal liability, constitutes forgery. Hick-receipt. State v. Hendry, 54 L.R.A. 794, son v. State, 54 L.R.A. 327, 61 Neb. 763, 86 N. W. 509. E. 680. g. One who secures the execution of a duplicate note by fraudulently representing that the original was lost or destroyed does not, by passing it for value, become guilty of forgery, under a statute making the passing or uttering of a forged instrument forgery, on the theory that the note is in fact false because it is not what, on its face, it purports to be. People v. Pfeiffer, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 138, 243 Il. 200, 90 N. (Annotated) h. One cannot avoid his authorized transfer of his real estate, on the theory that the paper he signed was a forgery because he was deceived into signing one of a different character than he intended to sign, where the ultimate effect of the one signed and the one intended would have been the same, the only difference being that one would not have been delivered until the price was paid, while the other was delivered without payment. Conklin v. Benson, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 537, 159 Cal. 785, 116 Pac. 34. (Annotated) i. Uttering a letter with a forged signature for the purpose of falsely representing the bearer to be a certain well-known person, friend of the writer, and giving him standing with persons to whom it may be presented, is forgery, under a statute declaring guilty of that offense any person who shall utter a letter purporting to have been signed by another in which the sentiments, opinions, conduct, character, prospects, interests, or rights of such other person shall be misrepresented or otherwise injuriously affected; the latter phrase referring to character, interests, etc., and not to sentiments and opinions. People v. Abeel, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 730, 182 N. Y. 415, 75 N. E. 307. (Annotated) j. A notary public who makes a certificate of acknowledgment the contents of which are untrue is not indictable for forgery under a statute making it unlawful falsely to make, alter, forge, or counterfeit any public record, or any certificate, return, or attestation which may be received as legal proof. Territory v. Gutierrez, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 375, 13 Ñ. M. 312, 84 Pac. (Annotated) k. Merely padding a genuine pay roll is not forgery under a statute making guilty of forgery every person who shall falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit any order or request for payment of money with intent to defraud any person or corporation. De Rose v. People, L.R.A.1918C, 1193, Colo. -, 171 Pac. 359. (Annotated) 1. Forgery by alteration of an elevator receipt given by a railroad for grain to be stored and shipped is not committed where 525. 156 Înd. 392, 59 N. E. 1041. (Annotated) m. A loan agent is guilty of forgery in signing the name of a pretended borrower to a note for the purpose of deceiving his client into the belief that the money which had been furnished him had been lent to the person who signed the note. People v. Campbell, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 58, 160 Mich. 108, 125 N. W. 42. n. The affixing to a note of a signature which it is intended shall be regarded as that of another person is not prevented from being forgery by the circumstances that the name is misspelled. State Chance, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1003, 82 Kan. 388, 108 Pac. 789. (Annotated) V. o. An indorsement upon an instrument is within the provisions of a statute denouncing forgery, that every signature, and every writing purporting to be such signature, shall be deemed a writing, and a written instrument, within the meaning of the statute. State v. Carragin, 16 L.R.A. (N.S. ) 561, 210 Mo. 351, 109 S. W. 553. p. The indorsement upon a check of the name of a fictitious person to whom it was, by fraudulent procurement, made payable, is forgery. Harmon v. Old Detroit Nat. Bank, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 514, 153 Mich. 73, 116 N. W. 617. q. The execution of a promissory note in the name of a fictitious person, or under an assumed name, with an intent to defraud, is forgery. State v. Wheeler, 10 L.R.A. 779, 20 Or. 192, 25 Pac. 394. (Annotated) r. Forgery may be committed by changing the second initial of a name which is composed of two initials and a surname. State v. Higgins, 27 L.R.A. 74, 60 Minn. 1, 61 N. W. 816. s. A false statement of fact in the body of an instrument, or a false assertion of authority to write another's name, or to sign his name as agent, by which a person is deceived and defrauded, is not forgery. People v. Bendit, 31 L.R.A. 831, 111 Cal. 274, 43 Pac. 901. t. Signing another's name as his agent, and adding one's own initials to show agency, in the presence of the person who pays over money on the faith of such signature, is not forgery, although the claim of authority is false and may constitute some other crime. People v. Bendit, 31 L.R.A. 831, 111 Cal. 274, 43 Pac. 901. (Annotated) u. Signing the names of other persons to a note, with an addendum over the signer's own name stating that he is authorized to sign for the others, does not constitute forgery, although the claim of authority is entirely false. State v. Taylor, 25 L.R.A. 591, 46 La. Ann. 1332, 16 So. 190. v. Forgery is committed by indorsing one's own name upon commercial paper be longing to another of the same name, with | jury of another. Gordon v. Com. 57 L.R.A. knowledge of want of title, and with intent 744, 40 S. E. 746. to perpetrate a fraud. Beattie v. National Bank, 43 L.R.A. 654, 174 Ill. 571, 51 N. E. 602. w. To add to a canceled check the words, "in full of account to date," with intent to alter its effect as a receipt, constitutes forgery. Gordon v. Com. 57 L.R.A. 744, 100 Va. 825, 40 S. E. 746. x. The addition to a check of the words, "in full of account to date," may constitute a forgery if made at any time after the check is delivered to the payee. Gordon v. Com. 57 L.R.A. 744, 100 Va. 825, 40 S. E. 746. § 3.intent. a. The question of intent is material in determining the guilt of a person charged with forgery. State v. Wheeler, 10 L.R.A. 779, 20 Or. 192, 25 Pac. 394. b. The intent to defraud by forgery, under Mass. Pub. Stat. chap. 204, § 1, need not be to defraud a party named in the instrument forged. Com. v. Brown, 1 L.R.A. 620, 147 Mass. 585, 18 N. E. 587. c. That a sales agent, after collecting money from a customer, forged his note and turned it in to enable himself to retain the money for his own accommodation, sufficiently shows intent to defraud to sustain a conviction of forgery, although he also intended to take up the note when it fel due. Spears v. People, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 402, 220 III. 72, 77 N. E. 112. § 4. What subject of. See also ante, § 2 i. a. An instrument may be the subject of forgery though it does not in fact work any legal injury upon the person whose name is forged, nor need it be such as, if genuine, would be legally valid, it being sufficient if it is calculated to deceive and intended to be used for a fraudulent purpose. State v. Webster, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 337, 88 S. C. 56, 70 S. E. 422. b. A writing invalid on its face cannot be the subject of forgery, because it has no legal tendency to effect a fraud. State v. Evans, 28 L.R.A. 127, 15 Mont. 539, 39 Pac. 850. c. An instrument which is void on its face is not, as a general rule, the subject of forgery, but the offense may be committed by means of an instrument which does not appear to have any validity if there are extrinsic facts existing by which the holder might be enabled by means thereof to defraud another. Forsey v. State, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 327, 60 Tex. Crim. Rep. 206, 131 S. W. 585. d. It is not essential in order that a writing should be the subject of forgery that it be calculated to affect another's right of property injuriously, it being sufficient if it may injure another in his personal rights. State v. Webster, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 337, 88 S. C. 56, 70 S. E. 422. e. An instrument is one of legal efficacy within the rule relating to forgery where by any possibility it may operate to the in f. A writing may be the subject of forgery though not sufficient to create a legal liability if genuine, when it is such that if genuine it might injure another. People v. Munroe, 24 L.R.A. 33, 100 Cal. 664, 35 Pac. 326. (Annotated) g. Although a check is so irregular in form that the bank would be justified in refusing payment of it, yet it may be the subject of forgery as to its effect as a receipt, after it has passed through the hands of several indorsers, and has been paid by the bank and returned to the hands of the drawer. Gordon v. Com. 57 L.R.A. 744, 100 Va. 825, 40 S. E. 746. g 5.-order for payment of money. a. A written request to pay a certain amount to the order of a person named therein, "and charge to him at my office," is not the subject of forgery, as it could do no possible damage if acted upon as genuine. State v. Evans, 28 L.R.A. 127, 15 Mont. 539, 39 Pac. 850. b. An assignment or sale of the unearned salary of a public-school teacher, with an order therefor, although void on the ground of public policy, is not so plainly worthless that it cannot be the subject of forgery. People v. Munroe, 24 L.R.A. 33, 100 Cal. 664, 35 Pac. 326. e. The want of an internal revenue stamp does not prevent an order for the payment of money from being a subject of forgery, although the Federal statute provides that such an instrument, unless stamped, shall be invalid and of no effect and not admis sible in evidence. Thomas v. State, 46 L.R.A. 454, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 562, 51 S. W. 242. (Annotated) § 6. order for delivery of goods or chattels. a. An order upon a merchant purporting to be signed by one having credit with him, requesting the filing of an order to a certain amount, is the subject of forgery, and one who, without authority, signs the customer's name to such instrument, and presents it, and receives goods upon it, will be guilty of that offense, although it is not made pay able to bearer, and does not in terms obligate the customer to pay for the goods. Forcy v. State, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 327, 60 Tex. Crim. Rep. 206, 131 S. W. 585. (Annotated) b. One who knowingly presents to the carrier a forged order for intoxicating liquor which had been ordered in the name of the one whose name is signed to the order is guilty of uttering a forged instrument both with respect to the carrier, who is induced to make a wrong delivery of the property. and to the consignee, where, had the order been genuine, he might have been subjected to a penalty for violation of the law regu lating dealings in intoxicating liquors. State v. Webster, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 337, 88 S. C. 56, 70 S. E. 422. (Annotated) c. A written instrument in the following form: "Mr. Sage: Please let this boy have a |