II. Concealment; failure to disclose facts. Fraudulent concealment of assets of bank- f. Failure by residuary legatees to exrupt as continuing offense, see BANK- press their opinion that the bequest to them RUPTCY, § 125 a. Secret commission by owner of property to broker employed by purchaser, see BROKERS, § 24 j. Broker's concealment of purchaser's identity, see BROKERS, § 26 a. By carrier selling round trip ticket, see CARRIERS, § 93 a. By promotor in sale of property to corporation, see CORPORATIONS, § 173. Concealment of epilepsy as, see DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, § 20 d. Effect on guaranty, see GUARANTY, § 11 b. Matters affecting insurance, see INSURANCE, S$ 269, 270, 307. Landlord's liability to tenant for injury by hidden defects, see LANDLORD AND TENANT, §§ 166-168. Effect of, on running of limitations, see Failure to disclose facts to surety, see See also post, § 37 1; WORDS AND PHRASES, 1458. a. Suppression of a fact material to be known, and which the party is under obligation to communicate, constitutes fraud. M. & L. S. Fechheimer & Co. v. N. B. Baum & Bro. 2 L.R.A. 153, 37 Fed. 167. b. When there is no actual relation of trust or confidence between parties, neither is under any duty in the absence of inquiry to disclose facts which are equally within the means of knowledge of both, and if one fails to do so, he is not guilty of fraud. Cherry v. Brizzolara, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 508, 89 Ark. 309, 116 S. W. 668. c. Mere failure of an executor to give notice to a residuary legatee, after settling the estate as insolvent, of the fact that after his discharge he had secured title to the real estate of the testator, is not fraud. Williams v. Woodruff, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 986, 35 Colo. 28, 85 Pac. 90. d. No fraud is shown in the purchase of a note by a third person for the maker, for less than full value, by the fact that such third person does not disclose that he is making the purchase for the maker. Sigler v. Sigler, L.R.A.1917A, 725, 98 Kan. 524, 158 Pac. 864. e. Mere suppression by a debtor of the fact that negotiations are pending for a sale of the plant of a corporation, shares of stock in which he has pledged as collateral security for his debt, and that such ale will more than double the value of the stock, is not a fraudulent concealment which will invalidate an agreement by the creditor to release the collateral and abate a portion of the debt in consideration of its immediate payment some months before maturity, since the debtor occupies no fiduciary relation, and is under no obligation to speak. Chicora Fertilizer Co. v. Dunan, 50 L.R.A. 401, 91 Md. 144, 46 Atl. 347. was subject to a trust in favor of public institutions which would make the gifts to such purposes exceed the proportion of the estate permitted by statute, and therefore void as against the widow, is not such fraud as will render void releases by her of the right to contest the bequest given in compromise of litigation for that purpose in which all the facts have been brought out. Amherst College v. Ritch, 37 L.R.A. 305, 151 N. X. 282, 45 N. E. 876. g. Whether or not a bank which made an entry upon the pass book of a customer purporting to show a credit in his favor, which was ab initio false, was under such obligation to indicate the exact truth to one who dealt with the customer on the faith of the credit as to render it liable to him,-is for the jury upon evidence that he sought information of the bank as to the genuineness and accuracy of the apparent credit, disclosing his reasons for making the inquiry, and that the banker, while expressly declining to give in terms the information sought, by concealing the truth induced him believe that the entry was correct. James v. Crosthwait, 36 L.R.A. 631, 97 Ga. 673, 25 S. E. 754. to § 10. Effect of fiduciary or confidential relation. As excuse for breach of promise to marry, see BREACH OF PROMISE, § 5. a. If a person standing in a special relation of trust and confidence to another has information concerning property, and contracts with the other, and does not disclose his exclusive knowledge, the contract may be avoided, or he may be held as a constructive trustee. Harrison v. Harrison, L.R.A.1916E, 854, 21 N. M. 372, 155 Pac. 356. b. Mere nondisclosure or silence is not fraud for the purpose of rescission or cancelation, in the absence of special circumstances imposing a duty to speak. Opie v. Pacific Invest. Co. 56 L.R.A. 778, 26 Wash. 505, 67 Pac. 231. c. The duty to disclose exists where there is a previous definite fiduciary relation between parties, and one or both of them, in entering into a contract, expressly reposes a trust and confidence in the other, or such trust and confidence are necessarily implied, or the transaction in its essential nature is fiduciary and necessarily calls for perfect good faith, without regard to any particular intention of the parties. Opie v. Pacific Invest. Co. 56 L.R.A. 778, 26 Wash. 505, 67 Pac. 231. d. In case of the termination of the agency of one who has undertaken to sell another's stock, so that he is at liberty to purchase for himself, the confidential relation may be found to continue so that concealment by him of opportunities which he has for resale, knowing that the principal is relying on him for information, may amount to fraud which will render him liable for the difference between what he pays for the stock and its true value. McDon II. Concealment; failure to disclose facts. ough v. Williams, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 452, 77 § 13. By vendor. Ark. 261, 92 S. W. 783. a. No trust relation exists between an indorser of a note secured by mortgage, and the mortgagee, which will require him to disclose to the mortgagee knowledge possessed by him as to the value of the mortgage, when as agent he attempts to buy it for a third person. Opie v. Pacific Invest. Co. 56 L.R.A. 778, 26 Wash. 505, 67 Pac. 231. a. The holder of a mortgage who forecloses it by advertisement and sells the property, with knowledge that the mortgagor has no title and that a purchaser will receive no consideration for his money, is liable for fraud to one who bids in the property on the faith of the advertisement. Dirks Trust & T. Co. v. Koch, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 513, 32 S. D. 551, 143 N. W. 952. (Annotated) b. One who knowingly sells a house located over a cesspool which receives the drainings from his other building, and is completely concealed from view, without notifying the purchaser of the existence of the pool, is liable in damages as for fraud to the extent of the expense and loss to which the purchaser is subjected because of it. Weikel v. Sterns, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1035, 142 Ky. 513, 134 S. W. 908. (Annotated) § 14. of lease. b. Merely sending a nonresident mortgagee a circular letter setting forth that the writer has customers for mortgages, and suggesting that upon quotation of a price he will endeavor to secure a buyer for the mortgage, to which a reply is returned asking what will be given for it, does not establish a fiduciary relation between the writer and the mortgagee, so as to require a disclosure of the writer's information as to the value of the mortgage in sub-mine which is subject to forfeiture if operasequent endeavors to buy it, where the tions which cannot be profitably conducted mortgagee selects a third person as his are suspended, by concealing and disguising agent to close the transaction. Opie v. Pa- the physical conditions of the property, makcific Invest. Co. 56 L.R.A. 778, 26 Wash. ing false statements of existing facts within his knowledge of which the purchaser is ignorant, made with intent that the purchaser shall rely on them, which he does, is 505, 67 Pac. 231. § 12. Of fact of insolvency. a. One who sells a lease of a worked-out As fraud justifying rescission of sale, see liable to him for the difference between the SALE, § 164 k, n, o. See also post, § 16 d. a. One knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that a bank is insolvent, commits a fraud if, with intent to evade his own liability, he sells his shares therein. Earle v. Carson, 60 L.R.A. 266, 107 Fed. 639, 46 C. C. A. 498, aff'd in 188 U. S. 42, 47 L. ed. 373, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254. b. A stockholder is not under legal obligation to state the fact that the corporation is insolvent, to a purchaser who seeks him of his own accord for the purpose of buying the stock, without any previous offer to sell. Rothmiller v. Stein, 26 L.R.A. 148, 143 N. Y. 581, 38 N. E. 718. c. Concealment of insolvency, with no reasonable expectation of paying, renders a sale fraudulent, and entitles the seller to possession as against the purchaser or his voluntary assignee. Morrow Shoe Mfg. Co. v. New England Shoe Co. 24 L.R.A. 417, 57 Fed. 685, 60 Fed. 341, 6 C. C. A. 508, 8 C. C. A. 652. d. A party who induces the owner to sell him goods on credit by fraudulently concealing his insolvency and his intent not to pay for them, is guilty of a fraud which entitles the vendor, if no innocent third party has acquired an interest in them, to disaffirm the contract and recover the goods. 581 Diamonds v. United States, 60 L.R.A. 595, 119 Fed. 556, 56 C .C. A. 122. e. Undisclosed insolvency of a buyer does not affect the validity of his purchase if there be an honest purpose on his part to pay. German Nat. Bank v. Princeton State Bank, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 556, 128 Wis. 60, 107 N. W. 454. price which he pays and the value of what he gets. Tooker v. Alston, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 818, 159 Fed. 599, 86 C. C. A. 425. § 15. - of personalty. Concealing defect in automobile from purchaser, see NEGLIGENCE, § 40 gl. a. The intentional nondisclosure of a latent defect by the seller, when he knows that it is unknown to the buyer, is fraudulent. Kitchen v. Long, L.R.A.1917C, 617, 67 Fla. 72, 64 So. 429. b. The intentional nondisclosure by the seller of a hidden defect in a mule not discoverable by ordinary observation, and his statement that he knew nothing about the animal, is such a fraudulent concealment as entitles the buyer upon discovery of the defect to a rescission of the contract and a recovery of his own property taken in trade for the diseased mule, although the seller expressly refused to guarantee the animal. Kitchen v. Long, L.R.A.1917C, 617, 67 Fla. 72, 64 So. 429. (Annotated c. One selling personal property, knowing he has no title, and concealing that fact from the purchaser, is liable for fraud. Jarrett v. Goodnow, 32 L.R.A. 321, 39 W. Va. 602, 20 S. E. 575. d. If the vendor of personal property at the time of the sale knows of a valid outstanding title or encumbrance and fails to give notice to the vendee, the element of fraud is introduced, and the vendee may rescind without waiting for actual loss to come to him. Computing Scales Co. v. Long, 65 L.R.A. 294, 66 S. C. 379, 44 S. E. 963. e. Where several persons, for the purpose of buying a horse, mutually agree to pay II. Concealment; failure to disclose facts. ESTOPPEL, 100. a certain price for him, a secret agreement Estoppel by representations de futuro, see between the vendor and one of them, whereby he receives his share in the horse for nothing for securing the others to join with him in the purchase, is such a fraud as will entitle the purchasers to defeat recovery on the notes evidencing their promise to pay the purchase money. Noble v. Fox, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 933, 35 Okla. 70, 128 Pac. (Annotated) Opinion as to value of insured property, see INSURANCE, § 266 a. 102. § 16. By purchaser. Concealment of insolvency, see ante, § 12 c-e. Director purchasing corporate stock, see That stock dividend has been declared, see As ground for revocation of deed, see DEEDS, As ground for rescission of contract, see Opinion as to health, see INSURANCE, § 378. a. Expressions of opinion as to matters which in their nature are contingent and uncertain do not constitute fraud. Bradley v. Oviatt, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 828, 86 Conn. 63, 84 Atl. 321. b. To constitute fraud there must be a statement or representation as to a fact existing in the present or in the past and not a mere expression of opinion as to what will take place in the future. Guthrie & W. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 490, 19 Okla. 21, 91 Pac. 1119. c. Every person reposes at his peril in the opinion of others, when he has equal judgment. Simplex commendatio non obligat. Industrial Sav. & L. Co. v. Plummer, L.R.A.1915C, 613, 84 N. J. Eq. 184, 92 Atl. a. The mere failure of a buyer to dis-opportunity to form and exercise his own close something extrinsic or intrinsic to the thing bought, known to him and not known to the seller, is not in legal sense fraud. Crompton v. Beedle, 30 L.R.A, (N.S.) 748, 83 Vt. 287, 75 Atl. 331. b. The sale of a remainder at the price it was worth if the life tenant was in good health will be set aside, where the purchaser, with knowledge that the life tenant was on his deathbed, sought the remainderman, and, with knowledge of his ignorance of the facts, gave a misleading answer to a ques tion as to how the life tenant was getting along, with the object of affirmatively de ceiving him, and thereby secured the trade. Hays v. Meyers, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 284, 139 Ky. 440, 107 S. W. 287. (Annotated) c. A vendee of land who knows of the existence of a mine on the land, of which the vendor is ignorant, is not bound to disclose such fact in making the purchase; but, if he undertakes to do so, must dis close the whole truth without concealment of material facts, and without doing any thing calculated to prevent an investigation on the part of the vendor,-especially if the latter does not reside near the land, and the purchaser does. Stackpole v. Han cock, 45 L.R.A. 814, 40 Fla. 362, 24 So. 914. d. The purchase by an insolvent of goods on credit without disclosing the facts that he has given a mortgage upon his present and future property, to secure an existing indebtedness, is such fraud as to give the vendor a right to avoid the sale and sue to recover the property, or to recover the value of the goods from the purchaser in an action for fraud, with the remedies afforded by statute in such cases, or to proceed against him in bankruptcy. Louisville Dry Goods Co. v. Lanman, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 363, 135 Ky. 163, 121 S. W. 1042. III. Matters of opinion or of the § 17. Generally. 583. d. Where a false representation is merely an expression of an opinion, and not of a subsisting fact, the law will not give relief. Williamson v. Holt, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 240, 147 N. C. 515, 61 S. E. 384. e. Statements of mere matters of opinion, although false or erroneous, are not sufficient ground for an action of damages. Nounnan V. Sutter County Land Co. 6 L.R.A. 219, 81 Cal. 1, 22 Pac. 515. f. A false representation which is an expression of commendation or simply a matter of opinion is not legal fraud. National Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 70 L.R.A. 349, 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. E. 306. g. A representation of intention as to future acts or events, not having been falsely made with the purpose to deceive, is not, though the act or event did not occur as represented, a sufficient ground upon which to predicate a charge of fraud. or be made the basis for the rescission of a contract induced and brought about by the representation. Bigelow v. Barnes, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 203, 121 Minn. 148, 140 N. W. 1032. i. When a party states a matter which might otherwise be only an opinion but does not state it as an expression of his own opinion, but affirms it as an existing fact material to the transaction, so that the other party may reasonably treat it as a fact and rely and act upon it as such, it becomes an affirmation of fact and may be a fraudulent misrepresentation. Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co. 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 125, 163 Cal. 561, 126 Pac. 351. j. False representations on which to base III. Matters of opinion or of the future; trade talk. e. If a promise is made to do something in the future and at the time it is not intended to perform the promise, that fact does not constitute a fraud in the law. Miller v. Sutliff, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 735, 241 Ill. 521, 89 N. E. 651. an action for deceit must be of some exist-, tention to fulfil, is not a misrepresentation ing fact, and not a mere promise; must be of an existing fact. Younger v Hoge, 18 made in reference to some subject material L.R.A. (N.S.) 94, 211 Mo. 444, 111 S. W. to the contract itself, and the injury from 20. it must be direct. Hence representations for the purpose of inducing one to enter into a contract to build a portion of a railroad, that the person making the representations has bought a quantity of rails at a certain price specified, and will sell them to the other person at the same price, constitute no ground for an action of dereit. Dawe v. Morris, 4 L.R.A. 158, 149 Mass. 188, 21 N. E. 313. (Annotated) k. A statement that a signature sought is necessary to make a security good is merely of opinion and not of fact or law, and therefore is not fraudulent. Wicks v. Metcalf, L.R.A.1918A, 493, 83 Or. 687, 163 Pac. 434, 988. 1. Representations as to the amount of earth necessary for constructing a levee, and its quality or kind, made to induce another to enter into a contract for constructing the levee within a certain time, with a forfeiture for failure to complete it in that time, are mere expressions of opinions equally within the power of both parties to ascertain, and therefore not a sufficient ground for an action for damages, although the contractor was not within 150 miles of the place of the work when he entered into the agreement, and it would have taken many days to have ascertained the truth of the representations. Nounnan v. Sutter County Land Co. 6 L.R.A. 219, 81 Cal. 1, 22 Pac. 515. m. Even when a vendor parts with his goods upon false representations, such representations are not actionable unless they were not only relied upon by the vendor, but related to some present or past state of facts. Field v. Siegel, 47 L.R.A. 433, 99 Wis. 605, 75 N. W. 397. § 18. Effect of fiduciary relation. a. The mere expression of a false opinion may amount to fraud justifying a rescission of the contract, where a fiduciary relation exists between the parties, and the expression of opinion is accompanied by other matters which tend to establish misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence, undue confidence, mental inability, or prise. Poole v. Camden, L.R.A.1917E, 988, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S. E. 454. § 19. Nonperformance of promise. sur a. The nonperformance of a promise made in the course of negotiations is not of itself a fraud nor the evidence of a fraud. Kilpatrick v. Inman, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 188, 46 Colo. 514, 105 Pac. 1080. b. Fraud cannot be predicated on a promise not performed. Cerny v. Paxton & G. Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 640, 78 Neb. 134, 110 N. W. 882. c. A promise unenforceable under the statute of frauds will not sustain an action for fraud and deceit. Cerny v. Paxton & G. Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 640, 78 Neb. 134, 110 N. W. 882. d. A promise, though made without in f. A mere failure to perform a promise, honestly made, will not constitute such fraud as will justify a court in decreeing a constructive trust, but a false promise made to secure the performance of an act beneficial to the promisor, with intent to repudiate the obligation upon which the promise rests to the prejudice of another. will justify such decree. Stout v. Stout, L.R.A.1915A, 711, 165 Iowa, 552, 146 N. W. 474. g. False representations in the nature of "promissory representation," looking to the future, does not constitute legal fraud. National Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 70 L.R.A. 349, 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. E. 306. h. The making of a promise does not constitute fraud unless it is made without any intention of performing it. The mere failure to perform a covenant does not relate back and render the same fraudulent. Ayers v. Southern P. R. Co. L.R.A.1917F, 949, 173 Cal. 74, 159 Pac. 144. i. A promise may constitute a false and fraudulent representation, if made with the intention in the mind of the promisor not to perform it. Braddy v. Elliott, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1121, 146 N. C. 578, 60 S. E. 507. j. A promise made without any intention of performing it constitutes actual fraud in the law of contracts. Millar v. Millar, L.R.A.1918B, 415, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 349. k. If a promise to perform some act in the future is made with the design and inwith no intention to perform it, and is made tention of the promisor to disregard it, and to deceive and entrap the other party, then such promise, in case the refusal to perform take place, will amount to actual fraud. Anderson v. Reed, L.R.A.1916B, 862, 20 N. M. 202, 148 Pac. 502. 1. The procuring of property upon a prointend to perform, is a fraud. Cerny v mise which the party, at the time, does not Paxton & G. Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 640, 78 Neb. 134, 110 N. W. 882. m. The possibility or probability of performance of many contracts known to the commercial world is dependent upon so many contingencies that it is only in an extreme case that a given contract can be said, as matter of law, to be so incapable of performance as to evidence a purpose to defraud. Equitable Loan & Security Co. v. Waring, 62 L.R.A. 93, 178 Ga. 599, 44 S. E. 320. n. For an obligor to wilfully refuse to pay an obligation notwithstanding his ability to do so is fraud when he has promised to pay whenever, in his opinion, his circumstances would enable him to do so. III. Matters of opinion or of the future; trade talk. b. A physician is not relieved of individual liability to an action for deceit in falsely stating that a patient's injuries are curable by the fact that he is acting at the time as agent of a medical institute. Hedin v. Minneapolis Medical & S. Inst. 35 L.R.A. 417, 62 Minn. 146, 64 N. W. 158. (Annotated) c. To recover damages from a healer because of deceit in stating that he could and would cure an intending patient, whom he failed to benefit, plaintiff must show not only that the statement was false, but that it was made with fraudulent intent. Spead v. Tomlinson, 68 L.R.A. 432, 73 N. H. 46, o. A false representation, in order to be available as a cause of action or defense, must relate to some existing or past fact and not merely to a promise as to future conduct or intention. Bennett v. McIntire, 6 L.R.A. 736, 121 Ind. 231, 23 N. E. 78. p. An action of tort cannot be maintained on an unfulfilled promise by reason of the nonperformance of which plaintiff is injured, although at the time of making it the promisor did not intend to perform it; because to permit such an action would violate the policy of the statute of frauds by relieving a party from the necessity of 59 Atl. 376. observing those statutory formulas which are necessary to the validity of certain 8 21. Estimates and valuations genexecutory contracts. Dawe v. Morris, 4 L.R.A. 158, 149 Mass. 188, 21 N. E. 313. (Annotated) q. That a conveyance of a half interest in the coal and minerals underlying the grantor's lands is made on the faith of a representation that the grantee will locate manufacturing plants on or near the property, and secure railroad communication therewith which promise is not intended to be, and is not, performed, does not entitle the grantor to a cancelation of the conveyance on the ground of fraud. Miller v. Sutliff, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 735, 241 Ill. 521, 89 N. E. 651. (Annotated) r. Taking advantage of the other party to an exchange of lands by making promises with respect to the construction of buildings on the property deeded by the promisor which the promisor does not intend to fulfil is such fraud as will entitle the other party to a rescission of the contract. Braddy v. Elliott, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1121, 146 N. Č. 578, 60 S. E. 507. s. A creditor who, to induce his debtor to secure the indebtedness by a mortgage on a stock of goods, promises that he will not permit a sale of the property under fore- | closure for less than a certain sum, is guilty of actionable fraud where he makes the promise with the secret intention of not performing it, although it does not relate to existing facts. Cerny v. Paxton & G. Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 640, 78 Neb. 134, 110 N. W. 882. (Annotated) t. A trade of a farm for stock in a corporation and a promise of a salaried position in the concern will not be rescinded for breach of the promise, on the theory of misrepresentation. Younger v. Hoge, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 94, 211 Mo. 444, 111 S. W. 20. § 20. As to ability to cure person. a. A statement by a physician to an illiterate man, that the latter's injuries can be cured by the former's mode of treatment, made without knowledge of its truth or falsity, but without belief in its truth, or upon the representation, without knowledge of its truth or falsity, that it is true of his own knowledge, renders him liable to an action for deceit if the statement is acted upon and injury results. Hedin v. Minneapolis Medical & S. Inst. 35 L.R.A. 417, 62 Minn. 146, 64 N. W. 158. (Annotated) erally. By vendor, see post, § 22. Allegations as to, see PLEADING, § 404 c, j. d, 141 b. a. A statement by an architect that the cost of a building to be constructed according to his plans will not exceed a specified sum, is a statement of fact and not a mere expression of opinion. Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co. 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 125, 163 Cal. 561, 126 Pac. 351. b. A person employing an architect to superintend the construction of a building according to his plans does not deal at arms length with the architect and has a right to rely upon his representations as to his ability and the maximum cost of the building and it is the duty of the architect to disclose his lack of skill and ability and his knowledge that the building cannot be constructed for the sum specified. Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co. 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 125, 163 Cal. 561, 126 Pac. 351. c. Expressions of opinion as to value, even though false, are not grounds for an action for false representations. Deming V. Darling, 2 L.R.A. 743, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N. E. 107. d. The mere expression of an opinion as to value, or a statement as to the uses for which real estate is wanted, will not, unless used as part of fraudulent means to mislead and prevent an examination of the property, suffice to set aside a deed thereto on the ground of fraud. Stackpole v. Hancock, 45 L.R.A. 814, 40 Fla. 362, 24 So. 914. e. The rule that no one is liable for an expression of an opinion is applicable only when the opinion stands by itself as a distinct thing. If it is given in bad faith. with knowledge of its untruthfulness, to defraud others, the person making it is liable, especially when it is as to a fact affecting quality or value and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the one making it. Williams v. State, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1197, 77 Ohio St. 468, 83 N. E. 802. f. A statement of value may be of such |