110. Statutes-Construction.-A substantial re-enactment of a statute is a legislative adoption of the fixed judicial pre-existing construction.-Wood-Dickerson Supply Co. v. Cocciola, Ala., 45 So. Rep. 192.

111. Street Railroads-Duty Toward Trespassers. In an action against a street railway for injuries to a trespasser, whether the motorman discovered the plaintiff in time to prevent the accident and whether he promptly used the means at his command to prevent it, held for the jury.-Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones, Ala., 45 So. Rep. 177.

112. Injury to Alighting Passengers.-In an action against a street railway company for injury to an alighting passenger injured while crossing a track, facts held to be evidence on the question of the company's negligence.Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Lan drum, Ala., 45 So. Rep. 198.

113. Questions for Jury.-In an action against a street railroad for personal injuries to a passenger, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence held under the evidence to be for the jury.-United Rys. & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. Rosik, Md., 68 Atl. Rep. 511.

114.- -Transfers.-Where a passenger presenting a transfer entitling him to passage on a street car was ejected therefrom for failure to pay another fare, there was an unlawful assault upon him, warranting recovery of damages.-Charbonneau v. Nassau Electric R. Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 105.

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115. Sunday-Public Shows.-Exhibition of paintings, statuary, wax figures, plaster groupings and curios, unaccompanied by any sical or stage, entertainment. on Sunday, did not constitute a violation of Pen. Code, sec. 265. -Eden Musee American Co. v. Bingham, 108 N. Y. Supp. 200.

116.- -Regulation.-The legislature has power to regulate the observance of the Sabbath, and prevent its desecration to protect the moral and physical well-being of the people, and to preserve the peace, quiet and good order of society. In re Hammerstein, 108 N. Y. Supp. 197.

117. Tenancy in Common-Compensation of Co-Tenant Collecting Rents.-In the absence of an agreement, one tenant in common is not entitled to compensation for collecting rents belonging to himself and his co-tenants.-Cole v. Cole, 108 N. Y. Supp. 124.

118. Torts-Proximate Cause.-Whether an alleged wrongful act was the proximate cause of the injury is a part of plaintiff's cause of action which it is necessary to decide upon demurrer, unless the facts are capable of more than one reasonable inference, when the question is one for the jury.-McGehee v. Norfolk & S. Ry. Co., N. C., 60 S. E. Rep. 912.

119. Trial-Instructions.-An instruction that insurer was not liable for loss of rents accruing before plaintiff took possession of the premises after the fire was unauthorized in the absence of evidence of delay in plaintiff's taking possession.-Palatine Ins. Co., Limited, of Manchester, England. v. O'Brien, Md., 68 Atl. Ren. 484.

120. Issues and Theories.-The court should not undertake to state specifically the contentions of one party without stating the corresponding contentions of the other party. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Sikes, Ga., 60 S. E. Rep. 868.

a trust in favor of a third person was expressed in a deed, it follows the land into the hands of subsequent purchasers.-Koch V. Streuter, Ill., 83 N. E. Rep. 1072.

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122. Usury-Nature, of.-Usury is the result of statute; there being no common-law rule regulating the amount of interest.-Banov Bank of Charleston, S. C., 60 S. E. Rep. 942. 123. Vendor and Purchaser-Bona Fide Purchasers. Whatever directs the attention of a purchaser to prior rights of third parties, so as to put him on inquiry, will operate as notice.Pocahontas Tanning Co. v. St. Lawrence Boom & Mfg. Co., W. Va., 60 S. E. Rep. 890.

125.

Warehousemen-Delivery to Third Person. Where plaintiff did certain things intending to pledge goods in a warehouse, held, she could not recover of the warehouseman, who delivered the goods to the pledgee on default in payment by the pledgor.-Kramer v. Haeger Storage Warehouse Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 1.

126. Waters and Water Courses-Rights of Water Company in Streets.-In view of Gen. St. p. 2199, sec. 2, the consent to the laying pipes by a water company in the streets, required by section 12, may be given at the same time as the consent to the incorporation.Woodbridge Tp. v. Middlesex Water Co., N. J., 68 Atl. Rep. 464.

127. Riparian Rights.-In an action by a lower riparian owner for injuries from the acts of an upper riparian owner an instruction held not objectionable as imposing on the latter the duty of guaranteeing the purity of waters in a stream passing over the lands of the lower owner. Tetherington V. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., Ill., 83 N. E. Rep. 1048.

128. Wills-Construction.-Where one construction of a will renders a portion of it meaningless, and another gives effect to all the words used, the latter must be adopted.Wardner V. Seventh Day Baptist Memorial Board, Ill., 83 N. E. Rep. 1077.

129. Contingent Remainders.-A devise of land to S. for life, "and at his death to his children then alive in fee simple forever," with remainder over in case S. left no living children, held to vest contingent remainders in the children.-Steele v. Poe. S. C., 60 S. E. Rep.

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130. Effect of Probate.-Under V. S. 2532, as amended by Laws 1896, p. 32, No. 44, sec. 5, and sec. 2543, the probate court may extend the time for a husband to waive the provisions of his wife's will and take under the law.-In re Peck's Estate, Vt., 68 Atl. Rep. 433.

131.Statutes.-The statutes put no restraint on the distribution among persons of a man's property by will, barring the property rights accruing to the widow.-Lavin v. Thomas, 108 N. Y. Supp. 112.

132. Witnesses—Impeachment.-In an action against a railroad for injuries to plaintiff through being struck by a train while walking on the track, certain testimony held admissible to impeach a witness.-Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co. v. Donahue, Md., 68 Atl. Rep. 507.

133. Impeachment.-When a state witness, called in rebuttal, contradicts testimony of accused, the latter should be allowed to impeach the witness.-State V. Anderson, La., 45 So. Rep. 267.

they be aldermen, trustees, or directors in a corporation.

In fact, upon the general principles of equity it would seem to be well established by the best authority that even though there be no ordinance or statute or by-law prohibiting interested members of the boards of managers of either public, quasi public, or private corporations in voting for the passage of an ordinance or resolution wherein one or more of such board is interested, directly or indirectly. Yet such an ordinance or resolution is void.

These questions arise most frequently when a contract is proposed whereby a purchase of property is sought for the poration in which the member of the board has a pecuniary interest.

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A case which ably presents all the features of the subject under consideration, is that of Stroud v. Consumers' Water Company, 56 N. J. Law, 422, which relates to an ordinance passed by the common council of Atlantic City, providing for the purchase of the property and franchise of the Consumers' Water Company, payable in the bonds of the city, and another similar ordinance for the purchase of the franchise of the Atlantic City Water Works Company. The objection was made that

the ordinances were illegal, because four of the members of the common council who voted for them were stockholders in the Consumers' Water Company. The point made was that the common council was the agent of Atlantic City in making these purchases, and that four of its members were adversely interested as part owners of the property of the Consumers' Water Company; and that the ordinance is voidable at the instance of the city or a taxpayer of the city. Judge Reed, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is a fundamental rule applicable to both sales and purchases, that an agent employed to sell cannot make himself the purchaser, nor, if employed to purchase can he be himself the seller. The expediency and justice of this rule are too obvious to require explanation. Durr Agency (Paley), page 33."

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This doctrine is applicable whenever the fiduciary situation of contracts or condition of agency exists, and is 'enforced, whether the agency is public, quasi public, or pri"It is well settled," says Mr. Beach, "that directors or managers of corporations and other companies are equally within the rule which guards and restrains the dealings and transactions between trustee and cestui que trust and agent and his principal; directors and managers being, in fact, trustees and agents of the bodies represented by them." I Beach Corp., sec. 240. Again in Section 242, he says: "Directors are disqualified from acting in the right and behalf of themselves, and of their companies at the same time; and transactions with themselves, or wherein. they are interested, are voidable, either by the company or by its stockholders, or by its creditors." A director of a corporation cannot make for himself or for his own benefit a contract which will bind the company, and such a contract may be repudiated by the company at the instance of a

stockholder. Guild, Executor, v. Parker, Receiver, 14 Vroom, 440.

In the case of Stewart v. The Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 9 Vroom, 505, Mr. Justice Dixon speaking for the court, said: "The vice which inheres in the judgment of a judge of his own cause, contaminates the contract; the mind of the director or trustee is the forum in which he and his cestui qui trust are urging their rival claims, and when his opposing litigant appeals from the judgment there pronounced, that judgment must fall, and it matters. not if the contract seems a fair one. Again, this learned judge remarks: "The application of this rule is most frequent in relations between vendor and purchaser, but its reason and force extend to all agents and trustees, public and private. * * * The strongest intellects have enunciated the rule with its utmost vigor, and in its broadest sense.' Referring to the section which applied to the disqualification of councilmen pecuniarily interested in the passage of an ordinance, Judge Reed says: "This language, with equal clearness, includes the contract now in question. Four of the members of the common council of Atlantic City were interested in furnishing the property of the Consumers' Water Company, to the city, the expense or consideration of which is paid by the council, of which these four members are a part. The invalidity of the contract rests upon the doctrine that a contract is illegal, if it be opposed to the general policy and intent of the statute. Meliss v. Shirly, L. R. 26 Q. B. D. 446; Milford Borough V. Milford Water Co., 124 Pa. St. 610; State, Gregory Taylor v. Jersey City, 5 Vroom, 390. I regard this case directly ruled by the last case cited. The statute under which that decision was made is similar to the one already tioned. Two of the members of the common council of Jersey City, in that case, were interested in the property purchased: in this case four. The condition existing in that case exists in this." The reasons for the rule are all so well stated by Judge Reed, in the above, that we will confine

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further comment to short applicable passages from other authorities.

In Pennsylvania, after quoting the law forbidding members to be interested in in the case of Milford Borough v. Milford contracts with the corporation, the court, Water Company, 124 Pa. St. 610, said: "It is almost needless to say that a contract so prohibited by law is utterly void, and there is no power that can breathe life into such a dead thing."

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Says McQuillin, in his work on Municipal Ordinances, section 108: "The fact that the vote of the interested member is not necessary to pass an ordinance seems to be immaterial. Thus in a New Jersey case, a member of the board of public works voted for an ordinance authorizing a railroad company, in which he was a stockholder, to lay its tracks in the streets, and the ordinance was held voidable. appeared that there was no necessity for the action of the interested member, for there were others who could act without him." The court said: "The fact that there were a sufficient number of votes, apart from his vote, to pass the ordinance, is no answer to the objection taken upon this point. The infection of the concurrence of the interested persons spreads so that the action of the whole body is voidable." That is to say, that the interest of one person may have been exerted to influence the whole body.

All the above goes to show that even were there no provision by statute or city ordinance, the same rule would apply as to the validity of an ordinance, where one of a board of aldermen had a pecuniary interest in the contract about which such ordinance related, for it is true, as Mr. Abbott says in his recent work on Municipal Corporations, vol. 2, page 1458, that: "In our form of government public offices are public trust."

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This being true, the strictest rules of trusteeship should apply to all matters of the character of those under consideration herein where a public trust is concerned.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS

LIMITATIONS-IMPLIED OR RESULTANT TRUSTS.-Under the statute in Missouri relating to married women, where a husband receives money belonging to his wife without her consent in writing, it remains hers, and he holds it as her trustee. Smith v. Settle (Mo.), 107 S. W. Rep. 430, is a case based on that statute arising on the following facts:

"Defendant's wife in her lifetime inherited the sum of $1,131.50. Defendant received the money in May, 1890, and he used it as his own, but he never had the written consent of his wife. The wife died intestate in July, 1904, and plaintiff was appointed administrator of her estate, and began this action in October, 1905. Among other things, the petition alleges that, after the death of his wife, defendant concealed from the heirs the facts concerning said moneys for the purpose of preventing them from collecting. The answer was a general denial and a plea of the statute of limitations. The judgment in the trial court was for the plaintiff."

The defense rested on the statute of limitations, the suit not having bee. brought within one year after the death of the wife. The plaintiff contended that the fund, being a trust fund, the statute did not run. On this branch of the case the court says:

"When the defendant received the money belonging to his wife without her consent in writing, it remained hers, and he held it in trust for her. The period of limitation began to run the day he received the money. But, as she was under coverture and died under that disability, another statute applied to such case (sections 4279, 4281, Rev. St. 1899 [Ann. St. 1906, pp. 2354, 2355]), which gave her representative one year from her death. The latter section reads that: 'If any person so entitled to sue die, before the expiration of the time herein limited for the commencement of such suit, if such cause of action shall survive to his representatives, his executor or administrator may, after the expiration of such time and within one year after such death, commence such action, but not after that period.' Under this section it is imperative that the action be begun within one year." Citing Rosenberger v. Mallenson, 92 Mo. App. 27, Reed v. Painter, 145 Mo. 341, 46 S. W. Rep. 1089. Continuing, the court says, respecting the application of limitations to trusts:

"But it is said by plaintiff that defendant became a trustee for the deceased wife, and that limitation does not run in such case, and that the statute aforesaid requiring suit to be brought within one year after death does not

apply. It is true where the husband appropriates the wife's money inheritance, as here, she can treat him either as a trustee, or simply as a debtor. Winn v. Riley, 151 Mo. 61, 67, 52 S. W. Rep. 27, 74 Am. St Rep. 517. But, if treated as a trustee, it is not such a trust as is exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations. It was not an express trust. It was an implied or constructive trust, and the statute runs against such from its creation. Landis v. Saxton, 105 Mo. 486, 16 S. W. Rep. 912, 24 Am. St. Rep. 403; Reed v. Painter, 145 Mo. 341, 356, 46 S. W. Rep. 1089."

The statutes of Missouri are very liberal toward married women, and the decisions have, in the main, given full force to such statutes. The statement as to the rule that the statute runs against implied or constructive trusts is supported by authority, with certain qualifications, as in cases of fraudulent concealment.

ELECTRICITY-INJURIES INCIDENT TO PRODUCTION AND CARE REQUIRED.-It is held in Cutler v. Putman Light & Power Company (Conn.), 68 Atl. Rep. 1006, that the ordinary care required by law calls for the use of very great care in the construction and maintenance of wires for conducting a high voltage of the electricity. In this case defendant maintained its wires directly over the poles and wires of a street railway company. The decedent was a lineman in the employ of the railway company and in the course of his employment climbed a pole to bore a hole in it near the eye bolt. He had no knowledge that the defendant's wire was not properly insulated. While so engaged in his duties, and by reason of the poor insulation, he received a shock from which he died in a few minutes. As to the care required in the control of the electricity, the court savs:

"The exercise of that degree of care which the law terms 'ordinary care' required the use of very great care by the defendant in the construction, maintenance, and operation of its appliances for conducting its currents of electricity of high voltage. McAdam v. Central Railway and Electric Co., 67 Conn. 445447, 35 Atl. Rep. 341. In determining what precautions it should take against danger to human life by possible contact with its highly charged wires, it was bound to recognize the right of the railway company to maintain and use its poles and wires, and to consider the fact that the railway company's linemen were required in the performance of their duties to climb these poles for the purpose of maintain ing and repairing the railway company's wires. Nelson v. Branford L. & W. Co., 75 Conn. 548551, 54 Atl. Rep. 303. The defendant knowingly allowed its highly charged wire, the current