CHAPTER XII.

LEE'S SECOND ENTRY INTO MARYLAND.-MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

THE defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville marks one of the decisive moments of the Civil War. For the first time it appeared to be perhaps possible that the Washington Government would come to the conclusion to recognise the independence of the South. Although hitherto the Federal authorities had regarded as utterly inadmissible the creation of a distinct Confederation in the South, the two defeats which the Northern troops had just experienced on the Rappahannock, had given rise to many serious doubts with many Unionists of the possibility of repressing the Confederates by force. Besides, the proclamations in which President Lincoln declared the slaves in the South free, and in reality put the United States in a state of siege, exasperated the democratic party, who complained bitterly that all constitutional liberties were disappearing.

Hence came a violent reaction in opinion: from all sides protestations arrived against a continuation of the war. Many journals in New York and elsewhere declared themselves against the politics of the Government. A convention of the friends of peace met at Philadelphia to deliberate on the measures to be employed in the realization of their wishes. Judge Curtis, of Boston, formerly one of the associate-judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, vehemently inveighed against the violation,

by the President, of the Federal pact. "I do not see," wrote he, "that it depends upon the executive decree whether a servile war shall be invoked, to help 20,000,000 of the white race to assert the rightful authority of the constitution and laws of their country over those who refuse to obey them. But I do see that this proclamation (emancipating the Southern slaves) asserts the power of the executive to make such a decree! I do not perceive how it is that my neighbours and myself, residing remote from armies and their operations, and where all the laws of the land may be enforced by constitutional means, should be subjected to the possibility of arrest, and imprisonment, and trial before a military commission, and punishment at its discretion, for offences unknown to the law,―a possibility to be converted into a fact at the mere will of the President, or of some subordinate officer, clothed by him with this power. But I do perceive that this executive power is asserted. It must be obvious to the meanest capacity that, if the President of the United States has an implied constitutional right, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of war, to disregard any one positive prohibition of the constitution, or to exercise any one power not delegated to the United States by the constitution, because, in his judgment, he may thereby best subdue the enemy, he has the same right, for the same reason, to disregard each and every provision of the constitution, and to exercise all power needful in his opinion to enable him best to subdue the enemy. The time has certainly come when the people of the United States must understand, and must apply those great rules of civil liberty, which have been arrived at by the self-devoted efforts of thought and action of their ancestors during 700 years of struggle against arbitrary power."

Such were the echoes which Lee's cannon at Chancellorsville awakened. All in the North, and their number was great, whom hitherto the military necessities of the situation had drawn into accepting the continuation of the war, or whom the very extent of the usurpations of the executive power had intimidated, rose and

declared themselves partisans of an understanding with the South on the basis of a separation.

A thrill of relief and joy overran the whole country at the prospect of a speedy peace. This was the moment chosen by Mr. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederate States, to submit to the Government of Richmond a proposition tending to open up negotiations with the North. He offered his own services as negotiator. He particularly desired to be able to arrive at Washington before any fresh military operations, by reawakening the warlike spirit, had added to the already great difficulties of his task. Mr. Stephens's letter was dated the 12th of June. Mr. Davis, consequently, called him to Richmond by a telegram, but he did not arrive till the 22nd of June. Lee's troops were then entering Maryland, and the time was gone.

The plan of a new invasion of Maryland by a Confederate army owed its birth to several causes. The two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had filled the South with joy and confidence. Hence it was demanded on all sides that Lee should take the offensive against an enemy apparently incapable of resisting the Confederates. The army, whose ranks were renewed by the return of many men on furlough or invalided, by the re-entry of many conscripts, and the recall of Longstreet's two corps, shared the universal enthusiasm. Public opinion thus exercised a strong impression on the Government and on General Lee, and influenced them to take the offensive, which, according to all appearance, would in a brief space bring about an illustrious victory and glorious peace.

This mode of looking at things squared sufficiently with Lee's inward thought, who regarded it as very important to keep the enemy as far as possible from the interior of the country, and to shift the theatre of war to the frontier on Federa soil. In this way the South would be as little as possible exposed to the ravages of the enemy, and Richmond, the capital, would remain sheltered from all danger. This last consideration was one of much importance,

as the future proved. As long as the Federals could be kept at some distance north of the Rappahannock, Richmond and its network of railways, which connected it with all the South, were in safety, and the Confederate Government, quiet in its capital, continued to affirm itself as an independent power in the eyes of the world. But if the enemy succeeded in approaching the capital, and menacing its lines of communication, the Government could no longer remain there in safety. This was one of the motives which continually influenced Lee to manoeuvre in such a way as to keep the enemy off Virginian soil. The question of provisions also intervened. At all times they had specially failed the Confederates; it was, therefore, essential to be master of the greatest possible extent of country to draw provisions from. Besides, the Confederate commissariat was always at its last shifts. It is even said that when, in May or June, Lee sent a requisition to Richmond for victuals, the commissary-general would have written on the margin: "If General Lee wants rations, let him go and get them in Pennsylvania."

Such were the chief reasons which persuaded the Richmond Cabinet to take the offensive, after the battle of Chancellorsville.

There was likewise another. If victory had hither crowned the efforts of the Northern Virginian army, it was not the same as to the other Southern armies in the West and South-West of the Confederate States.

General Bragg's army in Tennessee had experienced nothing but reverses. General Pemberton had permitted himself to be shut up in Vicksburg on the Mississippi, and beyond that river the Confederates were losing ground rapidly. For a moment there was an idea of detaching a division from Lee's army (which would then of necessity have remained on the defensive), and sending it to raise the siege of Vicksburg. But this would have been to enfeeble the most exposed part of the frontier, and sacrifice Virginia to save Vicksburg. Lee himself counselled against this plan, adding, however, that if the measure appeared absolutely

necessary, he would send off Pickett's division immediately. It was, therefore, given up, and instead of it, a new invasion of the North was contemplated.

The tone of Lee's army was excellent. His veterans were ready to undertake anything. On the other hand, the commissariat had much ado to feed the army, and naturally enough the idea presented itself of going into Pennsylvania, and living at the expense of the enemy. As to the Federals, the departure of soldiers enrolled who had finished their service, and desertions, becoming more and more frequent, enfeebled Hooker's army. Generally in the North the discouragement following the reverses in Virginia went on increasing. All these considerations encouraged the South to seize the favourable opportunity for resuming the offensive by striking a great blow in Pennsylvania, and by making a diversion for the armies of the West, to obtain for the South that advantage which it was beginning to lose.

This invasion of the North by Lee has been severely criticised. What, however, does he himself say in his report?" The enemy's positions at Fredericksburg being too formidable for him to be dislodged by force, it was necessary to bring about the desired result by other means. It was likewise urgent to rid the Shenandoah Valley of the Federal troops, who had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if occasion offered, to transport the theatre of war to the north of the Potomac. On the other hand, it was probable that the movements of the enemy,—movements which would be the inevitable consequences of our operations, would offer us an opportunity to smite General Hooker's army unawares, and, in any case, this army would be compelled to evacuate Virginia, and, indeed, to summon to its aid all such detachments as were operating in other parts of the country. So that it was permitted us to hope that the Federal plan for their summer campaign would be frustrated, and the fine weather would have, in good part, gone, before they were able to design another. Besides, if we were to gain some-even trifling