upon Japanese policy. She now adopted the practices of Russia, which had formerly aroused such protests in China and Japan. Her conduct increased the bitterness of the Chinese and brought down upon her the denunciation of European critics. But Japan could see no reason why she should not play the game according to the same rules which her European rivals were using.

The expansion of her interests on the continent also forced her to rely more and more upon her army. This gave the military leaders great influence in governmental circles, and tended to produce a form of "militarism" as dangerous as that in any other land. But the military party did not have an easy time of it. Japan was sick of war. She had suffered severely in the Russian struggle and her people were burdened by war-taxes which we would deem almost unbearable. The young men of Japan did not take kindly to conscription, any more than they do in this country. So the popular representatives in the Diet opposed every scheme for army expansion. For ten years the military authorities tried to secure funds for the addition of two divisions-say 70,000 men-to the standing army of Japan. And for ten years the Diet stoutly refused to appropriate a penny. It was not until the great war broke out, and then only after a bitter political campaign, that Japan added a single soldier to her forces.

In the meantime the Germans, with their usual thoroughness, bent themselves to the development of their concessions in Shantung province. They poured German money in to get rapid results. The leased territory covered about 200 square miles. On the fine harbor of Kiaochow there was only a small Chinese village called Tsingtao. Beside it they erected a model settlement, along the best lines of German town-making. They improved the harbor and built fine docks. They strongly fortified the hills overlooking the city. They promptly commenced building a railway into the interior, which finally reached the capital of the province, Tsinan-fu, 256 miles away. And they had a concession to build two other railway lines. They began to open mines along the railway, and two coal and one

iron mines were in operation. And they had a monopoly of the right to supply money and materials whenever China needed foreign aid for any public works in the whole province.

It must be borne in mind, therefore, that although the natural resources belonged to China, all the improvements were German. Germany exercised complete sovereign rights within the leased territory. Her money and her skill had transformed a neglected Chinese harbor into a fine port with an import trade of about $50,000,000 in 1913. She had opened mines which China had never used, and thus added to the wealth of both countries. At the outbreak of the Great War, in 1914, Kiaochow was considered for all practical purposes as a part of Germany, and the whole province was set aside for German development.

With the declarations of war, Germany prepared to use Tsingtao as a naval base. Her reservists scattered through the Far East were assembled there. Great Britain at once asked Japan to act under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and remove this German menace, for the British navy was mobilized in the North Sea.

I might say that if Japan had any love for Germany she might easily have delayed action, for it would not have been difficult to find a loop-hole in the treaty, but her whole foreign policy was founded upon the British understanding and so she acted promptly. An ultimatum was served on Germany demanding that she surrender Kiaochow to Japan for eventual restoration to China. If the Germans had been reasonable they would have yielded to overwhelming force and thus saved the lives of many of their soldiers as well as clinched the restoration of the leasehold to China. But they refused to reply to the demand, and as soon as the ultimatum expired Japan and Great Britain took action. The operations were carefully conducted, for the Germans had no chance at all, and the Japanese did not wish to throw away any lives needlessly. On the 7th of November, 1914, Tsingtao surrendered. During the operations the Japanese marched across Chinese territory, thus violating its neutrality. But under the precedents established in the RussoJapanese war the Japanese felt justified in thus proceeding against a foreign power holding fortifications on Chinese soil.

I may say frankly that I was sorry to have Japan enter the war in 1914. At its origin it was purely a European controversy and I did not see why the tax-ridden peasants of Japan should have to pay for Japanese participation. But, on the other hand, knowing how Germany had acquired Kiaochow and what mischief she might do were she not expelled, I rejoiced that Japan was able to come promptly to the aid of her British ally.

Shortly after the occupation of Kiaochow Japanese diplomacy took on a sinister form. If you will analyze your own memories of the early days of the war you will remember how few Americans understood the real issues at stake. It seemed to us to be merely another European upheaval in which the Central Empires and the Triple Entente stood face to face. Germany, we knew, was fighting for aggrandizement, and her conduct soon alienated the sympathy of the civilized world. So in Japan, this was looked upon as another imperialistic struggle, and thus it offered a good chance for Japan to better her own position in the world.

Now to Japan the place where she must hold a commercial and economic preponderance is China-the greatest undeveloped market in the world and the source of many of the raw materials which Japan so much needed. On the basis of this reasoning Japan launched her notorious twentyone demands upon China. In doing so she again followed the precedents of Europe. Without offering any real consideration she demanded from China concessions which would greatly strengthen her position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as well as in some of the old provinces of China. Japan purposely urged these demands when all Europe was engaged in war and when China could obtain no support, for not one believed the United States would turn a hand to aid China.

Now, if we are honest, we will recognize that there was little in these demands which were not based upon earlier demands by Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain. Even in the methods used, the preparation of military forces and the ultimatum, I could cite many precedents.

One of the worst examples of the old diplomacy was in 1858-which happily is a long time ago. China was involved in a terrible civil war. The Imperial power was so weakened that for a time it looked as if it would collapse. Just at that moment Great Britain and France presented demands for greater commercial privileges, followed them up by sending a joint military and naval force to China, and extorted the Tientsin treaties of 1858. It was much as if, during the darkest days of our own Civil War, an allied squadron had appeared in the Potomac and demanded great concessions from us.

Because I cite precedents for what Japan has done, I would not have you think for a moment that I condone her acts. But because I try to be honest with myself, I cannot heap denunciations upon her, without remembering the examples which had been set for her.

In my opinion the Japanese statesmen who formulated the twenty-one demands and who pressed them through in modified form, will go down in history as men who wrought great harm to their country. The demands aroused intense resentment among the Chinese. They embittered all the European nations, including the allies of Japan, because she sought to reap a selfish advantage in China when they were involved in the Great War. And they served to increase American suspicion and alarm. Nothing that Japan gained through the concessions which China was finally forced to make could atone for the harm done to the reputation and prestige of Japan. I have never met a Japanese who attempted to defend these acts of his government.

The only consideration-except her good will-which Japan offered China was the return of the German leasehold at Tsingtao. One of the treaties provided that China would agree to the decision of the Peace Conference regarding the German interests in Shantung. And in an exchange of notes Japan promised to return the German leasehold under these conditions: that China would open Kiaochow as a commercial port; that a Japanese settlement (under Japanese jurisdiction) might be established there; that an

international settlement might also be established if the powers so desired; and that China and Japan would come to an agreement concerning the German public properties before the recession was effected.

Thus, in May 1915, China had agreed to accept whatever decision the Peace Conference arrived at regarding the German interests, and Japan, in turn, had promised to restore the leasehold under certain conditions. China, of course, never became reconciled to the 1915 treaties. They were extorted by force-as all previous concessions to other powers had been. She had no faith in the promise of Japan to restore Chinese jurisdiction in Kiaochow, and she hoped against hope that at the conclusion of the war the European powers would compel Japan to revise the treaties which had been concluded during their embarrassment. But the Peking government did not formally denounce the treaties and so they were legally binding.

The point has been made that if Japan were acting in good faith she would have returned the leasehold at once, in 1915. But that overlooks one very important point. Suppose Germany won the war. Would China have been able to prevent a victorious Germany from regaining Kiaochow? Japan did not intend to have Germany again in possession of a naval base on the China Sea, and she alone was able to prevent it.

As the war dragged on its gloomy course the Japanese continued to occupy Kiaochow. They had early seized the German railway and mines and had promptly commenced to operate them. Thousands of Japanese merchants and adventurers crossed over to Shantung and established themselves there. Some of them, without doubt, behaved very badly and further inflamed the Chinese. Camp-followers of any nation are not very good representatives of their home folk. And the Chinese central government became more corrupt and inefficient, rebellions broke out in various regions, and it looked as if only foreign control could maintain peace in any part of the land. Many Japanese expansionists talked in a large way about Japan's rôle in Shantung, and did not hesitate to say that the