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the allies would have changed Russia from a bad liability to a substantial asset. Now six months of disastrous revolutionary adventure have put a new complexion on the situation. Aroused by German Duplicity. "We in Russia who are actually in contact with the soviet government discern the possibility of Russia's again becoming a tributing member of the allies' coalition. see the soviet government a real power with a firm grip on the internal situation. We see the soviet government furious because of the shameful peace Germany forced upon it. We see the soviet's growing resentment against Germany. We feel the sentiment of the Russian people harden against Germany. We see this resentment crystallizing in Russia's efforts to create a revolutionary army and the hurried evacuation of munitions to depots beyond the Volga in preparation for the expected resumption of German attacks.

"Above all we feel the new revolutionary spirit demanding war against Germany, which spirit is the direct result of the growing conviction of the Russian masses that Germany menaces the existence of free Russia. We realize that the Russian debacle was a catastrophe to the allies and that it prolonged the war. This is ample reason for assisting Russia to recover some of her lost prestige.

Faults of Kerensky Government. "When the American missions began cooperating with Alexander Kerensky two glar: ing faults were disclosed in the provisional government.

"First-That government was built on the foundations of the old regime. This meant that the new socialistic order was trying to utilize the bars of bureaucracy.

"Second-The provisional government was utterly unable to organize the country's food supply. Although American investigation proved that Russia had sufficient food to feed herself, the cumbersome routine of the autocracy proved too inelastic to meet the demands of the revolution. Wherever Kerensky turned he found hostility: whatever he tried to do met with passive resistance which was as effective as active opposition.

Bureaucracy Fought Kerensky. "The allies' military and technical units complained of lack of progress.. A member of the American railway mission said: "We cannot help the Russians if they will not help themselves.' Kerensky's government stirred up the inertia of the old regime, but the machinery was slowing down. The inability of the provisional government to handle the food situation was largely due to the rottenness of the governmental mechanism, and it furnished all of Kerensky's enemies with a common target for attack. Extensive co-operation was necessary, but the corrupt bureaucracy did not respond to Kerensky's efforts.

"Kerensky's position was made more difficult by the war speculators. The American mission found the food prices entirely disproportionate to the cost of other commodities. Prices of manufactured articles were inflated to ten or a dozen times the normal prices, while the price of food was arbitrarily decreed at thrice its normal value. Result: The peasants refused to exchange foodstuffs for currency because of the distortion of the normal relative values. They preferred to barter grain for absolutely needed manufactured articles, hoarding their surplus grain.

Shorn of Power by Soviet.

"If Kerensky had actually possessed the power he might have oiled up the old machine and solved the food difficulty. But Kerensky was without power. The soviet had usurped it. Visible at every turn, alternately leading and frustrating the provisional government, was the soviet. It was virile and active, although as yet openly unobtrusive. The soviet's power was the direct result of gigantic propaganda that had already won over with timeworn formulas large groups of soldiers and the peasant masses.

"Whenever Kerensky's duma moved it encountered the solid substance of the soviet power. A clash invariably resulted and the Soviet invariably won. "Then America entered the game. This was in August, 1917.

American Red Cross at Work. "America sent a Red Cross mission to Russia, which under the force of circumstances erected itself into a political mission. This unofficial effort mitigated the mistake which all the allies made regarding the new Russia. For purposes of war the various allied nations selected as their representatives in Russia men who, through temperament and training, were fitted to work in harmony with the czar's autocratic regime. The revolution came and practically none of these representatives was replaced by a man more in tune with the situation. The old representatives of the allies were as much out of sympathy with the new socialistic order as were the supporters of the overthrown autocracy.

"The American Red Cross mission-now almost wholly a political mission-realized that when the czar fell the fundamental bond of Russian life was lost and there existed no common unity of patriotism to hold Russia together. The Russian people lived for the czar and warred for the czar. The ideals of patriotism crystallized in the czar's person. Some new bond was essential. It was necessary patriotism. Throughout Russia were scores of to create patriotism or something representing groups acting individually, with no apparent desire for cohesion.

Vision of American Mission.

"The American mission believed that attempts to re-establish the old bond were foredoomed to failure, because under it only about 6 per cent of the population had a real stake in the nation, while since the revolution 90 per cent had tasted freedom and ownership. There existed a solid mass of 15.000.000 soldiers against the re-establishment. Thus the Korniloff, Kaledines and Alexieff moves were destined failure, although this was better realized after a few bitter experiences.

"Russia's need of a new bond suggested to the American mission a definite course of action-namely, amalgamation and continued cooperation of the political and military elements of the new, Russia as a preliminary essential; then the inauguration of a vast educational campaign seeking to create a new patriotic unity in an ideal of a free Russia. land for the peasants, freeholds and firesides.' Nothing could be done without the coalition of the military and political elements, which had been growing more estranged. Consequently the Korniloff plot was hatched.

Leaf from French Revolution.

The Korniloff-Kerensky amalgamation was first "The plan interested the American mission. to solve the food problem, which furnished the main basis of attack against the Kerensky government, and then co-operate in educating the soldiers and peasants as to Germany's true character. It was hoped that the effort would culminate in the creation of a Russian revothe French revolutionary army. lutionary army, the counterpart in spirit of

"On Aug. 15, 1917, members of the American Red Cross mission attended a conference. at which Kerensky, Savinkoff, Nekrassoff and Skobeloff discussed with them the details of a coup d'etat to effect an amalgamation of the Korniloff and Kerensky forces. The next day Kerensky, Korniloff and the American mission met in the winter palace and further discussed details of the plan. All urged its speedy execution, as the, soviet's attacks because of the food situation and also the soviet's peace campaign were rapidly undermining the positions of both Kerensky and the allies in Russia.

"Kerensky and Korniloff agreed to join forces and co-operate with the United States. They agreed to meet the pressing food difficulty by appointing M. Batolin food dictator. Batolin was the Russian wheat magnate whose wizard

like foresight and aimost superhuman powers of organization enabled him to become prob ably the largest single human factor in Russia's industrial and commercial life, despite the handicap of his birth in a peasant's hovel.

Hoover Was to Be a Factor.

"The tentative economic agreement between Russia and America proposed that Mr. Hoover and other allied food specialists should be brought into the conference. America was to export to Russia certain foodstuffs in exchange for platinum and other metals. beet seed, flax and hides. Kerensky and Korniloff agreed jointly to sign a proclamation to this effect guaranteeing a permanent food supply to the Russian people and using America's came. They were to conduct a ruthless campaign against speculators, invoking the death penalty, if necessary. Both Kerensky and Korniloff were hopeful. They laid great stress or the necessity of America's co-operation. "Despite the urgent need of immediate action, the plan hung fire until the American mission, recognizing the soviet's rapidly rising power, advised Korniloff and Kerensky to abandon the plan entirely. Korniloff and Kerensky obstinately refused. Then came their attempt. As a coup d'etat a more miserable fiasco was never seen. Everything went wrong, But the failure was no mystery. It was the soviet which, learning of the plot, sprang into açtivity, showing unsuspected depths of organization.

Soviet's Coup Well Planned.

"Overnight the soviet's power became a factor of equal consideration with that of the provisional government, This was not accidertal. It was the culmination of weeks of untiring and skillful leadership. The Kerensky-Korniloff plot and the soviet counterplot popped simultaneously. Kronstadt sailors hurried to Petrograd under the thin pretext of guarding Kerensky. The sailors surrounded the winter palace, virtually held Kerensky a prisoner and forced him to repudiate his pledges to Korniloff. They forced him to sign a decree denouncing Korniloff as a counter-revolutionary. The movement was crushed in twenty-four hours.

"The soviet's maneuvers opened a new phase of the situation which disclosed Kerensky's lack of power. They made plain the fact that Kerensky was running a socialistic government with the machinery of an autocracy and was thus building on a false foundation. A wholly socialistic organization was striving to overthrow both Kerensky and Korniloff. On the one hand Kerensky talked the old world politics and diplomacy of the allies: on the other he shouted the most radical and excited views of the Russian masses. The two things did not mix. The opposition was the soviet conducting revolutionary, socialistic., antiwar propaganda. Its formula, 'peace. land and bread, was sweet music to the Russian ear, being just what it wanted to hear.

Captivated Army of 15,000,000. "Kerensky's declaration. 'We will fight until the bitter end,' did not stand a show. Psychologically the arguments of the soviet agitators captivated the Russian masses. The Russian soldiers fought Germany because the czar so ordered. The czar was gone. Where was there reason for fighting any further? Consequently the soviet's formula. 'Peace for the soldiers,' appealed to 15.000.000 soldiers.

'No annexations and no contributions,' was a formula so often reiterated that it was finally accepted as a beautiful principle. The soldiers said: "We have our villages on the Volga. There is land enough for all. Why should we take Constantinople? It does not belong to us and we do not want it.'

"The formula, "The land to the peasants.' appealed to the masses. The soviet told the soldiers: The revolution gave you land: go and take it.' Ever present in the soldier's mind was the fear that unless he went home he might be overlooked when the land was divided. The soviet made the most of this argument.

"Industries to the Workmen." "As a corollary to "The land to the peasants' there was "The industries to the workmen.' In all, the soviet so worked upon the soldiers and the peasant workmen that all of them believed that because the czar was deposed further need of waging the czar's war did not exist and also that the fruits of the revolution should immediately be enjoyed in full. "Logical western minds found it easy to answer this fallacious reasoning. The masses of western Europe understood that behind the victorious German bayonets lurked the old order for Russia, with its dungeons, its misery and its brutality. They understood that a German victory meant the return of the landed aristocrats, barons and grand dukes. Western Europe was fully conscious of the dreadful German menace, to democratic culture. But the simple Russian soldier, nothing but an illiterate Russian peasant clad in khaki, applied primitive, not practical. tests. He reasoned: "Why should we fight our German brother, who is forced to fight by his kaiser war lord just as the czar forced us to fight? We have overthrown our oppressor. We will tell them how it was done. They will overthrow their kaiser and we will live happily side by sidetwo great peoples enjoying full freedom.'

American Mission to the Rescue.

"The American mission decided that swift educational work on a larger scale than ever before attempted was necessary to teach the Russian masses the fatuity of this beautiful dream. It was hoped to put an X-ray on Germany and show the Russian masses that if Germany were victorious the new freedom would be displaced by the re-establishment of the old order and also that German victory would restore the newly acquired land to the hands of the nobles. The American mission decided that the old revolutionary group led by Mme. Breshovskaya, 'the grandmother of the revolution,' with Tchaikowsky and Lazereff was the best medium for conducting an educational campaign.

"The plan contemplated thousands of speakers lecturing in the armies and the villages on the subject of the German menace; millions of pamphlets in simple Russian and intelligible to the smallest village scribes; posters, placards and colored cartoons scattered broadcast.

"This educational campaign was to answer the soviet's slogan. 'Peace for the soldier, land to the peasants, factories to the workmen and bread for all.' The soviet was spending millions on its own propaganda. It employed thousands of speakers and issued tons of printed matter.

Plan for Vast Publicity Campaign.

"The American mission asked the American government for $1,000,000 immediately and $3,000,000 a month indefinitely for the purpose of combating the soviet propaganda. Previously Elihu Root had recommended $10,000.000 for publicity.

"Six weeks after the American mission's request Washington sent to Russia a branch of the committee on public information, which proceeded to tell the Russians how many airplanes America was building, how great an army America expected to raise and how America was certain ultimately to win the war. Neither America nor the allies ever made one serious attempt to combat the soviet's peace propaganda and to explain to the Russian people why Germany really menaced their newly won freedom. Seventy per cent of the Russian masses are uneducated, according to western standards. No one ever told the Russian masses about the German menace. How can we expect them to understand it except through experience? It seemed as though the allied representatives were completely oblivious to the growing power of the soviet.

"Meanwhile the soviet's power was strengthening and the soviet formulas undermined the allied influence. Kerensky became weaker and weaker. The allied political and military mis

sions, except the American Red Cross and political mission, completely misunderstanding the situation, charged Kerensky with ruining the army and misusing the allies' confidence.

Allies' Stiff Note to Kerensky.

"It will be remembered that on the eve of Kerensky's downfall the allied ambassadors, excepting the American ambassador, who had received no instructions, presented Kerensky with a stiff note of protest, amounting almost to an ultimatum, against conditions in Russia. This note is a part of the secret treaty publications. The allies hindered and persecuted Kerensky, whereas an active effort to explain why Germany menaced Russia might have frustrated the narcotic effect of the soviet's formulas.

"Three days before the soviet's coup d'etat was delivered a conference was held. Kerensky met the allied military representatives in the rooms of the American mission. He declared that he commanded the support of four Petrograd regiments, perhaps enough to defeat the soviet forces, but Kerensky refused to remain in power unless he was assured by the allies of full support for the Russian policy which Kerensky himself dictated. He was tired of telling the allies what they insisted on hearing through the mouth of the silver tongued Terestchenko while he himself was telling the Russian people something quite different.

"Instead of discussing a concrete plan for downing the soviet, the military representatives indulged in a general denunciation of the policy of the provisional government and each painful detail of the Tarnopol and Riga retreats. Kerensky admitted all these charges, but he did not see how he could have changed events.

No Constructive Action Taken. "Every attempt to reach an understanding resulted in mutual recrimination. The meeting lasted two hours, and despite the urgent pressure of the American mission not a single constructive action was taken. Allied missions favored supporting Kaledines and Alexieff as against Kerensky. They scouted the possibility that the soviet might overthrow the provisional government. Yet this virile soviet organization had swept before it every military unit, village and community into which it penetrated. It had overcome obstacle after obstacle, defeated Korniloff, gained the support of the majority of the bayonets at the front and assumed control of the Baltic and Kronstadt fleets.

"The allied military missions hardly sensed this power. Yet Kerensky reiterated the necessity of the allies' trusting him to deal exclusively with the Russian situation. Kerensky's demand was not answered.

Flight of Kerensky.

"Then came the blow. In five days all was over and Kerensky fled, a hunted fugitive. The allies then faced a new situation. The soviet controlled the government, the rifles and the masses. The soviet's program pledged Russia to the formula of peace. The soviet had what Kerensky never had-power-the reason being that the soviet promised the Russian people just what the Russian people wanted, namely. peace, land and bread. How to utilize this new situation as a factor in winning the world war for the allies became the burning problem

of the day.

a positive factor in the struggle against Germany, but it also realized that the soviet was so secure in its position that not even the concentrated efforts of all the other political elements in Russia could seriously threaten the soviet government's hold on Russia.

This small American unit was then unable to swing the allied policy of the old diplomats sent to Russia, The latter were equipped to negotiate with the czar and could not accommodate themselves to the changed conditions. They failed to understand that the soviet power had come to stay.

Predicted Early End of Soviet.

"Two of the ambassadors told me: "The Soviet is unable to last longer than ten days.' Ten days passed, yet the soviet was secure. After two months the diplomats were still whispering: "The soviet will last only a couple of weeks more.' The allied diplomatic and military group even attempted to expedite the soviet's downfall.

"The military chief wrote notes to Doukhonin, Alexieff and other leaders of the opposition to the soviet. The allied militarists supported Roumania and the Ukraine; both Finnish white guards. France even recognized sold out to Germany. They flirted with the the white guard government-German soldiers are now fighting side by side with these white guards.

"The little Red Cross group from the United States saw the soviet as an unpleasant but a necessary evil and began to co-operate with it. The Red Cross weathered attack after attack. Diplomats and militarists alike condemned the overtures to the soviet government.

"Now, in the sixth month of the soviet rule, there exists just one lane of approach to the soviet government, and that is through the American Red Cross. The allies appear at this time to be anxious to talk to Lenin ard Trotzky. Tentative overtures are made daily. Britain has withdrawn her embassy and substituted as her official representative a young liberal, Lockhart. Though not a diplomat, he recognizes the permanency of the soviet power and the necessity of co-operation with it. Already he has recovered some of the lost ground. He is not entangled with the old regime and consequently the soviet leaders trust him and co-operate with him.

"But it was the American Red Cross that made possible any resumption of negotiations with the soviet. To-day it is the only allied institution in Russia that the soviet really trusts. It is about the only allied institution that since November has not been actively interested in some scheme seeking to accomplish the soviet's downfall.

What the Soviet Is.

"Originally there existed differences between the bolsheviki and the soviet. To-day these terms are practically synonymous. The bolshev. iki utilized the soviet organization until they became one with it. In order to grasp what the soviet power in Russia really means one must define 'What is the soviet?"

"The soviet organization extends deep into Russian life. Literally, the soviet means the council of common usage; it means a village Russian council. Thus the modern soviet's

origin is the ancient village mir.

Where Soviet Gets Its Power. "Russia's present official title is "The Russian Socialistic Federated Republic of Soviets.' The present day Russian soviet government is really only the executive committee of a vast number of local village, town and city soviets

"Among all the allied institutions in Russia only one little group understood the situation-namely, the American Red Cross mission. It realized that the soviet was not then

idea of majority rule. The village soviets hold local elections and select members to attend the all-Russian congress of soviets. This congress chooses the government. It was such organizaton that ratified the Russo-German peace.

an

"The bolsheviki were extreme socialists. They perfected the organization of a central clear

ing house for these thousands of soviets. They used this organization to spread their propaganda and won over to their point of view 95 per cent of the soldiers and 80 per cent of the peasant masses. The soviet program was impossibly radical. It proposed impractical reforms. The bolshevist ideas are the narrow outgrowth of sixty years of forced, secret revolutionary work,

Soviet Is Largely Atheistic.

"We can hardly expect these revolutionists to possess modern ideals, when they saw mostly only the seamy side of the czar's regime. Already a century behind the time. the revolutionary workers became atheists. The soviet is largely atheistic in tendency. The Russian church was so bound up with the czar that the masses say⚫ "The church belonged to the czar. It was the czar's instrument. do not trust the czar.'

We

to

"But. regardless of their atheism and their fatuous, impossible reasoning, the bolsheviki swept the country completely, coming dominate the national organization of the village soviets. And in sweeping the country the bolsheviki became one with the soviet. The conservative representatives of allied countries reasoned that the bolsheviki, now the soviet leaders. were simply hired agents of Germany. They knew that Lenin through Germany in a sealed car. They said that Trotzky was notoriously anti-British. They declared that the soviet program was 'made in Berlin.'

came

"Lenin did come to Russia through Berlin. The bolsheviki did perhaps accept money from Germany. They explain that by saying, We would accept money from the devil himself in aid of our cause.' There exists an old saying that you may give a fanatic money. but you cannot buy him. Germany undoubtedly regrets Lenin's passage through Berlin; certainly the Germans regret the money given to the bolshevik propaganda which threatens to boomerang back on Austria. Lenin did not utter a single new word of extreme socialism. He and his associates made use of the most radical ready made arguments available because, knowing the psychology of the Russian masses, they understood that the arguments, 'Peace, land, bread and factory control,' would appeal to 93 per cent of the mass, because the individuals of this mass never before owned even their own souls.

Formula Not Made in Berlin. "Perhaps Germany crystallized things by urging bolshevik work in Russia, but the bolshevik formula was never made in Berlin. The 'land for the peasants' is a reiteration of the Fourier-Proudhon scheme based on the idea that all land belongs to the tillers of the soil,' proposed in France in 1842. 'Control of industries by the workingman' is only the Pfert program of 1876 and 'Peace for the soldier' is the formula of the international published in the communist manifesto of 1884 which expounded the theory that the autocratic ruling classes made wars to allay discontent at home and also for the purposes of imperialistic exploitation and the acquisition of foreign territories."

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PAID AGENTS OF GERMANY. The committee on public information Washington. D. C.. in September, 1918. printed a long and elaborate report made by Edgar Sisson, the committee's special representative in Russia during the winter of 1917-1918. This was later issued in pamphlet form with the following introduction, which sufficiently explains the character of the report: "The committee on public information publishes herewith a series of communications between the German imperial government and the Russian government and the bolshevist government.

"These documents show that the present heads of the bolshevist government-Lenin and Trotzky and their associates-are Ger man agents.

"They show that the bolshevist revolution was arranged for by the German great general staff and financed by the German Imperial bank and other German financial institutions.

"They show that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a betrayal of the Russian people by the German agents. Lenin and Trotzky: that a German picked commander was chosen to defend' Petrograd against the Germans: that German officers have been secretly received by the bolshevist government as military advisers, as spies upon the embassies of Russia's allies, as officers in the Russian army and as directors of the bolshevist military, foreign and domestic policy. They show, in short, that the present bolshevist government is not a Russian government at all, but a German government, acting solely in the interests of Germany and betraying the Russian people, as it betrays Russia's natural allies, for the benefit of the imperial German government alone.

Workmen Betrayed.

"And they show also that the bolshevist leaders, for the same German imperial ends, have equally betrayed the working classes of Russia whom they pretend to represent. "The documents are some seventy in number. Many are originals, annotated by bolshevist officials. The others are photographs of originals, showing annotations. And they corroborate a third set of typewritten circulars, of which only two originals are possessed, but all of which fit perfectly into the whole pattern of German intrigue and German guilt. "The first document is a photograph of a report made to the bolshevist leaders by two of their assistants. informing them that in accordance with their instructions there had been removed from the archives of the Russian ministry of justice the order of the German Imperial bank 'allowing money to Comrades Lenin. Trotzky and others for the propaganda of peace in Russia,' and that at the same time 'all the books' cf a bank in Stockholm had been audited' to conceal the payment of money to Lenin. Trotzky and their associates by order of the German Imperial bank. "This report is indorsed by Lenin, with his initials, for deposit in the secret department' of the bolshevist files. And the authenticity of the report is supported by document No. 2. which is the original of a report sent by a German general staff representative to the bol shevist leaders, warning them that he has just arrested an agent who had in his possession the original order of the German Imperial bank referred to in document No. 1 and pointing out that evidently at the proper time steps were not taken to destroy the above mentioned documents.

"Document No. 3 is the original protocol signed by several bolshevist leaders and dated Nov. 2. 1917, showing that 'on instructions of the representatives of the German general staff in Petrograd' and with 'the consent of the council of people's commissars,' of incriminating German circulars had also been which Trotzky and Lenin were the heads, two 'taken from the department of secret service of the Petrograd district' and given to the secret service_department of the German gen. eral staff in Petrograd. On the bottom of the protocol the German adjutant acknowledges receipt of the two incriminating circulars with his cipher signature. And to complete the evi dence the circulars are themselves penciled with the cipher signature of the head of the German secret service bureau.

"These two circulars apparently had been obtained by some Russian agent in Germany and transmitted to Russia. The German general staff evidently wished to get them back in order to destroy them. By the order of the German general staff and with the 'consent' of Lenin and Trotzky they are turned over to the Germans to be destroyed. Why? Because they are conclusive proof that on June 9, 1914, the German government was preparing for war, several weeks before the assassina tion of the Austrian archduke which was made the pretext for war.

"One circular is an order from the Ger

man general staff, dated June 9, 1914, informing all industrial concerns' in Germany to open the sealed envelopes containing their 'industrial mobilization plans and registered forms,' so that they might be prepared for the war for which the excuse had not yet been found.

The second circular is an order from the German general staff of the high sea fleet. dated Nov. 28, 1914, calling for the mobilization of all destructive agents and observers' in the United States and Canada for the purpose of preventing the sailing of ships from American ports to Russia, France and England. The order calls for explosions, strikes, delays, embroilments and difficulties, and it recommends the employment

of 'anarchists

and escaped criminals' for the purpose. "It is these damning proofs of a German conspiracy against the nations of Europe in June, 1914, and against the United States in November, 1914-it is these that Lenin and Trotzky surrendered to the German secret service in Petrograd on order of the representatives of the German general staff in Petrograd.'

"And they, surrender them in conformity with a working agreement between the bolshevist leaders and the German general staff, of which agreement a photograph is included in the series as document No. 5.

"It is dated October, 1917. It is from a division of the German general staff. It is addressed to the council of the people's commissars, of which Lenin and Trotzky were the heads. It begins:

"In accordance with the agreement which took place at Kronstadt, in July of the present year, between officials of our general staff and leaders of the Russian revolutionary army and democracy, Messrs. Lenin and Trotzky, Rasolnikov and Dybenko, the Russian division of our general staff operating in Finland is ordering to Petrograd officers for the disposal of the information department of the staff.' Among the officers named are Maj. Luberts. whose cipher signature is given as it appears on the two surrendered German circulars mentioned above (document No. 3) and Lieut. Hartwig, whose cipher signature is given as it appears on the receipt for the two circulars. And an indorsemcnt on this letter from the German general staff records that the German officers assigned to Petrograd had appeared before the military revolutionary committee' and had agreed on conditions with regard to their mutual activities.'

What their mutual activities' were to be is sufficiently indicated by document No. 7, which is a photograph of a letter signed in cipher by this Maj. Luberts and his adjutant, Lieut. Hartwig. They notify the bolshevist leaders on Jan. 12, 1918, that 'by order of the German general staff' the German intelligence section has informed us of the names and the characteristics of the main candidates for re-election' to the Russian bolshevist 'central executive committee,' and 'the general staff orders us to insist on the election of the following people.' They add a list of Russian leaders satisfactory to the German general staff. The list is headed by Trotzky and Lenin. They were elected, and the rest of the present bolshevist executive committee was chosen from the same German list.

in the country, as the antagonistic attitude of the south of Russia and Siberia to the existing government in Russia is troubling the German government.'

War Materials at Vladivostok.

"Four days later the same representative of the German Imperial bank sent another address to provide for the sending of a Russian 5,000,000 rubles $2,500,000] to the same revolutionary leader to Vladivostok, to get possession of the Japanese and American war mastroy them. terials' at that port, and if necessary to deA photograph of this letter is given as document No. 9.

"There were earlier payments, but probably none later than these. None was necessary. By this time the loot of an empire lay open to the bolshevists-and to the Germans.

"Most significant of all are two photographs of further communications from the German Imperial bank, given as documents Nos. 10 chairman of the council of people's commisand 11. One is a letter addressed to the sars and the other is the 'resolution of a conmercial banks' received by the chairman of ference of representatives of the German comindorsed by his secretary. the bolshevist central executive committee and Together they give

a complete synopsis of the terms on which Germany intends to have control of all Russian industries.

English, French and American capital in Rus"For five years from the signing of peace. sia is to be banished' and 'not to be allowed in the following industries: Coal, metallurgical. ceutical. These industries are to be developed machine building, oil, chemical and pharmaunder the control of a 'supreme advisory organ consisting of ten Russian specialists, ten from the German industrial organizations and Austria are to enjoy the unlimited privilege the German and Austrian banks.' Germany and of sending into Russia mechanics and qualified workmen. Other foreign mechanics and workmen are not to be allowed to enter at all' for five years after the conclusion of 'Private peace between Russia and Germany. banks in Russia arise only with the consent' of the union of German and Austrian banks. And so forth.

* *

*

Conspiracy Is Indorsed.

"And this conspiracy between German imperial capitalism and the pretended Russian reds is indorsed by a bolshevist leader, with the recommendation that it should be 'taken under advisement' and the ground prepared in the council of the workmen's and soldiers' deputies, in case the council of people's commis sars will not accept these requests.'

"Various details of the conspiracy between the bolshevist leaders and the German general staff are exposed in documents Nos. 16 to 29. These are photographs of letters which passed between the bolshevist leaders and the German general_staff, or the German officers in Russia. Document No. 21 shows that on Nov. 1, 1917. when Russia was still regarded as an ally of Great Britain, France, and America, the German general staff was having the honor to request' the bolshevist leaders to inform it at the earliest possible moment' concerning the quantity and storage place of the supplies which have been ceived from America, England and France, and also the units which are keeping guard over the military stores.'

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"Document 18 shows the German general staff requiring the bolshevist leaders to send 'agitators to the camps of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany,' in order that they might procure spies to work, among the English and French troops and to further 'peace

German general staff as being according to the negotiations between the Russian and German peace delegations at Brest-Litovsk.'

"In document 22 the bolshevist leaders and the Germans are arranging to send agents-agitators and agents-destructors' out of Vladivostok to ports of the United States, Japan and British colonies in eastern Asia.'