Preston, Lieut. H. W., American, in England, Prince, Adjt. Norman, American, Oct. 15, Putnam, David E.. American, killed in air bat- Quette, Adjt.. French, missing. June 5, 1918. Rockwell, Lieut. Kiffin Yates, American, Sept. Roosevelt, Lieut. Quentin, American, killed in Saxon, Harold, American, reported missing. Spencer, Dumaresku, American, Jan. 22, 1918. Sturtevant, Ensign Albert O.. American, re- Tailer, William S.. American, Feb. 4, 1918. Thompson, Lieut. William A., American, July Tonnay-Charente, (missing), March 20, 1918. Velie, Harry Glenn, American, March 15, 1918. Vertongen, Rene, Belgian, Feb. 4, 1918. Weddell, Thomas McMillan. American, killed Wilford, Second Lieutenant John, American. Wohl. Lieut. Benjamin, American, killed in NATIONAL COUNCIL OF DEFENSE REPORT. The second annual report of the council of national defense, composed of the secretaries of war, navy. interior. agriculture. commerce and labor, made public Dec. 4. 1918. by Grosvenor B. Clarkson, acting director in reviewing the story of the work of the council during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, tells also the story of a very large part of the government's activities in the war of a nonmilitary character. Particularly is this true of the transition period included in the first six or eight months of the war. during which the initial mobilization of the country's industrial and commercial resources took place. The present report becomes. therefore. an important contribution to the official records of the war. the storage, shipping, transportation, fuel and medical problems. The report was made by W. S. Gifford, director of the council until Nov. 1, last, to the secretary of war. as chairman. to be transmitted by him to the president for submission to congress. At the end of the period covered by the report, Mr. Gifford points out, the work of initial mobilization, the main task which the council undertook in the emergency, was largely completed. The council set out to act as a connecting link between the nation in its normal state and the nation as a machine for making war. The transition period past, the council's role as a main link in the war government naturally became less active, though it continued to perform functions of a most vital and necessary nature. especially through the great council of defense system, made up of state, county, municipal and community organizations, reaching practically every hamlet in the country. Nucleus for New Bodies. A perusal of the report shows that the council served as a nucleus for innumerable new functions and relations which the war made necessary and for which no administrative agency existed at the outbreak of the conflict. Some of these after being initiated and partially developed by the council were passed on to existing executive departments; for some the council created new agencies, either acting under its jurisdiction or given separate jurisdiction by executive order or congressional act. Perhaps the best example of the latter case was the war industries board, whose work was begun by and developed by the council and which was separated from it only on May 28 last. Other tasks which received their initial impulse from the council were: The food conservation program, aircraft program, war-labor administration, housing and many functions supplementary to those of the regular departments, such as those involved in The director's report points out that in the act creating the council congress has included among its duties "the creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the nation." This phrase, "the creation of relations, expresses the main ccutribution of the council to the winning of the war. "It has been through the performance of the duty thus defined," the director says, "and liberally interpreted in the light of a great national emergency, that the council has performed its most important service during the year just past. In a sense the council has served as a great administrative laboratery through which new plans and new and necessary functions could be initiated and developed, and, where effective action demanded, passed on to permanent or emergency executive agencies of the government." In saying that the date of the formal sepa- America's material resources The report is divided into three sections, the first dealing with the history of the branches of the council still under its jurisdiction, the second with the war industries board up to May 28, the date of its separation from the council, which, of course, includes much of its most significant work, and finally the story of the agencies dissolved or transferred to other jurisdiction during the year. Among the latter is the highly impressive story of the commercial economy board, transferred in May to become the conservation division of the war industries board. Almost the whole story of commercial conservation in the United States is summed up in the report of the commercial economy board. In the history of the war industries board is summarized the government's policy in meeting the tremendous demand of the government departments for steel, copper, lead, tin. for finished products of all kinds and the way that they were met; the story of the transference of plants from peace to war work; the story of the transformation under war conditions of the government's purchasing policy, and the initial development of a general industrial policy. Development of Price Fixing Particularly valuable from the historical point of view, as well as that of immediate interest, is a record of the development of price fixing, which had its beginnings in the early days of the council of national defense with informal voluntary agreements on prices negotiated between representatives of industry and members of the advisory commission and of the council staff. The report reviews the story of the way in which these informal agreements with nothing but voluntary COoperation to bind them developed finally into a definite price fixing organization under the war industries board. From similar modest beginnings the original first attempts at regulating priorities through voluntary co-operation developed into the existing large priorities organization, which at the time of the date of the report was issu ing hundreds of orders with binding power behind them. The Committee on Labor. Much space is given to the work of the large committee on labor, with its many subdivisions, which assumed so significant a place in government activities in maintaining the hearty co-operation of the labor movement with national war policies. Among the specific accomplishments of the committee was the initiation of the soldiers' and sailors' war insurance plan, later turned over to the treasury department for administration. An count is also given of the council's part in developing a plan for war labor administration, turned over by the president to the jurisdiction of the secretary of labor. ac The report reviews the work of the committee on transportation and communication. which organized the voluntary railroad administrative organization in effect prior to the creation of the United States railroad administration. The council undertook much work in drawing together for the purposes of the war the railroads, the waterways and national highways. The individual report of the highways transport committee tells of the pioneer work done in developing of motor truck routes to relieve congested railroads and a report is also included of the inland waterways transportation committee of the council. National Research Council. "Special acknowledgment," the report says, "should be made of the valuable activities of the national research council, which has served as a department of the council of national defense, mobilizing and directing the research work of the country's scientific men. Its work has been invaluable in giving the government war agencies the benefit of scientific research, both directly and indirectly applicable to the purposes of the war. In reviewing the first steps toward industrial mobilization the report states: "From the outset the purpose of the council and the subordinate committees of the council was to offer a channel through which the voluntary efforts of American industrial and professional life could be focused. The story of the way in which the members of these committees, practically all of them serving without compensation, rallied to aid in the common cause and the extent of the practical accomplishment of their voluntary service has probably not been equaled anywhere. The general spirit underlying these original committees was fundamentally that of business organizing itself in aid of the government. Lack of time for complete organization by of the members of these committees by the industry made impossible the formal election industries which they represented. In choosing the membership the council sought for a representation from the industry as wide as practicable.' Results of the Plan. It is probable that at this particular stage in the progress of the war no plan could have produced such effectual results in so brief a time as this voluntary system was able to show. The natural processes of administrative evolution gradually eliminated the old large committee system in the case of the industrial committees and substituted for it a closely knit scheme of sections under the general head of the war industries board, in which each section head had general authority over dealings with the industry with which he was particularly familiar. At the same time the industries of the country were rapidly organizing to assist the government in carrying on the war and were creating representative war service committees of their own, thus simplifying and strengthening the method of co-operation of business with the government. LARGEST SEAPLANE IN THE WORLD. All records for the number of passengers carried in any type of airplane were broken on Wednesday, Nov. 27, at the naval air station, Rockaway, when the navy's newest type seaplane. the giant NC-1, the largest seaplane in the world, made a flight with fifty men on board. The pilot was Lieut. David H. McCullough of the naval reserve flying corps, and the flight was made to demonstrate the enormous lifting power of the latest model of bomb carrying seaplanes. No special modifications were made for this test flight, most of the fifty men being accommodated in the large boat body. The design and the construction of the NC-1, with its triple motors, huge size, and other distinctive features, was carried out by the navy in co-operation with the Curtiss Engineering corporation. It was not specifically a flying boat nor was it of the pontoon variety of seaplane, but combined the most valuable advantages of both, its size and purpose being considered. While it was entirely new and original in type, the NC-1 incorporated proved essentials in aircraft construction and even before it was tested was regarded in naval circles as a preinsured success rather than as an experiment. This was the first American trimotored seaplane, being propelled by three Liberty motors that develop a maximum of 1,200 horse power, giving it a cruising speed of eighty The flying weight of the mamiles an hour. chine was 22,000 pounds, while the weight of the seaplane itself, unloaded and without a crew. was 13,000 pounds. An idea of the size of the big seaplane is shown by the fact that the wing spread is 126 feet, the breadth of wing 12 feet and the gap between wings 12 feet. Late in 1918 the NC-1 made the trip from Rockaway to Washington, about 350 miles, in 5 hours and 20 minutes. The flight from Washington to Hampton roads, 150 miles, was covered in 2 hours and 15 minutes, and the trip from Hampton roads to New York, 300 miles, took 4 hours and 20 minutes. The following report made by Gen. Pershing on Nov. 20. 1918. to Secretary of War Baker is a document of great historical importance, and hence is reproduced in full. It gives the first comprehensive outline of the work of the American soldiers in France at the most critical period of the war, and makes public many details withheld by the censorship from general knowledge. "Nov. 20. 1918.-My Dear Mr. Secretary: In response to your request. I have the honor to submit this brief summary of the organization and operations of the American expeditionary force from May 26. 1917. until the signing of the armistice, Nov. 11, 1918: "Pursuant to your instructions. immediately upon receiving my orders I selected a small staff and proceeded to Europe in order to become familiar with conditions at the earliest possible moment. The warmth of our reception in England and France was only equaled by the readiness of the commanders in chief of the veteran armies of the allies and their staffs to place their experience at our disposal. In consultation with them the most effective means of co-operation of effort was considered. With French and British armies at their maximum strength, and all efforts to dispossess the enemy from his firmly intrenched positions in Belgium and France failed, it was necessary to plan for an American force adequate to turn the scale in favor of the allies. Taking account of the strength of the central powers at that time. the immensity of the problem which confronted us could hardly be overestimated. The first requisite being an organization that could give intelligent direction to effort, the formation of a general staff occupied my early attention. General Staff. Copyright, Harris & Ewing. LIEUT.-GEN. H. LIGGETT. information. preparation of maps and all similar subjects: G. 3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans. movement of troops and the supervision of combat operations: G 4 coordinates important questions of supply. construction. transport arrangements for combat. and of the operations of the service of supply, and of hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded: G. 5 supervises the various schools and has general direction and co-ordination of education and training. The first chief of staff was Col. (now Maj.Gen.) James G. Harbord, who was succeeded in March, 1918. by Mai.-Gen. James W. McAndrew. To these officers, to the deputy chief of staff. and to the assistant chiefs of staff, who. as heads of sections. aided them. great credit is due for the results obtained not only in perfecting the general staff organization but in applying correct principles to the multiplicity of problems that have arisen. Organization and Training. "After a thorough consideration of allied organizations it was decided that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of 3,000 men, with three batta.ions to a regiment and four companies of 250 men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments. a machine gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench mortar battery, a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions-four combat and one depot and one replacement division-and also two regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and replacement divisions pre "A well organized general staff through which the commander exercises his functions is essential to a successful modern army. How-pared to fill the gaps in the ranks. ever capable our divisions, our battalions and our companies as such. success would be impossible without thoroughly co-ordinated endeavor. A general staff broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto, existed in our army. Under the commander in chief, this staff must carry out the policy and direct the details of administration. supply. preparation and operations of the army as a whole, with all special branches and bureaus subject to its control. As models to aid us we had the veteran French general staff and the experience of the British, who had similarly formed an organization to meet the demands of a great army. By selecting from each the features best adapted to our basic organization, and fortified by, our own early experience in the war, the development of our great general staff, system was completed. "Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should be able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly. the development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down, a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a complete division in war of movement. "The general staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with its chief, who is an assistant to the chief of the general staff. G. 1 is in charge of organization and equipment of troops. replacements. tonnage, priority of overseas shipment. the auxiliary welfare association and cognate subiects: G. 2 has censorship. enemy intelligence. gathering and disseminating "Very early a system of schools was outlined and started which should have the advantage of instruction by officers direct from the front. At the great school center at Langres, one of the first to be organized, was the staff school, where the principles of general staff work as laid down in our own organization were taught to carefully selected officers. Men in the ranks who had shown qualities of leadership were sent to the school A school of of candidates for commissions. the line taught younger officers the principles of leadership, tactics and the use of the different weapons. Am. Press Association. GLENN. In the artillery school, at Saumur, young officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery: while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in aviation. These and other schools, with their well considered curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were co-ordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of willing and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known even the rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and Gen. Petain placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional purposes, and we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to profit by their veteran experience. American Zone. "The eventual place the American army should take on the western front was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British armies' shipping and supplies, while the southern ports, though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes, and these we should have to build. The already overtaxed railway system behind the active front in northern France would not be available for us as lines of supply and those leading from the southern ports of northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much new construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots and regulating stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years, enormous quantities of material had to be brought across the Atlantic. Copyright, Harris & Ewing. N. Y. Herald Service. MAJ.-GEN. C. H. MUIR. an nish. Thanks to the patriotic spirit of our the at "As to organization, all the administrative and, supply services. except the adiutant-general's, inspector-general's and judge-advocate general's departments which remain at general headquarters. have been transferred to headquarters of the services of supplies Tours under a commanding general responsible to the commander in chief for supply of the armies. The chief quartermaster, chief surgeon, chief signal officer, chief of ordnance. chief of air service, chief of chemical warfare. the general purchasing agent in all that pertains to questions of procurement and supply, the provost marshal general in the maintenance of order in general, the director general of transportation in all that affects such matters. and the chief engineer in all matters of administration and supply, are subordinate to the commanding general of the service of supply, who, assisted by a staff especially organized for the purpose. is charged with the administrative co-ordination of all these services. "The transportation department under the service of supply directs the operation, maintenance and construction of railways, the operation of terminals, the unloading of ships and transportation of material to warehouses or to the front. Its functions make necessary the most intimate relationship between our organization and that of the French. with the practical result that transportation, department has been able to improve materially the Constantly operations of railways generally. laboring under a shortage of rolling stock, the department The transportation has nevertheless been able by efficient management to meet every emergency. "With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover. broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line. to the nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. tonnage for material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three and perhaps four million men wou'd require a mammoth program of shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France. with a correspondingly large project for additional railways and for storage depots. "All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the war we must utilize the southern ports of France-Bordeaux. La Pallice. St. Nazaire and Brest-and the comparatively unused railway systems leading, therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then. this would contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located. preferably in the area included by Tours. Bourges and Chateauroux. so that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serving on the western front. Growth of the Service of Supply. "To build up such a system there were talented men in the regular army. but more experts were necessary than the army could fur our "The engineer corps is charged with all construction. including light railways and roads. It has planned and constructed the many projects required. the most important of which are the new wharves at Bordeaux and Nantes, and the immense storage depots at La Pallice, Montoir and Vievres. besides innumerable_hospitals and barracks in various ports of France. These projects have all been carried on by phases keeping pace with our needs. The forestry service under the engineer corps has cut the greater part of the timber and railway ties required. "To meet the shortage of supplies from America. due to lack of shipping. the representatives of the different supply departments were constantly in search of available material and supplies in Europe. In order to co-ordinate these purchases and to prevent competition between our departments, a general purchasing agency was created early in our experience to co-ordinate our purchases and, if possible, induce our allies to apply the While there principle among the allied armies. was no authority for the general use of ap propriations. this was met by grouping the purchasing representatives of the different departments under one control charged with the duty of consolidating requisitions and purchases. Our efforts to extend the principle have been signally successful. and all purchases for the allied armies are now on an equitable and co-operative basis. Indeed. it may be said that the work of this bureau has been thoroughly efficient and businesslike. Artillery, Airplanes and Tanks. "Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery. aviation and tanks. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible. we accepted the offer of the French government to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment of 75s, 155 millimeter howitzers and 155 G. P. F. guns from their own factories for thirty divisions. The wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that, although we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in America on our front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these types produced at home thus far received in France are 109 75 millimeter guns. "In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French government came to our aid until our own aviation program should be under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training our personnel. and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation and bombing planes. The first airplanes received from home arrived in May. and altogether we have received 1,379. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including airplanes, crossed the German lines on Aug. 7. 1918. As to tanks, we were also compelled to rely upon the French. Here, however, we were less fortunate. for the reason that the French production could barely meet the requirements of their own armies. "It should be fully realized that the French government has always taken a most liberal attitude and has been most anxious to give us every possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation and tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early supply of practically all our necessities from Our own factories. "The welfare of the troops touches my responsibility as commander in chief to the mothers and fathers and kindred of the men who came to France in the impressionable period of youth. They could not have the privilege accorded European soldiers during their periods of leave of visiting their families and renewing their home ties. Fully realizing that the standard of conduct that should be established for them must have a permanent influence in their lives and on the character of their future citizenship, the Red N. Y. Herald Service. MAJ.-GEN. JOHN F. O'RYAN. Copyright, Harris & Ewing. MAJ.-GEN. H. F. HODGES. Cross, the Young Men's Christian association, Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army and the Jewish welfare board, as auxiliaries in this work, were encouraged in every possible way. The fact that our soldiers, in a land of different customs and language, have borne themselves in a manner in keeping with the cause for which they fought is due not only to the efforts in their behalf but much more to their high ideals, their discipline and their innate sense of self-respect. It should be recorded, however, that the members of these welfare societies have been untiring in their desire to be of real service to our officers and men. The patriotic devotion of these representative men and women has given a new significance to the golden rule, and we owe to them a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid. Combat Operations. "During our periods trenches some of training in the of our divisions had engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of which was Seicheprey by the 26th on April 20, in, the Toul sector, but none had participated in action as a unit. The 1st division, which had passed through the preliminary stages of training, had gone to the trenches for its first period of instruction at the end of October and by March 21, when the German offensive in Picardy began, had four divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed was such that our occupation of an American sector must be postponed. we "On March 28 (1918) I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had been agreed upon as commander in chief of the allied armies, all of our forces to be used as he might decide. At his request the 1st division was transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at Chaumont en Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required prompt action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference of the allied premiers and commanders and myself on May 2. by which British shipping was to transport ten American divisions to the British army area. where they were to be trained and equipped. and additional British shipping was to Do provided for as many divisions as possible for use elsewhere. "On April 26 the 1st division had gone into the line in the Montdidier salient on the Picardy battle front. Tactics had been suddenly revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men. confident of the results of their training. were eager for the test. On the morning of May 28, this division attacked the commanding German position in its front. taking with splendid dash the town of Cantigny and all other objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious counterattacks and galling artillery fire. though local, this brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and also that the enemy's troops were not altogether invincible. AI "The Germans' Aisne offensive, which began on May 27, had advanced rapidly toward the River Marne and Paris, and the allies faced |