armed forces would carry out all that you are personally asking here?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; or that I recommended in my report. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. General Marshall, I know you are tired, and I am inclined to go along with you in what is necessary, and I think the people of the country I am from feel similarly. I merely want to ask one or two questions to summarize what has been said. As I understood you to say, you feel like a general resolution would have a deep moral effect on the country as a whole?

General MARSHALL. That is my belief, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. In reference to the discharge of these men under the Selective Service Act, where training is authorized for a year, when you go beyond the year you are not holding the men so much for training purposes but because you need them for service purposes; is not that it?

General MARSHALL. That is it, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. In releasing them, I know you will conscientiously try to be fair in releasing them in groups. But do you have any idea about how you would relieve them from service? Would you do it in units or groups, or individually, or how would you do it?

I can recall when units of the A. E. F. were in service after the World War in France and Germany a notice was posted there one day that one outfit in the First Division, the Sixth field artillery, was about to be retained for service in Germany 4 years because the emergency would probably exist that long and they needed two regiments there in Ehrenbreitstein, and those men felt pretty badly

about it.

How would you work that out? Suppose you sent men to Iceland, to Alaska, or to the Philippines; are they apt to be forgotten in those places?

General MARSHALL. I feel sure they would not be forgotten. They might not secure as much special pleadings in the press as they do while in the local camps.

But we have a section of the staff devoted to those very considerations, to calculate and advise regarding those matters. We have a human interest in the men, and a deep professional interest in maintaining morale. Always this is a foremost thought. We must have morale. When you neglect or forget soldiers you lose their most important qualification. In the past we have had to stumble through. Now we are organized to pick our way with great dis

cretion.

Mr. BROOKS. I think the illustration which you have given us informally indicates what I am driving at. Where you have a group that might possibly be overlooked, or perhaps this emergency might continue or perhaps get just a little worse for a period, we will say 8 years, and you would have men in Iceland or somewhere else that were peculiarly adapted to that type of climate and the country, who had been specially trained for it, would your plans contemplate some organized effort to replace them with men with a limited amount of extra service, beyond a year's period, rather than keeping those same men over there year in and year out?

General MARSHALL. We would not keep them there.

Mr. BROOKS. You could, under this resolution.

General MARSHALL. But we must have morale in order to have efficient units. We cannot avoid considering the effect of such matters.

Mr. BROOKS. You think the question of morale would solve that. General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. General Haislip is bringing up i question that I have mentioned two or three times. We desire to rotate the selectees so long as we are not in an actual state of war, because we must build up a reserve; we want to keep the Officers Reserve Corps alive, and we want to have places for the graduates of the R. O. T. C. and the Officer Candidate Schools. So we would wish to release Reserve officers as we do not desire to continually increase the active corps, like a rolling snowball.

Mr. BROOKS. When that time comes and you have some selectees in Iceland and they have no plans for coming home, their morale will be a little low, will it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes; but if they have, as they will have, good leadership, they will be on the job.

Mr. BROOKS. You are going to put men serving under Regular Army enlistments on the same relative basis as far as extra training is concerned as the selectees? In other words, those men enlist for 3 years, while the selectee enlists for 1 year.

General MARSHALL. I would give the 3-year man the same consideration after 3 years as the selectee after 1 year.

Mr. BROOKS. Suppose he is in Iceland and his term runs out? Are you going to let him start home and leave the selectee there beyond his 1-year period?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. You will treat them in relatively the same way?

General MARSHALL. Yes. We would consider the interests of the 3-year volunteer in the same way as we would the interests of the selectee who has been inducted for 12 months. However, the 3-year volunteer had no obligation to transfer to the Reserve.

Mr. BROOKS. And the same thing would apply to the National Guard men?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; to the 3-year men.

Mr. DURHAM. General, your statement has been very enlightening and clarifying to me, and I for one would like to expedite consideration of this matter and deal with the problem in a businesslike way. I gather from your statement that Hitler, at the present time, is using his technique on the American continent that has been so effective in Europe.

Is that correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. With reference to the proposal that we might limit the existence of the emergency to the armed forces, would not that put us in an inconsistent position if we did that?

General MARSHALL. I am not an expert on the legal questions involved. From my own personal point of view, a direct, clear-cut approach is the method to adopt.

Mr. KILDAY. Is there any reason for a boy who did not wait for his number to come up, but volunteered to be inducted, to feel that he is in a different category than the one who waited? There is a state

ment that has been made that a man, if he desired, could, under the inducements of the provisions of this act, volunteer for a year and get it over with, and that such a man had done that and made his plans.

General MARSHALL. You gave him the opportunity under the law, as I saw it, to select his time and not to continue on a speculative basis. Other than that, he is on the same basis as the other man.

Mr. KILDAY. And he would be in the same category in the extension of his time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. He is subject to a 10-year reserve, and the Regular Army Volunteer would not be subject to that?

General MARSHALL. That is right, provided he served 3 full years. Mr. KILDAY. Is there any objection on your part to including in the record a statement of the composition of our existing divisions, both Regulars and National Guard, as to the percentage of Regulars and draftees, to show how interwoven they are.

General MARSHALL. We have that data, and will put it in the record. (The statement above referred to is as follows):

Selectees in Regular Army and National Guard Divisions (proportion of actual strength as of July 15, 1941

Mr. KILDAY. Will you also put in a further statement showing the increments by which they were brought into these divisions, to show whether there would be any large holes in these divisions by reason of the fact that their year of service would expire in gradual numbers or by large numbers at one time, so as to seriously dislocate the organization?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; we will put that in the record. (The statement above referred to is as follows:)

Mr. MERRITT. The big exodus will start in November, increasing in December and January?

General MARSHALL. The numbers of selectees are comparatively small for November and December, but they begin to pile up into large figures thereafter.

I would like you to have in mind when you look at those figures that there are only 9 Infantry divisions in the entire Regular Establishment, and that the Nation we are considering as antagonistic to our interests has about 300 divisions, all of which have the invaluable experience of actual campaign, following a long, deliberate training schedule through a period of years, from boy to man to soldier. Theirs is a highly developed huge army of veterans. We have only been developing our Army since last fall.

Mr. KILDAY. These figures show that, after all, 476,000, which may sound to the average citizen as being a considerable number, when you take from the 476,000 the thousands of men in the Air Corps and those assigned to small organizations, it leaves you in a position so that you would not have available any considerable number of total units; is not that true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. I have been much gratified with your statement, General. I think perhaps the reason the country does not realize just what the situation is is the fact that everybody was running for office, from the President down, and the country was led to believe that we were going to win the war without fighting it.

So I am hoping that the General Staff and the War Department can see their way clear to take this mass of information and separate that which you could disclose from that which should not be disclosed, and let the people get some such idea of the situation as we have gotten today. Do you think it would be possible to do that?

General MARSHALL. We are at work on that now, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. In the case of a man who contracts to serve for 3 years, do you have some sort of a stipulation by which you can keep him over that time?

General MARSHALL. In time of war, only, as provided for in the National Defense Act of 1920. In other words, if we should become involved in a state of war we can hold these men. In a national emergency we cannot. The picture changes instantly if we were forced into actual hostilities, because everybody would want to see things through. Our problem is the long period of maintaining ourselves in a state of readiness.

Mr. BROOKS. It would take a declaration of an emergency by Congress to make that possible, to retain these men?

General MARSHALL. More than that. It would require a state of

war.

Mr. MARTIN. Along the line of Mr. Brooks' questions, relative to limiting the period of the extension, could it be worked out in any practical way to put an outside limit on the length of the extension of the service for the National Guard and the inductees?

General MARSHALL. I would urgently recommend against that. You can just as well, and with less possibility of doing harm, reserve to yourselves the congressional right to cancel the emergency when, in your opinion, it has ceased to exist.

Mr. MARTIN. What I had in mind was a definite period of limitation.

General MARSHALL. I think that would be unwise, because you would be creating the basis of another political dilemma for yourselves, and an administrative dilemma for the War Department. If you reserve to yourselves the right to cancel the emergency when you think the national interests are no longer imperiled, you would have a check on developments.

The CHAIRMAN. General, on behalf of the committee I want to thank you very much for the very excellent statement you have made. You have presented your case exceedingly well, and I think it has about solved your problem.

General MARSHALL. I want to thank you gentlemen very much. Mr. FADDIS. I think this committee ought to express itself as having the fullest confidence in the sincerity, patriotism, ability, and professional qualities of the Chief of Staff.

General MARSHALL. Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF GRENVILLE CLARK, NEW YORK, N. Y., REPRESENTING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY COMMITTEE OF THE MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I represent a group of members of the national emergency committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States. This is substantially the same group of men who, as the national emergency committee, drafted the BurkeWadsworth bill as introduced, and sponsored it, all of which was fully stated on the records of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and of this committee a year ago.