Thus, on three accounts first, by the reason of the thing; secondly, by the familiar use of the descriptive term, "money bills," in all the debates; and thirdly, by the example of England - the conclusion seems irresistible, that "appropriation bills," by which the Government is carried on, are within the spirit of the interdict upon the Senate, and that this body cannot originate such bills without a violation of a well-established principle, inherited from English jurisprudence, and also without unhinging, according to the language of Colonel Mason, in the Federal Convention, that compromise, by virtue of which the small States are admitted to an equality of representation on this floor.

I am not unmindful of the fact, on which the Senator from Virginia has dwelt so emphatically, that the Senate has been in the habit of originating pension bills, bills for the payment of private claims, and kindred measures. I was glad, to-day, in voting for the bill originating in this body for the relief of our late distinguished Minister at Constantinople. But, against this usage, which is exceptional in character, and which has probably attracted little attention, from its considerable convenience and little importance, may be opposed the uniform usage, that the great bills providing for the necessities of the Government have always originated in the House of Representatives. And you will bear in mind, sir, that the question is now on these bills.

Mr. President, it is a received maxim, that it is the part of a good judge to amplify his jurisdiction; but it will hardly be accepted, that it is the part of the American Senate to amplify its powers, particularly in derogation of the popular branch. And it surely cannot escape observation, that the present effort is

launched at a moment when the popular branch promises to differ from the Senate on important questions of national policy. I am not insensible to the public convenience which has been pressed in this debate; but permit me to say, that should this convenience require the proposed departure from our standing policy, you will be wise, sir, if you hearken to the counsels of the Senator from New York, and refrain from any innovation, unless assured of the consent and cooperation of the other House.

THE ABROGATION OF TREATIES.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 6TH MARCH, 1856.

MR. SUMNER. A week ago, I laid on the table of the Senate a resolution relating to the Danish Sound dues. I have watched every day since for an opportunity to call for its consideration; and, if agreeable to the Senate, I now ask that it may be taken up.

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution, which is in these words:

Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations be directed to consider the expediency of some act of legislation, having the concurrence of both Houses of Congress, by which the treaty with Denmark, regulating the payment of Sound dues, may be effectively abrogated, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution, under which every treaty is a part of "the supreme law of the land," and in conformity with the practice of the Government in such cases; and especially to consider if such legislation be not necessary forthwith, in order to supply a defect in the notice of the purpose of the United States to abrogate the said treaty, which the President has undertaken to give to Denmark, without the authority of an act of Congress, and in disregard of the function of the House of Representatives, in the abrogation of all existing laws.

MR. SUMNER. Mr. President, if I can have the attention of the Senate for a brief time, I will explain the object of this inquiry. The question may be dry, but it is important, and, at this moment, of direct practical interest.

The President, in his annual message, called attention to three different questions, arising out of our relations with foreign nations. Two of these, concerning England, have been discussed in the Senate; the other, which concerns the payment of the Sound dues to Denmark, has not yet been mentioned here. In introducing it now, I have no purpose to say any thing as to the character of these dues, or to arrest the efforts of the Government for the relief of our commerce from foreign exactions. That is a broad field of history and of public law, which, for the present, there is no occasion to enter. My desire is simply to open to you a question of domestic interest under our own Constitution, with which, of course, Denmark has nothing to do, but which is necessarily involved in the determination of our course on this matter.

The President, in his annual message, announces that

"In pursuance of the authority conferred by a resolution of the Senate of the United States, passed on the 3d of March last, notice was given to Denmark, on the 14th day of April, of the intention of this Government to avail itself of the stipulations of the subsisting convention of friendship, commerce, and navigation, between that kingdom and the United States, whereby either party might, after ten years, terminate the same at the expiration of one year from the date of notice for that purpose."

The treaty, it will be noted, reserves to either party – that is, to either of the governments between whom

it is made the privilege of terminating it by notice; and the President, without the sanction of an act of Congress, but simply in pursuance of a resolution of the Senate, passed in Executive session, has constituted himself the Government, so far as to give such notice, and by such notice to abrogate the treaty. Acting under his instructions, our Minister at Copenhagen, on the 14th April, 1855, notified to the Danish Government that

“After the expiration of one year from the date of this communication, the United States will regard the general convention of friendship, commerce, and navigation, agreed upon by Denmark and themselves on the 26th of April, 1826, as finally abrogated, and that after that period its provisions will not be binding upon our Government."

In thus undertaking, merely with the consent of the Senate, and without the coöperation of the House of Representatives, to abrogate a treaty, the President has assumed a power inconsistent with the Constitution, and disowned by the practice of the government, adopted after debate on leading occasions. Of course, such a usurpation cannot be justified by the good tha is sought; for that good might have been sought, and may still be sought, by another course, in entire harmony with the Constitution and the practice of the Government. Nor is it safe for any temporary purpose to remove constitutional landmarks.

The Constitution has declared, that "the President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senate concur; " but it has not declared that the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, shall have power to abrogate treaties. The absence of all