Good Words, Nov. 1, 1867.1 MATTERS OF RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE. may be more or less complete, but which ought to be compatible at all times with just and generous feeling towards other communities within the Universal Church; and which may be compatible also with a large amount even of co-operation and communion. There is indeed a question which lies behind this one-a question of great difficulty, and of vast importance, viz., what is the nature and kind of opinion in Theology which justifies and calls for the forming of a separate Communion? Our ideas on this subject are very much formed on the historical events of the Reformation, and on a few of later years; whilst those events themselves have generally been determined by causes with which a deliberate consideration of principle in this matter had very little to do. The necessity which had arisen for an entire revolt from the Romish system compelled, or seemed to compel, men to review the very foundations of Christian Theology, and to draw up new and elaborate definitions of Belief. The relations in which these stand to modern thought is one of the great difficulties of our time. There has been a drift-a slow, gradual, and in its progress an insensible drift-of opinion separating more or less the present generation from the conceptions of the time when those confessions and articles were composed; and probably there is not one of the leading Churches of the Reformation whose members could cordially unite if their common confession had now to be drawn up for the first time. Their creeds and articles remain unchanged, not, for the most part, because of the general agreement they secure, but because of the greater disagreement which any modification would occasion. They cannot be touched because different parties would desire to alter them in diametrically opposite directions. Some parts of those creeds generally, we may hope, the more essential parts--are indeed held, and held as firmly as before; but other parts are held, if held at all, with less of emphasis and belief; whilst there are generally some portions over which we pass, or desire to pass, in silence. Under these circumstances the question is always liable to arise what divergence of teaching and belief is to be held as legitimate and consistent with loyalty to the distinguishing characteristics of the society to which we may belong? There are some churches in which, from accidental circumstances, this question falls to be decided by courts in which men preside who are invested with the character of the civil judge. I say this arises from accidental circumstances, because such I consider those circumstances to be which have led to what we call Established Churches; that is, to churches whose creeds and governments are directly supported and embodied in systems of legislation. Even in the case of an Established Church it may be so arranged, as we voluntary associations is conducted according to their been promised to ecclesiastical assemblies which have not been promised to other societies of men. But we must judge this belief by the facts of life and nature, by the light of history, by the universal experience of the past and of the present. It would indeed be a dreadful thing to think that the lamentable errors of opinion, and the crimes of cruelty and oppression which so long and so often have been the scandal of the Church, have not, in the minds and consciences of those who were guilty of them, had all the excuse which real ignorance and a horrible sincerity could afford. But we know from these examples, as a matter of fact, that Churches have fallen into the most grievous errors both of opinion and of conduct, and we ought to bear about with us a perpetual remembrance of our own liability to the same. In Religion, as well as in other matters-nay, more than in other matters the sentence of Jeremiah is true to the facts of nature, that the "heart is deceitful | above all things, and desperately wicked." Its powers of self-deception are indeed inexhaustible, and nothing but a rare humility of mind, an enlightened appreciation of the fragmentary character of our knowledge, and a jealous watchfulness over our own temper of mind, can keep us from that most terrible of all ignorance, the "knowing not what manner of spirit we are of." favourite dogmas in the general system of truth. On the contrary, in all such schemes of union there is a wide door of entrance for the worst vices of religious enmity, all the more dangerous and deceitful that they are veiled under the aspect of Christian charity and love. We may be seeking in such movements nothing but self-assertion. We may be exalting matters of trivial importance into fundamental truths. We may be sacrificing bonds of union which now exist, and which ought to be drawn more near and close. Above all, we may be selecting as the ground of union points of agreement which are not truths, but errors, and which will become doubly mischievous from the new stress and importance which it is our object to lay upon them. I ventured to make some remarks in this sense on a former occasion in this place; and a signal illustration of the caution required on this subject has lately been afforded to us. A party in the Church of England has been for some time expressing a desire for union, or at least for some formal and close intercourse with the Eastern Church. Some persons seem to have imagined that when such desire for closer fellowship with foreign and distant communions was proposed, the great Protestant communions of the Continent, and especially the Lutheran Church, might possibly come in for some share in these yearnings of brotherly affection. A suggestion to this effect appears to have been made, and has lately drawn forth a letter from one of the religious leaders of our time, Dr. Pusey, denouncing the proposal as incompatible with the conscientious convictions of himself and of his friends. Now it may be right, or it may be wrong-on this I express no opinion here | -to draw nearer to the Theology of Constantinople | and of Rome, but at least let it be known to all men that the whole aim and object of this movement is to draw off farther from the Theology of the Reformation. The desire of dividing and separating from those who in the historical and legal association of several hun It will bring home to us the pitfalls and temptations of party-spirit to which the human mind is liable in those matters, if we remember that needless divisions are not the only form in which that spirit may find expression. It may be as virulent and far more deceitful when it assumes the shape of a desire for union. Of the duty of putting an end to useless separations I have indeed no doubt; nor do I doubt that many such separations exist in Christendom. But I have already pointed out that a special union with certain men or communities involves generally a more marked separation from certain other men or certain other communities of men. In so far as this is a necessary result of a legiti-dred years have stood nearest to them, is with these mate operation, undertaken on legitimate grounds, it is open neither to censure nor to praise. Regarded in this point of view, a movement towards union is simply a strategic movement, a movement of attack, or of defence against those whom we specially dislike or to whom we are specially opposed. The moral character of such a movement will depend on the truth and purity and value of the doctrines which we select as the ground for drawing near to some men in order to draw off from others. But there is no moral presumption in favour of such endeavours, as those who make them too often represent to themselves and others. They do not necessarily involve any spirit of sacrifice in respect to our own party prejudices, nor any searching investigation into the extent to which these prejudices may be affecting our tenets, nor any stern analysis in the light of conscience of the secret of our love towards those we seek to join, of our jealousy of those from whom we determine to stand aloof. Still less do such movements necessarily involve any attempt at a calm and dispassionate judgment on the relative value of our men the avowed motive and spring of action. Again I say this movement may be right, or it may be wrong, but there is no prima facie presumption in its favour arising out of the obligations of Christian union. It must be judged on its own merits; on the value of the tenets it selects for preference, as compared with those which it rejects as grounds of union; on the tendency of that selection to build up again the system against which so large a part of the Christian world protested in the sixteenth century, and on our own estimate of the necessity, of the value, and of the truth of that protest. It is impossible, then, to take this review of the duties arising out of the differences of religious opinion without being impressed by the exceeding difficulty and delicacy of the considerations by which that duty ought to be determined. In matters of religious controversy the lay mind is becoming more and more important; and even in bodies which depart so fundamentally from the principle and practice of the early church as to assign to laymen no formal function or authority, their influence is rapidly extending. All men ought to be interested in religious questions. All men ought to be anxious in the ascertainment of Christian duty in matters of theology. Besides their own intrinsic interest, they are affecting more and more the politics, the science, and the philosophy of our time. It is my object in this paper to indicate general principles alone, and not to enter on the application of these principles in detail. This, indeed, is the special duty and the special burden of us all, as we are summoned to deal with the daily questions of life and conduct in the Church and in the State. No formal directions or definitions can solve those questions for us, or save us from the burden or necessity of exercising with care or circumspection our reason or our conscience in regard to them. It is not my business here to inculcate opinions on any existing controversy. It may be thought that what I have said is indefinite in character, and does little more than indicate the difficulties on either hand, without determining anything as to how they may be avoided. But this is the condition in which we are all placed. Men long to have some infallible guide-some mechanical rule to go by-something which shall save them from the burden of thought, and of reflection, and of self-restraint. But this cannot be given them. Seeing this, others take refuge in indifference, and believe, or affect to believe, that the wrangling of theologians is of no practical importance. This, however, is the most false of all conclusions; this is not tolerance, or liberality, or truth. The conduct of men is in the main determined by that which they believe. The knowledge we have of the past history of the world, and the knowledge we may have of the constitution of our nature, forbid the thought that Man can live without a belief, whether it be in the truth or in a lie. If he has not a God, he will make to himself an idol. Nor is it always possible to determine without much care and knowledge what is, and what is not, important even in the controversies of the Church. If all churches could now be satisfied with the shortness and simplicity of the early Creeds— which in matters of doctrine, perhaps, they ought to be this would not remove the necessity out of which separate organisations have arisen. Some questions which, at first sight, may appear trivial, and which are frequently referred to as mere questions of government, are in reality questions big with the most tremendous issues to society, to the State, and to the Church. Whether, for example, the Christian ministry is, or is not, a priesthood? What are its prerogatives and powers? The nature, the extent, and the seat of spiritual authority these are questions on which almost everything else depends. It is no part of the duty of toleration to give up, or to compromise, our matured opinion in respect to these. Let that opinion be formed in the light of reason, in the light of past experience, in view of the known tendencies of human character, and of the essential nature of spiritual worship. Let it be formed in recollection also of those cravings of the mind, "moving about in worlds not realised," which are the bridge and passage between Religion and Superstition. Those who regard these questions with indifference are fools indeed. The thirst for knowledge and the love of truth are the noblest aspirations of the mind. Can it be wise to let these fail us in that department of knowledge which is the highest of all, and which holds within it the most powerful influences even over the life that is? The narrow range within which our purely intellectual faculties are confined is indeed a fact which forces itself on the attention of us all, and most on those to whom those faculties have been given in largest measure. But there is at least this comfort and this lesson to be gathered from it: the pain with which we feel the limitation of our mental powers is itself the best witness to the strength of our spiritual desires. In the bearing of these two facts upon each other lies the strongest of all arguments for the reasonableness of a watchful faith. If there be indeed no other avenues of approach to the great object of those desires-if the best and highest impulses of man's nature have no correlative in the reality and truth of things, then is he like nothing else existing in the world-an exception and contradiction to the whole analogy and course of nature. Then, indeed, in the. words of the poet "Dragons of the Prime, That tear each other in their slime, Were mellow music, matched with him." And if we feel the difficulties of belief, let us remember that these belong to our condition of partial knowledge, that they affect every subject on which our powers are exercised, and follow us only in multiplied array into the melancholy retreats of Doubt. Let us remember also that they have been felt most keenly by those who have most signally triumphed over them. In that most eloquent and touching review of his own religious life, which has been left us by Richard Baxter, author of "The Saints' Rest," there is no passage more eloquent and touching than that in which he confesses how, in some high matters, difficulties had rather increased than diminished with the course of time, how much less disposed to be dogmatic he then was than he had been in his earlier years; how painfully he felt the different degrees of certainty and of clearness with which different objects of faith could be held and seen; and how nothing more increased his longing for another life than thinking with how little of the knowledge of God this world was honoured. Remember also the strong words of Milton:-"It is evident to me that in Religion, as in other things, the offers of God are all directed, not to an indo lent credulity, but to constant diligence, and to an unwearied search of the truth." The more we have felt the difficulties which beset religious knowledge the more shall we appreciate them for others, and the more successfully shall we be able to recommend to others those truths of which we may be "fully persuaded in our own minds." They heard God call them, and they obeyed; To turn away from the Tempter's smile; Because I expect her all the while:" can see the city lie far away, A sloping path from our house leads down; ISABELLA FYVIE. VII.—THE PERSON AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. In this confession the universal Church not only acknowledges the spirituality of the Divine Nature, and recognises a Divine Energy as operating in the world and on the mind of man, but specially professes belief in a Divine Person, by whom that energy is possessed and exercised. This confession all Christendom unites to make. It may be doubted, however, whether it is so fully realised in its import and its practical bearings as it ought to be, and as some other articles of the common Creed are. Like all the other articles in the Creed, this is simply an affirmation of belief in certain revealed facts as facts. With doctrines concerning them-i. e., modes of apprehending and adjusting them so as to make them fit into a system of theological scienceit does not meddle. This is appropriate to its character. Doctrines belong to the cogitata, not to the credenda, of religion, This belief respects two classes of revealed factsthose relating to the Nature and those relating to the Working of the Holy Ghost. We shall endeavour to set forth the Church's belief on both these heads, with a summary of the scriptural evidence on which it rests. I. Concerning the Nature of the Holy Ghost the belief of the Church of Christ is, that He is a Divine Person, of the same essence with the Father and the Son, equal with them in power and glory, sustaining to them certain relations, in one sense distinct from them, in another one with them, and so with them constituting the One Blessed and Undivided Trinity. This belief, in its full dogmatic form, cannot be traced in any of the documents of the early Church before the beginning of the |