the defendants prior to their location to give him an interest in consideration for his aid or assistance. No such agreement is shown, and judgment must go for defendants. HOWARD v. LINDEBERG. (Second Division. Nome. December 7, 1904.) No. 1,147. INJUNCTION-BONDS-BREACH. The condition of an injunction bond is broken by a dissolution of the injunction. The right of action accrues at once. The right is not stayed by an appeal from the final judgment. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 27, Cent. Dig. Injunction, §§ 533-535; vol. 2, Cent. Dig. Appeal and Error, §§ 2277, 2278.] W. H. Packwood, for plaintiff. Ira D. Orton, for defendant. MOORE, District Judge. This is an action upon an injunction bond, and the plaintiffs in the action demur to the answer, alleging that it does not state a good cause of defense in law. The bond was given by the defendants in a suit in equity upon the granting of a restraining order by this court at the institution of the suit. The plaintiffs in the equity suit are the principal obligors on the bond, and with their suretics are the defendants in this action, and the defendants in that suit are the plaintiffs in this action. The plaintiffs in the equity suit are named in the bill as a partnership, called the "Moonlight Springs Water Company." The bond was conditioned for the payment of all costs and disbursements to be decreed to the plaintiffs in the suit, their agents, servants, and employés, and such damages, not to exceed $2,500, as the plaintiffs therein, or any of them, should or might sustain by reason of the said injunction, if the same should be wrongful or without sufficient cause. The complaint in this action recites the bond, and alleges a breach of the condition resultant upon the order of this court, made after the hearing, by which the restraining order was dissolved; it also recites the grounds for special damages. The defense set up in the answer of the defendants when condensed amounts to an assertion denying that the right of action upon the bond has accrued, or that if a right of action ever did accrue thereon it was taken away by the defendants' appeal from the order of this court dissolving the injunction. I cannot think either proposition sound in law. "The condition of an injunction bond is broken by a dissolution of the injunction." High on Injunctions (1st Ed.) § 951; Stone v. Cason, 1 Or. 100. So, also, in High on Injunctions, § 956, the same doctrine in amplified form is announced by that author upon the sanction of authorities by him cited when he says: "Upon the dissolution of an injunction and failure on the part of the obligors to comply with the conditions of the bond, a right of action at once accrues." To this enunciation of the law I may add that, when a right of action once accrues, it continues until barred by the statute of limitations, or by such change of circumstances as will sweep away or satisfy the cause of action. Now it cannot be successfully maintained that the appeal by the defendants from the order in the equity suit dissolving the injunction ever took away or destroyed the cause of action. The pleadings in the action show that before the commencement of the action, not only did the court dissolve the restraining order or preliminary injunction, but that the cause thereafter was fully tried, and a decree dismissing the action was entered by the court. This was a final decree in the action, and if damaged the plaintiffs were not required to await the event of the appeal before bringing this action. If any doubt should remain as to whether the plaintiffs' right to bring their action in the present case was ripe, these cases may be cited: Clark v. Clayton, 61 Cal. 634; Dougherty v. Dore, 63 Cal. 170. In the former case the court says: "An action on the undertaking cannot be maintained until the suit in which the injunction issued is disposed of by a final decree or judgment." This language plainly implies that when a final decree in the case is made the right of action then, if not before, matures. This being the law applicable to the facts as the court apprehends it, the defenses set up in the answer cannot avail the defendants upon the trial of the action, and it follows that the demurrer should and will be sustained. ALASKA COMMERCIAL CO. v. DEBNEY. (Third Division. Valdez. No. 64. December 8-29, 1904.) 1. JUDGMENTS-COMITY-FOREIGN JUDGMENTS-EFFECT. The force and effect to be given to a foreign judgment when sued on in the courts of the United States is to be determined by what the Supreme Court of the United States terms "the comity of nations." [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 30, Cent. Dig. Judgment, 1443.] 2. SAME RIGHT OF ACTION. By the rule of the comity of nations, the same force and effect will be given to the judgments of a foreign country when sued on in the courts of the United States as that country gives to judgments of our courts when sued on there; the basis of such comity being reciprocity. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 30, Cent. Dig. Judgment, § 1516.] 3. SAME. In English courts full faith and credit is given to the judgments of the courts of the United States; they are held to be conclusive upon the merits. In French courts, however, they are admitted for no more than prima facie evidence of character upon the merits. Held, that the rule of comity gives English and French judgments a like and reciprocal weight when sued on in our courts. A Canadian judgment sued on in Alaska will be given full faith and credit as a cause of action, and treated as conclusive evidence of the matters adjudged therein, subject only to a defense for want of jurisdiction, mistake, or fraud. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 30, Cent. Dig. Judgment, §§ 1519, 1520.] 4. PLEADINGS-AMENDMENTS-FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. Plaintiff asked leave to file an amended complaint on two causes of action; the first upon an original debt due from the defendant in the Yukon Territory, and the second upon a Canadian judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant upon the original debt. Held that, upon the rendition of the judgment, the original debt was merged therein, that plaintiff had but one cause of action, and that upon the judgment, and the amendment asked for was denied. 5. JUDGMENT-COLLATERAL ATTACK-JURISDICTION-PRESUMPTIONS. It is presumed, as a general rule, that courts of unlimited jurisdiction have acted within the scope of their jurisdiction; that those facts or averments necessary to support their authority to render the judgment have been complied with or made. Held, the exception to this rule is that, where the record shows the facts or recites the averments, nothing additional will be presumed. Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 444, 24 L. Ed. 1110. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 30. Cent. Dig. Judgment, §§ 933, 934, 937, 1471-1473, 1520, 1521; vol. 13, Cent. Dig. Courts, §§ 140, 141, 145.] 6. PROCESS-SERVICE-SUMMONS. The statute of the Yukon Territory provides that service of summons in civil actions against a nonresident shall be made as follows: "In case any defendant is out of the Territories but has an agent, managing clerk or other representative resident and carrying on his business within the same, service of the writ of summons may be made on such agent, managing clerk or other representative." Defendant had previous to his leaving that territory given his brother a power of attorney "to transact any and all business relating to my interests in the Yukon Territory." At the time of service of the summons on him as the agent, the brother was not engaged in carrying on any business for the defendant therein. Held, that the service on the agent was not such service as the Yukon statute contemplated, and that a judgment in personam against the defendant, based on such substituted service, was void for want of jurisdiction. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 40, Cent. Dig. Process, § 92.] On June 15, 1903, the plaintiff brought a suit before this court at Eagle, Alaska, to recover the sum of $6,519.50, interest and costs, from the defendant, upon a judgment rendered in the Territorial Court of the Yukon Territory, Canada, at Dawson, Y. T. The substance of the complaint is: Paragraph 1 alleges that the plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of California; that it has complied with the requirements of the laws of Alaska relating to foreign corporations, and is engaged in business in Alaska. "(2) That the defendant has been engaged in mining on the Yukon river, and is now a resident of the district of Alaska. "(3) That during the years 1901-02, while defendant was carrying on mining operations on the Yukon river, aforesaid, he became indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-nine hundred and ninetyfive ($2,995) dollars; the same being a balance for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered to him by plaintiff. "(4) That on September 15, 1900, at Dawson, in the Yukon Territory, Canada, the defendant made, executed, and delivered to one S. W. Milan, his promissory note for the sum of twenty-six hundred and ten and 69/100 ($2,610.69) dollars, which note was payable on September 15, 1902, at either San Francisco or Seattle, and was thereafter transferred to plaintiff, who is now the owner and holder thereof." The fifth paragraph then alleges the existence of the Territorial Court of the Yukon Territory, Canada; that it was a "court of general jurisdiction, duly created under and by virtue of an act of Parliament of Canada"; that it "had jurisdiction in actions to recover money for debt unlimited, and had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action hereinafter men 2 A.R.-20 |