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which it is attempted to be drawn are the writing of two letters by Runner to Taylor, and securing a sum of $117 forwarded by Taylor to Runner at St. Louis.

The evidence is conclusive that, as soon as Taylor notified Runner and Bishoprick at Skagway that he had sold the lot, they joined in a telegram denying his authority and repudiating the sale, and instructing him to store the remainder of the partnership goods. Ten months later Runner wrote to Taylor from St. Louis, asking him to "pay me my share of the money due me on settlement." Taylor sent him from Los Angles, Cal., in answer to this letter, express money orders for $417, upon receipt of which Runner again wrote him, saying: "I rec. money all O. K.," and, after discussing his trouble to be identified, he said: "I had hoped we would have gotten out better in the clean up of the business, but I have perfect faith in your integrity, and believe you have done all you could; many thanks." Prior to writing either of these letters Runner had started an agent to Alaska to make a settlement of this partnership matter, with instructions to begin a suit to recover his interest in this lot, and in his first letter to Taylor he wrote that the agent, "Miss Burke, is on the road to Alaska." Upon her arrival in Alaska Miss Burke sought Taylor, and on October 18, 1904, procured a settlement with him by which he paid to Runner, in addition to the St. Louis payment, $600 as the final balance due from him on the settlement of their partnership venture in the personal property, and not including what Taylor had received from Woitke upon the sale of the lot. On October 25, 1904, Miss Burke brought this suit for Runner to recover his interest in the lot. Whether or not Taylor was overreached, as he claims, in this settlement, the facts in relation to it do not show a ratification of the sale of the lot. The use of the words "settlement" and "the business" in his letters is explained by Runner as a reference to a settlement of the partnership trading business. The court cannot from

the evidence conclusively find that Runner accepted the $117 other than as a payment upon the settlement of that trading business. His actions are consistent from the beginning in refusing to ratify the sale of the lot, and the court must find that he did not intend to so ratify it.

The sale of Runner's interest in the lot was unauthorized; it was not necessary to pay partnership debts, and was not subsequently ratified by him. Woitke bought with full knowledge of Taylor's want of authority, which was apparent upon the face of his deed. The defendants claiming under Woitke are in no better position. Let findings and decree be for plaintiff in accordance herewith.

BECHTOL v. BECHTOL et al.

(Third Division. Fairbanks. May 8, 1905.)

No. 218.

1. PARTIES-INTERVENTION-PETITION.

A petition or complaint in intervention must state facts sufficient, if admitted, to support a decree for intervener.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. Parties, § 72.]

2. DOWER-PROPERTY.

Since the adoption of the Alaska Codes, June 6, 1900, a wife has no inchoate or other dower interest in the real property belonging to her husband (1) until her husband's death, and then (2) only in lands whereof he died seised of an estate of inheritance.

3. SAME MINES AND MINERALS.

The wife has no dower interest in a placer mining claim sold by the husband during his lifetime. A husband's interest in a mining claim is not subject to any possible incumbrance of the wife by way of dower.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 17, Cent. Dig. Dower, § 23.]

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Motion by Rosalind H. Bechtol for leave to intervene in this action. Her motion alleges that she and Charles W. Bechtol, one of the defendants, and the son of the plaintiff herein, were married on December 22, 1904, and continued to live together as husband and wife until April 17, 1905, when by the advice and procurement of his father her husband abandoned her, leaving her without any means of support, and has gone to parts unknown.

The records in this case show that plaintiff brought this action against his son to establish a trust in certain placer mining claims purchased by the son with the father's money. The son in his answer admits the purchase with the father's money, but alleges that there was an agreement that he should have a half interest with his father for his services in locating and purchasing and working the mine. This agreement is denied by the father in his reply. The reply was filed and the issues settled on April 13, 1905. Intervener's motion alleges:

"That afterwards, and on April 14, 1905, the plaintiff, John G. Bechtol, and her husband, the said Charles W. Bechtol, conspiring together and with the express purpose in view of cheating and defrauding the said Rosalind H. Bechtol out of her inchoate rights of dower and heirship as the wife of said Charles W. Bechtol, executed, and procured to be executed and delivered, a deed of an undivided three-fourths' interest in and to said mining ground from said Charles W. Bechtol to said John G. Bechtol, such three-fourths interest being all the estate that said Charles W. Bechtol had in said mining ground and being all the property that he owned."

Intervener alleges that her husband abandoned her on April 17th, and on the 21st she began a suit against his father, John G. Bechtol, plaintiff in this action, for damages in the sum of $50,000 for alienating her husband's affections, for loss of his society, protection, and support. She asks leave to intervene in this action; that the deed from the son to the father be declared void as in fraud of her marital rights, because "executed for the express purpose of defeating her inchoate rights

of dower and as heir" of her husband. Plaintiff objects to leave being granted, upon the ground that upon the face of her application it appears that it does not state a cause of action, and moves to dismiss the case.

Pratt & Johanson, for intervener and defendants.
McGinn & Sullivan, for plaintiff.

WICKERSHAM, District Judge. The petition or complaint in intervention must state facts sufficient, if admitted, to support a decree for intervener. Coffey v. Grenfield, 62 Cal. 602; Ward v. Healy, 114 Cal. 191, 45 Pac. 1065; Clapp v. Phelps, 19 La. Ann. 461, 92 Am. Dec. 545; Davis v. Sullivan, 33 N. J. Eq. 569; Noyes v. Brown, 75 Tex. 458, 13 S. W. 36; Empire Distilling Co. v. McNulta, 77 Fed. 703, 23 C. C. A. 415; French v. Gapen, 105 U. S. 509, 26 L. Ed. 951. Demurrer lies as to an original complaint. Fischer v. Hanna, 8 Colo. App. 471, 47 Pac. 303; Ragland v. Wisrock, 61 Tex. 391; Shepard v. Murray, 33 Minn. 519, 24 N. W. 291.

The principal question presented upon the demurrer to this application is, what inchoate right of dower or heirship has a married woman in Alaska in her husband's interest in a placer mining claim after location but before application for patent?

Lindley on Mines (2d Ed.) §§ 543, 544, briefly summarized the law touching the dower rights of married women in mines, and says:

"Of the precious metal-bearing states, no dower right whatever exists in California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, or Wyoming. In Montana a widow is entitled to the third part of all lands whereof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance, and equitable estates are subject to such dower right. The states of Oregon and Utah have dower laws similar to those of Montana. * The dower laws of Oregon have been adopted for Alaska."

This latter statement is not quite correct.

The seventh section of the act of Congress entitled "An act providing for a civil government for Alaska," approved May 17, 1884 (chapter 53, 23 Stat. 24), provides:

"That the general laws of the state of Oregon now in force are hereby declared to be the law in said district so far as the same may be applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of this act or the laws of the United States."

One of these general laws was that defining the dower rights of married women, the first section of which reads as follows: "Sec. 2954. The widow of every deceased person shall be entitled to dower, or the use, during her natural life, of one-third part of all the lands wherof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, unless she is lawfully barred thereof." Volume 2, Hill's Ann. Laws Ore. 1892, p. 1345.

Congress, however, made a sweeping change in this section upon the adoption of the Alaska Civil Code by the act of June 6, 1900 (chapter 786, 31 Stat. 321). It was then amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 36. The widow of every deceased person shall be entitled to dower, or the use during her natural life of one-third part in value of all the lands whereof her husband died seised of an estate of inheritance." Carter's Ann. Alaska Codes, p. 363.

From 1884 to June 6, 1900, the wife, in Alaska, had (1) a continuing though inchoate dower interest in all the lands whereof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time during marriage; (2) of which she could be barred only by her deed of conveyance or other voluntary waiver; (3) which inchoate right matured into a fixed dower right upon her husband's death. Since the congressional amendment of June 6, 1900, she has no inchoate or other dower interest (1) until her husband's death, and then (2) only in the lands whereof her husband dies seised of an estate of inheritance. McNeer v. McNeer, 32 N. E. 681, 142 Ill. 388, 19 L. R. A. 256; Mitchell v. Violett, 104 Ky. 77, 47 S. W. 195. The title to the

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