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to exceed one hundred and sixty acres, to be taken as near as practicable in a square form, of such land at two dollars and fifty cents per acre: Provided, that in case more than one person, association, or corporation shall claim the same tract of land the person, association, or corporation having the prior claim by reason of possession and continued occupation shall be entitled to purchase the same." 26 Stat. 1100, c. 561 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1467].

It is provided that any citizen

"Hereafter in possession of and occupying public lands in the District of Alaska in good faith for the purpose of trade, manufactures, or other productive industry, may each purchase one claim only not exceeding eighty acres of such land for any one person, association, or corporation at two dollars and fifty cents per acre, upon submission of proof that said area embraces improvements of the claimant and is needed in the prosecution of such trade, manufacture, or other productive industry, such tract of land not to include mineral or coal lands, and ingress and egress shall be reserved to the public on the waters of all streams, whether navigable or otherwise; Provided, further, that there shall be reserved by the United States a space of eighty rods in width between tracts sold or entered under the provisions of this act on lands abutting on any navigable stream, inlet, gulf, bay, or seashore, etc. * * * Provided, further, That in case more than one person, association, or corporation having the prior claim, by reason of actual possession, and continued occupation in good faith, shall be entitled to purchase the same, but where several persons are or may be so possessed of parts of the tract applied for the same shall be awarded to them according to their respective interests."

Under this statute a citizen may use and occupy a tract of the public domain not to exceed 80 acres in area for the purpose of trade, manufactures, or other productive industry. Whenever he shall have marked out said tract, and shall have erected his mill or other machinery for trade and manufactures upon any part of it, he may hold the entire tract under this law. It is not necessary that he shall cover the entire tract claimed by him with structures, nor is it necessary for him to fence it to maintain his exclusive possession thereof.

It is claimed on behalf of the defendant that there was no such marking of the boundaries in this case as would exclude the defendant from claiming the land as a portion of the public domain; his theory being that there was no segregation of any particular tract. The facts appearing in evidence are that, when Crawford and Rutherford originally located this land for milling purposes, they set stakes corresponding to the corners of Broadway and Front streets. and Front and Reservation streets, and the evidence is that they set another stake 300 feet toward deep water along the line of Broadway. These stakes inclosed the tract in dispute in this case. I am inclined, however, to hold, that the fact that both Broadway and Reservation avenue are extended along each side of this tract, and that Broadway is used by the general public along the side where the land in dispute lies, is a sufficient boundary to segregate the land in dispute from the public domain. Defendant himself recognized such boundary for his 100 feet front extending from Broadway back into plaintiff's lumber yard. He recognized Broadway as the boundary, the plaintiff has always recognized it as such, and no reason is suggested why the court should not so recognize it. It is my judgment that this land had been effectually segregated from the public domain by Crawford and Rutherford, doing business as the Valdez Milling Company; that it was conveyed to the plaintiff, who used the same, and who was in the sole and exclusive possession thereof, using it for the purpose of trade and manufactures, when the defendant trespassed upon a portion of it; that plaintiff's possession was then sufficient to hold the entire tract; and that defendant could acquire no rights by his trespass thereon.

There is some contention by the defendant that the land which he claims is above the ordinary high tide. It would make no difference, however, under the circumstances in

this case, whether it was above or below ordinary high tide. If it is above high tide, the facts bring it fairly within the statute in relation to the disposal of lands for trade and manufactures, and, if it is below, the circumstances bring it clearly within the rule that the owner of uplands cannot be deprived of the use of the tideland in front of his upland holdings by a mere trespasser, and that he may construct wharves, mills, and approaches to the sea from his upland, and will be protected in such right by the injunctive process of the court. Lewis v. Johnson, 1 Alaska, 529; Sutter v. Heckman, 1 Alaska, 81; Martin v. Heckman, 1 Alaska, 165.

WILLIAMS, Adm'r, v. ALASKA COMMERCIAL CO.
(First Division. Juneau. March 3, 1903.)

No. 137A.

1. NEW TRIAL-MOTION-STATEMENT OF GROUNDS.

The object of a motion for a new trial is to call the attention of the court specifically to the errors that are claimed to have been made during the trial, that the court may have an opportunity to investigate those questions anew; and if he finds error has been committed to award a new trial without subjecting the parties moving to the expense of taking the case to a higher court. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial, § 254.]

2. SAME-SPECIFICATION OF Errors.

A motion for a new trial which does not specify the ground therefor, in compliance with section 229 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not sufficient under the statute, and will not be regarded by the court.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial, §§ 254-257.]

3. SAME.

Where a motion for a new trial states the ground generally "that such verdict is against the law," it is insufficient, it is not

"plainly specified" as required by statute, and does not give notice to the court or opposing counsel of the specific error or point relied upon.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial,

4. SAME.

261.]

A motion for a new trial which states "that such verdict is against the law" is not sustained by showing that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial,

5. SAME.

261.]

A statement in a motion for a new trial generally, "error in law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the defendant herein," is insufficient; it should specifically point out the error complained of.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial, §§ 254-257.]

6. SAME-EVIDENCE-TRIAL.

If exception or objection is heard to the ruling of the court on the admission of evidence, the question and answer should be set forth in the motion for a new trial, and the ground of objection stated as on the trial, so that the court may have its attention specifically directed to the claimed erroneous ruling. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial,

258.]

7. SAME-EXCEPTION-TRIAL.

If exception is taken to a particular instruction of the court, the instruction objected to should be quotio in hæc verba in the motion for a new trial, and the ruling of the court thereon indicated in detail.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial, 259.]

8. SAME DEMURRER-EVIDENCE.

Where a ground of motion for a new trial is the insufficiency of the evidence on a particular point, the particulars thereof must be specifically pointed out, and where the motion is based upon the total failure of proof, where it is intended as a general demurrer to the evidence, it may be stated in the language of

the statute, as "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision."

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial, §§ 258, 259.]

9. SAME.

All errors occuring on the trial, to be taken advantage of on an appeal, must be clearly stated in the motion for a new trial, and any not included in the motion for a new trial will not be regarded. The general rule is that the grounds of a motion for a new trial must be stated so specifically as to direct the attention of the court and opposing counsel to the precise errors complained of. The mere statement of the ground, without further specification, will therefore be insufficient. The court will not, upon the statutory statement only, wade through the whole record, and examine each ruling and instruction to ascertain if error was committed, but will deny the motion for noncompliance with section 229, Code Civ. Proc.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial, §§ 254-257.]

10. SAME-Grounds-VERDICT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.

Where there is a fair conflict of testimony, the court will not grant a new trial, even though the judge might have found different upon the same evidence. Where the weight of evidence is so manifestly against the verdict that it is evident that the jury were influenced by prejudice or passion, it would be the imperative duty of the court to set the verdict aside, and a failure to do so would be an abuse of discretion.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. New Trial, §§ 135-148.]

11. DEATH-DAMAGES.

A verdict for $5,000 in an action for damages for causing the death of a man 21 years old, in good health, and capable of earning good wages, held, not excessive.

[Ed. Note.

§§ 125-130.]

For cases in point, see vol. 15, Cent. Dig. Death,

12. TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS-NEW TRIAL.

It is not error for a trial court, in its instructions to a jury, to state so much of the admitted facts as may be necessary to illustrate and apply the law to the case on trial.

13. ADMIRALTY-DAMAGES TORTS.

The steamer Bertha engaged to tow the schooner Dora B. to Lituya Bay, but owing to rough wheather passed that port and

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