nesses and the weight to be given to the testimony of each and every of them. To say that, because the court might not agree with the jury as to the weight of evidence, the verdict should be set aside, would be to subvert the jury system, and array the judgment of one man against that of twelve, each of whom might be equally competent to judge the character of witnesses and the weight that should be given their testimony.

Where there is such overwhelming evidence against the verdict as to justify the inference that it was rendered under the influence of prejudice, passion, or bias of some kind, the court below should grant a new trial. People v. Vance, 21 Cal. 403; Corning v. Iron Co., 44 N. Y. 577; Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 569.

From an examination of this case, I find no such indication. In considering a motion for new trial, it is said it becomes. the duty of the trial court to weigh all the evidence in the case, and sustain or overrule the same according to the weight or preponderance of the evidence as the court finds it. When the verdict is, in the opinion of the court, clearly against the weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the court to set it aside. Rarick v. Ulmer, 144 Ind. 25, 42 N. E. 1099. It is clearly the duty of the trial court to weigh the evidence, though it be conflicting. Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 569.

Where the weight of evidence is so manifestly against the verdict that it is evident the jury was influenced by prejudice or passion, it would be the imperative duty of the court to set the verdict aside, and a failure so to do would be an abuse of discretion. The duty of correcting the mistakes of juries is believed to be one of the most important duties a trial court is called upon to perform, and should be exercised with great caution and wise judgment. Though the court in weighing the testimony might be in doubt as to the correctness of the verdict, he should not usurp the functions of the jury

by setting their verdict aside on some difference of opinion. Where the question is close, it is believed to be the true rule that the doubt should be resolved in favor of the verdict, not against it. If the verdict is in the main just and fair, the court should sustain it, although upon some particular point, if properly presented, the court might be of the opinion that the weight of the evidence was against the finding of the jury on that point. This court will be controlled by these general rules in considering motions for new trials.

As before stated, if it was upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict on some special point or phase of the case the defendant relied, the particular or particulars in which the evidence failed to sustain that point should have been set out in the motion. But outside of the special findings, from the view the court takes of the law of this case, it is wholly immaterial as to what distance the ship and her tow were from the shores of Alaska at the time the line parted and the tow went adrift. This fully appears from the instructions given by the court to the jury.

In the same ground of motion is found the further statement that the "verdict is against the law." The court is of the opinion that this is not a ground of motion for new trial, which, under section 229, supra, the court is required to notice. In other words, the ground is not "plainly specified." "Errors in law," under subdivision 7 of the motion, are not included in the expression "against the law." Martin v. Matfield, 49 Cal. 46. The ground of motion for new trial "against the law" is not supported by showing that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. Brummagim v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 35. But since no specification is made to show in what the verdict is against the law, it is believed as a ground of motion it is unworthy of consideration.

Now, considering the seventh ground for motion for new trial, we find it is also stated in the language of the statute,

"error in law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the defendant herein." What error of law occurring on the trial and excepted to by the defendant is relied upon in support of this motion? No particular ruling is pointed out; no specification of a single error is called to the attention of the court. Is there any ground "plainly specified" in this motion? Is the trial court to hunt the entire record, and ascertain, if he can, what objection was made to testimony, and what exception was taken to the ruling of the court either on the admission or rejection of testimony during the trial? Supposing the court were to find rulings in the record which seem to be error, how is he to know whether they are the ones relied on by counsel ? Is the court to go through the several instructions given to the jury, considering them in every legal phase conceivable, in order to ascertain if he can what particular instruction is excepted to by the party making the motion? The object of a motion for a new trial is to call the attention of the court specifically to the errors that are claimed to have been made during the trial, that the court may have an opportunity to investigate these questions anew, and, if he finds error has been committed, to award a new trial without subjecting the parties moving to the expense of taking the case to a higher court. Another object is that the trial court shall have an opportunity to pass upon each assigned error, so that the higher court, if appeal is taken, may be clearly advised of the rulings of the court below. It is held, too, that an appellate court will not inquire into an alleged error of law on the trial not included in the motion for a new trial. Longfellow v. Smith (Kan. App.) 61 Pac. 875; McDonald v. Carpenter (Okl.) 65 Pac. 942; Boyd v. Bryan (Okl.) 65 Pac. 940; Gallagher et al. v. Cornelius (Mont.) 57 Pac. 447; McLennan v. Wilcox (Cal.) 58 Pac. 305; Thomas v. Blaisdell (Nev.) 58 Pac. 903; O'Leary v. Castle (Cal.) 65 Pac. 950.

I am of the opinion that no question of "error of law occurring at the trial" is raised by this motion, because no particular error is specified in the motion. If a statement or bill of exceptions was required to be filed before a motion for new trial should be considered, then the bill of exceptions or the statement might furnish the specific grounds indicated under the general head of the motion; but neither of these being required by our statute, the motion must take their place, and should, in all fairness, call the attention of the court to the specific errors complained of, and not attempt to gloss over claimed error by this general assignment. And what is true as to rulings of the court on questions of evidence is equally true as to exceptions to instructions. If exception or objection is urged to the ruling of the court on the admission of evidence, the question and answer should be set forth in the motion for a new trial, and the ground of objection stated as on the trial, so that the court may have its attention specifically directed to the claimed erroneous ruling. If exception is taken to a particular instruction of the court, the instruction objected to should be set forth in hæc verba in the motion for a new trial, and the ruling of the court thereon indicated in detail. Anything less than this is to leave the trial court without any means whatsoever of determining what errors are complained of.

All errors occurring on a trial, to be taken advantage of on appeal, must be clearly stated in the motion for a new trial, and if not included in the motion for new trial the motion may be overruled by the court, and will not be regarded on appeal or error. Many cases might be cited in support of this proposition. Suffice it to say the authorities are practically universal.

But what shall be the character of the assignment of error made in the motion for new trial in order to entitle it to consideration by the trial court and on appeal? Vol. 14, Encyclo

pedia Pleading and Practice, under the head of Assignments of Error in Motions for New Trial, we find the following:

"The practice is to state the grounds for a new trial separately and in separate paragraphs. Each error complained of should be stated as a separate ground. It is said that to present an error in excluding evidence there must be an assignment of error as to sustaining an objection to the question, and an assignment as to the exclusion of the offer of proof; but both rulings may be embraced in one assignment or specification." Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Reitz, 14 Ind. App. 493, 39 N. E. 541, 43 N. E. 46.

The general rule is that the grounds must be stated so specifically as to direct the attention of the court and opposing counsel to the precise errors complained of. A mere statement of the grounds, without further specification, will therefore be insufficient. Reese v. Chaffiee, 133 Ind. 14, 32 N. E. 720, Tucker v. Hyatt, 144 Ind. 635, 41 N. E. 1047, 43 N. E. 872; Louisville R. R. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403; Ohio Valley R. R. Co. v. Kuhn (Ky.) 5 S. W. 419; Illstad v. Anderson, 2 N. D. 167, 49 N. W. 659.

In Nebraska it is said that errors should be so specifically and definitely assigned in the motion for new trial in the court below as to challenge the court's attention to each decision complained of, and thus give the trial judge an opportunity to review his own rulings, and correct any errors therein. Each specification of error in a motion for a new trial should be complete in itself, and so framed as to embrace a single ruling. Aultman v. Martin, 49 Neb. 103, 68 N. W. 340.

It is insufficient to state as a ground "error of law occurring at the trial and excepted to" without further specification, as such an assignment would require the trial judge to review the entire record in the case. Ohio Valley Ry. Co. v. Kuhn (Ky.) 5 S. W. 419. A mere statement of the grounds for a new trial in the language of the statute is insufficient. Dawson v. Baum, 3 Wash. T. 464, 19 Pac. 46.