erly certified; and 2. Whether he is a fugitive from justice from the
state demanding him. When it is made properly to appear to the
court upon what showing the governor acted, it becomes a question
of law for the court to determine whether the accused has been
substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the demand-
ing state. (Neb.) Dennison v. Christian, 817.

7.

EXTRADITION.-Courts will not Review the Decision of the
Governor in extradition proceedings upon a question of fact made
before him which he ought to decide and as to which there was
evidence pro and con. (Neb.) Dennison v. Christian, 817.

FALSE PRETENSES.

FALSE PRETENSES-Evidence in Favor of Accused.-In a
prosecution for obtaining money under false pretenses through selling
as unencumbered cattle which in fact are mortgaged, the defendant
may show that the mortgage, although fair on its face, is void be-
cause based in part upon a consideration made illegal by an anti-trust
statute. (Kan.) State v. Wilson, 479.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

1. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-A Parol Agreement for a Private
Way is within the statute of frauds, and cannot operate as a grant
or conveyance. (Ill.) Schmidt v. Brown, 261.

2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Contract for Work or of Sale.-An
agreement by one person to construct a tombstone especially for or
according to the plans of another, whether or not at an agreed price,
although the transaction is to result in a sale of the article, is a con-
tract for work and labor, not for a sale, and is not within the stat-
ute of frauds. (Ark.) Moore v. Camden Marble and Granite Works,
87.

3. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Verbal Agreement to Form Partner-
ship-Enforcement of Contract of Purchase.-If two persons make a
verbal agreement to form a partnership and each to buy in his own
name certain town lots, both thereafter to pay for and own them as
copartners, such agreement constitutes a partnership and is not within
the statute of frauds, and if after they make such purchase at auction
sale, the owner of the lots tenders them a joint deed thereto and de-
mands a compliance with the terms of the sale, which is refused, he
is entitled to enforce a specific performance of the contract in a joint
action against them. (Ky.) Garth v. Davis, 571.

4. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Auctioneer's Memorandum, signed
by him, describing the lots sold and stating the terms of the sale,
is sufficient to bind both the seller and the purchaser, and is a com-
pliance with the statute of frauds. (Ky.) Garth v. Davis, 571.

5.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Real Estate Partnership.-An agree-
ment to become partners in dealing in real estate is neither a contract
to buy nor a contract to sell real estate, as between the parties to it,
and is not within the statute of frauds, and need not be in writing if
it is to be begun and may end within a year, although as a fact it
may not be terminated for more than a year. (Ky.) Garth v. Davis,

571.

6. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Partnership.-If a partnership is
formed, though by parol, and the status of the copartners has become
thereby fixed, the firm's transactions as between it and others con-

cerning lands are subject to the same terms under the statute of
frauds as indivinduals are. The firm, if it proposes to buy or sell
land, will be bound or not in the transaction as an individual would
be under the same circumstances. (Ky.) Garth v. Davis, 571.

7. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Partnership Lands in equity and for
partnership purposes are to be treated as personalty within the mean-
ing of the statute of frauds. (Ala.) Tillis v. Folmar, 31.

8. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Sale of Land-Part Performance.—
A contract of sale of several lots of land is not within the statute
of frauds, if one of the parcels has been taken into the possession
of the purchaser. In such case taking possession of one parcel is
equivalent to taking possession of them all. (Ala.) Tillis v. Folmar,

31.

See Trusts.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

1. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Insolvent Debtor.-While a
vigilant creditor may procure payment of his debt against a failing or
insolvent debtor by a purchase of his property, he cannot go beyond
the permissible purpose of securing his own demand, and confer a bene-
fit upon the debtor by purchasing much more than is necessary and
paying the difference to the debtor, and if he thus hinders and delays
other creditors and impairs their rights, the purchase and conveyance
will be set aside. (Iowa) Sly v. Bell, 417.

2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES—Unnecessary Purchase from
Insolvent Debtor.-A creditor of an insolvent debtor may, with knowl-
edge of his insolvency and fraudulent purpose, purchase of him suffi-
cient property to pay his debt, and pay the debtor a reasonable cash
difference if necessary, but if he unnecessarily purchases a large ad-
ditional amount of property from his debtor and pays him the dif
ference in cash, the whole transaction is fraudulent at the suit of the
other creditors. (Iowa) Sly v. Bell, 417.

Note.

Gambling, contracts in violation of laws against, 506.

contract, money loaned to be used in, 506.

contract to construct building with knowledge that it is to be
used for, 506.

GARNISHMENT.

GARNISHMENT-Exemptions-Injunction.-A court of equity
cannot restrain a creditor from the exercise of the right granted
him by law to issue a writ of garnishment seeking to subject the
exempt wages of his debtor to the payment of a just debt, and the
fact that the corporation for whom the debtor works has promul
gated a rule that its employés will be discharged if their wages are
garnished, cannot aid such debtor. (Miss.) Sturges v. Jackson, 754.

GAS.

STATUTES Respecting the Price of Illuminating Gas, Con-
struction of.-Under a statute providing that in cities of a specified
class no corporation or person shall charge for illuminating gas to
exceed a price designated per thousand feet, the maximum price so
fixed must be deemed reasonable, and the city, in an action against
it for gas furnished to it, is not entitled to defend on the ground

that the price charged, though less than that thus specified, is not
reasonable. (N.. Y.) Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. City of New York,
868.

GIFTS.

1. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS may be Effected by a delivery to a
third person in trust for the donee, though the gift does not come
to the knowledge of the donee until after the donor's death. (Minn.)
Varley v. Sims, 694.

2. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS-Presumption.-It is presumed that
the person to whom delivery of a gift causa mortis is made takes as
a trustee for the donee. (Minn.) Varley v. Sims, 694.

3. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS-Bank Check-Delivery.-A bank
check delivered as a gift causa mortis to a third person for the use
and benefit of the donee, with instructions to deliver it to the latter,
is a sufficient delivery, though it does not reach the hands of the
donee until after the donor's death. (Minn.) Varley v. Sims, 694.

4. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS-Presumption of Acceptance.-If a
gift causa mortis is beneficial to the donee and imposes no burden
upon him, acceptance is presumed as matter of law. (Minn.) Varley
v. Sims, 694.

5. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS-Bank Checks.-A bank check for the
entire amount of the drawer's credit in the bank, delivered to a
person as a gift of the money, though unaccepted by the bank, oper-
ates as an assignment of the fund, sufficient to sustain a gift causa
mortis, when the intention to make such gift is free from doubt,
and no question of fraud or the rights of creditors is involved, al-
though the check is not presented for payment until after the death
of the donor. (Minn.) Varley v. Sims, 694.

6. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS Require no Consideration to support
them. (Minn.) Varley v. Sims, 694.

7.

GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS-Bank Check.-A bank check which
is the subject of a gift causa mortis need not disclose on its face
that it covers the entire bank credit of the donor. That fact may be
shown by evidence dehors the instrument. (Minn.) Varley v. Sims,

694.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

1. THE RELATION of Guardian and Ward Continues as long as
the estate of the latter is in the hands of the former. (Ill.) Baum
v. Hartmann, 246.

2. WHERE A PARENT is Guardian of His Child, though the
latter has attained the age of majority, any transaction between them
whereby the former obtains an advantage at the loss of the latter will
be regarded with the highest degree of suspicion. The presumption
against the transaction is so strong that it is hardly possible to over-
come it. (Ill.) Baum v. Hartmann, 246.

Fraud.-From the

3. GUARDIAN AND WARD-Constructive
confidential relations existing between guardian and ward, who are also
parent and child, all transactions between them prejudicially affect
ing the interests of the ward are constructively fraudulent. (Ill.)
Baum v. Hartmann, 246.

4. GUARDIAN AND WARD, Dealings Between Shortly After
Termination of the Relation.-Where the Guardianship has Ceased
by the Majority of the Ward, the courts will not permit transactions
between the guardian and the ward to stand, even when they occurred

after the minority, if the intermediate period was short, unless the
circumstances demonstrate, in the highest sense of the term, the
fullest deliberation on the part of the ward and the most abundant
good faith on the part of the guardian. (Ill.) Baum v. Hartmann,
246.

5. GUARDIAN AND WARD-Presumption of Uudue Influence-
Burden of Proof.-Whenever a transaction between guardian and
ward, prejudicial to the latter, is brought before a court of equity,
there is a strong presumption that the transaction resulted from the
undue influence of the former on the latter, and the guardian must
assume the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that the
act proceeded from the independent and uninfluenced will of the
ward. (Ill.) Baum v. Hartmann, 246.

6. GUARDIAN AND WARD-Gratuitous Receipt.-Where it ap-
pears that a ward a short time after attaining her majority was
brought before a probate court by her guardian, who was also her
father, and after informing the judge that she had received no part
of the estate, executed a receipt stating that she had received the
whole thereof, such judge fully advising her of the effect of the re-
ceipt, and she, notwithstanding his admonitions, insisting on execut-
ing it, and the judge thereupon enters an order of discharge, a pre-
sumption arises that her action was the fruit of the undue influence
of her father, and his sureties still remain liable on their official bond
if they have in no way been misled into changing their position by
the alleged statement. (Ill.) Baum v. Hartmann, 246.

HABEAS CORPUS.

HABEAS CORPUS-Pleading.-A return to a writ of habeas
corpus is a response to the writ itself and not an answer to the peti-
tion therefor, and the respondent should in his return simply seek
to relieve himself from the imputation of having imprisoned the
petitioner without lawful authority by statements in the return from
which the legality of the imprisonment may be determined without
regard to the statements of the petition for the writ. He is not re-
quired to make any issue on the petition for the writ, but simply to
answer the writ. (Colo.) Moyer, In re, 189.

fot

1. HIGHWAYS-Contracts for Working-Adertisements
Bids. A statute providing that the county commissioners "may"
advertise in the county newspaper for working highways by con-
tract should not be construed as "shall" or "must"; and a city
council having the same powers over streets as county commission-
ers have over highways is not required to advertise for bids in the
county newspaper for paving streets as a condition precedent to the
exercise of the power to contract therefor. (S. C.) Dillingham v.
City Council of Spartanburg, 917.

Automobiles.

€m-

2. AUTOMOBILES-Use of Highways-Negligence.-The
ployment of the automobile on the public highway as a means of

transportation is a lawful use of the road, and if it results in in-
jury to one traveling by another mode, the autoist cannot be held
liable unless he was using his machine at a time, or in a manner,
or under circumstances inconsistent with a proper regard for the
rights of others. (Ind.) McIntyre v. Orner, 359.

3. AUTOMOBILES-Negligence-Care Required.-One using an
automobile upon the highway must take notice that the appearance
and operation thereof are likely to frighten horses, and must govern
himself and his machine accordingly. (Ind.) McIntyre v. Orner,

359.

4. AUTOMOBILES-Negligence-Care Required.-If a person
operating an automobile on the highway sees, or by the exercise of
ordinary caution could see, that a team of horses in front of him
were, under excitement, forcibly crowding off the road, and manifest-
ing unmistakable fright, ordinary care requires him to slow up, stop
his machine, or do whatever is reasonably required to relieve per-
sons in the vehicle attached to the horses from their perilous situa-
tion, and, failing in this, he is guilty of negligence. (Ind.) Mc-
Intyre v. Orner, 359.

5.

AUTOMOBILES-Contributory Negligence.-A complaint al-
leging that defendant drove his automobile past plaintiff's team while
going one way, causing the team to become badly frightened to de-
fendant's knowledge, and that he, on the return trip, negligently
drove his automobile at a high rate of speed up to within fifteen feet
of plaintiff's team, does not show that the latter was guilty of con-
tributory negligence in failing to alight from her carriage when she
saw the automobile coming. (Ind.) McIntyre v. Orner, 359.

6. AUTOMOBILES-Negligence.-If a person is running an auto-
mobile at a high rate of speed, the assertion that the running of the
machine required his undivided attention is no justification for his
negligence in failing to look ahead and see the perilous situation
of the driver of a team which has become frightened at the approach
of the automobile. (Ind.) McIntyre v. Orner, 359.

7. AUTOMOBILES-Negligence.-A person using an automobile
when he sees that his approach is endangering the safety of the
occupants of a vehicle in the highway must stop or check his ma-
chine until such danger is over, and on failing to do so is guilty of
negligence, regardless of contributory negligence on the part of the
occupants of such other vehicle. (Ind.) McIntyre v. Orner, 359.
8. AUTOMOBILES-Negligence-Sudden Peril.-An instruction
that if plaintiff, finding herself in sudden peril caused by the negli
gence of an automobile in approaching at a high rate of speed, in
jumping from her carriage acted naturally and as an ordinary per-
son might act under similar circumstances, she would not be guilty
of contributory negligence, is proper. (Ind.) McIntyre v. Örner,
359.

See Negligence, 5-7.

HOMESTEADS.

1. HOMESTEADS-Encumbrances-Nonjoinder of Wife.-A deed
or mortgage of a homestead without the wife joining is an absolute
nullity. (Miss.) McDonald v. Sanford, 758.

2. HOMESTEADS - Encumbrances Foreclosure-Nonjoinder of
Wife-Injunction.-A mortgage of a homestead executed by a hus-
band alone and the foreclosure thereof by the mortgagee without
making the wife a party to the suit, are nullities, and the husband

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 117-72