the vacation of the public schools, if its interests or necessities so require, without subjecting it to conditions substantially different from those affecting the children attending the public schools. There is no discrimination. The legislature has the power to make such reasonable regulations as these with respect to the time of the vacations of schools, whether public or private, in the interest of the public welfare and the welfare of the children.

404 The last clause of section 2 declares that no child under sixteen years of age shall work at any gainful occupation during the hours that the public schools are in session, unless such child can read English at sight and write simple English sentences, or is attending night school. The first clause of section 2 provides that no minor under sixteen shall work in any mercantile institution, office, laundry, manufacturing establishment, or workshop, between 10 o'clock in the evening and 6 o'clock in the morning. Section 5 of the act further provides that nothing in the act is to be construed to prevent the employment of minors at agricultural, viticultural, horticultural, or domestic labor, during the time the public schools are not in session, or during other than school hours. The petitioner's contention with respect to the first and last clauses of section 2 is that they constitute such important parts of the statute that it cannot be presumed that the legislature would have adopted the other parts thereof if it had been aware of the invalidity of these particular provisions, and hence the whole act must fall. We cannot accede to this proposition. They are separable and independent provisions and are not so important to the entire scheme as to justify us in concluding that the legislature would have refused to adopt the other parts without these, and thereby to declare the entire statute invalid.

Nor can it be conceded that these provisions are invalid. The principles already discussed apply with equal force to the first clause of the section. The proviso concerning illiterate children is a reasonable regulation to prevent those having control of such children from working them to such an extent as to hinder them from acquiring, or endeavoring to acquire, at least the beginning of an education before arriving at the age of sixteen years. The exemption of domestic labor and the several kinds of farming from the operation of the act is not an unreasonable discrimination. Such work is generally car

ried on at home and as a part of that general home industry which should not be too much discouraged, and it is usually under the immediate care and supervision of the parents or those occupying the place of parents, and hence is not liable to cause so much injury. These circumstances distinguish them from the prohibited industries and is a sufficient reason for the exemption.

405 We find no reasonable ground for declaring the law invalid.

The petition is denied and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the officer.

Sloss, J., Angellotti, J., Lorigan, J., and Beatty, C. J., concurred.

MCFARLAND, J., Concurring. I concur in the judgment, and in what is said by Mr. Justice Shaw in his opinion; but I do not concur in some of the quotations which he makes from other cases, and particularly in that quotation in which it is stated that the presumption in favor of the validity of a statute "continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt." This is, in my opinion, too strong a statement of the rule.

The Constitutionality of Statutes which, with the avowed purpose of protecting the health and promoting the welfare of certain classes of employés, place limitations upon the right of employers and employés freely to contract with each other, is discussed in the recent cases of Starne v. People, 222 Ill. 189, 113 Am. St. Rep. 389; Ex parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 113 Am. St. Rep. 817; People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 113 Am. St. Rep. 902; People v. Lochner, 177 N. Y. 773, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773.

GOLDBERG, BOWEN & CO. v. STABLEMEN'S UNION, LOCAL No. 8760.

[149 Cal. 429, 86 Pac. 806.]

BOYCOTTING, Injunction Against.-An injunction will issue against members of a local union of stablemen to prevent their continuing a boycott carried on by them by means of pickets or representatives in front of complainant's place of business, carrying placards, for the purpose and having the effect of intimidating employés and patrons of complainant from entering his place of business. (p. 147.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Statutes Undertaking to Forbid an Injunction Against Boycotting. If a statute may be construed as prohibiting the courts from enjoining acts in the nature of boycotting, and which are done for the purpose and have the effect of intimidating complainant's patrons and employés from entering his place of business, such statute must be pronounced void as violative of his right to acquire, possess, enjoy and protect property. (p. 150.)

INJUNCTION Against Boycotting, When too Comprehensive.— An injunction against members of a stablemen's union engaged in an unlawful boycott must not assume to restrain them from mere expressions of opinion as to complainant and his business, which, at most, consist of slander which could not be reached in the suit in equity, nor from doing other acts not connected with or incidental to the main acts and therefore acts properly enjoined, and the judg ment will be modified on appeal by striking out the matters properly enjoined. (pp. 150, 151.)

Henry B. Lister, for the appellants.

Bush Finnell, for the respondent.

429 MCFARLAND, J. This is an action for injunction to restrain the defendants, who are members of the Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760, from doing certain alleged damaging acts to plaintiff, which acts are mostly connected with what is called a "boycott" of plaintiff's business by the defendants. A demurrer on the general ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and also on some special grounds, was interposed by defendants: The demurrer was overruled; and defendants declining to 430 answer, judgment was rendered for plaintiff. From this judgment defendants appeal.

We see no merits in the special grounds of demurrer, and do not deem it necessary to specially notice them. The main question is whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 117-10

The plaintiff was a corporation, and at the time mentioned in the complaint was engaged, in its places of business, "in selling groceries and general household goods to various patrons and customers with whom it had established business relations, and with the public in general, upon whose patronage and trade plaintiff depended for its existence.” Its places of business were No. 432 Pine street, and No. 232 Sutter street, in the city and county of San Francisco. It also had a place at No. 965 Sutter street which was used as a stable, in which the horses and vehicles used in carrying on its business were kept and cared for. It is averred that in September, 1904, defendants notified plaintiff at its place of business, No. 432 Pine street, that plaintiff must continue to pay certain wages to its employés at said stable, or defendants would order a strike and cause all of the union stablemen employed by plaintiff, of whom there were many, to quit plaintiff's employment. On or about October 3, 1904, plaintiff notified defendants that it would not comply with said demand, but would exercise the right to pay its said employés what employés in the same kind of work were receiving from their employers. It is further averred that thereupon, and on or about said October 3, 1904, "the said defendants entered into a combination, confederation and conspiracy, for the purpose of coercing plaintiff to subject the control of its business to the said Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760, and the members thereof, by inaugurating and declaring a boycott on the said business of said plaintiff, and thereupon and on the third day of October, 1904, in pursuance of said unlawful combination, confederation and conspiracy, placed and continue to place, representatives or pickets in front of the places of business of plaintiff, carrying placards or transparencies which are false in fact, bearing the words and figures as follows, to wit: 'Unfair firm; reduced wages of employés 50c per day. Please don't patronize.'"

It is further averred "that subsequent to the third day of 431 October, 1904, and since the said boycott so ordered as aforesaid by said Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760, the said Stablemen's Union and the members thereof have conspired, confederated and combined among themselves and with other parties to the plaintiff unknown, and will continue to conspire, confederate and combine among themselves and with other parties to the plaintiff unknown, to provide means and

methods for impeding the plaintiff in the conduct and transaction of its aforesaid business, to interfere with employés, not members of said union, employed by said plaintiff, who are engaged in a line of work other than that of stablemen, and to greatly impede and obstruct the plaintiff in carrying on its aforesaid business, and by threats and intimidations by reason of maintaining pickets or representatives in front of the said places of business of plaintiff, compel and force said employés engaged in other lines of work than that of stablemen to quit the services of plaintiff "

It is further averred "that the defendants in furtherance of their said combination, confederation and conspiracy, have placed and continue to place in front of the aforesaid places of business of plaintiff said representatives or pickets, and that said representatives or pickets are for the purpose of not only inducing but intimidating the nonunion employés of plaintiff to quit its service, and are for the purpose of intimidating patrons and customers of plaintiff who may desire or attempt to do business with the said plaintiff." It is further averred that by means of said representatives and pickets placed in front of plaintiff's said places of business bearing the placards and transparencies above described, "mary patrons and customers of said plaintiff have been and now are frightened and intimidated from entering the places of business of plaintiff." It is further averred "that the said pickets or representatives are still engaged in the acts herein complained of, and threaten to continue the commission of the acts, and each of the said acts, to the irreparable damage and injury of this plaintiff, and that by reason of and by consequence of the acts herein set forth, plaintiff has already been damaged in the sum of five hundred dollars, and if the said acts still continue, and the said defendants threaten to continue, the said acts as hereinbefore alleged, plaintiff will be irreparably damaged, and his business will be greatly injured, if not destroyed." 432 It is further averred that defendants and each of them are financially irresponsible and unable to respond in damages to any judgment against them on account of the commission of the acts alleged to have been committed and threatened to be committed by them.

We think that the complaint clearly states facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action alleged. It is not necessary here to undertake to define the limits within which a number