crowned with thorns, clothed in purple with a reed in his hand, scourged, and led away to execution, bearing his cross, and hanged up among thieves: forsaken by his own disciples, and all the world, and in part by him who is more than all the world and consider why all this was done. For whom he did it, and what lesson he purposed hereby to teach us: consider why he made it one half the condition of our salvation, and so great a part of the Christian religion, to deny ourselves and take up our cross and follow him and will have no other to be his disciples. Were a crucified Christ more of our daily study, and did we make it our religion to learn and follow his holy example, self-denial would be better known and practised, and Christianity would appear as it is, and not as it is misunderstood, adulterated and abused in the world. But because I have long ago written a "Treatise of Self-denial,” I shall add no more.

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CHAPTER XXVII.

Cases and Directions for Loving our Neighbour as ourselves.

Tit. 1. Cases of Conscience about Loving our Neighbour.

Quest. 1. IN what sense is it that I must love my neighbour as myself? Whether in the kind of love, or in the degree, or only in the reality.'

Answ. The true meaning of the text is, you must love him according to his true worth, without the diversion and hindrance of selfishness and partiality. As you must love yourself according to that degree of goodness which is in you, and no more; so must you as impartially love your neighbour according to that degree of goodness which is in him. So that it truly extendeth to the reality, the kind, and the degree of love, supposing it in both proportioned to the goodness of the object. But before this can be understood, the true nature of love must be well understood.

Quest. II. 'What is the true nature of love, both as to myself and neighbour?'

Answ. Love is nothing but the prime motion of the will

a Luke xiv. 26, 31. 33.

to its proper object; which is called complacence; the object of it is simple goodness, or good as such: it ariseth from suitableness between the object and the will, as appetite doth from the suitableness of the appetent faculty and food. This good as it is variously modified, or any way differeth, doth accordingly cause or require a difference in our love; therefore that love which in its prime act and nature is but one, is diversely denominated, as its objects are diversified. To an object as simply good in itself, it followeth the understanding's estimation, and is called, as I said, mere complacence or adhesion: to an object as not yet attained, but absent, or distant, and attainable, it is called desire or desiring love and as expected, hope, or hoping love, (which is a conjunction of desire and expectation): to an object nearest, and attained, it is called fruition, or delight, or delighting love. To an object which by means must be attained, it is called seeking love, as it exciteth to the use of those means: and to an object missed, it is, by accident, mourning love. But still love itself in its essential act is one and the same. As it respecteth an object which wanteth something to make it perfect, and desireth the supply of that want, it is called love of benevolence; denominated from this occasion, as it desireth to do good to him that is loved. And it is a love of the same nature which we exercise towards God, who needeth nothing, as we rejoice in that perfection and happiness which he hath; though it be not to be called properly by the same name. Goodness being the true object of love, is the true measure of it: and therefore God as infinitely and primitively good, is the prime and only simple object of our absolute, total love. And therefore those who understand no goodness in any being, but as profitable to them, or to some other creature, do know no God, nor love God as God, nor have any love but selfish and idolatrous. By this you may perceive the nature of love.

Quest. III. But may none be loved above the measure of his goodness? How then did God love us when we were not, or were his enemies? And how must we love the wicked? And how must an ungodly person love himself?'

Answ. If only good as such be the object of love, then certainly none should be loved but in proportion to his

goodness. But you must distinguish between mere natural and sensitive love or appetite, and rational love; and between love, and the effects of love; and between natural goodness in the object, and moral goodness. And so I further answer, 1. There is in every man a natural and sensitive love of himself and his own pleasure and felicity, and an averseness to death, and pain, and sorrow, as there is in every brute: and this God hath planted there for the preservation of the creature. This falleth not under commands or prohibitions directly, because it is not free but necessary: as no man is commanded or forbidden to be hungry, or thirsty, or weary, or the like: it is not this love which is meant when we are commanded to "love our neighbour as ourselves" for I am not commanded to feel hunger, and thirst, nor to desire meat or drink by the sensitive appetite for my neighbour: nor sensitively to feel his pain or pleasure, nor to have that natural aversation from death or pain, nor sensitive desire of life and pleasure, for him as for myself. But the love here spoken of, is that volition with the due affection conjunct, which is our rational love; as being the act of our highest faculty, and falling under God's command. As to the sensitive love, it proceedeth not upon the sense or estimate of goodness in the person who loveth himself or any other (as beasts love their young ones without respect to their excellency). But it is rational love which is proportioned to the estimated goodness of the thing beloved. 2. Physical goodness may be in an object which hath no moral goodness; and this may contain a capacity of moral goodness; and each of them is amiable according to its nature and degree. 3. Beneficence is sometimes an effect of love, and sometimes an effect of wisdom only as to the object, and of love to something else; but it is never love itself. Usually benevolence is an act of love, and beneficence an effect, but not always. I may do good to another without any love to him, for some ends of my own, or for the sake of another. And a man may be obliged to greater beneficence, where he is not obliged to greater love.

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And now to the instances, I further answer, 1. When we had no being, God did not properly love us in esse reali' (unless you will go to our co-existence in eternity; for we were not 'in esse reali'); but only as we were in esse cog

nito;' but he purposed to make us, and to make us lovely, and to do us good, and so he had that which is called 'amor benevolentia' to us: which properly was not love to us, but a love to himself, and the idea in his own eternal mind, which is called a loving us in esse cognito,' and a purpose to make us good and lovely: that which is not lovely is not an object of love: man was not lovely indeed, when he was not; therefore he was not an object of love; (but 'in esse cognito.') The same we say of God's loving us when we were enemies: he really loved us with complacency so far as our physical goodness made us lovely and as morally lovely he did not love us, otherwise than in esse cognito.' But he purposed to make us morally lovely, and gave us his mercies to that end; and so loved us with a love of benevolence as it is called; which signifieth no more than out of a complacence (or love) to himself, and to us, as physically good, to purpose to make us morally good and happy. As to the incident difficulty of love beginning 'de novo' in God, I have fully resolved it elsewhere".

2. So also we must love a wicked man with a love of benevolence which properly is but to love him in his physical worth, and his capacity of moral goodness and happiness, and thereupon, (but especially through the love of God) to desire his happiness.

3. And as to the loving of ourselves, (besides the sensitive love before mentioned which respecteth self as self, and not as good,) a wicked man may rationally love himself according to his physical goodness as a man, which containeth his capacity of moral goodness, and so of being holy and serviceable to God and to good men, and happy in the fruition of God. But beyond all such goodness (which only is amiableness) no man may rationally love himself or any other, with the true formal act of love, which is complacence; though he may wish good to himself or another beyond the present goodness which is in them; nay, he wished them good, not because they are good, but because they want good.

And though some define loving, to be bene velle alicui ut. illi bene sit,' to desire another's welfare, yet indeed this may be without any formal love at all. As I may desire the

a Apology against Dr. Kendal.

of my horse, without any proper love to him, even lf and use. When God from eternity willeth to ul, and to convert and save him, ut illi bene sit,' ed, love of benevolence; but properly it is only to d, a will to make Paul good and lovely; it being ›d himself who is the original and ultimate end of ill and purpose; and himself only which he then there being nothing but himself to love; till in that that Paul is existent, and so really lovely. For in esse cognito' is not Paul: yet no reality doth de novo' in God; but a new respect and denominand in the creature new effects. (Of which elsewhere.) uest. IV. 'Must I love every one as much as myself in e, or only some?'

nsw. You must love every one impartially as yourself, rding to his goodness; and you must wish well to every as to yourself; but you must love no man complaceny so much as yourself, who is not or seemeth not to e as much loveliness, that is, as much goodness, or as ch of God, as yourself.

Quest. v.

Must I love any one more than myself?' Answ. Yes, every one that is and appeareth better than urself. Your sensitive love to another cannot be as much to yourself; and your beneficence (ordinarily) must be Lost to yourself, because God in nature and his laws hath appointed it; and your benevolence to yourself and to thers must be alike: but your rational estimation, and ove or complacence (with the honour and praise attending t) must be more to every one that is better than yourself; for that which is best is most amiable, and that which hath most of God.

Quest. vI. Will it not then follow, that I must love another man's wife and children better than mine own, when they are really better?'

Answ. Yes, no doubt; but it is only with that rational estimative love. But there is besides a love to wife and children, which is in some measure sensitive, which

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you are

not obliged to give to others and rationally they are more amiable to you, in their particular relations and respects,

b But if any be resolved to call mere benevolence by the name of love, I will not contend about a name.