native-born citizen under like conditions, is in direct conflict with a well-settled principle of international law.

It is true that after naturalization, an emigrant is no longer an alien, but a full-fledged American citizen; and so long as he remains in the United States, he is entitled to, and should receive, the same measure of protection as to person and property that is accorded to a native-born citizen. But if he visits the country of his former allegiance, the protection to be accorded to him therein by our government becomes complicated with certain questions of natural rights which no civilized government can afford to disregard. His change of allegiance is not retroactive. It does not exempt him from obligations or penalties which he may have incurred before Cigration. These remain; nor is it in the power of our Government to absolve him from them. So long as he remains within our domain and jurisdiction, it is discretionary with us to give him up for trial or screen him. But the moment he enters the domain and jurisdiction of the country of his former allegiance, where the obligation or penalty was incurred, that discretion ends. He must then take the consequences of his own acts. These principles are too well settled by the practice of nations, even when not specifically asserted by treaty (as is the case in many instances), to be any longer matters of dispute.

In effect, then, the high-sounding declarations in our so-called "Expatriation Act" are nothing more than gratuitous expressions of opinion. They are not binding even upon the President, who is charged by the Constitution with the administration of our foreign affairs, and who, in that capacity, is expected to conform to the settled principles of international law, and to our solemn treaty obligations.

The charge is sometimes made that our government fails to adequately protect its adopted citizens abroad. In a few exceptional cases, there may have been some foundation for this charge. But as a rule just the reverse is true. More frequently we interpose in behalf of those not entitled to our protection. The records of our State Department show that in nearly every instance where such a charge has been made the alleged victim was either a person of very doubtful nationality, or, if duly naturalized, that he had, before emigration, incurred obligations or penalties under a former allegiance that had not been discharged or satisfied. Yet it is precisely this class of persons who are the readiest to invoke the power of our govern

ment, and who make loudest complaint if their selfish and unreasonable demands are not instantly complied with. And it too often happens that, by misrepresentation and falsehood, or by demagogic appeals through the public press, they succeed in placing our Government in an awkward and untenable position before the civilized world, or in raising a senseless clamor against it at home.

An adequate remedy for such scandalous abuses of American citizenship is not possible except by some well-digested scheme of legislation. There ought to be some clear and explicit declaration by Congress of the conditions under which an American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself. And when a person presents himself at one of our legations or embassies, and demands protection as an adopted citizen, he should be required to produce some better evidence of his right to receive it than that afforded by a certificate of some obscure county or police magistrate.

The nationality of married women has been, and is still, another fruitful source of international controversy. We have no law defining the status of American women married to aliens; and in every country except where the old English common law prevails, the nationality of the wife merges into that of her husband. She loses her own nationality and gains his. Even in England this is now the law, the old common law rule having been superseded by the provisions of the naturalization act of 1870. But in the United States, the common law rule still prevails. An alien woman married to an American citizen acquires her husband's nationality and loses her own; while an American woman married to an alien, acquires her husband's nationality and retains her own. She thus owes a double allegiance, something incongruous with reason and abhorrent to modern international law; yet our law is powerless to relieve her of embarrassment in consequence of it.

If, therefore, it is desirable to appear consistent, and to place ourselves in harmony with the civilized world on this important matter, some legislation is necessary. There should be a statute making the nationality of the wife to follow that of her husband, and to change as he changes his. And if such a law, publicly proclaimed, would have the effect to make American heiresses a little more cautious about contracting matrimonial alliances with titled alien spendthrifts, perhaps that fact might be urged as an additional reason in its favor.

APPENDIX N.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW IN CUBA.

PAPER BY LUCIUS Q. C. LAMAR, COUNSEL TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.

SUBJECT OUTLINED.

In tendering your kind invitation to me to deliver an address at the present annual meeting of this learned Association, your Executive Committee were thoughtful enough to suggest that, while the selection of a subject was left entirely to my discretion, anything pertaining to the legal phases of the Cuban question, the constitutional convention, or the American occupation of the island, would be listened to with interest. I have accordingly selected a subject relating generally to the development and present status of the law in Cuba, but I shall speak with particular reference to the new constitution of the republic, which it is expected will soon be promulgated and established.

In following out the line of my remarks, I shall not have occasion to deal with the historical developments of the early law in Spain, because, while such a study undoubtedly would be of interest to the legal antiquarian, it forms no necessary part of the present paper, and, even if I were qualified to make it, would probably be of little value and less interest at a time and place like the present. To the Spanish Monarchical Constitution, however, which was extended to Cuba, and to the civil and penal codes and laws of civil and criminal procedure and the code of commerce at present in force in Cuba, I shall refer somewhat at length. After a glance at the constitution by which Spain

vainly attempted in 1897 to establish self-government in Cuba, and at the modifications in the laws of Cuba effected by the United States Military Government in the island, I shall conclude by a consideration more or less in detail of the new constitution of the Republic of Cuba, including the appendix thereto of the Platt Rider or Senate amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of our own Congress.

The topic cannot fail to be of importance, considered from any point of view, when it is remembered that the Cuban question is in many respects a question to be settled by the people of the United States, and that this constitution of the new-bora Republic will soon be submitted to the President and Congress of the United States for consideration and approval by them.

SPANISH MONARCHICAL CONSTITUTION AND CODES.

In the early days the government of Cuba, in common with that of the other Spanish colonies, was conducted on the theory that newly discovered territory belonged to the crown, and that all political control was vested in the king, who appointed all the viceroys, captains-general and governors. When Cuba was colonized by Velasquez, this control was mainly exercised through the Council of the Indies. From that time to the 1621, the laws of Spain applied equally to all her colonies, but thereafter they did not so apply unless express declaration was made to that effect. Special decrees and regulations modifying the application of the laws to the colonies, or promulgating new laws, were not infrequent, and a compilation of them in 1680 was published as the Laws of the Indies. This and the famous Siete Partidas, on which the laws of the Indies were largely based, comprised the Code under which the people of Cuba were formerly governed.

When the Americans assumed general jurisdiction over Cuba on January 1, 1899, they found in force in the Island, in addition to the Spanish Monarchical Constitution, five principal codes which constituted the main body of the Civil and Penal Law of the Island. These were the Penal Code, the Law of Civil

Procedure, the Code of Commerce, the Law of Criminal Procedure and the Civil Code. These important Spanish Codes had been extended during the last twenty-five years by royal decree to the Spanish Ultramarine possessions in substantially the same form in which they had existed in the Peninsula. In the last quarter of a century there has been much activity on the part of Spain in providing laws for Cuba.

The present constitution of the Spanish monarchy was decreed and sanctioned by Don Alfonso XII., in union and agreement with the Cortes of the kingdom on June 30, 1876. By this constitution it was ordained that the Spanish provinces beyond the sea should be governed by special laws, but the government was authorized to apply to the colonies laws theretofore or thereafter promulgated for the Peninsula, with such modifications as the government might judge convenient, at the same time informing the Cortes. Accordingly, three years later, by royal decree of May 23, 1879, the Penal Code of Spain was extended to Cuba. This Code is a volume about the size of the Penal Code of the State of New York, is divided into three parts, and contains in all six hundred and thirty-four articles. The first part contains general provisions regarding both crimes and misdemeanors, the persons liable and the penalties. The second part, the main body of the work, contains a full enumeration of the crimes punishable by law and their various penalties. The third part deals with misdemeanors as distinguished from crimes. The diversity of conditions between Spain and Cuba was the cause of the Penal Code suffering more alterations than the other Codes which were subsequently extended to the Island. The Penal Code of Cuba is a scientific codification of criminal law similar in many respects to the reformed penal codes in the United States.

The Spanish Monarchical Constitution itself was the next to be extended. This was done by royal decree of April 7, 1881. In passing it may be interesting to note that, while the constitution was extended to Cuba and Puerto Rico, it was not extended to the Philippines, that archipelago remaining directly and im