« PreviousContinue »
contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished hy a fine not exceeding tive thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sec. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
Sec. 5. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section four this act may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.
Sec. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.
SEC. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Sec. 8. That the word “person,” or “persons," wherever used in this act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.
This act applies to combinations of laborers as well as of capitalists. The fact that a combination of men is in its origin and general purposes innocent and lawful is no ground of defense when the combination is turned to the unlawful purpose of restraining interstate and foreign commerce. A combination to secure or compel the employment of none but union men becomes a combination in restraint of interstate commerce within the meaning of this act, when, in order to gain its ends, it seeks to enforce and docs enforce, hy violence and intimidation, a discontinuance of labor in all departments of business, including the transportation of goods from State to State, and to and from foreign nations. 54 Fed. Rep. 394.
A rule of a labor organization which forbids its members to handle the cars of a railroad against which the organization has a grievance until such grievance has been adjusted is violative of section 1 of this act as being in restraint of trade or commerce. 55 Fed. Rep. 149.
Under section 5, an injunction order may provide that it shall be in force on defendants not named in the bill, but who are within the terms of the order where it also provides that it is operative on all persons acting in concert with the designated defendants, though not named in the writ, after the commission of some act by them in furtherance of the conspiracy against which the order is directed, and service of the writ on them. 62 Fed. Rep. 801.
The provision for forfeiture in section 6 of this act does not imply that only cases in which property shall be found subject to forfeiture shall be deemed within the scope of the act. The power given to circuit courts "to prevent and restrain violations” of the act, is not an invasion of the right of trial by, jury, as the jurisdiction so given by equity will be deemed to be limited to such cases only as are of
Interference with employment-Blacklisting.
(Page 3205.) SECTION 1. The provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers and their officers, agents, and employees, except masters of vessels and seamen, as defined section forty-six hundred and twelve, Revised Statutes of the United States, engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water, for a continuous carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States. The term ** railroad” as used in this act shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease; and the term “transportation” shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage. The term "employees' as used in this act shall include all persons actually engaged in any capacity in train operation or train service of any description, and notwithstanding that the cars upon or in which they are employed may be held and operated by the carrier under lease or other contract: Provided, however, That this act shall not be held to apply to employees of street railroads and shall apply only to employees engaged in railroad train service. In every such case the carrier shail be responsible for the acts and defaults of such employees in the same manner and to the same extent as if said cars were owned by it and said employees directly employed by it, and any provisions to the contrary of any such lease or other contract shall be binding only as between the parties thereto and shall not affect the obligations of said carrier either to the public or to the private parties concerned.
Sec. 8. In every incorporation under the provisions of chapter five hundred and sixty-seven of the United States Statutes of eighteen hundred and eighty-five and eighteen hundred and eighty-six (relating to national trade unions) it must be provided in the articles of incorporation and in the constitution, rules, and by-laws that a member shall cease to be such by participating in or by instigating force or violence against persons or property during strikes, lockouts, or boycotts, or by seeking to prevent others from working through violence, threats, or intimidation. Members of such incorporation shall not be personally liable for the acts, debts, or obligations of the corporations, nor shall such corporations be liable for the acts of members or others in violation of law; and such corporations may appear by designated representatives before the board created by this act, or in any suits or proceedings for or against such corporations or their members in any of the Federal courts.
Sec. 10. Any employer subject to the provisions of this act and any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer who * shall, after having discharged an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent such employee from obtaining employment, or who shall, after the quitting of an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent such employee from obtaining employment, is hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which such offense was committed, shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars.
THE COMMON LAW.
By the term “strike" is commonly understood a concerted and simultaneous quitting of work by employees to influence the action of the employer in respect of some disputed matter, usually affecting the conditions of employment. A lockout, on the other hand, is the simultaneous discharge of all or a group of employees, or a refusal of the employer to permit them to labor because of such dispute.
raise wages amounted to a criminal conspiracy, for participation in which the parties might be indicted. (R. v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 628.)
As construed in this country at the present time the common law does not condemn the strike. “The right to strike for any cause or no cause is clearly and fully sustained by all authority. Even a conspiracy to strike, followed by legal damage, is not unlawful if formed to better labor conditions." (Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union No. 125, 150 Fed. 155.)
An agreement among strikers to take peaceable means to induce others to join the union and strike, or to remain away from the works of the employer until he yields to the demands of the strikers, is not a conspiracy; nor is the carrying out of such a purpose by peaceable persuasion and without violence or intimidation unlawful. (Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local Union, 165 Ind. 421; 75 N. E. 877; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102.)
Peaceable picketing, or the placing of watchers about the works and on the approaches to them for the purpose of gaining information and of informing prospective employees as to existing conditions, or of persuading workmen willing to be approached to refrain from working, has been held to violate no tenet of the common law. (Fletcher Co. v. Int. Assn. of Machinists, 55 Atl. 1077; Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148; Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, supra.) In the case last named, however, it was said that peaceful picketing, while theoretically possible and entirely lawful, “is very much of an illusion;" and all forms of picketing are discountenanced in some cases on the ground of its tendency to bring undue pressure to bear on third parties, thus producing a sort of coercion or intimidation. (Otis Steel Co. (Limited) v. Local Union of Iron Molders No. 218, 110 Fed. 698; Beck v. Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, etc.)
The idea at the bottom of all such measures is that of compelling the employer to treat with his former employees now on strike and reinstate them in their positions on the desired conditions. This implies a sort of surviving claim on the positions vacated, a view that is expressly or impliedly condemned in a number of cases. (Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ruef, supra; N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co. v. Wenger, 17 Weekly Law Bul. 306; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 403; Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, supra; Crump v. Com., 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620.) The places vacated are to be freely open to any one who may choose to accept them, and any interference by violence, intimidation, or threats with the constitutional right of another to labor when, where, and on what terms he pleases is
The boycott is frequently resorted to as a means of enforcing strike demands. It may be defined as a confederation of persons for the purpose of injuring the business of another by preventing third parties from having dealings with him through fear of incurring the displeasure and hostility of the confederates. The boycott is directed not only at the person against whom the strikers had a grievance in the first instance, but against all who patronize him, with the intention of coercing him at the peril of financial ruin and social ostracism to comply with the requirements of the strikers. (Purvis v. Local No. 500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 63 Atl. 585; Beck v. Teamsters' Union, 77 N. W. 13; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881.) Its legality has been denied in strong terms by some courts. (Brace Bros. v. Evans, 3 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 561; Thomas v. Cin., N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803; Casey v. Cin. Typ. Union, 45 Fed. 135.) In the last-named case it was said that "No case has been cited where, upon a proper showing of facts, an unsuccessful appeal has been made to a court of chancery to restrain a boycott;” and in a recent case the boycott is defined as “an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.” (Walsh v.
(Walsh v. Assn. of Master Plumbers of St. Louis, 71 S. W. 455.) The restraint is illegal even though there be no threats or acts of violence and the withholding of trade be done only by members of an association, if there is actual coercion and intimidation, and even though such coercion is only the danger of incurring a fine imposed by a by-law of the association. (Martell v. White, 69 N. E. 1085.) In Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell (26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547) and Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis (54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119), however, the boycott in itself was not condemned as illegal.
Closely allied to the boycott, and often used as a part of its machinery is the black list, which is a list of persons who are “marked out for special avoidance, antagonism, or enmity on the part of those who prepare the list.” (Mattison v. L. S. and M. S. Ry. Co., 3 Ohio Dec. 526.) A more common term among labor organizations is that of “unfair list,” which includes the names of persons and firms from whom trade and intercourse are to be withheld. In such cases the legality or illegality of the maintenance and distribution of the “unfair list” would follow the conclusions of the courts as to the boycott of which it was an incident. As to the use of the black list by employers to prevent workmen from obtaining employment at other establishments with which the former employer is in association of some sort, A mere exchange of information, leaving each employer free to act according to his own judgment in the case is not, in the absence of a statute, illegal. (Willis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., 48 S. E. 177; Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 Fed. 246; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Young, 69 N. E: 1003.) Perversion of facts would give a right of action, however, as would any wrongful and malicious interference by a third person with contract relations existing between others, causing a breach thereof. (Willis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., supra; Joyce v. G. N. Ry. Co., 110 N. W.975.) The question was raised by the court in the latter case, though not answered, whether at common law such wrongful interference for the purpose of preventing the formation of contracts was not equally actionable, and May v. Wood (172 Mass. 14, 51 N. E. 191), Graham v. Ry. Co. (47 La. Ann. 214, 16 South. 806), etc., were cited as favoring that view.
As to the lockout, but little need be said. The right of the employer to discharge any or all of his employees who have no contract with him, or to refuse to employ any person or class of persons, rests on exactly the same footing as does the right of such employees to leave him or to refuse to work for him; it may be done for any reason or no reason, and no redress at law or equity exists. (U. P. Ry. Co. v. Ruef, supra; State v. Kreutzberg, 90 N. W. 1098.) If a number of employers agree among themselves to refuse employment to designated persons or classes of persons, their action would be subject to review only to the extent indicated in the discussion of the black list, just above.
Redress for injuries resulting from boycotting may be sought in an action for damages (Boutwell v. Marr, 42 Atl. 607; Martell v. White, supra); and money paid on demand of a labor organization to prevent a threatened strike is recoverable in an action on the case. (Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; Varch v. Bricklayers' and Plasterers' Union No. 1, 63 Atl. 291.) But inasmuch as the participants in a strike are generally numerous and are often not able to meet a judgment for damages if it should be secured against them, whether as individuals or as a union, cases of damage suits are not numerous. More common are proceedings in equity to procure injunctions to restrain picketing, boycotting, the distribution of “unfair lists” and other forms of coercion, intimidation, or interference with employment or business.
A preliminary or interlocutory decree may be issued at the instance of one party, who must show not merely possible or probable danger of interference, but that the injury is either already occasioned and