DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was indicted for killing one Green, and on the trial was convicted of manslaughter, his punishment being assessed at two years in the penitentiary. The evidence discloses that deceased, a larger and stronger man than defendant, entered the stall used by the latter in feeding his horses, and undertook to take from him a team turned over to him the day previous by the superintendent of their landlord. Deceased had used the team prior to the time mentioned, and was seeking to obtain possession of it at the time of the difficulty. Upon entering the stall where defendant was harnessing the team, the deceased seized the reins, but was prevented by defendant from carrying the team away, whereupon the deceased slapped the defendant, who returned the blow, knocking down his antagonist with his fist. As he arose deceased drew his knife, seized defendant by the collar, and pushed him back into an angle of the stall. Defendant warded off the blow aimed at him, and with his pocketknife inflicted two wounds upon deceased, one of which, 18 hours later, proved fatal. These substantially are the facts bearing upon the issue of manslaughter and upon the homicide generally. The second difficulty, outside the house, a few minutes later, was of minor importance, and throws but very slight, if any,

light upon the prior trouble. We are unwilling that the conviction should stand upon these facts. As the record presents the case to us, the defendant acted in self-defense, the deceased being the aggressor throughout the entire transaction. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

LANE v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 24. 1894.)

BURGLARY-INSTRUCTIONS.

On a prosecution for burglary, committed by breaking into a house with intent to steal, it is not necessary for the court to define "nighttime."

Appeal from district court, Shelby county; James T. Polly, Judge.

Jim Lane was convicted for burglary, and appeals. Affirmed.

Hugh B. Short, for appellant. R. L. Henry, for the State.

HURT, P. J. Conviction for burglary for entering a house with intent to steal bacon. A motion in arrest of judgment was made upon the ground that the verdict was not signed by the foreman of the jury. The rec ord does not sustain this proposition alleged in the motion. The verdict was signed by the foreman of the jury. There was no error in overruling the motion to continue the cause. The proposed evidence is not probably true, if the witness were present and should testify. In regard to impeaching the credibility of witnesses, the court's charge was correct. It was not necessary for the court to define "nighttime," because there was an actual breaking, and, if done with the intent to commit theft, would have been burglary, whether committed during the day or night. The court instructed the jury clearly on the propositions contained in bill of exception No. 4, and it was not necessary to give the requested instructions on these propositions. The other matter contained in the requested instructions was not a matter of law, but a matter of fact. The verdict of the jury was amply sustained by the evidence. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

WILSON v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 24, 1894.)

CRIMINAL LAW-REVIEW ON APPEAL

Where the record contains no bill of exceptions, nor any special charges requested by defendant and refused by the court, errors in the refusal of requests to charge will not be reviewed.

Appeal from district court, Harrison county; W. J. Graham, Judge.

Ed Wilson was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

R. L. Henry, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was given a life term in the penitentiary for murder in the first degree. There are no bills of exception incorporated in the record, nor does it contain any special charge asked by appellant and refused by the court; hence the errors suggested in this connection cannot be revised. The charge, we think, is a full and fair presentation of the law applicable to the facts as presented to us. Nor is the point well taken that the evidence does not support the verdict. We deem it unnecessary to review the evidence, but we have carefully considered same, and are of opinion it amply supports the conviction. The judgment is affirmed.

ESTES v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 10,

1894.)

JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURT-TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CAUSE.

A failure to show a presentment of the indictment in the transcript of transfer of a criminal cause from the district to the county court is ground for dismissal.

Appeal from Shelby county court; R. L. Parker, Judge.

Jack Estes was convicted of disturbing religious worship, and appeals. Reversed.

Hugh B. Short, for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was convicted of disturbing religious worship. The indictment was transferred from the district to the county court, and there the cause was tried. The transcript of transfer to the county court fails to show a presentment of the Indictment in the district court by the grand jury. This is made the ground of dismissal In the county court, and was overruled. The point was properly presented, and should have been sustained. We think it unnecessary to discuss the question, but refer to the statutory provisions relating to the question, and the decisions heretofore rendered. Willson's Crim. St. §§ 1942, 1943, 2007, 2009; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 52; Brumley v. State, 11 Tex. App. 114; Donaldson v. State, 15 Tex. App. 25; Mitten v. State, 24 Tex. App. 346, 6 S. W. 196.

2. The point raised upon the alleged improper remarks of the county attorney will not be discussed, as they will hardly occur upon another trial in manner and form as stated in the bill of exceptions. For the error indicated, the judgment is reversed, and cause remanded.

McVEA v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 17, 1894.)

CRIMINAL APPEAL-PRESUMPTIONS-RECORD.

Where the state makes no reply to a motion to dismiss the cause on the ground that

no complaint was filed as a basis for the information, and no complaint appears in the record, it will be presumed that the record is complete, and the cause will be dismissed.

On rehearing. Reversed, and cause dismissed.

For original opinion, see 26 S. W. 834. S. H. Hopkins and Thos. McNeal, for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SIMKINS, J. This cause was heard at Austin term, 1894, and a rehearing is ap plied for upon various grounds, none of which are well taken, except the last, to wit, there is no complaint in the record as a basis for the information, and hence the judgment is void. The state has made no reply to the said motion, and we must presume the record is complete, and that no complaint was filed in the court below. The judgment is reversed, and the cause dismissed.

EARL et al. v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 21, 1894.)

INDICTMENT-VALUE OF PROPERTY.

An indictment for theft which states the value of the property by using the dollar sign is valid.

Appeal from Shelby county court; R. L Parker, Judge.

Prince Earl and others were convicted for stealing a hog, and appealed. Affirmed.

J. O. B. Richardson and M. W. Wheeler, for appellant. R. L. Henry, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J. This conviction was for hog theft. The indictment charged the value of the hog to be "$3." Motion to quash was made, because the value was not written in "plain and intelligible words," as required by the statute. Code Cr. Proc. art. 420, subd. 7. Is the figure 3, prefixed by the dollar mark, "plain and intelligible words." within the purview of the statute? We think sufficiently so.. "An indictment for any of fense against the penal laws of this state shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged and enable the court on convietion to pronounce the proper judgment." Code Cr. Proc. art. 428a. The statutory in gredients of the offense must be set in the indictment, and if it be then sufficient to "enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense," the indictment will be valid. It is now too well settled, we think, to be questioned that Arabic numerals and all well-defined and well-understood abbreviations may be used

in indictments without rendering them defective. Brown v. State, 16 Tex. App. 245; State v. Reed, 35 Me. 489; Com. v. Hagar. man, 10 Allen, 401; Corn v. Kingman, 14 Gray, 85; 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. (3d Ed.) §§ 345, 346, and notes. And this is true as to all pleadings in this country. 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 16, and note 6, for cited authorities. When values are to be expressed in pleadings, adjudicated cases hold that the money of our federal government may be in. dicated by using the dollar mark, $, and Arabic numerals, for that purpose. Throughout the Union, in all financial transactions expressed in writing, it is and has been the habit, practice, and custom of all the people to so express values. Among those nations of the world where our money circulates, or is the subject of exchange in commercial dealings had with the citizenship of this country, these marks are thoroughly appre ciated, and their meaning fully understood. If there is one thing fixed beyond doubt in the mind of the American people it is the meaning of úgures prefixed by the dollar mark. Every account made out, every promise in writing, and every check or draft drawn by or through our vast systems of banking, carry the inevitable and certainly indicating figures and dollar mark, and show the amount due, and express the responsibill ty of the contracting parties. It permeates our business relations in all its bearings, enters into every phase of our financial sys tem, is equally understood by learned and the unlearned, and carries a meaning and significance thoroughly known to all. The dollar mark conveys an unquestioned mean. ing. Everybody understands its significance. It is a part and parcel of our language, poculiarly and originally an American con tribution to the language of the world. In view of these matters, would it not be strange, indeed, that our courts should be required to be ignorant of the purport and meaning of Arabic numerals so long Anglicized, and the significance of the dollar mark, native and original to the United States and peculiarly our own invention. Tested by the provisions of the statutes, we think the in dictment valid, and the value sufficiently expressed. Again, we desire to say that it would be advisable for the pleader to so frame indictments as to avoid such questions. A little time, the exercise of a small amount of patience and caution, and a limited amount of accuracy in framing indictments would avoid such unnecessary and vexed questions. Pleadings in and trials of criminal causes should be in strict conformity to the provisions of our statutory law, and to the end that when a conviction is ob tained it should be free from errors and a termination of the cause. A strict adherence to and compliance with our statutes would be of incalculable advantage to a due and impartial administration of our criminal laws. The judgment is affirmed.

GARDNER v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 24. 1894.)

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE BEFORE GRAND JURY -ADMISSIBILITY.

Where defendant was not under arrest at the time of his examination before the grand jury, it was not error to allow the prosecution to show that his testimony at that examination had been reduced to writing, and signed by him, and to put such written testimony in evidence.

Appeal from district court, Fayette county; H. Teichmueller, Judge.

Joe Gardner was convicted of theft, and appeals. Affirmed.

W. S. Holman and N. M. Williams, for appellant. R. L. Henry, for the State.

HURT, P. J. Conviction for the theft of two hogs, the property of H. L. Farris. There was no reversible error of the court in permitting J. F. Walters to testify in the case because the witnesses had not been placed under the rule. This matter is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, and his action will not be revised, unless it is shown that he abused this discretion. Walters was an attorney at the bar, and was not subject to the rule. Appellant was a witness before the grand jury when that body had this matter under consideration. His testimony given before the grand jury was introduced against him in the trial of the cause, over his objections. He was not under arrest, and needed no caution. The statements made before the grand jury were in direct conflict with the theory of his de fense, in conflict with the testimony of his witnesses, and were, therefore, admissible. The evidence of the defendant before the grand jury was reduced to writing, and signed by him. After proving that defendant signed the written testimony, over objec tions of defendant the state introduced it in evidence. In this there was no error. We conclude that the verdict of the jury is amply supported by the testimony, if Mary Faust is worthy of belief. That she is, is settled by the verdict of the jury. The judgment is affirmed.

WAKEFIELD v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 14. 1894.)

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SALE TO MINOR-KNOWL EDGE OF MINORITY.

On the trial of one indicted for knowing ly selling intoxicating liquors to a minor with out the written consent of his parents, it ap peared that defendant was informed by such minor's brother-in-law that the minor was of age, that to all appearances he was, and that defendant thought him to be so. The minor had been in business for himself for four years. Held, that a conviction was not justified.

Appeal from district court, Houston county; A. B. Watkins, Judge.

J. H. Wakefield was convicted of knowing. ly selling liquor to a minor without the consent of the latter's parents, and appeals. Reversed.

John I. Moore, for appellant. R. L. Hen ry, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J. This conviction was for knowingly selling intoxicating liquor to a minor without the written consent of the parents, etc. The sale occurred in October, the minor being of age the following Deceniber. It is shown by the testimony that appellant was informed by the brother-in-law of the minor, prior to the alleged sale, that the minor was 21 years of age. It was also shown that the minor, to all appearances, was fully grown, and of age, at the time of the sale; that he had been in business for himself for four years prior to the sale; and that appellant believed him to be of age when he sold him the liquor. These facts were not disputed. We are of opinion the facts do not justify the conviction. The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded.

BROWN v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 17, 1894.)

CRIMINAL LAW-NEW TRIAL.

A motion for a new trial on the ground that "the judge erred in his charge to the jury" is too indefinite.

Appeal from district court, Rusk county; W. J. Graham, Judge.

Robert Brown was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

R. L. Henry, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was convicted of assault with intent to murder. It was alleged in the motion for a new trial "that the judge erred in his charge to the jury." This allegation was a very indefinite and a very general statement. No error is sought to be pointed out or particularized; nor are errors assigned in this court. After examIning the charge, we think it a fair, full application of the law to the facts adduced on the trial.

Nor is the remaining ground of said motion-that the verdict "was contrary to the law and evidence, and was not supported by the evidence"-supported by the record before us. As is usual in this character of case, the evidence was conflicting. The testimony introduced in support of the prosecution, we think, authorized the verdict of conviction. The judgment is affirmed.

FREEMAN v. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 21, 1894.)

CRIMINAL LAW-REVIEW ON APPEAL-COMPETENCY OF WITNESS.

1. The refusal to grant a continuance will not be reviewed when a bill of exceptions was not reserved.

2. It is no ground for reversing a conviction that one of the state's witnesses was subsequently indicted for the same crime.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; L. B. Hightower, Judge.

George Freeman was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed. R. L. Henry, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, his punishment being assessed at a life term in the penitentiary. A bill of exceptions was not reserved to the court's refusal to grant the application for a continuance, hence appellant's contention in this respect will not be revised. Nor does it constitute, in this cause, ground for reversal, that one of the witnesses in the case was subsequently indicted for the same murder of which appellant was convicted. The record does not contain a statement of the facts. The court charged fully the law in regard to the testimony of accomplices, and it is not verified that the witness was in fact indicted as alleged in the motion for a new trial. Whether indicted or not, the witness would have been competent to testify in the case in behalf of the state. The inhibition would apply only when the witness is indicted for the same offense as the accused, and is offered in his behalf. Code Cr. Proc. art. 731. The remaining questions cannot be revised without the evidence, and that is not before us. We find no error, and the judgment is affirmed.

SMITH V. STATE.

(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Nov. 21, 1894.)

CRIMINAL LAW-REVIEW ON APPEAL.

1. When the statement of facts was not filed within the time allowed by court, and no excuse for such failure was given, the facts cannot be considered on appeal.

2. To reverse a case for the refusal of a continuance on account of the absence of a witness the materiality and probable truth of such witness' testimony must appear.

Appeal from district court, Harris county. E. D. Carin, Judge.

Gilbert Smith was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed. R. L. Henry, for the State.

DAVIDSON, J. Appellant's punishment was assessed at 10 years' confinement in the penitentiary for the offense of murder in the