erty mentioned in the larceny counts. Thompson v. State, 4 Neb. 524.

128. (1887.) The verdict by which the defendant was found guilty of larceny "in manner and form as charged in the first count or paragraph of the information,” without ascertaining the value of the property alleged to have been stolen, is insufficient, under the provisions of section 488 of the criminal code, to sustain a sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary. McCoy v. State, 22 Neb. 418 (35 N. W. 202).

129. (1894.) The provision of section 488 of the criminal code that the jury on a conviction for larceny "shall ascertain and declare in their verdict the value of the property stolen," etc., requires a definite finding, and a conviction for grand larceny cannot be sustained upon mere estimate by the jury of the value of the property stolen. McCormick v. State, 42 Neb. 866 (61 N. W. 99).

130. (1894.) A verdict in the following form: "We, the jury in the above entitled cause, duly impaneled and sworn, do find the defendant James McCormick guilty as he stands charged. Amount, estimated, of stolen property, $95. I. A. Baker, Foreman," held, an estimate only, and not an ascertainment of the value of the property within the meaning of the statute. McCormick v. State, 42 Neb. 866 (61 N. W. 99).

131, 132. (1897.) A verdict of guilty in a prosecution for larceny is fatally defective, which omits to find the value of the property alleged to have been stolen. Fisher v. State, 52 Neb. 531 (72 N. W. 954); (1899) Holmes v. State, 58 Neb. 297 (78 N. W. 641).

133. (1902.) It is not necessary that a jury in a criminal case should in their verdict fix the value of money stolen or em bezzled. Courts will take judicial notice of the worth of a dollar. Reed v. State, 66 Neb. 184 (92 N. W. 321).

134. (1903.) Whether the provisions of section 488 of the criminal code, requiring the jury to ascertain and declare in their verdict the value of the property stolen, apply to prosecutions had under section 117 of the criminal code, quære. Keller v. Davis, 69 Neb. 494 (95 N. W. 1028).

135. (1903.) In a prosecution under the provisions of section 117 of the criminal code, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, but did not include therein a declaration of the value of the property stolen. The sentence pronounced was two years imprison

ment in the penitentiary. Held, That as the value of the property did not affect the character of the crime, the defect in the verdict was at most error, and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to pronounce sentence. Keller v. Davis, 69 Neb. 494 (95 N. W. 1028).

Conviction for larceny on charge of

robbery.

136. (1886.) A person charged in an information with robbery may be convicted of larceny, as the greater includes the less offense. Stevens v. State, 19 Neb. 647 (28 N. W. 304).

137. (1891.) The charge of robbery includes the offense of stealing from the person without force and violence or putting in fear, as is provided for by section 1130 of the criminal code, and under an information for robbery the accused may be convicted of stealing from the person. Brown v. State, 33 Neb. 354 (50 N. W. 154).

Appeal and error.

138. (1882.) A finding of the value of property stolen to be much less than the evidence showed it to be, but still enough to make the offense grand larceny, although erroneous, is without prejudice to the accused, and not a ground for a new trial. Gittinger v. State, 13 Neb. 308 (14 N. W. 403).

D. Sentence and Punishment. Excessiveness.

139. (1897.) A sentence of imprisonment for seven years imposed upon one found guilty of having stolen property valued at $50 is not excessive. Catron v. State, 52 Neb. 389 (72 N. W. 354).

years

140. (1903.) Sentence of seven for larceny of stray steer worth $20 held excessive and reduced to two years. Palmer v. State, 70 Neb. 136 (97 N. W. 235).

141. (1905.) A sentence of five years in the state penitentiary for stealing property of the value of $40, under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case, is excessive, and for that reason is reduced to two years and six months, and the judgment of the district court, as thus modified, is affirmed. Junod v. State, 73 Neb. 208 (102 N. W. 462).

LAW OF THE CASE. Previous decision as, see Courts, 88 72-106.

LAW REPORTS. Reading decision to jury, see Jury, § 189.

Rosewater v. Hoffman, 24 Neb. 222 (38 N. W. 857).

4. (1889.) Words falsely and maliciously spoken of a person, which impute the commission of some criminal offense, involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge be true, may be indicted and punished by law, are actionable per se. Hendrickson v. Sullivan, 28 Neb. 329 (44 N. W. 448).

5. (1894.) Any written or printed statement which falsely and maliciously charges another with the commission of an indictable, criminal offense is libelous per se. Pokrok Zapadu Publishing Co. v. Zizkovsky, 42 Neb. 64 (60 N. W. 358); (1896) Herzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb. 370 (66 N. W. 424).

6. (1894.) A published statement, "John S. Mullen is the plaintiff in two suits in the county court against the German Fire Insurance Company of Peoria, Illinois. The suits are to recover the value of two insurance policies which Mullen held on his saloon and store in Albright, which were destroyed by fire August 31, 1890. There were a number of suspicious circumstances at the time, and it was reported that Mullen fired the buildings himself. The agent of the insurance company investigated the matter, and as a result the company refused to pay the insurance, which amounts to $1,900 on both policies. Mullen now brings suit and it will be contested by the company. Its agent said it had excellent grounds for contesting the case, but refused to state what facts they were in possession of in regard to Mullen's complicity," is libelous per se, as charging a crime. World Publishing Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126 (61 N. W. 108; 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

7. (1894.) Any language the nature and obvious meaning of which is to impute to a person the commission of a crime, or to subject him to public ridicule, ignominy, or disgrace, is actionable per se. World Publishing Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126 (61 N. W. 108; 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

8. (1894.) A publication to be libelous per se by charging another with the commission of a crime need not contain the technical language essential to charge a crime. World Publishing Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126 (61 N. W. 108; 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

9. (1894.) Any written or printed statement which falsely and maliciously charges another with the commission of a crime is

libelous per se. World Publishing Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126 (61 N. W. 108; 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

Charging one as a blackmailer.

10. (1906.) Charging a person with being a blackmailer is libelous per se, our statute having made blackmailing a criminal offense. Sheibley v. Nelson, 75 Neb. 804 (106 N. W. 1034).

Attack on personal character.

11. (1895.) Written accusations by deacons of a church, charging the pastor with uttering untruths, giving way to violent and unchristian temper and defaming church members, are libelous per se. Piper v. Woolman, 43 Neb. 280 (61 N. W. 588).

12. (1906.) A newspaper article, charging a person with originating and circulating false and malicious reports attacking the character of another, is libelous, and is actionable per se. Sheibley v. Huse, 75 Neb. 811 (106 N. W. 1028).

Exposing to public contempt and ridicule.

13. (1903.) Any false and malicious writing published of another is libelous per se, when its tendency is to render him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him to public hatred or contempt, or deprive him of the companionship of respectable people. Williams v. Fuller, 68 Neb. 354 (94 N. W. 118).

Injury to business or profession.

14. (1900.) A newspaper article in which it is falsely stated that a business corporation is maintaining a precarious existence, that it is not able to meet its financial obligations and is tottering, bankrupt and about to pass out of existence, is libelous per se. Bee Publishing Co. v. World Publishing Co., 59 Neb. 713 (82 N. W. 28). Words charging unchastity or immorality.

15. (1881.) A publication that one was "a seducer of innocent girls," and instanced an attempt on his part to debauch and ruin a young school girl, who at the time was a member of his own household. Also, that he was an arch hypocrite and scoundrel who was simply using his talents for moneymaking purposes, and not through any sincerity in the cause in which he is laboring." Held, That each of these charges is per se actionable. Finch v. Vifquain, 11 Neb. 280 (9 N. W. 43).

16. (1886.) Words charging a woman with being a whore are actionable per se. Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 739 (28 N. W. 280).

17. (1895.) Words spoken of a woman which falsely charge that she is a prostitute are actionable per se, and in an action of slander against the person who made such a charge it is not necessary to either allege or prove special damages in order to maintain the action. Barr v. Birkner, 44 Neb. 197 (62 N. W. 494).

18. (1906.) To charge a woman with being a lewd character, of using her body for commercial purposes, and with keeping a gambling room is actionable per se. Battles v. Tyson, 77 Neb. 563 (110 N. W. 299). Criticism and comment of a public officer. 19. (1905.) Where a newspaper states, in substance, that the sheriff of the county, who is a candidate for reelection, had obtained from the county a certain sum of money upon a false and "imaginary" account for expenses which he had never incurred, this is a charge of moral turpitude and dishonesty, and, if false, is libelous per se. Farley v. McBride, 74 Neb. 49 (103 N. W. 1036).

Inserting name on commercial blacklist.

20. (1894.) A member of a retailers' collection association who procures the insertion of an outsider's name in the list of delinquents, to whom members of the association are forbidden to extend credit, no opportunity being allowed such outsider for explanation or defense, is liable to the latter in damages. Masters v. Lee, 39 Neb. 574 (58 N. W. 222).

Construction of words.

21. (1894.) In determining whether the words of a publication are libelous the courts will not resort to any technical construction of the language used, but construe it in its ordinary and popular sense. Pokrok Zapadu Publishing Co. v. Zizkovsky, 42 Neb. 64 (60 N. W. 358).

22. (1894.) In determining whether the words of a publication are liebelous the courts will not resort to any technical construction of the language used, but read the language in court as they would read it elsewhere. World Publishing Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126 (61 N. W. 108; 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

23. (1894.) Language alleged to be libelous is to be construed in its ordinary and popular sense, and the question is whether the language, when so construed, conveys, or is calculated to convey, to persons reading it the charge of a crime. World Publishing

Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126 (61 N. W. 108; 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

24. (1894.) The courts no longer strain to find an innocent meaning for words prima facie defamatory, neither will they put a forced construction of words which may fairly be deemed harmless. World Publishing Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126 (61 N. W. 108; 47 Am. St. Rep. 737).

What amounts to a publication.

25. (1901.) Where a libelous letter concerning plaintiff was sent by mail addressed to plaintiff's employer and plaintiff jointly, and delivered at her employer's shop, where it was found by plaintiff and turned over unopened to her employer, who read it, held that there was a publication. Schmuck v. Hill, 2 Unof. 79 (96 N. W. 158).

26. (1901.) While the sending of a libelous letter to the person defamed does not amount to publication thereof, where the sender so addresses it that in ordinary course it will reach a third person, and as a natural result it does reach and its contents become known to such third person, there is a sufficient publication. Schmuck v. Hill, 2 Unof. 79 (96 N. W. 158).

II. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. Burden of proof when matter is privileged, see post, § 78.

Nature and grounds of privilege.

27. (1894.) A communication is priviledged when made in good faith, in answer to one having an interest in the information sought; and it will be privileged when volunteered, if the party to whom the communication is made has an interest in it, and the party by whom it was made stands in such relation to him as to make it a reasonable duty, or, at least, proper that he should give the information. Pokrok Zapadu Publishing Co. v. Zizkovsky, 42 Neb. 64 (60 N. W. 358).

28. (1903.) An occasion of privilege will not justify false and groundless imputations of wicked motives or of crime against public officials in the performance of their duty. Bee Publishing Co. v. Shields, 68 Neb. 750 (94 N. W. 1029; 99 N. W. 822).

29. (1904.) When a communication is privileged, it does not lose its privileged character by reason of incidentally coming to the attention of others than those for whom it was intended. Mertens v. Bee Publishing Co., 5 Unof. 592 (99 N. W. 847).