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and 114 New York State Reporter time ask him how the child was injured, and ask him to point out to you where the child was standing when the child was injured ? A. No, sir; I did not.” “Q. Did you not then say that you didn't see the child and didn't know how the matter occurred? A. No, sir; I didn't say one word to the gentleman.” For the purpose of contradicting this witness upon such subject, Williams, the witness with whom the claimed conversation was had, was recalled, and asked to state what the boy said to him, and answered such question, stating, in substance, that he asked, “How did I do this accident? How did I run over the child?' He said, 'I didn't see it;'” to which the witness replied, “I said, 'I know very well you didn't see it, because you were looking towards Eighth avenue.' He thanked me and walked out." "He said it was an accident, and I said, 'I know that, too.'” He was then asked, "What, if anything, was said about the location where the child was standing? A. And he says, 'Where was this child standing?'” The witness having answered thus far, counsel for the defendant said, "I object to that as not rebuttal." Plaintiff's counsel then said: "I asked him this morning. That is what I recalled the boy for.” The court sustained the objection, to which the plaintiff took an exception. The subject matter of the testimony thus sought to be elicited was material to the issue. Upon the direct examination the boy who drove the wagon testified that the child ran from the sidewalk into the street immediately in front of the front wheel of the wagon; that he turned this wheel out of the way, but was unable to stop, and the hind wheel passed over the child. The statements claimed to have been made by him subsequent to the action, and to which his attention had been directed, bore directly upon such question; and if the jury believed that after the accident he had made statements showing that he did not see the child, and did not know where she was standing in the street, at the time the wheel struck her, it would seriously impair his credibility, and furnish a basis for the rejection of his entire testimony bearing upon that subject. The testimony which he gave tended to excuse him of any negligence in the management of the horse and wagon. The subsequent statement which was sought to be established directly and forcefully contradicted his testimony in this respect. It was competent testimony, and the inethod to elicit it was proper. Patchin v. Insurance Co., 13 N. Y. 268; Sloan v. Railroad Co., 45 N. Y. 125; Stape v. People, 85 N. Y. 390; Jamieson v. Railway Co., II App. Div. 50, 42 N. Y. Supp. 915.
It is said, however, that the question propounded by the plaintiff was not the same question which was asked of the driver of the wagon. A comparison of the two questions which we have quoted shows that with respect to the location of the child at the time of the injury the question is quite similar, and exactly so as to where the child was standing. In substance the question is the same in this respect as was propounded to the driver. It was not claimed upon the argument, nor in the brief submitted by the respondent, that any doubt could arise, but that the evidence sought to be thus elicited was called to the attention of the driver; that he understood it, and that if there was any change it was technical, in the use of words which did not materially change the form or substance of the question, and certainly did not mislead or inject any foreign matter into the substance of the evidence which was sought to be obtained. The testimony being competent and proper, and the question propounded being in substance the same as that to which the driver's attention had been directed, it answered the requirements of the rule governing such matter. In Bank v. Koehler (Sup.) 1 N. Y. Supp. 870, affirmed on appeal, 117 N. Y. 657, 22 N. Ē. 1133, it was said by the presiding justice in considering a similar question:
"A party has a right upon cross-examination of a witness contradicting another in regard to the language used by him to use the language which has been before testified to, or the substance thereof, in the putting of the question in answer to which the contradiction is expected.”
Such is the rule of the authorities. Shufflin v. People, 4 Hun, 16; Kinner v. Canal Co., 52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 162; Sloan v. Railroad Co., supra; Church v. Sheffer, 88 Hun, 335, 34 N. Y. Supp. 724. In addition to this it is to be observed that no such objection as is now suggested was raised upon the trial. Had it been so raised, the plaintiff might have obviated the same by putting his question in the precise language which had been propounded to the driver, or by recalling him and propounding to him the precise question which had been asked of the witness. The defendant, not having taken any objection on this ground, must be held to have waived it. Height v. People, 50 N. Y. 392; Murphy v. People, 63 N. Y. 590; Schermerhorn v. Gregg, 55 N. Y. 670. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the plaintiff became entitled to have this question answered, and that its exclusion constitutes reversible error.
Error was also committed in permitting the defendant to read in evidence extracts from a standard medical work. It is quite true that the matter contained in the book had been in some respects the subject of examination by the plaintiff as a part of her affirmative case. The defendant undoubtedly had the right to cross-examine the physician, who testified upon such subject with respect thereto. This, however, he did not do so far as the particular matter contained in the book was concerned. What he did do was to introduce in evidence, as a part of his affirmative case, matter contained in the book by reading therefrom, after the plaintiff's expert had been examined, and when the subject matter of the examination had entirely passed. It was not cross-examination, but affirmative proof, and as such was incompetent. Foggett v. Fischer, 23 App. Div. 207, 48 N. Y. Supp. 741. Of course, this error would not be available had no error been committed in respect of the primary questions of negligence and contributory negligence and the conduct of the trial in relation thereto; but, as we have seen, error was committed in the consideration of such question, in consequence of which this error is also available.
If these views be correct, it follows that the judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
PATTERSON, J., concurs. VAN BRUNT, P. J., concurs on last ground stated.
and 114 New York State Reporter LAUGHLIN, J. (dissenting). This is an action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff, an infant five years of age, alleged to have been caused through the negligence of the driver of the defendant's butcher wagon. The evidence presented a fair question of fact for the consideration of the jury upon both questions of negligence. The questions presented on the appeal requiring consideration are two exceptions to the evidence. One Williams was a witness for the plaintiff. The driver of the butcher wagon was asked if he saw Williams some time after the accident, and, upon his answering in the affirmative, was then asked, "Q. Did you not at that time ask him how the child was injured ?” to which he replied, “No sir; I did not.” He was then asked, “Q. Did you not then say that you did not see the child and did not know how the matter occurred?” to which he replied, “No, sir; I did not say one word to the gentleman." For the purpose of contradicting the driver who had given material testimony as to how the accident occurred, Williams was then recalled, and asked to state what the driver said to him. No objection was interposed to this question, and he answered that the driver said to him, in substance, How did I do this accident? How did I run over the child?' He said, 'I did not see it.'” The witness testified that he replied to the driver, "I know very well that you did not see it, because you were looking towards Eighth avenue;" whereupon, according to his testimony, the driver thanked him and walked out. He further testified that the driver said, “'It was an accident;' and I said, 'I know that too.'” Williams was then asked, "What, if anything, was said about the location where the child was standing ?" to which he started to reply, “A. And he says, 'Where was this child standing—'" whereupon counsel for the defendant interposed an objection upon the ground that the evidence was not in rebuttal. The court sustained the objection, and the plaintiff excepted. The specific objection interposed was not well founded, for manifestly evidence tending to impeach a witness for the defendant could only be given in rebuttal. The validity of the exception does not depend upon the ground of the objection, but upon the competency of the evidence which was excluded by the court. If the question was merely improper in form, or if a foundation had not been laid, probably its exclusion could not be sustained, inasmuch as no specific objection to that effect was taken. But this question called for the conversation; and such evidence, for the purpose of impeaching a witness, is clearly incompetent, and no foundation or change in the form of the question would make it competent. The court is vested with considerable discretion with reference to the extent to which an examination will be allowed for the purpose of impeaching a witness for declarations inconsistent with his testimony. The general rule is that the attention of the witness who is sought to be impeached should be specifically drawn to the time and place of the interview, and the statenient claimed to have been made which is inconsistent with his testimony, and that the examination of the impeaching witness should be confined substantially to the statements embraced in the questions to the witness whose testimony it is sought to impeach. Bailey, Tr. Prac. (2d Ed.) 275, 276; Sloan v. Railroad Co., 45 N. Y. 125. Here it will be seen that the plaintiff received more ihan she was entitled to. The witness was first permitted to give all of the conversation that he could collect without leading questions being propounded to him. This manifestly was not proper, and should have been excluded if objected to. The declarations of the witness are not evidence, and they are only permitted to be shown for the purpose of contradicting him. Hence it is that the contradiction should be confined to the statements or declarations, or to the substance thereof, to which his attention was specifically drawn. If this rule were not followed, and the conversation were admitted, other statements and declarations of a prejudicial character might be brought before the jury; and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the court to make it clear to them that the conversation was not evidence, but was merely permitted for the purpose of contradicting the witness. If the contradiction is confined to the statements or the substance of the statements to which the attention of the witness has been called, the jury will readily understand that the sole point and object of the evidence is to contradict. the witness. The driver said that he had no conversation with the impeaching witness. That was contradicted by showing that he had a conversation. The driver was asked if he did not say to the impeaching witness that he did not see the child and did not know how the accident occurred. If the impeaching witness had been asked, “Did not the driver say to him that he did not see the child and did not know how the accident occurred ?" and he had answered, “Yes," this would have contradicted and have tended to impeach the driver. The driver was asked if he did not ask the impeaching witness how the child was injured, and ask him to point out where the child was standing. If the impeaching witness had been asked whetier or not this was so, and he had answered in the affirmative, that also would have tended to contradict and impeach the driver. These are the only particulars of the alleged conversation to which the attention of the driver was drawn, and the examination of the impeaching witness should have been confined to these matters or their substance. The question which the witness was precluded from further answering called for the entire conversation, including the statements made by the impeaching witness as well as by the driver with reference to where the child was standing. Moreover, the plaintiff was not prejudiced, for the question was sufficiently answered to show that if the testimony of the impeaching witness was true the driver did not know where the child was standing, and the other witness, received without objection, sufficiently covered the ground.
The other objection urged relates to an error in permitting the defendant to read in evidence extracts from a standard medical work. This bore only on the question of damages. There was no controversy but that the child was injured, and there is no reason to believe that the verdict of no cause of action was rendered on the theory that no damages were sustained. The evidence erroneously received had no tendency to contradict or impeach any witness who
and 114 New York State Reporter testified upon the main issue. Consequently, the jury having found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, the admission of this evidence was not reversible error.
It follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
(79 App. Div. 296.)
In re PECK. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. January 14, 1903.) 1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—CONTINUANCE OF BUSINESS-ACCOUNTING.
Where an executor was not required by the will to continue the testator's business, but did so of his own motion, he is only required to account for the actual net profits made in the business during such continuance, and therefore the expenses paid by him for salaries, etc., cannot
be reviewed by the surrogate on such accounting. 2. SAME-SALARY TO EXECUTOR.
The executor, under such circumstances, was not entitled to deduct from the gross receipts of the business a salary for his own services, since he was not entitled to deal with the trust property for his own
advantage. 3. SAME-Claims CREDITED BY EXECUTOR-BURDEN OF PROOF.
The burden of proving the justice and necessity of payments made on
a claim created by an executor is on him. 4. SAME-COUNSEL FEES.
Where a sum of $650 has been allowed to an executor for counsel fees paid to a firm of attorneys, it was error to allow the executor a further sum of $500 for attorney's fees paid to another firm, where the only proof of service rendered by such firm was the executor's general state
ment that it was for advice given. 5. SAYE-PERFORMANCE OF LEASE-PAYMENT OF RENT.
Where an executor was obliged to pay the full sum of $375 on an outstanding lease held by deceased for the unexpired term, and received from subletting the property the sum of $225, and there was no evidence that he could have obtained more, he was properly credited with the difference
of $150. 6. SAME-WILLS-CONSTRUCTION.
A testator, by a codicil to his will, bequeathed certain legacies in the event that he survived his wife, payable out of the capital employed in his business, and the proceeds of sales of machinery, molds, patents, and good will of the business. A similar bequest to the same persons was contained in a codicil to the will of his wife, executed at the same time and place, in the event she survived her husband, to be payable out of the capital employed in the husband's business, and the proceeds of the sale of machinery, etc. Prior to the execution of such codicils, the wife had loaned her husband, to be invested in the business, over $9,000, and on the settlement of the husband's estate after the wife's death it was determined that the amount of the capital employed therein was $21,119.84, and that the outstanding debts amounted to $6,416.99. Held, that the amount loaned by the wife was not a debt of the firm, to be deducted from such balance in determining the amount from which such legacies were payable. Appeal from surrogate's court, Essex county.
Judicial accounting by George W. Peck, as executor of the last wills of George W. Banker and Henrietta M. Banker, deceased. From a surrogate's decree settling the accounts and disallowing excep tions filed by certain of the heirs, they appeal. Modified.