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BEAUHARNAIS v. ILLINOIS.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
No. 118. Argued November 28, 1951.-Decided April 28, 1952.
Over his claim that the statute violated the liberty of speech and
of the press guaranteed as against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was void for vagueness, petitioner was convicted in a state court for distributing on the streets of Chicago anti-Negro leaflets in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 38, § 471, which makes it a crime to exhibit in any public place any publication which "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion" which "exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy.” Held:
1. As construed and applied in this case, the statute does not violate the liberty of speech and of the press guaranteed as against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 251–264.
2. As construed and applied in this case, the statute is not void for vagueness. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, distinguished. P. 264.
3. Since petitioner did not, by appropriate steps in the trial court, seek to justify his utterance as "fair comment” or as privileged as a means for redressing grievances, those hypothetical defenses cannot be considered by this Court. Pp. 264–265.
4. Since the Illinois Supreme Court construed this statute as a form of criminal libel law, and truth of the utterance is not a defense to a charge of criminal libel under Illinois law unless the publication is also made “with good motives and for justifiable ends," petitioner was not denied due process by the trial court's rejection of a proffer of proof which did not satisfy this requirement. Pp. 253-254, 265–266.
5. Since libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is not necessary for this Court to consider the issues raised by the denial of petitioner's request that the jury be instructed that, in order to convict, they must find that the publication complained of was likely to produce a "clear and
present danger" of a substantial evil. Pp. 253, 266. 408 Ill. 512, 97 N. E. 2d 343, affirmed.
Opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of Illinois sustained petitioner's conviction of a violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 38 $ 471, over his objection that the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. 408 Ill. 512, 97 N. E. 2d 343. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 809. Affirmed, p. 267.
Alfred A. Albert argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Herbert Monte Levy.
William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General, John T. Coburn, Assistant Attorney General, and Albert 1. Zemel.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted upon information in the Municipal Court of Chicago of violating $ 224a of the Illinois Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 38, Div. 1, $ 471. He was fined $200. The section provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is produc
tive of breach of the peace or riots. ..." Beauharnais challenged the statute as violating the liberty of speech and of the press guaranteed as against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as too vague, under the restrictions implicit in the
Opinion of the Court.
same Clause, to support conviction for crime. The Illinois courts rejected these contentions and sustained defendant's conviction. 408 Ill. 512, 97 N. E. 2d 343. We granted certiorari in view of the serious questions raised concerning the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on the power of a State to punish utterances promoting friction among racial and religious groups. 342 U.S. 809.
The information, cast generally in the terms of the statute, charged that Beauharnais "did unlawfully hibit in public places lithographs, which publications portray depravity, criminality, unchastity or lack of virtue of citizens of Negro race and color and which exposes [sic] citizens of Illinois of the Negro race and color to contempt, derision, or obloquy ...
.." The lithograph complained of was a leaflet setting forth a petition calling on the Mayor and City Council of Chicago "to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro ...." Below was a call for "One million self respecting white people in Chicago to unite . ..." with the statement added that “If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will.” This, with more language, similar if not so violent, concluded with an attached application for membership in the White Circle League of America, Inc.
The testimony at the trial was substantially undisputed. From it the jury could find that Beauharnais was president of the White Circle League; that, at a meeting on January 6, 1950, he passed out bundles of the lithographs in question, together with other literature, to volunteers for distribution on downtown Chicago street corners the following day; that he carefully organized that distribution, giving detailed instructions for it; and that
Opinion of the Court.
the leaflets were in fact distributed on January 7 in accordance with his plan and instructions. The court, together with other charges on burden of proof and the like, told the jury “if you find ... that the defendant, Joseph Beauharnais, did . . . manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place the lithograph ... then you are to find the defendant guilty. He refused to charge the jury, as requested by the defendant, that in order to convict they must find "that the article complained of was likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest.” Upon this evidence and these instructions, the jury brought in the conviction here for review.
The statute before us is not a catchall enactment left at large by the State court which applied it. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Cant well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307. It is a law specifically directed at a defined evil, its language drawing from history and practice in Illinois and in more than a score of other jurisdictions a meaning confirmed by the Supreme Court of that State in upholding this conviction. We do not, therefore, parse the statute as grammarians or treat it as an abstract exercise in lexicography. We read it in the animating context of well-defined usage, Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, and State court construction which determines its meaning for us. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568.
The Illinois Supreme Court tells us that $ 224a "is a form of criminal libel law.” 408 Ill. 512, 517, 97 N. E. 2d 343, 346. The defendant, the trial court and the Supreme Court consistently treated it as such. The defendant offered evidence tending to prove the truth of parts of the utterance, and the courts below considered and disposed of
this offer in terms of ordinary criminal libel precedents. Section 224a does not deal with the defense of truth, but by the Illinois Constitution, Art. II, $ 4, "in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.” See also Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 38, 8 404. Similarly, the action of the trial court in deciding as a matter of law the libelous character of the utterance, leaving to the jury only the question of publication, follows the settled rule in prosecutions for libel in Illinois and other States. Moreover, the Supreme Court's characterization of the words prohibited by the statute as those “liable to cause violence and disorder” paraphrases the traditional justification for punishing libels criminally, namely their "tendency to cause breach of the peace.
Libel of an individual was a common-law crime, and thus criminal in the colonies. Indeed, at common law, truth or good motives was no defense. In the first decades after the adoption of the Constitution, this was changed by judicial decision, statute or constitution in most States, but nowhere was there any suggestion that
1 408 Ill. 512, 518, 97 N. E. 2d 343, 346-347. Illinois law requires that for the defense to prevail, the truth of all facts in the utterance must be shown together with good motive for publication. People v. Strauch, 247 Ill. 220, 93 N. E. 126; People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116, 87 N. E. 336; cf. Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587.
See, e. g., State v. Sterman, 199 Iowa 569, 202 N. W.222; State v. Howard, 169 N. C. 312, 313, 84 S. E. 807-808; cf. Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., supra.
3 See, e.g., People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 489, 149 N. E. 466, 469; Odgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed.), 368; 19 A. L. R. 1470. Some States hold, however, that injury to reputation, as in civil libel, and not tendency to breach of the peace, is the gravamen of the offense. See Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L. Q. 261, 273 and n. 67.