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Opinion of the Court.

343 U.S.

should share with the injured employee the costs of accidents incurred in the course of employment. Its benefits have been expanded over the years. See 5 U.S. C. (Supp. III) $$ 751 et seq. Such a comprehensive plan for waiver of sovereign immunity, in the absence of specific exceptions, would naturally be regarded as exclusive. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495. Such a position does not run counter to the progressive liberalization of the right to sue the United States or its agencies for wrongs. This Court accepted the principle of the exclusive character of federal plans for compensation in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135. Seeking so to apply the Tort Claims Act to soldiers on active duty as "to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole," p. 139, we gave weight to the character of the federal “systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services.” P. 144. Much the same reasoning leads us to our conclusion that the Compensation Act is exclusive.

Had Congress intended to give a crew member on a public vessel a right of recovery for damages against the Government beyond the rights granted other Government employees on the same vessel under other plans for compensation, we think that this advantage would have been specifically provided. As the Court of Appeals in the Johansen case explained, the duties and obligations of civilian and military members of the crew of a public vessel are much the same. Each has a general compensation system for injuries. To allow public-vessel seamen an election and to deny it to civilian seamen employed through the War Shipping Administration, 50 U. S. C.

8 Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 842; Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525; Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112. See Keijer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381.

o Bradey v. United States, 151 F. 2d 742. See Dobson v. United States, 27 F. 2d 807.

427

BLACK, J., dissenting.

App. $ 1291, would contribute neither to uniformity nor to fairness. See Mandel v. United States, 191 F. 2d 164.

All in all we are convinced that the Federal Employees Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for civilian seamen on public vessels. As the Government has created a comprehensive system to award payments for injuries, it should not be held to have made exceptions to that system without specific legislation to that effect. Both cases are

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE Douglas and MR. JUSTICE MINTON concur, dissenting.

Petitioner in No. 414 sued the United States under the Public Vessels Act' to recover damages for the death of Willie Dillehay, Jr., who was killed when the United States public vessel on which he worked struck a mine. Petitioner in No. 401 sued under the same Act to recover for personal injuries he suffered while working aboard another public vessel of the United States. The Court, as it must, concedes that these actions are properly brought if the "literal language" ? of the Public Vessels Act be adhered to. The Court nevertheless decides that petitioners should be denied the benefits accorded by the language of the Act. This holding is premised on the theory that the language Congress used conflicts hopelessly with the purpose Congress sought to achieve. Not being able to establish such a conflict from the Public Vessels Act itself, the Court moves back through the pages of the United States Code until it arrives at the Federal Employees Compensation Act. Again it can find no

1 43 Stat. 1112, 46 U. S. C. $ 781 et seq.

2 Section 1 of the Act provides “That a libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States

339 Stat. 742, as amended, 5 U.S. C. (Supp. IV) $ 751 et seq.

BLACK, J., dissenting.

343 U.S.

language barring petitioners' rights to sue under the Public Vessels Act. However to find such a bar, the Court reasons thusly: The Compensation Act provides for an adequate (probably smaller) recovery in these cases; it is shocking to judicial concepts of symmetry to allow injured persons a choice between two remedies-besides “There is no reason to have two systems of redress”; therefore Congress intended the Compensation Act of 1916 to be exclusive and did not mean what it said nine years later in the Public Vessels Act.

The Court's holding is as unique as the reasoning behind it. Time and time again during the last thirty years other federal courts have allowed injured employees to take their pick-receive compensation benefits, or sue for damages under the Public Vessels or some other Act. Moreover, the Court gives the Government precisely what Congress, after debate, refused to give in 1949. Government representatives then asked Congress to make the Compensation Act “exclusive, and in place of all other liability of the United States." The House yielded to this request. The House Report favoring the change stated that when the Compensation Act was enacted in 1916 a "provision making the compensation remedy exclusive apparently was then not deemed by the Congress to be necessary." 5 The Report also stated

4 See e. g., Johnson v. United States, 186 F. 2d 120. In Gibbs v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 586, 588-589, District Judge Goodman said: “From a review of court decisions, it can be categorically stated that no federal court decision, other than the case of Posey v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 5 Cir., 1937, 93 F. 2d 726, has ever held that the FECA affords the exclusive remedy to federal employees. To the contrary, it has been specifically held that the FECA does not bar suits by federal civilian employees against the Panama Railroad, or against the United States under the Federal Control Act of 1918, under the Suits in Admiralty Act, under the Public Vessels Act and under the Federal Tort Claims Act.” (Footnotes and citations omitted.)

5 H. R. Rep. No. 729, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14.

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that such a provision was now needed because of acts such as the Public Vessels Act which “in general terms” authorize the bringing of damage suits against the Government. The Senate refused to grant the Government's request and prevailed upon the House to accept the present provision of the Act which states that: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect any maritime rights and remedies of a master or member of the crew of any vessel." 6 This Senate modification of the bill, as it had passed the House, was offered by Senator Morse and accepted by Senator Douglas who was in charge of the bill. In offering this modification, Senator Morse said: "Under existing law, Government-employed seamen have been accorded the right to assert their maritime rights against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act and Public Vessels Act .... I feel they should not be deprived of benefits they have enjoyed for many years without opportunity to have their arguments carefully considered by the appropriate committees of the Congress

95 Cong. Rec. 13608. Senator Douglas agreed to the modification, stating that “The primary consideration for accepting the Senator's amendments preserving the maritime rights and other statutory remedies of seamen is the fact that no hearings were held, no arguments were heard, and no discussion was had on this aspect of the pending bill.” 95 Cong. Rec. 13609.

I do not think this Court should deprive these seamen of rights which the Congress of 1925 gave them and the Congress of 1949 refused to take away.

6 63 Stat. 868, § 305 (b). In addition § 201 (b), which states that the Compensation Act "shall be exclusive, and in place, of all other liability of the United States,” contains the special exception: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply to a master or a member of the crew of any vessel.” 63 Stat. 861, 862.

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BESSER MANUFACTURING CO. ET AL. v.

UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.

No. 230. Argued April 21, 1952.-Decided May 26, 1952.

1. In this civil action brought by the United States to enjoin viola

tions of the Sherman Act, the conclusions of the trial judge that appellants conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in machinery for making concrete blocks, and that they monopolized and attempted to monopolize that industry, are

overwhelmingly supported by the evidence. Pp. 445-447. 2. This Court sustains provisions of the decree requiring appellants

to issue patent licenses on a fair royalty basis and to grant to the existing lessees of their machines an option, on terms “mutually satisfactory to the parties concerned,” (1) to terminate their lease, (2) to continue their lease, or (3) to purchase leased machines.

P. 447. 3. Pursuant to a provision of the decree for fixing reasonable royalty

rates under appellants' patent licenses, a committee consisting of two persons selected by appellants and two by the Government was appointed; and, on the basis of the evidence adduced before the committee, the trial judge resolved a deadlock which developed. Held: The procedure was fair and reasonable, and did not deprive appellants of their property without due process of law. Pp. 447-449.

(a) In the absence of glaring error, this Court does not pass upon the question of the sufficiency of the evidentiary material considered in arriving at the royalties finally established. P. 448.

(b) It was not incumbent upon the trial judge to have a full hearing of the royalty matters himself or to refer them to a master for such a hearing. Pp. 448-449.

(c) In framing relief in antitrust cases, a range of discretion rests with the trial judge, and there was no abuse of discretion

shown here. P. 449. 4. The Government's suggestion that this Court consider the royalty

setting procedure outlined by it in the trial court, and direct that

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