far greater danger to the community than the dead body of one who has died of the same disease.

The following notes relating to Court decisions upon the foregoing topics may be found useful. While some of them relate to laws of other States, many of these laws have been copied from Massachusetts laws, and are of similar character and phraseology.

Indigent sick persons, suffering from infectious diseases, may be sent to a public or private hospital to be treated at the public expense.

State v. New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 521.

Tucker v. City of Virginia, 4 Nev. 20.

A person sick with an infectious disease in his own house, or in suitable apartments at a hotel or boardinghouse, cannot be removed without his consent, under the authority conferred by a city charter "to abate and remove nuisances."

Brown v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104.

For further decisions relative to taking possession of houses and furniture without consent of owner, for use as a hospital, &c., see,

Spring v. Hyde Park, 137 Mass. 554.
Brown v. Murdock, 140 Mass. 314.
Lynde v. Rockland, 66 Maine, 309.

Health authorities can decide on propriety of removal,
Haverty v. Bass, 66 Maine, 71.

"In order to carry out the law relating to the isolation of persons suffering with small-pox, and for the protection of the community, it may become necessary to convert private houses into hospitals and make them subject to hospital regulations, to seize and destroy infected articles, and to do many other things, which under ordinary circumstances would be considered a gross outrage upon the rights of persons and property. This is allowed, on the same principle

that houses are allowed to be torn down to stop a conflagration. Salus populi est suprema lex, is the governing law in such cases. When the public health and human life are concerned, the law requires the highest degree of care. It will not allow of experiments to see if a less degree of care will not answer." (Parker & Worthington, p. 134.) Seavey v. Preble, 64 Maine, 120.

Labrie v. Manchester, 59 N. H. 120.
Farmington v. Jones, 36 N. H. 271.

Kennebunk v. Inhabitants of Alfred, 19 Me. 221. "Notwithstanding this privilege, it does not appear that a house may be seized and occupied against the will of the owner. The consent of the owner must be obtained to the use and appropriation of his property by the board of health, and provision made for his compensation, by means of a regular contract. Otherwise the property must be appropriated to the use of the board of health by proceedings regularly had for its impressment to the public use, as is provided for in the statutes of several States, accompanied by suitable safeguards in each case.”

Lynde v. Rockland, 66 Maine, 309.

Spring v. Hyde Park, 137 Mass. 554.

In the matter of disinfection after small-pox the law of this State (Rev. Laws, Chap. 75, §49) states, "Upon the death, recovery or removal of such person, such of the rooms of said house, and such of the articles therein, as, in the opinion of the board of health, have been subjected to infection or contagion, shall be disinfected by the householder, to the satisfaction of the board of health."

Practically this work is done by the board of health, but strict compliance with the law would at least in all such instances make it advisable to give the owner timely notice that such rooms and articles are to be disinfected within a certain time, and if the owner fails to comply within the specified time, the board is fully justified in doing the work at the householder's expense. (Parker & Worthington, p. 139.)

VACCINATION.

In nearly all States, as well as in civilized countries generally, laws exist providing for the vaccination of the population, and particularly for that portion which attends the public schools.

Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226.

This requirement, of submission to vaccination, is a constitutional exercise of the police power of the State, which can be sustained as a precautionary measure in the interest of the public health. (Parker & Worthington, p. 139.)

The Massachusetts Laws relating to vaccination require— 1. "A parent or guardian who neglects to cause his child or ward to be vaccinated before the child or ward attains the age of two years, except as provided in R. L., Chap. 75, Section 139, shall forfeit $5 for every year during which such neglect continues."

2. By an act of 1855, the local Board of Health must "require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants," if, in the opinion of the board, it is necessary for the public health and safety. Every person over 21 years old, not under guardianship, who refuses or neglects to comply with this requirement is liable to a penalty. (Chap. 75, §137.)

The chief defect in this law, as also in the laws of other states, is that it recognizes a false principle in sanitation. The ideal community, so far as vaccination is concerned, is not that population in which "the public health and safety" requires vaccination at irregular times and seasons, on the eve of, or in the midst of great epidemics, but a community in which vaccination and revaccination are constantly and uniformly practised year by year upon all young children. and upon older children at the end of a definite period, say, of 10 or 12 years. In such a community there are no epidemics of small-pox, because there is no virgin soil in which it can take root and flourish.

A law, then, which only requires vaccination when small-pox is prevailing or is epidemic in the State or district, is defective, and wrong in principle, and a community living under such conditions and with such laws, may, as I have already said, be likened to one which waits for a great fire before purchasing its fire apparatus. The only correct sanitary principle in regard to vaccination is that of complete and permanent immunity, and not that of partial and temporary immunity of the people.

3. By a further provision of the same law (Chap. 75, Revised Laws, §137), as amended in 1894, the local Board of Health is required "to provide the inhabitants with free vaccination," if, "in the opinion of said board," the public safety requires it. Here, again, the law, unfortunately, recognizes a wrong principle of waiting until "in the opinion" of a local board of health" the public safety requires " vaccination. As an illustration of the defective character of this principle during the present epidemic, several instances have occurred in which local boards of health have, unfortunately, been composed (at least partially) of men who were opposed to vaccination. In several instances, the presence of one anti-vaccinationist upon a local board of health has so influenced the action of the board as to result in serious harm to the community, by delaying public vaccination, until the common sense of the community compelled them to act.

Possibly, the framers of such laws recognized this defect, but also recognized the common but often fallacious principle of local self-government, which allows those municipalities which do not act for the common safety of their population, to suffer the consequences of such neglect. But, unfortunately, small-pox is a contagious disease, and is not confined to the boundary lines of cities or towns. The neglect of one town or one State may prove also a serious menace to the people of another town or State. Again,

the non-voting part of the community, the women and especially the unprotected children, may become the victims. of the neglect of the voting portion.

4. For many years a beneficent law existed in this State as well as in many others, providing that the School Committee shall not allow a child who has not been duly vaccinated to be admitted to or connected with the public schools." The law was absolute, and wherever this provision has existed and has been thoroughly enforced, it has proved to be a helpful aid in protecting the community. But, unfortunately, in consequence of unwise opposition, this law was so amended in 1894, as to admit to school any child who was, in the opinion of a "regular practising physician," "an unfit subject for vaccination" (R. L., Chap. 75, §139). The intent of this law was to admit such children as might be temporarily unfit for vaccination, in consequence of some ailment which might possibly make it improper to vaccinate the child for the time being. The serious blunder of enacting such a statute has been illustrated in the experience of the present epidemic, wherein it has appeared that the law has been frequently misapplied, by using it as a means of exemption for any child, without regard to its condition of health, on the ground that the certifying physician believed that all children were unfit subjects for vaccination. Worse than this, such certificates became for a time the subject of further abuse, since physicians advertised that they would, for a small fee, send certificates by mail to parties at a distance, without personal examination of the child. This mode of abuse has now been corrected by a law of this year, requiring that the certifying physician "at the time of giving the certificate, shall have personally examined the child, and that he is of the opinion that its physical condition is such that its health will be endangered by vaccination." This exemption is in force, according to the statutes, "while such condition con