Who will gainsay, in the light of our judicial history, that his selection of judges, schooled in his belief and theory of economics, would honestly charge a grand jury more vigorously, and direct a district attorney more effectively, to bring before him and such grand juries offenders against the Sherman anti-trust act, as well as decide more promptly the various preliminary questions that are frequently interposed to stay proceedings, than would a judge that he might appoint from the ranks of the trust attorneys and from the ranks of the corporation counselors, or from the States where trusts were fattened; and yet these latter men might be equally as learned and conscientious as his former appointees. One set of judges would be active and aggressive in punishing all law violators alike; the other set might

be negative and non aggressive, and wholly indifferent, either as to charges of grand juries or crowding offenders to trial.

In conclusion, I can but reiterate that Mr. Bryan, as President, can do much affirmatively to destroy trusts and monopolies by reason of his constitutional powers as chief executive proper, and as controlling legislative formation of committees, passing or defeating measures, and can wield indirectly great power through and over the courts; or he can negatively retard, practically, every effort to carry out or to enforce the Sherman anti-trust act, and nullify all of its provisions, by letting it be known through his political managers that campaign assessments will do much to soften the rigors of the law, even while a pretence of enforcement is still maintained.

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AM asked, not to discuss the merits or demerits of trusts, but to express an opinion as to what Mr. Bryan could do in the way of carrying out, his expressed policy against trusts if he were to be elected.

First of all, it must be recalled that as President Mr. Bryan would be only an executive. This reminder is the more necessary in a Presidential year, because the politicians are, as usual, engaged in the old game of associating all the great issues with this or that candidate for the Presidency, trying to further personal ambitions. and perpetuate partisan organizations, when, all the while, the main issues can be settled only by the legislative branch in Congress assembled. Indeed, the Speaker of the House has more power in settling issues that need legislation than the President. Consequently, to know what Mr. Bryan can effect in this matter, it is important to consider how far Congress can be led.

In the next place, the issue of trusts differs from such issues as imperialism and civil-service reform. The policy in the Philippines is, as yet, almost entirely the work of the executive. The position of the President as commander-in-chief of the army and navy gives him war powers of great influence, and as an executive he can do much to embarrass or calm our foreign relations. The executive, also, can entirely control the civilservice appointees (subject to confirmation in certain classes); hence, his power is decisive on this question. But it is quite a different thing to

regulate trusts; for that is not an affair of the executive. Were Mr. Bryan elected, it does not at all follow that his platform will be enacted into law. We have had a very recent and unfortunate illustration of this, when Mr. McKinley was elected on the issue of establishing the gold standard, while to-day Secretary Gage is telling the public that the gold-standard law would not protect us from silver and a panic if Mr. Bryan were elected. The crux of the question, then, lies in what Congress is likely to do-not in what the President alone can do. In order to carry out a new policy against trusts, new statutes must be passed through both houses of Congress. Looking at Mr. Bryan's individual policy of controlling trusts by a constitutional amendment, it is clearly apparent that this is as much more difficult than getting an act through Congress as swimming the Hellespont is more difficult than swimming the Rubicon.

Granting Mr. Bryan's election, there are the following possibilities as to Congress-(1) a Republican majority in both Senate and House; (2) a Republican Senate and a Democratic House; (3) in a few years, a Democratic Senate and a Democratic House. The probability of a Democratic House, in any case, is so strong that if Mr. Bryan is elected, we may assume the first possibility as ruled out. In that event, there is nothing to be said; for no positive legislation could be passed, and Mr. Bryan's influence would end with preventing his opponents

from scoring by the exercise of the veto power. The second, however, would give the President little or no chance for party legislation on trusts. Even if a stringent bill were passed through the House, it would be held up in the Senate; because, as generally understood, that body is likely to act in protection of the large corporations. What influence Mr. Bryan, as President, could have on individual Senators, through offers of patronage, it is impossible to say beforehand cynical as that may sound; but the political antagonisms are so strong that party fealty would probably defeat any recognized Democratic policy on trusts. To be sure, Mr. Cleveland drove a hostile majority in both House and Senate to repeal the purchase clause of the silver acts; but he had the support of the business community to help him in influencing members of Congress. Mr. Bryan would not have this support in attacking trusts (meaning, of course, large combinations of capital, even if not technically trusts). The Senate, as has been said, has shown itself in many instances friendly to the large corporations, and is not likely to help Mr. Bryan. It checked the full force of the Wilson bill, even when pushed by Mr. Cleveland; sugar and other interests received important favors from the Senate. All in all, even if in position to offer the spoils of office, Mr. Bryan need hope for little from the present Sen ate; it could cleverly emasculate a House bill on trusts, as easily as it did the House bill on the gold standard, and yet pose before the voters as opposed to trusts.

While keeping in mind the fact that a President is only an executive, still it must not be forgotten that he remains, in fact, a party leader, who can by tact, by adroitness, by bribing Congressmen with appointments (even those of the opposite party), so influence the close votes on critical bills as to gain his point. Moreover, he has at his elbow the successful manager of his campaign, and he can suggest the punishment of irresolute Congressmen who oppose him by threats of withdrawing funds from his district when he is running for reëlection. croachment of the legislative on the executive branch of the Government is attended by a subservience on the part of the executive in order to gain certain legislation.

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The real question arises in considering the third possibility. The election of Mr. Bryan should be properly regarded, not as an isolated phe

nomenon, but as a sign of the growth of radicalism in the United States. If he were elected, and carried with him a Democratic House, there is reason to believe that this would also be accompanied by sending more radicals to State legislatures. If so, this would show itself in the substitution of radical for conservative Senators

in Congress. The present Senate, by common report, is dominated by commercialism; and Mr. Bryan's party represents the struggle of the masses against the plutocrats. Hence, if Mr. Bryan succeeds, it would be regarded as an evi. dence of the rise of radicalism, which is certain to be felt later in the Senate. What legislation on trusts Mr. Bryan, in the end, could obtain becomes, therefore, a question of the outlook for radicalism in the United States. If one were to judge from the action of the country in 1896, it must be confessed that in no country in the modern world is there a more cautious and conservative element than the business community of the United States; and that whichever way it turns it generally decides the national election.

A radical, as distinct from a liberal, Presi dent like Mr. Bryan could, of course, exercise a considerable control over legislation on trusts in a negative way by his veto power; that is, he could prevent new favors to special interests such as have been notorious in the past. Consequently, bills intended to modify or repeal existing trust laws, railway legislation, and the like, could be killed, in all probability, by his veto (especially if one body in Congress were Democratic).

Finally, it remains to mention Mr. Bryan's power to execute the existing national anti-trust law. As an executive, through his attorneygeneral, he might stir up a good deal of trouble for many organizations. The Sherman anti-trust law is a very extraordinary measure, and its full import may not yet have been clearly understood. It is not clear but that it forbids labor combinations. But without going into the details of a very serious measure, it may be said in general that legal technicalities will, by offering new plans of operation, make it very difficult to prevent the continuance, even by national legislation, of industrial enterprises merely because they are on a large scale. The legal fraternity will find a way. Eventually, large operations must and will be allowed, provided they do not infringe on the rights of others, large or small, be they producers or consumers.

"THE HE Trust Problem," by Professor Jenks, is a valuable addition to much that is being written on the great economic evolution which is resulting in the centralization of industry.

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He describes this movement, which has proceeded from destructive competition to "price agreements," and finally to consolidation. tense competition, becoming disastrous, forced agreements on prices. The fundamental disadvantage of such agreements was that they were not lived up to. They offered a premium on bad faith, and finally our lawmakers wisely legislated against price agreements." They were declared as in restraint of trade-against public policy. Then relief through centralizing manufacture naturally followed. Instead of a plan under which a reward was secured by breaking agreements, an absolute and permanent identity of interests was created, and it became in the interest of all to work for the common good. In place of an agreement to put up prices as the only relief from disastrous competition, plans were developed to secure more economic production and distribution. Many of the "industrials," cer-. tainly the most successful, while reserving a proper compensation for their stockholders, recognized that their continued success depended upon their giving to the public an opportunity to share in the benefits of the economies thus secured, thereby increasing the volume of business, and still further reducing the cost of production and distribution.

On the other hand, Professor Jenks calls attention to the fact that some so-called "trusts,' under a shortsighted management, take advantage of centralization to increase the prices to the consumers, with the result that through natural laws conditions arise that bring about a war of prices, sometimes between giants, as in the case of the sugar war; and the lesson is taught that continuous success can only be maintained by low prices to consumers, large volume of business, and consequent reduction of the percentage of general charges to production and distribution, and other economies which, as every factory superintendent appreciates, can be secured when the factory runs full time.

Professor Jenks also points out that, while

*The Trust Problem. By Jeremiah Whipple Jenks, Ph.D. 12mo, pp. 298. New York: McClure, Phillips & Co. $1.

through combinations men are thrown out of employment, combinations sustain and sometimes advance rates of wages; but it seems to me that he might have gone farther, to advantage, and called attention to the greater certainty and steadiness of employment insured through distributed markets by the enormous increase in the exports of manufactured goods made possible by more economical production secured by centralization. And this great increase of the exports of the products of our factories, which during the past two years of "industrial" organization has been 40 per cent. more than during the previous two years, and ten times what they were in 1860, as against an increase of other exports of less than fourfold, has been made while the wage-earners have been living better than any wage-earners have ever before lived in the history of the world, and at the same time depositing their surplus earnings, so that our savings-bank deposits have reached the great sum of $2,300,000,000. Through the combination of our natural resources and superior organization, we are sending these enormous exports to countries where the average rates of wages are 40 per cent. of what we are paying to our laborers. These exports will still further largely increase as soon as there is a material reduction in our home demand; and thousands of our laborers who would otherwise be thrown out of work will, during such dullness in domestic trade, find employment in filling foreign orders.

Professor Jenks makes a point that appeals to every merchant: that, while the quality of certain kinds of merchandise is easily distinguished, in other products purchases are made on faith in the trade-marks. Large corporations almost invariably recognize that their most valuable assets are their trade-marks; and, not being under the pressure of intense competition, instead of mak ing inferior, or what might be called counterfeit goods, they adopt the policy of sustaining and often improving the high quality of their prod. ucts thus increasing, instead of jeopardizing, their most valuable asset.

In referring to Royal Baking Powder, however, Professor Jenks states that it may be perfectly pure, but the housewife who insists on using it has probably never tested it in comparison with other brands." There can be no better proof of the pudding than the eating of

it" and the general popularity of a trade-mark results from the fact that it has been tested in comparison with other brands, and that it holds its position owing to the fact that it has been subjected to the most practical test-viz., the test of the oven.

Professor Jenks describes, in a most able way, the evils of overcapitalization, and it is to be hoped that at a later period he will publish another volume giving many interesting facts on this subject that did not exist at the time this volume was written. To-day the advantage of centralized industry is generally recognized. The fact that, through the distribution of shares, the profits of manufacturing are being widely distributed to investors and the employees in the different companies is recognized as of general advantage; but what is most interesting to the public is to have suggestions as to how they can discriminate between the good and the bad. In the case of one "industrial," tangible assets were purchased for $800,000 in cash, and those assets then capitalized for $4,000,000 preferred stock and $4,000,000 common stock. At present those securities are selling 60 per cent. below the price at which they were sold to the subscribers. The result is that there is a lack of confidence in that particular company, and such inflation tends to lessen confidence in the sound industrials." There should be some well-defined rules in capitalizing "industrials." Preferred stock should not be issued in excess of the actual value of tangible assets, except in cases where there is a very large earning capacity protected by patents or trade-marks, as in the case of the Royal Baking Powder and the American Chicle Co. (chewing-gum).

No preferred stock should be offered to the public until its earning capacity has been demonstrated. In the case of the consolidation of companies that have an established business and a demonstrated earning capacity, the placing of the securities on the market is justifiable; but where the business is a new one, the exploitation of patents and processes, -the stock should be locked up until the concern has shown its capacity by the actual earning of dividends. Where any other course is pursued, the public may be deceived, and it results to the prejudice of those responsible for the organization. The great responsibility in connection with capitalizing industrials" is, to my mind, in the issue of senior securities. In the issues of junior securities, notice is given to the public by the word "common" being engraved in large letters across the face of the certificate that such stock is not an investment security; that it represents good-will.

But the responsibility of issuing bonds and preferred stock is a most serious one, because the public interests demand that said securities be put upon a basis sufficiently conservative to justify investment by those who are dependent on income; and where the issues of such senior securities have been offered to the public, and have not been based upon tangible assets or protected earning capacity, to my mind it would appear to be a method of obtaining money under false pretenses. The investor has been very largely responsible for unsound capitalizations, being too careless in buying shares. Most investors have the facilities through banks or bankers of securing the opinions of men of high character who are well informed in regard to industrial" propositions; and if they had taken the trouble to use such sources, they would have been able to make sound investments in "industrials," but instead of that, they have been attracted by the fact of a large number of shares being procurable for what appeared to be a comparatively small amount of money, and such carelessness has given the opportunity to those who have not been thorough in organizing "industrials" to place securities upon a purely artificial basis.

The common stock of "industrials" to-day occupies the same relation to "industrial" capitalization that the common stock of railroads occupied to railroad development. Most of the railroads were constructed for the amount of the original issue of bonds, and the common stock largely represented prospective value. Time put these stocks in the position of investment securities, and in the case of the well-organized "industrials" the same conditions will prevail; but at present, the public not feeling able to discriminate, good "industrial" securities are sold at a price that shows from 15 to 30 per cent. earning capacity on the present quotations, while railroad securities, having been tried by time, are selling on the basis of from 4 to 7 per cent., and many without any better guaranties for permanency of earnings than are possessed by the good "industrials."

Professor Jenks' work is by no means an academic treatise; it deals with actual facts and conditions, not with mere speculations and theories. The author's position as counsel to the United States Industrial Commission (the report of which is contained in an appendix to the volume) has given him unusual facilities for the acquisition of the freshest and most authentic data. In his treatment of trust legislation, Professor Jenks confines himself to practical propositions now before the people, and his book is an impor tant contribution to current political discussion.

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N what way would the election of Mr. Bryan be likely to change the financial policy of the Government, and what effect would it probably have upon the money markets of the country, and, through them, upon trade and industry?

The present policy of the Government is to keep all of our money at par with our gold coin, to the end that the word "dollar," wherever it may be used, be it on paper, silver, or gold, or in a bond, a note, an insurance policy, a bank credit, a price-list, or a wage agreement, shall always mean the same value. The attitude of Mr. Bryan towards this policy is well known. He is opposed to all efforts to maintain the gold standard, holding that such efforts enhance the value of gold, and make money too dear.

To maintain this parity, it is necessary that those who desire gold shall be able to obtain it without cost over paper or silver. There is a legiti mate and necessary use for gold in our relations with the world-relations becoming daily more intimate and important. Gold is the only money we have that can go abroad and be converted into the money of other countries. If those who require it cannot obtain it readily from their bankers or from the Government, they will bid a premium for it; and a premium on gold means that the parity of our several forms of money is lost. If it occurs under conditions likely to be permanent, it means that about one-half the total stock of money in the country has become a commodity, and is withdrawn from circulation.

It is known by all who were familiar with the situation that the Government was very close to a suspension of gold payments during the last administration of President Cleveland, and that the crisis was only tided over by the bond sales. Such was the public alarm and sense of insecurity that gold was generally hoarded, money-lending practically ceased, enterprise was suspended, and all business operations were contracted to the narrowest scope. The country had an abundance of money, but the danger of a premium on gold made nearly one-half of its stock unavailable for use.

There was entire confidence in President Cleve land at that time. Nobody doubted that, so

long as he was President, gold payments would be maintained. Secretary Carlisle found authority to do what the new monetary act directs the secretary of the treasury to do; namely, replenish the gold reserve by the sale of bonds. But public confidence was not maintained, as everybody knew that the protection given by a friendly administration might be wanting after the Presidential election. The bond sales were unpopular, and were decried by Mr. Bryan and his followers as a regular, necessary, and inevitable accompaniment of the gold standard. The greater the probability of Mr. Bryan's success, the greater was the pressure for the only kind of money he could not depreciate, the greater the necessity for bond sales, the greater the paralysis in financial circles; and all of these conditions were seized upon by him and made capital for his campaign. This experience demonstrated that it is unfortunate to be obliged to resort to bond issues to maintain the gold standard. It is an emergency defense, uncalled for unless the credit of the Government is under strain, and then so subject to misrepresentation as to be perilous to its own cause.

We have seen that while protected by the Cleveland administration as effectually as it could be under any gold-standard law, the country suffered from apprehension of what was threatened. If Mr. Bryan should be elected now, would there, or would there not, be ground for apprehension as to what might follow?

The gold-standard law received 11 Democratic votes in the House. There is greater probability that the next House will be Democratic than that Mr. Bryan will be elected; and, if the latter event occurs, it may be accepted as certain that the House will be Democratic by a much larger majority than 11. The free-silver element will organize the House, elect the Speaker, and control legislation.

In the Senate there are now 54 votes to sustain the gold standard law, counting one in the Pennsylvania vacancy. But the two Democrats who voted for it, Lindsay and Caffery, will be replaced on March 4 next by free-silver Senators already elected. Seven Republican Senators who voted for it are likely to lose their seats at