cution of the treaty, and, in case it be refused or longer delayed, take redress in their own hands." And he accordingly recommends "that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property, in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers." These reprisals would not, in the opinion of the President, give to France any just cause of war; but if she should continue to refuse an act of acknowledged justice, and, "in violation of the law of nations, make reprisals on our part the occasion of hostilities against the United States, she would but add violence to injustice, and could not fail to expose herself to the just censure of civilized nations, and to the retributive judgments of Heaven." The President does not present this course of reprisals as the only one for the consideration of Congress. He says: If it shall be the pleasure of Congress to await the further action of the French Chambers no further consideration of the subject will, at this session, probably be required at your hands. And, in conclusion of this part of his message, he repeats that— It belongs to Congress to decide whether, after what has taken place, it will still await the further action of the French Chambers, or now adopt such provisional measures as it may deem necessary, and best adapted to protect the rights and maintain the honor of the country. Whatever that decision may be, it will be faithfully enforced by the Executive, as far as he is authorized so to do. Thus the President states, for the consideration of Congress, two measures, one contemplating further forbearance and the continuance of friendly negotiation and peace, and the other, although provisional and contingent, involving the possible hazard of war. The committee are happy to agree fully with the President "that our institutions are essentially pacific. Peace and friendly intercourse with all nations are as much the desire of our Government as they are the interest of our people." But if it be the true policy of the United States to practice the greatest moderation and forbearance toward all nations, and to consider war as a calamity never to be resorted to but in extreme cases, what additional force do these sentiments acquire when applied to France, our ancient ally and friend, for whom the people of the United States cherish "the most grateful and honorable recollections associated with our struggle for independence." Entertaining these views, the committee have considered it to be their first duty attentively to examine the pacific branch of the alternative presented by the President to discover whether there was any rational hope that, by the exercise of further patience, the hazards of war might be prevented. They have, in consequence, carefully perused the whole correspondence submitted by the President to the Senate, between the two Governments, to find out, if they could, the causes of the extraordinary delay which has occurred in the execution of the treaty, and whether there was any prospect of their ultimate removal. They have done more; they have felt it to be their duty to examine the correspondence, as far as it was accessible to them, which preceded as well as that which followed the conclusion of the treaty to see if those causes were altogether unforeseen and unexpected. It appears from a dispatch of Mr. Rives to the Secretary of State, under date the 18th September, 1830, at his first interview with the French secretary of foreign affairs, after the revolution which placed the present King of France on the throne, that this French minister said that he thought that the principle of indemnity would be admitted, but that the amount of the claims was a very complex question, depending on a great variety of considerations, and requiring minute and detailed examination; "that he believed our claims would encounter much less opposition with the Government (meaning the King and his ministers) than with the Chambers; that he had thought of the organization of a commission to examine the subject, consisting of members of both Chambers as the best means of preparing those bodies for an ultimate decision, and that he should submit the proposition at an early day to the council." In a subsequent dispatch of Mr. Rives, of the 9th November, 1830, he says: The disposition of the King, as well with regard to this subject [the American claims] as to the general relations between the two countries, are everything we could desire. The difficulty exists in the extreme reluctance of the nation to pay any more indemnities, and the necessity which the Government feels itself under of consulting the representatives of the nation, and of securing their approbation to any arrangement which may be ultimately concluded. The commission, of the formation of which I have already apprised you, has grown entirely out of this feeling. On the occasion of an audience with the King, Mr. Rives, in his dispatch of the 18th January, 1831, says that the King in replying to his remarks "reiterated the sentiments he had heretofore expressed to me, and referred to the measures he had taken with a view to bring the differences between the two countries to a conclusion." * * * The King proceeded to say that, since reading the President's message, he had "remonstrated" against all unnecessary delays in the prosecution of the business, and assuring me that everything should be done on his part to bring it to the earliest termination, notwithstanding the disastrous state of their finances. The commission appointed to examine our claims made their report. The majority of four rejecting our claims growing out of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as well as the Rambouillet and other special decrees, estimated the sum to which they supposed the United States to be fairly entitled, according to Mr. Rives, at between ten and fifteen millions of francs, and the minority of two, admitting the claims, rejected by their colleagues, at thirty millions. In an interview between the French minister of foreign affairs and Mr. Rives, described in his despatch of the 28th of April, 1831, the minister "spoke of the intrinsic difficulty of all money questions in a representative government, increased in the present instance by the almost unanimous report of the commission." In another interview with the president of the council of ministers, described in the same despatch of Mr. Rives, Mr. Perrier said: He felt all the importance of cultivating good relations with the United States; and that he was sincerely desirous of adjusting this ancient controversy, but that their finances, as I saw, were exceedingly deranged: and that there would be great difficulty in reconciling the Chamber of Deputies to an additional charge, on the enfeebled resources of the state, for claims, too, which had not arisen from any wrong done by the present Government of France. In the same despatch, Mr. Rives reports: The King expressed, as he has always done, very cordial sentiments for the United States; said he had frequently called the attention of his ministers to the necessity of settling our reclamations; that they had always objected the embarrassed state of the finances, but he hoped they would yet find the means of doing justice. In a despatch of Mr. Rives of the 7th May, 1831, communicating the offer of 20,000,000 francs, in full satisfaction of our claims, and his declining to accept it, he states the French minister to have replied: That the offer he had just made was one of extreme liberality; that it would subject the ministers to a severe responsibility before the Chambers; that he had cution of the treaty, and, in case it be refused or longer delayed, take redress in their own hands." And he accordingly recommends "that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property, in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers." These reprisals would not, in the opinion of the President, give to France any just cause of war; but if she should continue to refuse an act of acknowledged justice, and, "in violation of the law of nations, make reprisals on our part the occasion of hostilities against the United States, she would but add violence to injustice, and could not fail to expose herself to the just censure of civilized nations, and to the retributive judgments of Heaven." The President does not present this course of reprisals as the only one for the consideration of Congress. Ile says: If it shall be the pleasure of Congress to await the further action of the French Chambers no further consideration of the subject will, at this session, probably be required at your hands. And, in conclusion of this part of his message, he repeats thatIt belongs to Congress to decide whether, after what has taken place, it will still await the further action of the French Chambers, or now adopt such provisional measures as it may deem necessary, and best adapted to protect the rights and maintain the honor of the country. Whatever that decision may be, it will be faithfully enforced by the Executive, as far as he is authorized so to do. Thus the President states, for the consideration of Congress, two measures, one contemplating further forbearance and the continuance of friendly negotiation and peace, and the other, although provisional and contingent, involving the possible hazard of war. The committee are happy to agree fully with the President "that our institutions are essentially pacific. Peace and friendly intercourse with all nations are as much the desire of our Government as they are the interest of our people." But if it be the true policy of the United States to practice the greatest moderation and forbearance toward all nations, and to consider war as a calamity never to be resorted to but in extreme cases, what additional force do these sentiments acquire when applied to France, our ancient ally and friend, for whom the people of the United States cherish "the most grateful and honorable recollections associated with our struggle for independence." Entertaining these views, the committee have considered it to be their first duty attentively to examine the pacific branch of the alternative presented by the President to discover whether there was any rational hope that, by the exercise of further patience, the hazards of war might be prevented. They have, in consequence, carefully perused the whole correspondence submitted by the President to the Senate, between the two Governments, to find out, if they could, the causes of the extraordinary delay which has occurred in the execution of the treaty, and whether there was any prospect of their ultimate removal. They have done more; they have felt it to be their duty to examine the correspondence, as far as it was accessible to them, which preceded as well as that which followed the conclusion of the treaty to see if those causes were altogether unforeseen and unexpected. It appears from a dispatch of Mr. Rives to the Secretary of State, under date the 18th September, 1830, at his first interview with the French secretary of foreign affairs, after the revolution which placed the present King of France on the throne, that this French minister said that he thought that the principle of indemnity would be admitted, but that the amount of the claims was a very complex question, depending on a great variety of considerations, and requiring minute and detailed examination; "that he believed our claims would encounter much less opposition with the Government (meaning the King and his ministers) than with the Chambers; that he had thought of the organization of a commission to examine the subject, consisting of members of both Chambers as the best means of preparing those bodies for an ultimate decision, and that he should submit the proposition at an early day to the council." In a subsequent dispatch of Mr. Rives, of the 9th November, 1830, he says: The disposition of the King, as well with regard to this subject [the American claims] as to the general relations between the two countries, are everything we could desire. The difficulty exists in the extreme reluctance of the nation to pay any more indemnities, and the necessity which the Government feels itself under of consulting the representatives of the nation, and of securing their approbation to any arrangement which may be ultimately concluded. The commission, of the formation of which I have already apprised you, has grown entirely out of this feeling. On the occasion of an audience with the King, Mr. Rives, in his dispatch of the 18th January, 1831, says that the King in replying to his remarks "reiterated the sentiments he had heretofore expressed to me, and referred to the measures he had taken with a view to bring the differences between the two countries to a conclusion." * * * The King proceeded to say that, since reading the President's message, he had "remonstrated" against all unnecessary delays in the prosecution of the business, and assuring me that everything should be done on his part to bring it to the earliest termination, notwithstanding the disastrous state of their finances. The commission appointed to examine our claims made their report. The majority of four rejecting our claims growing out of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as well as the Rambouillet and other special decrees, estimated the sum to which they supposed the United States to be fairly entitled, according to Mr. Rives, at between ten and fifteen millions of francs, and the minority of two, admitting the claims, rejected by their colleagues, at thirty millions. In an interview between the French minister of foreign affairs and Mr. Rives, described in his despatch of the 28th of April, 1831, the minister "spoke of the intrinsic difficulty of all money questions in a representative government, increased in the present instance by the alinost unanimous report of the commission." In another interview with the president of the council of ministers, described in the same despatch of Mr. Rives, Mr. Perrier said: He felt all the importance of cultivating good relations with the United States; and that he was sincerely desirous of adjusting this ancient controversy, but that their finances, as I saw, were exceedingly deranged; and that there would be great difficulty in reconciling the Chamber of Deputies to an additional charge, on the enfeebled resources of the state, for claims, too, which had not arisen from any wrong done by the present Government of France. In the same despatch, Mr. Rives reports: The King expressed, as he has always done, very cordial sentiments for the United States: said he had frequently called the attention of his ministers to the necessity of settling our reclamations; that they had always objected the embarrassed state of the finances, but he hoped they would yet find the means of doing justice. In a despatch of Mr. Rives of the 7th May, 1831, communicating the offer of 20,000,000 francs, in full satisfaction of our claims, and his declining to accept it, he states the French minister to have replied: That the offer he had just made was one of extreme liberality; that it would subject the ministers to a severe responsibility before the Chambers; that he had been already warned from various quarters that he would be held to a strict account for his settlement of this affair. In the same despatch, Mr. Rives details a conversation which he had had with the president of the council respecting the amount of our claims, in which he said: That it was particularly hard that the burden of their adjustment should now fall upon the existing Government, in the present crippled state of its resources, and when all of its expenses were upon a war footing; and that it was certainly not the interest of either country to make an arrangement which the legislative authority here might refuse to carry into execution. In another despatch of Mr. Rives, of the 29th May, 1831, he relates a conversation in an interview with the president of the council. That minister, Mr. Rives states, then said: That but for the Chambers, there would be less difficulty in arranging this question; but that he apprehended a very serious opposition to it on their part, which might even more seriously embroil the relations of the two countries, by refusing to carry into execution any arrangement which should be made. He added: That two months, sooner or later, could not be of much importance in the settlement of this question, and asked me if there would be any objection to adjourning its decision till the meeting of the Chambers, when the ministers could have an opportunity of consulting sorne of the leading men of the two Houses. This postponement was objected to by Mr. Rives, and was not insisted upon. During the progress of the negotiation, the principle of indemnity was early conceded. The French minister first offered fifteen millions of francs. Mr. Rives demanded forty. The French minister advanced to twenty, to twenty-four; and finally, with extreme reluctance, to twenty-five. At the point of twenty-four, Mr. Rives came down to thirty-two, as the medium between the two proposals. At that of twenty-five, the French ministers announced it as their ultimatum; and in a despatch of Mr. Rives, 14th June, 1831, he reports the French minister to have said: That it was the opinion of the most enlightened and influential members of both Chambers, that the offer of twenty-four millions, heretofore made, was greatly too mach: that -, and other leading members of the one Chamber or the other, whom he mentioned, had already expressed that opinion to him, and emphatically warned him of the serious difficulties to which this affair would expose ministers. Thus, it appears, that, throughout this whole negotiation, the King manifested the most friendly feelings towards the United States; that he took a decided interest and exerted an unusual agency in the conduct of the negotiation; that the principle of indemnity having been acknowledged, the difficulty lay in the adjustment of its amount; but that by far the greatest difficulty arose from the apprehension that the Chambers, in consequence of the repugnance of the nation to the payment of any more indemnities, would not make the necessary appropriations to carry the treaty into effect; that Mr. Rives was reminded again and again, by more than one French minister, of this anticipated obstacle; that he was told by the president of the council that he apprehended the opposition from the Chambers might be such as seriously to embroil the relations between the two countries, by refusing to carry into execution any arrangement which should be made; and that a proposition to adjourn the negotiation for two months, |