power to grant writs of ne exeat and of injunction; but the former writ cannot be granted unless a suit in equity be commenced, and satisfactory proof be made that the party designs quickly to leave the United States; and no injunction can be granted to stay proceedings in a state court, nor in any case, without reasonable notice to the adverse party. (a) All the courts of the United States have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles *301 and usages of law. (b) *So the judges of the Supreme

(a) Act of congress, March 2d, 1793, c. 57, sec. 5.

(b) Act of September 24th, 1789, sec. 14. United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dallas, 17. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheaton, 38. Ex parte Watkins, 7 Peters's U. S. Rep. 568. The principles and usages of law here mean those general principles and usages which are to be found, not in the legislative acts of any particular state, but in that generally recognized and long established law, which forms the substratum of the laws of every state. Marshall, C. J., in United States v. Burr. The judiciary act of 1789, sec. 17, gave to the courts of the United States power to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the courts, all contempts of authority, in any cause or hearing, before the same. But the act of congress of March 2, 1831, c. 99, limited and defined this power, by declaring that the power to issue attachments, and inflict summary punishments, for contempt of court, shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; and the misbehavior of any of the officers of the said courts in their official transactions; and the disobedience or resistance, by any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness or any other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts. The provisions of this act of congress have been adopted in Tennessee by statute, in 1831, and in Ohio by statute, in 1834, with even some impediments thrown in the way of the prompt execution of the power; for the statute in the latter state declares that the charge is to be stated in writing, and the accused shall be heard in his defence by himself or counsel. The power of the English courts is more extensive. Thus, where several persons were to be tried successively for the same treasonable act, the Court of Oyer and Terminer prohibited publication of any of the proceedings, until the whole of the trials had been brought to a conclusion; and it was held that a publication, disregarding this order, was a contempt punishable by fine and imprisonment, and that a party disregarding a summons to appear and answer for the contempt, might be fined in his absence. The King v. Clement, 4 Barnw. & Ald. 218. 11 Price's Rep. 68, S. C. The fair and impartial administration of justice in such cases would seem to require the existence and exercise of such a power. The act of congress, however, reaches and prohibits all interference by attachment and summary punishment for contempts committed out of the presence of the court, by libels upon the court and the parties, and pending causes; and it is a very considerable, if not injudicious abridgment of the immemorially exercised dis

Court, as well as the judges of the district courts, may, by habeas corpus, relieve the citizens from all manner of unjust

cretion of the courts in respect to contempts. But in the "System of Penal Law, prepared for the state of Louisiana," in 1824, by Edward Livingston, Esq., the courts were stripped of almost all power to preserve themselves from insult. The code provided for contempts in the presence of the court, by word, clamor, noise, or disobedience to legal orders, or violence, or threats. It provided, also, for contempts, by using verbally, in court, or in any pleading or writing, addressed to the judges, in any cause pending, any indecorous, contemptuous, or insulting expression, to or of the judges, with intent to insult. But how did it provide? Contempts were to be tried on indictment, (which may be at another session,) and the jury are to pass upon the intent, and whether the words were indecorous, contemptuous, or insulting. There is no provision at all for insulting gestures or looks. Code, tit. 5, c. 11. The New York Revised Statutes, vol. ii. (4th ed.) p. 467, have dealt with the subject of contempts more temperately and judiciously, and with a wiser regard for the honour and dignity of the courts, so essential to the orderly, pure, independent, and impartial administration of justice. They provide that every court of record may punish summarily, disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed in the immediate presence of the court, and tending to interrupt its proceedings and impair the respect due to its authority; and for breaches of the peace, noises, and disturbances, tending directly to interrupt its proceedings; and for wilful disobedience or resistance to lawful orders; and for the publication of false or grossly inaccurate reports of its proceedings. The commissioners appointed to revise the civil code of Pennsylvania, by their report, in January, 1835, followed the substance of the Pennsylvania act of 1809, on the subject of contempts, and confined the power of imprisonment to contempts committed in open court. No publication out of court, respecting the conduct of the court, or any of its officers, jurors, witnesses, or parties in any cause pending in court, exposes the party to summary punishment, and the only remedy for the persons aggrieved is by indictment or action at law. The act of Pennsylvania of 16th June, 1836, enacted the same provision. In the case Ex parte Poulson, which arose upon a motion in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in 1835, in the cause of Drew v. Swift, for a rule on Poulson, the editor of a daily paper, to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him for a contempt, in publishing a very libellous article upon the plaintiff pending the trial, Judge Baldwin felt himself bound to deny the motion, in consequence of the act of congress of 1831. That act had withdrawn from the courts of the United States the common-law power to protect their suitors, officers, witnesses, and themselves, against the libels of the press, however atrocious, and though published and circulated pending the very trial of a cause. The case before him was one which showed, in a very strong light, the unreasonableness of the law, in leaving the suitor unprotected, at the moment when he stands most in need of it, and when the mischief to him might be great and remediless. The want of such protection, and the undue distrust which the denial of the commonlaw power over contempts implies, tend to impair, in the estimation of the public, the value of the administration of justice.

The power of the courts to punish summarily for contempts, has been lately much restrained in England; for in the case of The King v. Faulkner, (2 Montagu & Ayrton's Cases in Bankruptcy, 311,) it was held, in the Court of Exchequer, that a single commissioner of the Court of Bankruptcy, sitting alone, had no power to punish any contempt, however gross or personal.

imprisonment occurring under or by color of the authority of the United States, or for acts done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of a judicial authority of any court or judge thereof. The justices of the Supreme Court, and the judges of district courts, may grant writs of habeas corpus, when subjects of any foreign government, and domiciled therein, are in custody, under the authority or process of the United States, or of any state, for acts done under the order or sanction of any foreign state, the validity of which depends upon the law of nations, or under color thereof; and may hear the case, and discharge the prisoner, if entitled thereto by reason of such alleged authority set up, and the law of nations applicable thereto; and all proceedings had in the mean time, under any state authority, are declared void. (a) 1

Circuit (2.) The limits and jurisdiction of the circuit courts courts. of the United States have been subject to frequent changes, and their number has been steadily increasing with the increase of states and districts, ever since the first organization of the national courts under the acts of congress of the 24th of September, 1789. They are established in each district (with a few exceptions) of the nine great circuits into which the United States are now (b) divided. The first circuit is com

(a) Act of congress of September 24th, 1789, sec. 14, and March 2d, 1833, c. 57, sec. 7, and August 29th, 1842, c. 257. This last statute was passed in consequence of the case of McLeod, who was indicted for murder, in crossing the river Niagara, in the night, with an armed force, and seizing and destroying the steamboat Caroline, attached to the American shore, and in which affray an American citizen was killed. He pleaded authority from the Canadian powers, which authority was admitted, or assumed, by the British government; but the plea was overruled by the judicial authorities of New York, and McLeod brought to trial. See 1 Hill, 377, and 25 Wendell, 483.2

(b) 1840.

1 As to the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States to issue a habeas corpus as an appellate tribunal, see ante, p. 299, note. State courts have jurisdiction, concurrent with the federal courts, of a writ of habeas corpus for the body of a minor enlisted in the army. Commonwealth v. Fox, 7 Barr's R. 336. This power is denied In the Matter of Vertemaitre, Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of N. Y. Law Rep. Apr. 1851, p. 608, New York Leg. Obsr. May, 1851, p. 129.

2 In Buron v. Denman, 2 Wels. H. & Gor. R. 167, it was held, that the ratification of an individual's act by the government rendered it an act of state, for which the crown alone was responsible.

posed of the districts of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island; the second circuit, of the districts of Connecticut, Vermont, and the northern and southern districts of New York; the third circuit, of the district of New Jersey, and the eastern and western districts of Pennsylvania; the fourth circuit, of the districts of Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia; the fifth circuit, of the districts of Alabama and Louisiana; the sixth circuit, of the districts of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; the seventh circuit, of the districts of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan; the eighth circuit, of the districts of Kentucky, east, middle, and west Tennessee, and the district of Missouri; and the ninth circuit, of the districts of Mississippi and Arkansas. In each district of these circuits, with the exception of some of the districts in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, two circuit courts are annually held by one of the judges of the Supreme Court and the district judge of the district; but the Supreme Court may, in cases where special circumstances shall in their judgment render the same necessary, assign two of the judges of the Supreme Court to attend a Circuit Court; and when the district judge shall be absent, or shall have been counsel, or be interested in the cause, the Circuit Court may consist only of a judge of the Supreme Court. (a)1

* These circuit courts, thus organized, are vested with *302 original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, and the United States are plaintiffs, or an alien is a party, and the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state.(b)

(a) Acts of congress of April 29th, 1802, c. 31; of March 3d, 1837, c. 34; of February 22d, 1838, c. 12; and of August 16th, 1842, c. 180.

(b) The damages laid in the declaration, if they exceed $500, give the jurisdiction as to the matter in dispute. Muns v. Dupont, 2 Wash. Cir. Rep. 463. It is the amount of damages claimed in the declaration that determines the jurisdiction in the

1 If both the judges be disqualified by interest or otherwise, the cause will be certified to the nearest court in the circuit competent in point of law to try it. Richardson v. Boston, 1 Curtis, C. C. 250.

They have likewise exclusive cognizance, except in certain cases which will be hereafter mentioned, of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, exceeding the degree of ordinary misdemeanors, and of them they have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts. (a) But no person can be arrested in one district for trial in another, and no civil suit can be brought against an inhabitant of the United States out of his district; (b)1 and the act of congress provides against the assumption of federal jurisdiction to be created by the assignment of promissory notes, or other choses in action, except foreign bills of exchange. This restriction

federal courts. Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters's R. 97. The limitation to $500 and upwards, was abolished by the act of March 3d, 1815, in cases where the United States are plaintiffs. The suits between citizens, in civil causes, where the demand is to any small amount, belong to the local state courts, and are generally cognizable before single magistrates, and with juries reduced in number, or without juries, as the case may be. A late English statute (8 and 9 Vict. c. 127) instituted a court of that kind, of an efficient organization and summary jurisdictions. It consists of a single judge, who is to be a barrister, a pleader, or an attorney of ten years' standing; and it has jurisdiction to try summarily all suits for debts under £20. The judge has power to commit, in all cases of fraud or misconduct, to prison for forty days, and is the judge of all matters of law and fact, and there is to be no appeal from his decisions; but certiorari will lie to remove all suits above £10.

(a) See infra, pp. 360–363.

(b) Process of foreign attachment cannot be issued by the circuit courts of the United States, where the defendant is domiciled abroad, or not found within the district. The circuit courts cannot issue process beyond the limits of their district,

1 The circuit courts have jurisdiction of torts, wherever committed, in cases where they have jurisdiction of the persons of the parties. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.U. S. 115. The state courts have jurisdiction in actions of trover, against a postmaster, for non-delivery of a letter. Teal v. Felton, 12 How. U. S. 284.

2 A debt secured by a bond and mortgage is a "chose in action" within the meaning of the statute. Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. U. S. 441. In this case, the question was raised whether the act of congress, denying the courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases where suits are brought on choses in action, under the circumstances mentioned in the text, was within the consitutional powers of congress; and the court held that it was. See, also, Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. U. S. 198. Although the assignor make the assignment for the express purpose of giving the United States courts jurisdiction, they will have jurisdiction, unless the assignee was also privy to, or entertained such purpose. The rights of the remote assignee of a chose in action shall not be prejudiced by the disability of intermediate holders, if the party first entitled to the debt could have sued under the act, and the assignee now occupy the same position. Milledollar v. Bell, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 334. The assignee is not restrained from bringing suit to recover the thing in specie or damages for its detention. Deshler v. Dodge, 16 How. U. S. 622.