would be glad to consult Gen. Merritt about such appointments and to recommend men for them whom he knew to be fit for the places.)

6. That the Filipinos should retain control of the reservoir and pumping station of the water-works.

7. That the Filipino officers should be permitted to enter the city at all times wearing their side arms.

8. That the arms taken from the Filipinos on the night of August 13th should be returned 9. That the American troops should retire within the lines proposed by Aguinaldo, and should not pass beyond those lines with arms.

10. That all regulations should be in writing, and to be binding should be confirmed by the commanders-in-chief of the two forces.

Gen. Anderson, in reply, said he had just one condition to make, and that was that the insurgents should withdraw at once to the line he then drew, before there should be any further negotiation. The line ran from the Bocano de Vista to San Lazaro, Cemeterio de Sampaloc to block-house No. 5, block-house No. 6, the Depot des Aguas Patables, the Spanish works beyond San Juan del Monte; thence in a straight line to San Pedro Macati; thence in a straight line to blockhouse No. 14, on

the Pinda Road; thence in a straight line to the beach at Maytubig, south of

the Polvorin at Malate. Gen. Anderson yielded to the commissioners in their

NEBRASKA REGIMENT MARCHING INTO MANILA, AUGUST 13, 1898.

request to have the matter submitted to Gen. Merritt, and all appeared before Gen. Merritt. Now, while Gen. Anderson had been told to take sole charge of the matter, Merritt listened to the commissioners and asked for time in which to consider their proposal, promising an answer later.

Leaving Anderson at headquarters, and in waiting, Merritt went out to consult Admiral Dewey. On his return, he ordered Anderson back to Cavite in charge of his command. After much deliberation, Gen. Merritt consented to the following: That, as the insurgents had captured the water-works, they should retain them; that the insurgent officers should enter the city with side arms, but suggested that they should do so without revolvers; that the arms captured from the Filipinos should be returned to them when they left the city. The answer was delayed in getting to Aguinaldo. The insurgents in the meantime were strengthening their positions. Aguinaldo, on receipt of Merritt's communication, sent three propositions in lieu of those previously sent. They asked, first, that the first line designated by his commissioners be the line of separation between the forces; second, that the insurgent vessels be protected by our navy in American waters, or waters

under our control; third, that in case the Americans should return the city to Spain in consequence of the impending treaty, the insurgents should be placed in possession of all they now hold.

THE PRESIDENT GIVES INSTRUCTIONS.

Gen. Merritt left for Paris on August 30th, leaving this letter unanswered. Gen. Merritt had been in the Philippines, or, to speak definitely, on the Newport, in the bay most of the time, a little over a month, and during this time he had announced the policy of the government, and in a large part formulated its measures. Whether wise or unwise, however, the responsibility must rest with his superiors. On August 13th, the day of the surrender, the following despatch was sent to the Adjutant-General at Washington: "Since occupation of town and suburbs the insurgents on the outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of city. Situation difficult. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience in this matter and others that may arise. Is government willing to use all means to make natives submit to the authority of the United States?

MERRITT. DEWEY."

The answer was the following: "MAJOR-GENERAL MERRITT, Manila, Philippines: The President directs that there must be no joint occupation of the insurgents. The United States, in possession of Manila City, Manila Bay and Harbor, must preserve the peace, and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever means, in your judgment, is necessary to this All law-abiding people must be treated alike.

end.

By order of Secretary of War.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General."

GEN. MERRITT REPORTS ON AGUINALDO.

The official report of Major-General Merritt, dated August 31, 1898, has the following bearing upon the relation of the two commands:

As Gen. Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasai Road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations by prearranged plans of mutual attack to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.

After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military governor, I had direct written communications with Gen. Aguinaldo on several occasions. He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact; but, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement.

OTIS SUCCEEDS MERRITT IN COMMAND.

Gen. Elwell E. Otis arrived in Manila on August 20th, and when Gen. Merritt was ordered to Paris, he succeeded to the command. He had to take up the unfinished work of Gen. Merritt and he required some little time to familiarize himself with the situation. The insurgent occupation continually increased in

SIGNING DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AT MALOLOS.

aggressiveness-their entrenching and fortifying continually went on, and with it the show of resistance increased. Orders had been issued to the effect that no interference should be made with them, while they did not disturb our lines or positions. There was a prospect that the city water supply might be shut off. Americans desiring to pass the insurgent lines required a pass from the insurgent commander, and the demonstrations of the soldiers became insolent. A few companies of the Colorados were ordered to the water-works, but met with resistance so that they were about to use force when the situation was reported to headquarters and they were ordered back.

When Gen. Otis assumed command, the insurgents while infesting the whole city, had some especial strongholds, notably, Tondo, Paco, Sampaloc, Ermita, and Malate. Gen. Otis sent word to Aguinaldo that it would take some time for him to

familiarize himself sufficiently with the matter to answer his last letter to Gen. Merritt. The insurgents had now been infesting the city for a month; and Gen. Otis determined that the only solution compatible with the duties and obligations

of the command was to order the removal of the insurgents from their position, and to

such distance

that there would be no interference

with the occupation of the Americans in

the territory surrendered by the Spaniards. After submitting to the War Department his views of the situation he was instructed to proceed, and, if need be, use force to effect a removal. Gen. Otis now addressed a letter to Aguinaldo in which the exigencies of the case were set forth, and closed by giving Aguinaldo notice to remove his forces from the jurisdictional limits of Manila by September 15th on penalty of being forcibly removed by the Americans. Aguinaldo was at this time establishing his headquarters and seat of government at Malolos, with communication by railroad north and south, and a country of large resources tributary.

Aguinaldo demurred and again sought his favorite method of doing business by commission. An encounter seemed likely to occur, and the Americans strengthened their positions and prepared for the worst. In the conference which followed, the insurgent leaders still professed their cordial amity towards the American occupation, but wanted an agreement made that in case Manila was put back into Spanish control, they should have the same positions before Manila that they now held. They desired also to know whether the Spaniards would have returned to them the guns and supplies captured by the Americans, and be re-instated in the position they occupied before the attack of August 13th. Gen. Otis in reply said, "If the Americans quit control the Spaniards will be reinstated in their defensive positions and their arms restored to them." There was intense dissatisfaction on the part of a large element of the insurgent command with this disposition of the matter, and an open rupture was imminent. Gen. Pio del Pilar was the leader of this faction.

THE FILIPINOS EVACUATE.

After acceding to all requirements the Filipinos made a last request that in removing from their position they be allowed to march up the Luneta with their arms and pass the ground of the many bloody executions of their friends by the Spaniards. To this Gen. Ovenshine in command of the Ermita and Malate precincts consented. On the morning of the 14th, there were indications of a move,

and all our sentries were on the keen lookout for events. Early on this morning, that part of the insurgent forces which would make their departure by the Luneta, began to move. The columns passed from the Calle Real into the Calle San Luis, the rank and file in blue drilling led by the famous Pasig band of ninety pieces and the column headed by Col. Callis. Down the Paco Road they went to the Calle Bagumbayan where they soon stood beside the wall where so many of their comrades had endured Spanish execution. As they passed the Wyoming Regiment, cheer upon cheer was given by the Wyoming boys. It was an incident. long remembered by the insurgents. With the removal of the insurgents there was no further immediate opposition to American control.

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

The withdrawal of the Filipinos from the immediate vicinity of the city left the commanding general free to arrange the details of the civil administration. The most important orders upon this subject will be found at the end of this chapter. Military rule required first, order; next, justice. As has been said, the people of Manila were anxious for the maintenance of order, but there were many adverse conditions to be

met. During the interregnum the constabulary and all administrative functions had been suspended. It was a meeting of strangers in method, manner, and tongue, and the purposes of each were difficult of understanding by the cther. Some misunder

standings and mistakes, under these circumstances, were unavoidable. That none which were serious occurred may be attributed to the forbearance of all parties concerned. Our habits and customs were so unlike those of the inhabitants that often our intent was in doubt, and the requirements under our rule were, in many essentials, so unlike those which preceded us that they were often considered severities. Our design was the betterment of the social life of the citizen and the security of his personal and property rights; but the two civilizations were so unlike that those intended to be benefitted were often disposed to rebel. Spanish custom approved much that is not only distasteful, but iniquitous, under our laws and civilization, and the interference with native habits naturally brought enmity and discontent. This was especially the case as to gambling, which was a national habit.

THE FILIPINOS OBJECT TO CLEANLINESS.

The many restrictions put upon the citizens in social life and essential to the maintenance of military rule were irksome, and our sanitary measures brought our rule squarely in conflict with the daily life of the great mass of people.