At 10:20 A. M. the line was met by a heavy fire from the dense bamboo thickets in its front, where the enemy was strongly entrenched in a line of earthworks built across the road, and in the woods. One field gun opened immediately to the

Dakotas and Nebraskas charged the enemy's earthworks, and, as a longer resistance than usual was made, a large number were killed. In one barricade thirtyeight dead were counted, at another, twenty-eight, and at a third, fifteen, while many more were seen along the lanes and in the woods. The brigade halted at Pulilan, resuming the march at 3 P. M.

As the sun was sinking towards the horizon, and the weary skirmish line was plodding along past the ford of the Quingua where the crossing would have been made if the plan had been carried out, and thinking that the enemy would probably not make another stand before the final and crucial conflict at the stronghold of Calumpit, they were rudely awakened by the crackling of Mausers from a line of invisible trenches extending perpendicularly to the river along the entire front of the brigade for a distance of nearly a mile. The left battalion of the Nebraskas and the artillery took up some earthworks which had been vacated by the Filipinos, and which made a splendid defense at this time. Lieut. Webber's com pany was sent up the road on the left to turn the enemy's right flank. The right battalion of the Nebraskas, under Maj. Eager, in company with the South Dakotas, under Col. Frost, charged across the intervening space. When they were half way across, the Filipinos retreated, leaving twenty-five dead. This ended the third fight of the day. Without counting those scattered through trees and jungles, over one hundred of the enemy were found killed and wounded in four groups alone during the day, and it is a conservative estimate to place their dead at two hundred. The Americans lost in the day's fight six killed and fourteen wounded, one of whom after

wards died. The command
camped on the battle-field during
the night. Under the cover of
the darkness supplies were
brought from Malolos and taken
across the river on the men's
backs. The dead, wounded and
sick were carried across and sent
back to Malolos in ambulances, and in the wagons and bull-carts which brought out
the supplies. The next morning, April 25th, after a practically sleepless night, mak-
ing forty-eight hours of almost continual fighting, marching and handling supplies,

PENNSYLVANIAS SKIRMISHING JUST AFTER DAYBREAK
IN THE MARCH ON MALOLOS.

the advance upon Calumpit was resumed. The order of battle was for the main body to march in an extended line, leaving one battalion of each regiment in reserve. When within a mile of the Calumpit River, Gen. Hale, by means of the compass, established a new line, forty degrees west of north, and swung his brigade around, so that it would be parallel with the river, before he made his final advance on the town. Maj. Mulford, of the Nebraskas, and the General made a reconnaissance, locating the Bagbag railroad bridge, the west span of which had

been broken down, and the enemy's entrenchments across the river. The 1st Brigade was working up the railroad, on the south side of the Quingua River in conjunction with the 2d Brigade on the north side. When sure that the 1st Brigade was up, the guns, which had been placed to command the bridge and trenches, opened fire. The enemy replied with much vigor. When the artillery had sufficiently shaken things up, the infantry advanced, firing, until they came to the east bank of the Calumpit River, where they engaged with the enemy only fifty yards away, defended by the strong entrenchments already mentioned, and with a deep and apparently impassable stream. The brigade staff and the artillery came forward, Lieut. Fuller, Aide-de-camp, going back to hurry up the last piece. Lieut. Fleming, with great coolness, placed his guns on the bank and poured death into those wonderfully constructed trenches. Not in the whole Filipino war have our troops occupied more dangerous ground, and it is only owing to the fact that the insurgents were obliged to fire without aiming, that our men escaped a heavy slaughter. The conduct of the men was gallant, and so heavy and accurate was their fire that the frame of the covered and loopholed earthworks was afterwards seen to be cut in shreds by bullets passing through the loopholes themselves. The insurgents were afraid to raise their heads above the ramparts, but their hands and guns could be seen rising over the edge, firing and dropping back to load. Consequently, their sheet of bullets flew over the prostrate forms of the Americans, lying on the opposite bank, and delivering a cool and aimed fire that played like a garden hose along the top of the enemy's parapets. After half an hour, when the enemy's fire was practically silenced on our left, it seemed feasible to Hale to get a line of troops across, near the junction of the Calumpit and Quingua Rivers, and put an end to the agony. He therefore told Maj. Mulford to take Company K of the Nebraskas, which was on the left, and make the attempt. Mulford and Lieut. Webber waded in with their men, but were soon beyond their depth. A second attempt farther out on the Quingua showed the water to be only shoulder deep, and at this point the line was sent across.

Gen. Hale and his staff intrepidly plunged through with the first fording party, at the same time hurrying about fifty more men across, and formed them in line to sweep through Calumpit and take the river trenches in flank. The Nebraska men at once marched through the town, and the Iowas and South Dakotas were told not to fire across the river while this move was going on. Several times Aguinaldo's men rallied, but at each stand they were routed and left their slain in the blood-stained trenches. Forty dead, and fourteen wounded, were found as the result of this movement through the town. The number killed and wounded in the earlier part of the fight can not be estimated, as they were removed before our troops crossed the river.

When the Americans approached Calumpit church, which the insurgents had fired before retreating, a reconnoitering party went forward and discovered that the insurrectos had left the district south of the Rio Grande, and were in strong force on the north bank. Soon afterward the Filipinos opened fire with artillery as well as infantry. It was one of the few instances in which they used artillery. A shrapnel burst over the heads of our men. Receiving no reply, the insurgents soon tired of their artillery and rifle practice, and stopped firing. The Nebraskas bivouacked on the Calumpit and Bagbag Rivers, with their left on the railroad track. The Adjutant-General of the brigade, Capt. Brooks, was sent up the railroad with a detail of ten men, to ascertain the condition of the track and the Rio Grande Bridge. He found that the road-bed had been stripped of ties and converted into a breastwork for resisting the American advance, either along or across the road, but that the trusses of the railroad bridge were apparently uninjured. As he approached within 400 yards of the Rio Grande Bridge, he had been fired on by infantry and artillery. The total number of our losses during these engagements at Calumpit, were three killed and thirty-three wounded, of which one, later, died. During the rest of April, the command remained at Calumpit, guarding the bridges over the Bagbag and Rio Grande Rivers. On May 2d, Gen. Hale took the South Dakota and Iowa Regiments with a

platoon of cavalry and three guns to a point on the Pulilan-Quingua Road, east of Pulilan, holding them there as a re-inforcement for Gen. Lawton's Division in the movement, then proceeding against Baliuag, in case assistance should be required. Baliuag, however, was captured with little resistance, and the next morning the command was ordered back to Calumpit, and in the afternoon moved north of the Rio Gronde in preparation for the advance on San Fernando the following day. The total distance marched in the two days was twenty-one miles.

OPERATIONS OF WHEATON'S BRIGADE TO CALUMPIT.*

Pursuant to orders of Major-General MacArthur, Gen. Wheaton moved his brigade, now consisting of a battalion of 3d U. S. Cav., one of Montana Volunteer Inf. and one 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf., out of Malolos, on the morning of April 24th, with instructions to attack the enemy on the north bank of the Bagbag River, but the brigade of Gen. Hale, with which it was desired he should co-operate, not having advanced from the direction of Quinga on Calumpit sufficiently to attack at that point that day, Gen. Wheaton was directed by Major-General MacArthur to hold his brigade in the vicinity of the railroad at Barasoain until Hale had fought his way to the vicinity of a ford across the Quinga, not far from the Calumpit River. About 8:30 A. M., on the morning of April 25th, by direction of the Division Commander, Gen. Wheaton marched his brigade on the enemy's position, moving the 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf. on the left of the railroad and the 1st Montana Volunteer Inf. on the right. The battalion of the 3d U. S. Art., Maj. Kobbe, was left at Malolos and Barasoain to guard the line of road. The armored train was directed to follow up the track, after the brigade was well on

the march.

His movements being well screened from the enemy by extensive lines of bamboo jungle, the General moved both regiments of infantry into a wellprotected position, about 1200 yards from the enemy's entrenchments along the Bagbag. The armored train, having reached at this time a point on the road near the infantry, it was ordered that fire be opened from the rifled six-pounder and the three machine guns on the train, and at this minute Hale's Artillery, in front and on the right, across the Quinga, opened fire, and the guns of the Utah Battery on the right commenced firing. Soon after the armored train was moved to the front and several companies of infantry, from both regiments, were advanced to seize all places near the river, from which an effective fire might be directed upon the enemy's entrenchments. The converging fire of the two brigades of the division and the artillery now began to shake the enemy.

Col. Funston, 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf., with Lieut. C. M. Warner, 1st Sergt. Raymond Enslow and Sergt. C. P. Barshfield, Company K 20th Kansas, endeavored to rush across the railroad bridge. A span of the bridge being * Written by an officer of the brigade.

broken, Col. Funston, Lieut. Ball and the two sergeants named, swam the river and drove the enemy out of the entrenchments near the bridge. At the same time Hale's Infantry on the right, forded the Calumpit to the front and right, turned the enemy out of his entrenchments along the Calumpit and pursued him to the vicinity of the Rio Grande, near the town of Calumpit, which the enemy burned. The two regiments of Gen. Wheaton's Brigade bivouacked near the Bagbag. April 26th, the enemy was in force on the north bank of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, a broad and deep river. He was protected by a most elaborate system of field fortifications and had near the railroad bridge three pieces of artillery, and one rapid fire Maxim. The important stragetic position of Calumpit would be untenable until he was driven off. Gen. Wheaton was directed to do this, his force to be the 20th Kansas, and 1st Montana Volunteer Inf., five guns Utah Light Artillery, and three machine guns. It was effected in thirty-six hours as follows: The infantry was advanced in deployed lines in the extended order from the Bagbag, to an entrenched position about 600 yards from the Rio Grande, which position had been abandoned by the enemy, placing the 20th Kansas on the left of the railroad, and the 1st Montana on the right. The main body now being well screened from the enemy's fire, detachments and several parties of skirmishers were advanced, and seized all sheltered places near the river, and within long rifle range of the railroad bridge. Two brick and stone buildings near the river were seized and loopholed for musketry. The machine guns and a part of the artillery were placed in position for fire upon the enemy's entrenchments. The river was reconnoitered below the railroad bridge for the purpose of ascertaining any place feasible to cross. A constant and continued fire of sharpshooters was kept up, and a slow, but continued fire from the 3.2-inch guns, during the 26th. On the night of the 26th, the railroad bridge was found to be in such condition that to rush it with men carrying arms would be impracticable. A reconnaissance at night by Col. Funston, made it apparent that the enemy was entrenched in force at all points for a considerable distance down the river. The morning of the 27th of April, a 3.2-inch gun was brought up to the brick house near the bridge and opened fire at short range upon the enemy's works.

Upon consultation with Col. Funston a point about 900 yards below the railroad bridge was selected as the place that he would endeavor to cross part of his regiment. The enemy's entrenchments opposite this point were well screened by bamboo thickets, but a welldirected fire from the brick house near the bridge from the 3.2-inch gun and by the companies of infantry was kept up. Col. Funston also advanced to the river bank strong parties that kept up a fire of great volume. The effect of the heavy and continued fire was to drive a part of the enemy's force from his works and Privates Edward White and W. B. Trembly of Company B,