go into camp at that place, which the 3d and 22d Inf. and the 1st North Dakotas, accompanied by Hawthorne's Mountain Battery, occupied the same day.

The mounted troop was sent on a reconnoissance along the west bank of the river and about two miles west of Angat, at Marunco, encountered the enemy in force reported to be about 500-200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, 3d Art., Acting Judge-Advocate. At the same time the cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons, under Maj. Eastwick, forded the river, just above Norzagaray, and successfully dispersed the insurgent forces from the thickets, along the river bank from east to west. Maj. Eastwick reported an insurgent loss of five killed and several wounded. The following report will explain Gen. Lawton's view of the situation at this time.

GEN. LAWTON REPORTS PROGRESS.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

In the Field, Norzagarary, Luzon, April 26, 1899.

To the Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, Manila, P. I. SIR-Your messages of 9:30 and 9:35, 25th inst., reached me this A. M. The command with transportation has not yet reached this point. I hope to get it all up this evening. The mounted troops were sent this A. M., on a reconnoissance west along the bank of the river to look at roads and fords. Two miles west of Angat, the enemy was encountered in force, reported to be about 500-200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer who accompanied the cavalry. At the same time cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons forded the river opposite this place and drove the enemy from the country opposite; they were plainly seen from this point scattering, some fifty moved up the river in southeast direction, others moved toward the main body. Our troops occupied high ground and moved down river opposite Angat. As soon as my command arrives will cross Col. Summers' command and move by both flanks down river and endeavor to throw flanks around the enemy and destroy some of them. Concerning your message of 9:30, there seems to be no direct road from this place to Quingua. The only route for wagons is via Baliuag to Bocaue. I will be prepared to follow instructions contained in message of 9:35 as soon as my column has arrived with transportation, and I have drawn the enemy from this vicinity. I desire, however, to submit the following suggestions:

From the best information I can obtain, I learn that there were at this place and at Angat about 1000 men. They were reported to have plenty of ammunition and expended it freely at long range, mostly Remington, but very little food. Gen. "Punta" Pantelon Garcia, commanding a few local troops, but mostly troops driven from Malabon about March 25th or 26th. The action of the enemy indicates that they are disintegrating, as small detachments have been wandering in different directions over the country and there seems to be little organization. They have been well cut off from the east and south and the mountains in the up-river country, and the main force have been pushed north and west. I feel sure we are on their extreme left and can double them up. Our problem is transportation. Buffalo carts are out of the question for even ordinary marching except over smooth, hard roads, for rapid moving over rolling country they are impracticable. The conditions of marching are such that the soldier is taxed to his utmost capacity of endurance to carry his rifle, ammunition and blanket roll, without being yoked to a cart to haul the supplies as we have been obliged to do, and are doing at this moment. A number of our bulls have died, I cannot ascertain how many, but ten or more, and the men pull along the carts. These bulls have died from exhaustion and not from disease. The fourmule teams have done very well, with help over bad places and on the hills, but the two-horse and mule teams could not pull more than the empty wagons. I have therefore no spare transportation even after the reduction of weight after the consumption of rations; we have, however, traveled over a rough country with no road. I hope when I get my transportation in to replace dead bulls with others found in the country, to re-adjust and arrange it so that it can continue

over good roads and make short marches each day. The fifty pack mules will give us very little material assistance, as they will not carry one day's rations for the whole command, and I must still rely on the bull teams. I can, however, give the pack train to the squadron of cavalry, including the mounted troops, and it will carry ten days' rations for the whole squadron, and I can use them for flank or rapid movements as they will be strong enough to maintain themselves anywhere.

My suggestion then is to let me move west down the river by both banks to or near Baliuag, where I should be met by a supply train with ten days' rations. Then let me move north along the road through San Ildefonso to San Miguel, and let MacArthur move over the road to the west of the swamp along the river. I can keep my cavalry squadron on my right flank, and in communicating distance, and thus the whole country between the mountains on the east and the Rio Grande on the west will be covered. I believe the movement would disintegrate the insurgent army in that section, and I gather from information received that the roads suggested are very good. The signal officer has reported it impossible to maintain the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. He has sent out twice or oftener each day to repair it, but it is as often cut, and the last time a long section was removed, and he did not have wire enough along to repair it. I suggest that it be taken up from Manila and toward Novaliches, and I will send out and take up from this end as far as possible, and then that a line be laid out to me with supply train, if it be sent.

I do not believe I will be much in advance of MacArthur, if my suggestion is approved; at any rate I feel that I have force enough for any emergency. A reply by return of this escort will reach me before I can be ready to move.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,

Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

LAWTON'S COMMUNICATIONS DISTURBED.

As there was no other means of communication Gen. Lawton was obliged to send this by courier. No one had been over the route from Norzagaray to Bocaue since Col. Summers' advance, and therefore the security of this route to small parties was problematical.

Maj. Charles G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V., was selected for this duty, which he unhesitatingly performed, accompanied only by his personal orderly.

With the exception of Troop I, 4th Cav., all the troops left Norzagaray for Angat on the morning of the 27th, Col. Summers' command continuing two miles further down the river to and occupying the town of Marunco. Much trouble was experienced with the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. Information was received from Corps Headquarters, that the line would be taken up from Manila to Novaliches, and the remainder would be abandoned unless the command could recover it from the north. This was afterwards done by Capt. F. A. Perkins, U. S. V., Signal Corps, escorted by Troop I, 4th Cav.

From an insurgent officer captured by Maj. Eastwick's Battalion, of the 2d Oregons, on the 26th, it was learned that the San Jose and Novaliches insurgents did not obey orders from Aguinaldo, but acted separately; and that the insurgent forces were falling back to San Miguel where Aguinaldo was supposed to be. It was also learned from the same source, that if the soldiers of the insurgent army knew of the treatment they would receive from the Americans, many would desert and come into our lines, and that the officers, particularly, feared maltreatment by Americans.

At 9 A. M., the commanding officers of regiments, battalions and separate organizations were called together at headquarters, and were advised regarding treatment of the property and persons of non-combatants, the purpose of the expedition, and what was contemplated for the future. Two companies of the 22d Inf. were sent back to Norzagaray to re-inforce Troop I, 4th Cav., the insurgents having attempted to re-occupy the town.

Information was received from headquarters, that the fifty pack mules loaded with ammunition, and the additional four-mule teams, hauling rations, would leave Bocaue the morning of the 29th, and request was made that they be sent via Angat to join the command. Instructions were received on the 29th, after the first battle of San Rafael, to remain at Angat until supplies arrived.

GALLANT BEHAVIOR OF WILLIAM H. YOUNG.

At daybreak, on the 29th, the 1st North Dakotas, 3d U. S. Inf. and Scott's platoon, moved down the south bank of the river toward San Rafael. At the same time Col. Summers' command, to which was added Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery, moved down the north bank of the river in the same direction. About noon Col. Treumann's command developed a force of the enemy, afterwards estimated at 400, which they drove on down the river. Here an incident took

place which Gen. Lawton says he shall not soon forget, in that it made him acquainted with that splendid and gallant man and scout, William H. Young. He, in citizen's clothing, was noticed walking well in front of the right flankers of the advance point. Gen. Lawton ordered him in, intending to reprimand and send him to the rear. Something in the man's bearing and appearance made the General change his mind, and he directed him to go to the front and bring in a citizen that the General might get definite information about the location of San Rafael. He cheerfully complied, and in less than five minutes Gen. Lawton heard three shots and Young appeared as cool and collected as ever, bearing a rifle and haversack with eighty-six rounds of ammunition, dripping with blood. He had run into an insurgent outpost of eight men, and had alone killed one and driven the others off. His action prevented a surprise to our advance guard which was soon under a rapid and hot fire.

THE COMMAND OCCUPIES SAN RAFAEL.

Col. Summers' command occupied San Rafael without opposition. Our casualties: 2d Lieut. C. C. Todd, 3d Inf., slight gun-shot wound, right thigh, and two enlisted men, 3d Inf., and one enlisted man, 1st North Dakotas, wounded, the latter severely. One insurgent is known to have been killed. Scott's platoon of

artillery participated in the engagement with some effect. Telegraphic instructions were received from Corps Headquarters that peaceful conditions would obtain while representatives of insurgent government, who had come in through Gen. MacArthur's lines, remained.

April 30th, two companies of the 22d Inf. were sent with wagons from Angat to meet supply train coming from Bocaue and relieve its escort, a battalion of the 51st Iowa Volunteer Inf., and allow part of the wagons to return. Instructions were received from Corps Headquarters that upon moving, the objective would be Baliuag, where a strong

force (3000) of insurgents was reported to be. Information was received from the same source that the armistice requested by the enemy had not been granted. Much difficulty was experienced by the Quartermaster Department in bringing supplies from Bocaue. The mules were very soft, and the teamsters and packers, almost without exception, were inexperienced.

YOUNG'S SCOUTS ORGANIZED.

Mr. W. H. Young, previously mentioned, was employed as guide and scout, and placed in charge of twenty-five selected men who were detailed by name from the 4th Cav., 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., and the 1st North Dakotas.

SAN RAFAEL CAPTURED AGAIN.

The rations arriving at Angat in good season, May 1st, issue was made as speedily as possible, and the Oregons, Minnesotas, 3d Inf., Scott's platoon, under command of Col. Summers, moved down the right bank of the river toward San Rafael. Gale's squadron, 4th Cav., was ordered to be reported to Col. Summers for duty with his column. The remainder of the expeditionary forces, under command of Col. Treumann, moved down the left bank of the river as a co-operative force. Gen. Lawton accompanied Col. Summers' column, and Maj. Charles G. Starr of the staff, the force on the south bank.

The enemy was developed on the north bank by the scouts about one and onehalf miles above San Rafael. Private Harrington, scout, accompanied by one other, was well in advance of the left of our skirmish line. They steadily advanced, taking advantage of every shelter, entered the village, constantly firing, and steadily pushed back and drove a large force from the village and rang the bell in the belfry before our troops entered. The enemy were driven through the town under the fire of the Oregons and Minnesotas, and made a stand across the river from the town. Scott's Battery was brought into action, and the force on the south bank of the river co-operating, the enemy dispersed. The strength of the enemy estimated at about 1000. Our casualties, one enlisted man, 13th Minnesota, killed; one man, Battery D, 6th Art., and three men, 2d Oregon, wounded.

The town of San Rafael thus occupied by our forces was found deserted by the inhabitants. But little rice was found in the grainaries of the town. The troops on the north bank of the river remained in the town during the night, those on the south bank bivouacked opposite the town. Telegraphic communication was now via Bocaue, from which point a line had been constructed with the advance of the supply train. Information was received that a line was now in progress of construction via Quingua, to meet the expedition at some favorable time and place in the future.

THE COLUMN REACHES BALIUAG.

At daybreak, the 2d of May, the commands on both sides of the river left their bivouacs of the night and continued the advance down the river toward Baliuag on the north bank, and Bustos on the opposite bank. About one mile

from the latter town, Col. Treumann's command encountered the enemy, and forced them back and through the town which our forces occupied at 11:30 A. M. A half hour later, Col. Treumann's scouts crossed the river to Baliuag and rang the cathedral bells to announce their arrival. Col. Summers' column developed a force of the enemy about two miles out from San Rafael and easily forced them back for about two miles, when we came in view of the troops and citizens fleeing in great confusion along the road to the north (toward San Miguel). Owing to the great number of women and children and what appeared to be wounded, being carried on litters, our fire ceased, and a flag of truce was sent out, hoping we might assure them of their safety. Capt. J. F. Case, 2d Oregons, Acting Engineer Officer of the expedition, with Private Schnutenhaus, 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., as orderly, conducted the flag toward these people until at a point within about 500 yards of them, fire was opened on the flag detachment, and it returned to our lines without casualty. Col. Summers' troops were then deployed in the hope of surrounding the fugitives by advancing our right flank, but they scattered in dire confusion. Capt. Gale, in charge of his three dismounted troops and the mounted Troop I, 4th Cav., was sent up the San Miguel Road in the hope that a hurried march would allow him to get far enough north to turn to the left and cut off the fleeing force that was making for the marsh. When about three miles out, this command run into what was believed to be the rear guard of the enemy, belonging to, or bound for San Miguel. A sharp engagement followed, in which the enemy were driven rapidly north. It was midday